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Philosophy of Education

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Preface

Philosophy of education delves into fundamental questions about the nature, purpose, and methods of education, serving as a guiding framework for educational theory and practice. One core aspect explored within this field is the nature of knowledge itself. Philosophers debate whether knowledge is objective and universal or subjective and culturally constructed, which influences theories of curriculum, pedagogy, and assessment. Understanding the epistemological foundations of education helps educators develop approaches that foster critical thinking, creativity, and a deeper understanding of the world.

Moreover, philosophy of education addresses the aims and goals of education, asking questions about the ultimate purpose of schooling and the desired outcomes for students. This includes considerations of individual growth, societal needs, and the cultivation of ethical behaviour. Philosophical perspectives inform discussions about the role of education in fostering personal development, citizenship, and lifelong learning, shaping educational policies and practices to align with broader societal goals and values.

Additionally, philosophy of education delves into ethical dimensions, examining issues such as social justice, equity, and the moral responsibilities of educators. It explores how education can promote democratic values, respect for diversity, and the empowerment of marginalized groups. Philosophical inquiries into ethics in education guide educators in creating inclusive and equitable learning environments where all students have opportunities to thrive and succeed.

Furthermore, philosophy of education engages with questions about the role of the teacher, the structure of the curriculum, and the assessment of learning

outcomes. Educators draw on philosophical insights to shape their teaching methods, curriculum design, and assessment practices, aiming to create meaningful learning experiences that foster intellectual growth and personal development. Philosophical reflections on teaching and learning inform pedagogical approaches that prioritize student engagement, critical inquiry, and holistic development.

Moreover, philosophy of education explores historical and cultural perspectives, examining how different societies and traditions have conceptualized education over time. By studying the philosophies of thinkers from diverse cultural backgrounds, educators gain insights into alternative educational models and approaches, fostering a broader understanding of the purposes and possibilities of education. This comparative approach enriches educational theory and practice, encouraging educators to critically evaluate their own assumptions and beliefs about education.

Philosophy of education provides a rich framework for understanding and evaluating educational theory and practice. By engaging with questions about knowledge, purpose, ethics, teaching, learning, and cultural diversity, educators can develop informed approaches to teaching and learning that promote intellectual growth, ethical behaviour, and societal well-being. Philosophy of education encourages educators to reflect critically on their values, beliefs, and assumptions, empowering them to create educational experiences that inspire curiosity, foster creativity, and cultivate lifelong learners.

The book on Philosophy of Education provides a comprehensive exploration of fundamental questions regarding the nature, purpose, and methods of education, guiding educators and policymakers in shaping educational theory and practice.

—Author

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Introduction

MEANING OF PHILOSOPHY

The word *philosophy* literally means *love of wisdom*; It is derived from two Greek words *i.e.*, 'phileo' (love) and 'Sophia' (wisdom). This tells us something about the nature of philosophy, but not much, because many disciplines seek wisdom. Since times immemorial there have been various pursuits for unfolding the mystery of the universe, birth and death, sorrow and joy. Various ages have produced different thoughts throwing light upon the mystic region. The ultimate truth is yet to be found out. This eternal quest for truth 'lends the origin of philosophy. A love of wisdom is the essence for any philosophy investigation.

On the standard way of telling the story, humanity's first systematic enquiries took place within a mythological or religious framework: wisdom ultimately was to be derived from sacred traditions and from individuals thought to possess privileged access to a supernatural realm, whose own access to wisdom, in turn, generally was not questioned. However, starting in the sixth century BCE, there appeared in ancient Greece a series of thinkers whose enquiries were comparatively secular.

Presumably, these thinkers conducted their enquiries through reason and observation, rather than through tradition or revelation. These thinkers were the first philosophers. Although this picture is admittedly simplistic, the basic distinction has stuck: philosophy in its most primeval form is considered nothing less than secular enquiry itself. The subject of philosophical enquiry is the reality itself. There are different schools of philosophy depending on the answers they seek to the question of reality.

It is the search for understanding of man, nature and the universe. There are different branches of philosophy-Epistemology, Metaphysics, *etc.* There are different fields of philosophy such as educational philosophy, social philosophy, political philosophy, economic philosophy, *etc.* There are also different philosophical approaches such as idealism, naturalism, pragmatism, materialism, and so on.

MEANING OF EDUCATION

Etymologically, the word education is derived from educare (Latin) “bring up”, which is related to educere “bring out”, “bring forth what is within”, “bring out potential” and ducere, “to lead”. Education in the largest sense is any act or experience that has a formative effect on the mind, character or physical ability of an individual.

In its technical sense, education is the process by which society deliberately transmits its accumulated knowledge, skills and values from one generation to another. Webster defines education as the process of educating or teaching (now that’s really useful, isn’t it?) Educate is further defined as “to develop the knowledge, skill, or character of...”

Thus, from these definitions, we might assume that the purpose of education is to develop the knowledge, skill, or character of students. In ancient Greece, Socrates argued that education was about drawing out what was already within the student. (As many of you know, the word education comes from the Latin e-ducere meaning “to lead out.”) At the same time, the Sophists, a group of itinerant teachers, promised to give students the necessary knowledge and skills to gain positions with the city-state.

Thus we see that there are different views and understandings of the meaning of the term education.

In the modern times it has acquired two different shades of meaning namely:

- An institutional instruction, given to students in school colleges formally; and
- A pedagogical science, studied by the student of education.

The words of Adam education is the dynamic side of philosophy. Philosophy takes into its orbit, all the dimensions of human life. Similarly education also reflects the multifaceted nature of human life. Therefore, education is closely related to various aspects of human life and environment. Hence, the term education has a wide connotation.

It is difficult to define education by single definition. Philosophers and thinkers from Socrates to Dewey in west and a host of Indian philosophers have attempted to define education. However education can be understood as the deliberate and systematic influence exerted by a mature through instruction, and discipline. It means the harmonious development of all the powers of the human being; physical social, intellectual, aesthetic and spiritual. The essential elements in the educative process are a creative mind, a well integrated self, socially useful purposes and experience related to the interests of the individual, needs and abilities of the individual as a of a social group. In the historical development of man, education

has been the right of a privileged few. It is only in recent centuries that education has come to be recognized as a human right. All have equal right to be educated as education has become sine qua non of civilization. Our discussion of the concept of education and the concept of philosophy form the basis of arriving at the definition of philosophy of education.

MODES OF PHILOSOPHY

Speculative Philosophy

Speculative philosophy is a way of thinking systematically about everything that exists. The human mind wishes to see things as a whole. It wishes to understand how all the different things that have been discovered together form some sort of meaningful totality. Speculative philosophy is a search for order and wholeness, applied not to particular items or experiences but to all knowledge and all experience.

Prescriptive Philosophy

Prescriptive philosophy seeks to establish standards for assessing values, judging conduct and appraising art. It examines what we mean by good and bad, right and wrong, beautiful and ugly. The prescriptive philosopher seeks to discover and to recommend principles for deciding what actions and qualities are most worth- while and why they should be so.

Analytic Philosophy

Analytic philosophy focuses on words and meanings. The analytic philosopher examines such notions as 'course', 'mind', 'academic freedom', 'equality of opportunity', *etc.*, in order to assess the different meanings they carry in different contexts. Analytic philosophy tends to be skeptical, continuous and disinclined to build systems of thought.

Philosophy of Education is the application of the knowledge of philosophy to the solution of educational problems, concepts and theories. It examines, for example, concepts as equality, teaching, autonomy, freedom, morality, *etc.*, and considers their relevance to educational practice. It examines the role of aims in education as well as schools of philosophy and how they view education. Educational philosophy seeks to comprehend education in its entirety, interpreting it by means of general concepts that will guide our choice of educational ends and policies.

Educational philosophy is speculative when it seeks to establish theories of the nature of man, society and the world. Its speculative aspect on the one hand, deals with the search for values, knowledge and realities while the prescriptive aspect on the other hand is the effort towards getting the desired goals and recommending same to solve the current problems of education. Educational philosophy is analytic when it clarifies both speculative and prescriptive statements.

PROBLEMS, ISSUES, AND TASKS

There are a number of basic philosophical problems and tasks that have occupied philosophers of education throughout the history of the subject.

THE AIMS OF EDUCATION

The most basic problem of philosophy of education is that concerning aims: what are the proper aims and guiding ideals of education? What are the proper criteria for evaluating educational efforts, institutions, practices, and products? Many aims have been proposed by philosophers and other educational theorists; they include the cultivation of curiosity and the disposition to inquire; the fostering of creativity; the production of knowledge and of knowledgeable students; the enhancement of understanding; the promotion of moral thinking, feeling, and action; the enlargement of the imagination; the fostering of growth, development, and self-realization; the fulfillment of potential; the cultivation of “liberally educated” persons; the overcoming of provincialism and close-mindedness; the development of sound judgment; the cultivation of docility and obedience to authority; the fostering of autonomy; the maximization of freedom, happiness, or self-esteem; the development of care, concern, and related attitudes and dispositions; the fostering of feelings of community, social solidarity, citizenship, and civic-mindedness; the production of good citizens; the “civilizing” of students; the protection of students from the deleterious effects of civilization; the development of piety, religious faith, and spiritual fulfillment; the fostering of ideological purity; the cultivation of political awareness and action; the integration or balancing of the needs and interests of the individual student and the larger society; and the fostering of skills and dispositions constitutive of rationality or critical thinking.

All such proposed aims require careful articulation and defense, and all have been subjected to sustained criticism. Both contemporary and historical philosophers of education have devoted themselves, at least in part, to defending a particular conception of the aims of education or to criticizing the conceptions of others. The great range of aims that have been proposed makes vivid the philosopher of education’s need to appeal to other areas of philosophy, to other disciplines (*e.g.*, psychology, anthropology, sociology, and the physical sciences), and to educational practice itself. Given that consideration of education’s proper aims is of fundamental importance for the intelligent guidance of educational activities, it is unfortunate that contemporary discussions of educational policy rarely address the matter.

CLARIFICATION OF EDUCATIONAL CONCEPTS

A perennial conception of the nature of philosophy is that it is chiefly concerned with the clarification of concepts, such as knowledge, truth, justice, beauty, mind, meaning, and existence. One of the tasks of the philosophy of education, accordingly, has been the elucidation of key educational concepts, including the concept of education itself, as well as related concepts such as

teaching, learning, schooling, child rearing, and indoctrination. Although this clarificatory task has sometimes been pursued overzealously—especially during the period of so-called ordinary language analysis in the 1960s and '70s, when much work in the field seemed to lose sight of the basic normative issues to which these concepts were relevant—it remains the case that work in the philosophy of education, as in other areas of philosophy, must rely at least in part on conceptual clarification. Such analysis seeks not necessarily, or only, to identify the particular meanings of charged or contested concepts but also to identify alternative meanings, render ambiguities explicit, reveal hidden metaphysical, normative, or cultural assumptions, illuminate the consequences of alternative interpretations, explore the semantic connections between related concepts, and elucidate the inferential relationships obtaining among the philosophical claims and theses in which they are embedded.

RIGHTS, POWER, AND AUTHORITY

There are several issues that fall under this heading. What justifies the state in compelling children to attend school—in what does its authority to mandate attendance lie? What is the nature and justification of the authority that teachers exercise over their students? Is the freedom of students rightly curtailed by the state? Is the public school system rightly entitled to the power it exercises in establishing curricula that parents might find objectionable—*e.g.*, science curricula that mandate the teaching of human evolution but not creationism or intelligent design and literature curricula that mandate the teaching of novels dealing with sexual themes? Should parents or their children have the right to opt out of material they think is inappropriate? Should schools encourage students to be reflective and critical generally—as urged by the American philosophers Israel Scheffler and Amy Gutmann, following Socrates and the tradition he established—or should they refrain from encouraging students to subject their own ways of life to critical scrutiny, as the American political scientist William Galston has recommended?

The issue of legitimate authority has been raised recently in the United States in connection with the practice of standardized testing, which some critics believe discriminates against the children of some racial, cultural, religious, or ethnic groups (because the test questions rely, implicitly or explicitly, on various culturally specific cues or assumptions that members of some groups may not understand or accept). In such controversial cases, what power should members of allegedly disadvantaged groups have to protect their children from discrimination or injustice? The answer to this question, as to the others raised above, may depend in part on the status of the particular school as public (state-supported) or private. But it can also be asked whether private schools should enjoy more authority with respect to curricular matters than public schools do, particularly in cases where they receive state subsidies of one form or another.

These questions are primarily matters of ethics and political philosophy, but they also require attention to metaphysics (*e.g.*, how are “groups” to be

individuated and understood?), philosophy of science (*e.g.*, is “intelligent design” a genuinely scientific theory?), psychology (*e.g.*, do IQ tests discriminate against members of certain minority groups?), and other areas of philosophy, social science, and law.

CRITICAL THINKING

Many educators and educational scholars have championed the educational aim of critical thinking. It is not obvious what critical thinking is, and philosophers of education accordingly have developed accounts of critical thinking that attempt to state what it is and why it is valuable—*i.e.*, why educational systems should aim to cultivate it in students. These accounts generally (though not universally) agree that critical thinkers share at least the following two characteristics:

- They are able to reason well—*i.e.*, to construct and evaluate various reasons that have been or can be offered for or against candidate beliefs, judgments, and actions; and
- They are disposed or inclined to be guided by reasons so evaluated—*i.e.*, actually to believe, judge, and act in accordance with the results of such reasoned evaluations. Beyond this level of agreement lie a range of contentious issues.

One cluster of issues is epistemological in nature. What is it to reason well? What makes a reason, in this sense, good or bad? More generally, what epistemological assumptions underlie (or should underlie) the notion of critical thinking? Does critical thinking presuppose conceptions of truth, knowledge, or justification that are objective and “absolute,” or is it compatible with more “relativistic” accounts emphasizing culture, race, class, gender, or conceptual scheme?

These questions have given rise to other, more specific and hotly contested issues. Is critical thinking relevantly “neutral” with respect to the groups who use it, or is it in fact politically biased, unduly favouring a type of thinking once valued by white European males—the philosophers of the Enlightenment and later eras—while undervaluing or demeaning types of thinking sometimes associated with other groups, such as women, nonwhites, and non-Westerners—*i.e.*, thinking that is collaborative rather than individual, cooperative rather than confrontational, intuitive or emotional rather than linear and impersonal?

Do standard accounts of critical thinking in these ways favour and help to perpetuate the beliefs, values, and practices of dominant groups in society and devalue those of marginalized or oppressed groups? Is reason itself, as some feminist and postmodern philosophers have claimed, a form of hegemony?

Other issues concern whether the skills, abilities, and dispositions that are constitutive of critical thinking are general or subject-specific. In addition, the dispositions of the critical thinker noted above suggest that the ideal of critical thinking can be extended beyond the bounds of the epistemic to the area of moral character, leading to questions regarding the nature of such character and the best means of instilling it.

TEACHING, LEARNING, AND CURRICULUM

Many problems of educational practice that raise philosophical issues fall under this heading. Which subjects are most worth teaching or learning? What constitutes knowledge of them, and is such knowledge discovered or constructed? Should there be a single, common curriculum for all students, or should different students study different subjects, depending on their needs or interests, as Dewey thought? If the latter, should students be tracked according to ability? Should less-able students be directed to vocational studies? Is there even a legitimate distinction to be drawn between academic and vocational education? More broadly, should students be grouped together—according to age, ability, gender, race, culture, socioeconomic status, or some other characteristic—or should educators seek diversity in the classroom along any or all of these dimensions?

Whatever the curriculum, how should students be taught? Should they be regarded as “blank slates” and expected to absorb information passively, as Locke’s conception of the mind as a *tabula rasa* suggests, or should they rather be understood as active learners, encouraged to engage in self-directed discovery and learning, as Dewey and many psychologists and educators have held? How, more generally, should teaching be conceived and conducted? Should all students be expected to learn the same things from their studies? If not, as many argue, does it make sense to utilize standardized testing to measure educational outcome, attainment, or success? What are the effects of grading and evaluation in general and of high-stakes standardized testing in particular? Some have argued that any sort of grading or evaluation is educationally counterproductive because it inhibits cooperation and undermines any natural motivation to learn. More recently, critics of high-stakes testing have argued that the effects of such testing are largely negative—dilution (“dumbing down”) of the curriculum, teaching to the test, undue pressure on both students and teachers, and distraction from the real purposes of schooling. If these claims are correct, how should the seemingly legitimate demands of parents, administrators, and politicians for accountability from teachers and schools be met? These are complex matters, involving philosophical questions concerning the aims and legitimate means of education and the nature of the human mind, the psychology of learning (and of teaching), the organizational (and political) demands of schooling, and a host of other matters to which social-scientific research is relevant.

Finally, here fall questions concerning the aims of particular curriculum areas. For example, should science education aim at conveying to students merely the content of current theories or rather an understanding of scientific method, a grasp of the tentativeness and fallibility of scientific hypotheses, and an understanding of the criteria by which theories are evaluated? Should science classes focus solely on current theories, or should they include attention to the history, philosophy, and sociology of the subject? Should they seek to impart only beliefs or also skills? Similar questions can be asked of nearly every curriculum area; they are at least partly philosophical and so are routinely addressed by philosophers of education as well as by curriculum theorists and subject-matter specialists.

EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH

A large amount of research in education is published every year; such research drives much educational policy and practice. But educational research raises many philosophical issues. How is it best conducted, and how are its results best interpreted and translated into policy? Should it be modeled on research in the natural sciences? In what ways (if any) does competent research in the social sciences differ from that in the natural sciences? Can educational research aim at objectivity and the production of objective results, or is it inevitably subjective? Should researchers utilize quantitative methods or qualitative ones? How is this distinction best understood? Are both legitimate modes of research, or is the first problematically scientific or positivistic, or the second problematically subjective, impressionistic, or unreliable? These and related issues are largely philosophical, involving philosophy of science (both natural and social) and epistemology, but they clearly involve the social sciences as well.

FEMINIST, MULTICULTURALIST, AND POSTMODERN CRITICISMS

Feminist, multiculturalist, and postmodern criticisms of education extend far beyond the issue of critical thinking, addressing much more general features of philosophy and educational theory and practice. These three critical movements are neither internally univocal nor unproblematically combinable; what follows is therefore oversimplified.

Feminist philosophers of education often argue for the importance of educational aims typically excluded from the traditional male-oriented set. One feminist aim is that of caring—*i.e.*, the fostering of students' abilities and propensities to care for themselves and others. A more general aim is that of focusing less on the cognitive and more on the emotional, intuitive, and conative development of all students. Relatedly, many feminist philosophers of education call into question the traditional distinction between the public and the private realms, and they argue that education should focus not only on the development of abilities and characteristics typically exercised in the public sphere—*e.g.*, reason, objectivity, and impartiality—but also on abilities and characteristics traditionally consigned to the private sphere of home and family—*e.g.*, emotional connection, compassion, intuition, and sensitivity to the physical and psychological needs of others.

It must be noted that this characterization of feminist philosophy of education papers over some important internal disagreements and debates. For example, while some feminist philosophers of education suggest that girls and boys should master both traditional male and traditional female roles and abilities, others reject these familiar categories, while still others distrust or explicitly reject reason and objectivity themselves as problematically "male." Debate on these matters is complex and resists brief summary. Multiculturalist philosophers of education, as the label suggests, emphasize the significance of cultural diversity

as it manifests itself in education and its philosophy. Paying particular attention to such diversity, multiculturalists point out the ways in which actual educational aims and practices favour the interests of particular cultural groups at the expense of others. They emphasize differences not only of language, custom, and lifestyle but, more fundamentally, of basic beliefs, values, and worldviews. They argue that education must not privilege the cultures of certain groups but treat all groups with equal seriousness and respect.

What this means in practice, however, is far from clear. Some multiculturalists argue that justice and respect require that each group's traditions, beliefs, and values be regarded as equally legitimate; others hold that it is possible to respect a group while still regarding its beliefs as false or its values as deficient. This debate has important consequences in the particular curricular domain of science education, but the general issue arises in virtually every curriculum domain.

There is also the problem that the conceptions of justice and respect that multiculturalists tend to appeal to are themselves not universally shared but rather taken from particular cultural locations, thus apparently privileging those culturally specific beliefs and values, contrary to the movement's motivating impulse. How best to resolve this problem remains a subject of debate within the multiculturalist camp, with some opting for some form of cultural relativism and others for a mix of multiculturalism and universalism.

Postmodern philosophers and philosophers of education challenge basic aspects of traditional philosophical theorizing by calling into question the possibility of objectivity, the neutrality of reason, the stability of meaning, and the distinction between truth and power. They raise doubts about all general theories—of philosophy, education, or anything else—by suggesting that all such “grand narratives” arise in particular historical circumstances and thus inevitably reflect the worldviews, beliefs, values, and interests of the groups that happen to be dominant in those circumstances.

Like feminists and multiculturalists, postmodernists do not speak with a single voice. Some, emphasizing power and justice, strive to expose illegitimate exercises of dominating power in order to bring about a more-just social arrangement in which the dominated are no longer so. Others, emphasizing the instability of meaning and the defects of grand narratives, call into question the narratives of domination and justice, thereby undermining the justification of political efforts aimed at eliminating the former and enhancing the latter.

These distinct but partially overlapping movements have in common the insistence that education and its philosophy are inevitably political and the impulse to reveal relations of power in educational theory and practice and to develop philosophical accounts of education that take full account of the values and interests of groups that have traditionally been excluded from educational thinking. These movements also often question the very possibility of universal educational ideals and values. As such they in some ways challenge the very possibility of the philosophy of education and philosophy more generally, at least as these disciplines have traditionally been practiced. Critical responses

to these challenges have been many and varied; one of the most notable consists of pointing out the apparent inconsistency involved in claiming that, as a general matter, general accounts of education, justice, and the like are impossible. As elsewhere, the issues here are complex and far from resolved.

MORAL EDUCATION

Another set of problems and issues has to do with the proper educational approach to morality. Should education strive to instill particular moral beliefs and values in students? Or should it aim rather to enhance students' ability to think through moral issues for themselves? If the latter, how should educators distinguish between good and bad ways to think about moral issues? Should moral education focus on students' character—rather than on either the inculcation of particular beliefs and values or the development of the ability to think well about moral matters—and endeavour to produce particular traits, such as honesty and sensitivity? Or are all these approaches problematic in that they inevitably involve indoctrination (of an undesirable kind)? A related objection to the approaches mentioned is that moral beliefs and values are in some sense relative to culture or community; therefore, attempts to teach morality at least presuppose an indefensible moral absolutism and may even constitute a kind of moral “imperialism.” These large and complex questions are intimately connected with metaethics and moral epistemology—*i.e.*, the part of moral philosophy concerned with the epistemic status of moral claims and judgments. Moral psychology and developmental psychology are also highly relevant to the resolution of these questions.

NORMATIVE EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHIES

“Normative philosophies or theories of education may make use of the results of [philosophical thought] and of factual inquiries about human beings and the psychology of learning, but in any case they propound views about what education should be, what dispositions it should cultivate, why it ought to cultivate them, how and in whom it should do so, and what forms it should take. In a full-fledged philosophical normative theory of education, besides analysis of the sorts described, there will normally be propositions of the following kinds: 1. Basic normative premises about what is good or right; 2. Basic factual premises about humanity and the world; 3. Conclusions, based on these two kinds of premises, about the dispositions education should foster; 4. Further factual premises about such things as the psychology of learning and methods of teaching; and 5. Further conclusions about such things as the methods that education should use.”

PERENNIALISM

Perennialists believe that one should teach the things that one deems to be of everlasting importance to all people everywhere. They believe that the most

important topics develop a person. Since details of fact change constantly, these cannot be the most important. Therefore, one should teach principles, not facts. Since people are human, one should teach first about humans, not machines or techniques. Since people are people first, and workers second if at all, one should teach liberal topics first, not vocational topics. The focus is primarily on teaching reasoning and wisdom rather than facts, the liberal arts rather than vocational training.

ALLAN BLOOM

Bloom, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago, argued for a traditional Great Books-based liberal education in his lengthy essay *The Closing of the American Mind*.

PROGRESSIVISM

Educational progressivism is the belief that education must be based on the principle that humans are social animals who learn best in real-life activities with other people. Progressivists, like proponents of most educational theories, claim to rely on the best available scientific theories of learning. Most progressive educators believe that children learn as if they were scientists, following a process similar to John Dewey's model of learning: 1) Become aware of the problem. 2) Define the problem. 3) Propose hypotheses to solve it. 4) Evaluate the consequences of the hypotheses from one's past experience. 5) Test the likeliest solution.

JEAN PIAGET

Jean Piaget was a Swiss developmental psychologist known for his epistemological studies with children. His theory of cognitive development and epistemological view are together called "genetic epistemology". Piaget placed great importance on the education of children. As the Director of the International Bureau of Education, he declared in 1934 that "only education is capable of saving our societies from possible collapse, whether violent, or gradual." Piaget created the International Centre for Genetic Epistemology in Geneva in 1955 and directed it until 1980. According to Ernst von Glasersfeld, Jean Piaget is "the great pioneer of the constructivist theory of knowing."

Jean Piaget described himself as an epistemologist, interested in the process of the qualitative development of knowledge. As he says in the introduction of his book "Genetic Epistemology" (ISBN 978-0-393-00596-7): "*What the genetic epistemology proposes is discovering the roots of the different varieties of knowledge, since its elementary forms, following to the next levels, including also the scientific knowledge.*"

JEROME BRUNER

Another important contributor to the inquiry method in education is Bruner. His books *The Process of Education* and *Towards a Theory of Instruction* are

landmarks in conceptualizing learning and curriculum development. He argued that any subject can be taught in some intellectually honest form to any child at any stage of development. This notion was an underpinning for his concept of the spiral curriculum which posited the idea that a curriculum should revisit basic ideas, building on them until the student had grasped the full formal concept. He emphasized intuition as a neglected but essential feature of productive thinking. He felt that interest in the material being learned was the best stimulus for learning rather than external motivation such as grades. Bruner developed the concept of discovery learning which promoted learning as a process of constructing new ideas based on current or past knowledge. Students are encouraged to discover facts and relationships and continually build on what they already know.

ESSENTIALISM

Educational essentialism is an educational philosophy whose adherents believe that children should learn the traditional basic subjects and that these should be learned thoroughly and rigorously. An essentialist programme normally teaches children progressively, from less complex skills to more complex.

WILLIAM CHANDLER BAGLEY

William Chandler Bagley taught in elementary schools before becoming a professor of education at the University of Illinois, where he served as the Director of the School of Education from 1908 until 1917. He was a professor of education at Teachers College, Columbia, from 1917 to 1940. An opponent of pragmatism and progressive education, Bagley insisted on the value of knowledge for its own sake, not merely as an instrument, and he criticized his colleagues for their failure to emphasize systematic study of academic subjects. Bagley was a proponent of educational essentialism.

SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTIONISM AND CRITICAL PEDAGOGY

Critical pedagogy is an “educational movement, guided by passion and principle, to help students develop consciousness of freedom, recognize authoritarian tendencies, and connect knowledge to power and the ability to take constructive action.” Based in Marxist theory, critical pedagogy draws on radical democracy, anarchism, feminism, and other movements for social justice.

MARIA MONTESSORI

The Montessori method arose from Dr. Maria Montessori’s discovery of what she referred to as “the child’s true normal nature” in 1907, which happened in the process of her experimental observation of young children given freedom in an environment prepared with materials designed for their self-directed learning activity. The method itself aims to duplicate this experimental observation of children to bring about, sustain and support their true natural way of being.

WALDORF

Waldorf education (also known as Steiner or Steiner-Waldorf education) is a humanistic approach to pedagogy based upon the educational philosophy of the Austrian philosopher Rudolf Steiner, the founder of anthroposophy. Learning is interdisciplinary, integrating practical, artistic, and conceptual elements. The approach emphasizes the role of the imagination in learning, developing thinking that includes a creative as well as an analytic component. The educational philosophy's overarching goals are to provide young people the basis on which to develop into free, morally responsible and integrated individuals, and to help every child fulfill his or her unique destiny, the existence of which anthroposophy posits. Schools and teachers are given considerable freedom to define curricula within collegial structures.

RUDOLF STEINER

Steiner founded a holistic educational impulse on the basis of his spiritual philosophy (anthroposophy). Now known as Steiner or Waldorf education, his pedagogy emphasizes a balanced development of cognitive, affective/artistic, and practical skills (head, heart, and hands). Schools are normally self-administered by faculty; emphasis is placed upon giving individual teachers the freedom to develop creative methods. Steiner's theory of child development divides education into three discrete developmental stages predating but with close similarities to the stages of development described by Piaget. Early childhood education occurs through imitation; teachers provide practical activities and a healthy environment. Steiner believed that young children should meet only goodness. Elementary education is strongly arts-based, centered on the teacher's creative authority; the elementary school-age child should meet beauty. Secondary education seeks to develop the judgment, intellect, and practical idealism; the adolescent should meet truth.

DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION

Democratic education is a theory of learning and school governance in which students and staff participate freely and equally in a school democracy. In a democratic school, there is typically shared decision-making among students and staff on matters concerning living, working, and learning together.

A. S. NEILL

Neill founded Summerhill School, the oldest existing democratic school in Suffolk, England in 1921. He wrote a number of books that now define much of contemporary democratic education philosophy. Neill believed that the happiness of the child should be the paramount consideration in decisions about the child's upbringing, and that this happiness grew from a sense of personal freedom. He felt that deprivation of this sense of freedom during childhood, and the consequent unhappiness experienced by the repressed child, was responsible for many of the psychological disorders of adulthood.

CLASSICAL EDUCATION

The Classical education movement advocates a form of education based in the traditions of Western culture, with a particular focus on education as understood and taught in the Middle Ages. The term “classical education” has been used in English for several centuries, with each era modifying the definition and adding its own selection of topics. By the end of the 18th century, in addition to the trivium and quadrivium of the Middle Ages, the definition of a classical education embraced study of literature, poetry, drama, philosophy, history, art, and languages. In the 20th and 21st centuries it is used to refer to a broad-based study of the liberal arts and sciences, as opposed to a practical or pre-professional programme. Classical Education can be described as rigorous and systematic, separating children and their learning into three rigid categories, Grammar, Dialectic, and Rhetoric.

CHARLOTTE MASON

Mason was a British educator who invested her life in improving the quality of children’s education. Her ideas led to a method used by some homeschoolers. Mason’s philosophy of education is probably best summarized by the principles given at the beginning of each of her books. Two key mottos taken from those principles are “Education is an atmosphere, a discipline, a life” and “Education is the science of relations.” She believed that children were born persons and should be respected as such; they should also be taught the Way of the Will and the Way of Reason. Her motto for students was “I am, I can, I ought, I will.” Charlotte Mason believed that children should be introduced to subjects through living books, not through the use of “compendiums, abstracts, or selections.” She used abridged books only when the content was deemed inappropriate for children. She preferred that parents or teachers read aloud those texts (such as Plutarch and the Old Testament), making omissions only where necessary.

UNSCHOOLING

Unschooling is a range of educational philosophies and practices centered on allowing children to learn through their natural life experiences, including child directed play, gameplay, household responsibilities, work experience, and social interaction, rather than through a more traditional school curriculum. Unschooling encourages exploration of activities led by the children themselves, facilitated by the adults. Unschooling differs from conventional schooling principally in the thesis that standard curricula and conventional grading methods, as well as other features of traditional schooling, are counterproductive to the goal of maximizing the education of each child.

JOHN HOLT

In 1964 Holt published his first book, *How Children Fail*, asserting that the academic failure of schoolchildren was not *despite* the efforts of the schools,

but actually *because* of the schools. Not surprisingly, *How Children Fail* ignited a firestorm of controversy. Holt was catapulted into the American national consciousness to the extent that he made appearances on major TV talk shows, wrote book reviews for *Life* magazine, and was a guest on the *To Tell The Truth* TV game show. In his follow-up work, *How Children Learn*, published in 1967, Holt tried to elucidate the learning process of children and why he believed school short circuits that process.

CONTEMPLATIVE EDUCATION

Contemplative education focuses on bringing spiritual awareness into the pedagogical process. Contemplative approaches may be used in the classroom, especially in tertiary or (often in modified form) in secondary education. Parker Palmer is a recent pioneer in contemplative methods. The Center for Contemplative Mind in Society founded a branch focusing on education, The Association for Contemplative Mind in Higher Education.

Contemplative methods may also be used by teachers in their preparation; Waldorf education was one of the pioneers of the latter approach. In this case, inspiration for enriching the content, format, or teaching methods may be sought through various practices, such as consciously reviewing the previous day's activities; actively holding the students in consciousness; and contemplating inspiring pedagogical texts. Zigler suggested that only through focusing on their own spiritual development could teachers positively impact the spiritual development of students.

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Critique of Logical Philosophy in Education

One of the functions of philosophy is to develop a critical attitude towards language and meaning, and this is certainly something that analytic philosophy has fostered. Rather than accept ready-made answers and slogans as solutions for educational dilemmas, analytic philosophers have supported an approach that insists that all ideas and issues be examined every step along the way.

Critics argue that while analytic philosophy has helped clarify some educational issues, it is too limited a view to meet the demands of a changing complex culture. It has also been accused of promoting a new scholasticism where arguing over words is more important than substantive ideas. One of the things that frustrates critics is the difficulty of ascertaining what analysts really want in education. Analytic philosophers claim they want to clarify, not prescribe, but critics claim that the analytic approach has not achieved significant clarification.

Perhaps the frustration of critics lies with analytic philosophy's assertion that true philosophy can only be analytic. Where, then, do our visions come from? It would seem to most critics that philosophy has a larger role to play in shaping new ideas for education.

ORIGINS OF MARXISM

A distinguishing feature of Marxism is the importance of materialism, which Marx believed should guide human society. He held that science could transform human circumstances, that knowledge is based on sensory experience, and that social progress may be achieved by changes in the material world.

Socialism provided Marxism with the belief that human progress could occur through fundamental changes in social and environmental conditions. Marx adopted the need for social cooperation and believed that capitalism lacked social responsibility because it was selfishly absorbed in the accumulation of wealth.

The Philosophy of Karl Marx

As a philosopher, Marx borrowed two major ideas from Hegel: the concept of alienation and the process of the dialectic. A second major philosophical influence was Feuerbach's view that history is determined by human thought and action in a world of material conditions. Marx took this to mean that human thought and action (praxis) could revolutionize the course of history. In his early years, Marx wrote with humanistic tendencies, but after his collaboration with Friedrich Engels, he became a severe critic of "bourgeois" capitalism and advocated social revolution. Marx's "guiding thread" was how people produce necessities and create institutions that enmesh their conscious wills. He believed that when the forces of production and the superstructure of social institutions came into severe conflict, rapid social change would occur. Marx thought that workers had become alienated from their humanity, and that the capitalist system of private property was the cause.

Marx called his view "the materialist interpretation of history" in which history could be traced through the divisions of labour over time. The latest epoch was the class conflict between bourgeois capitalists (the "haves") and proletarian workers (the "have-nots"). He believed that workers could rise and overthrow capitalism if they developed a strong sense of class identity and solidarity. Engels helped popularize Marx's thought and called it "dialectical materialism," the view that history is determined by a dialectical process based on material conditions. Lenin adopted dialectical materialism and held that the state would "wither away" after violent revolution and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This view of Marxism gained influence in the East, especially in the former Soviet Union and in China.

Western Marxism and the Origins of "Significant Theory"

Although Marx relegated philosophy to "the dustbin of history," Western or neo-Marxists believed philosophy had a continuing role to play. The term "critical theory" defines the work of the Frankfurt School, which studied change in the West from old-style entrepreneurial capitalism to corporate capitalism. They criticized "mass culture," the "technocratic consciousness," the "administered society," and "one dimensional man." They held that historical evolution comes not only from material modes of production but from the cultural processes societies use to maintain themselves.

Marxism as a Philosophy of Education

Marx did not write extensively about education, but educational ideas within his general theory have influenced education. Under Marxism-Leninism,

education was supposed to mold a socialist consciousness, a socialist society, and a communist morality. If bourgeois indoctrination was banished, however, socialist indoctrination was not.

Marx's ideal was to put individuals in control of their own labour and enable the working class to change its conditions. He opposed paternalistic education designed to produce docile workers. If people are the product of circumstances and education, then human action is necessary to change socio-economic circumstances; hence, educational processes must be understood as purposeful human activity, or praxis.

Western Marxists promote a view of education for liberation where the learner is an active rather than a passive participant. They are against the kind of mechanical determinism championed by Marxism-Leninism, but they criticize Western schools for producing docile workers by reproducing the conditions of the workplace in the schools. They argue that such schooling changes people rather than the economic system. Marx favoured compulsory education, but not a curriculum based on class distinctions. He advocated local community control to avoid bourgeois state control and indoctrination. He also favoured technical and industrial education, but not narrow vocationalism. Marx approved a three-part curricular organization of mental education, physical education, and technological training; however, the later Marxist-Leninist systems of education promoted the authority of the Party apparatus and resulted in an authoritarian view of knowledge and curriculum for the schools.

Critique of Marxism in Education

One of the strengths of Marxism as a philosophy is that it provides a view of social transformation and promotes a view of purposeful human action to carry through on that transformation. Thus, it has a strong appeal for those who live under oppression, and it offers a utopian vision of collective destiny. Marxism also has the strength of its critical role, for it helps non-Marxist societies look at themselves in ways they would not ordinarily pursue. Western Marxism has issued warnings about alienation, technologism, bureaucracy, and mass culture that are timely for most contemporary industrialized countries. It has been a major advocate of making education available to everyone, and in its educational theory it blends theory and practice. A glaring weakness of Marxism, however, is that the model of education it practices seldom seems to demonstrate the ideals it espouses in theory.

Some critics maintain that Marxists and neo-Marxists alike show a lack of sensitivity to the changes that non-socialist industrial economies have undergone. They also note that the dialectic of history—or historical evolution—may not be only a socialist or a materialist development.

LOGICAL EMPIRICISM

A first generation of 20th-century Viennese positivists began its activities, strongly influenced by Mach, around 1907. Notable among them were a physicist,

Philipp Frank, mathematicians Hans Hahn and Richard von Mises, and an economist and sociologist, Otto Neurath. This small group was also active during the 1920s in the Vienna Circle of logical positivists, a seminal discussion group of gifted scientists and philosophers that met regularly in Vienna, and in the related Berlin Society for Empirical Philosophy.

These two schools of thought, destined to develop into an almost worldwide and controversial movement, were built on the empiricism of Hume, on the positivism of Comte, and on the philosophy of science of Mach. Equally important influences came from several eminent figures who were at the same time scientists, mathematicians, and philosophers—G.F. Bernhard Riemann, the author of a non-Euclidean geometry; Hermann von Helmholtz, a pioneer in a broad range of scientific studies; Heinrich Hertz, the first to produce electromagnetic waves in his laboratory; Ludwig Boltzmann, a researcher in statistical mechanics; Henri Poincaré, equally eminent in mathematics and philosophy of science; and David Hilbert, distinguished for his formalizing of mathematics. Most significant, however, was the impact of Einstein, as well as that of the three great mathematical logicians of the late-19th and early-20th centuries—the groundbreaking Gottlob Frege and the authors of the monumental *Principia Mathematica* (1910–13), Russell and Alfred North Whitehead.

THE EARLIER POSITIVISM OF VIENNESE HERITAGE

The confluence of ideas from these sources and the impressions that they made upon the Vienna and Berlin groups in the 1920s gave rise to the philosophical outlook of logical positivism—a label supplied in 1931 by A.E. Blumberg and the American philosopher of science Herbert Feigl. The leader of the Vienna Circle between 1924 and 1936 was Moritz Schlick, who in 1922 succeeded to the chair (previously held by Mach and Boltzmann) for the philosophy of the inductive sciences at the University of Vienna. By 1924 an evening discussion group had been formed with Schlick, Neurath, Hans Hahn, Victor Kraft, Kurt Reidemeister, and Felix Kaufmann as the prominent active participants. The most important addition to the circle was Carnap, who joined the group in 1926. One of its early activities was the study and critical discussion of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1922) of Ludwig Wittgenstein, a seminal thinker in analytic philosophy. It seemed at the time that the views of Carnap and Wittgenstein, though they had been formulated and elaborated quite differently, shared a large measure of basic agreement. Parallel, but not completely independent, developments occurred in the Berlin group, in which Hans Reichenbach, Richard von Mises, Kurt Grelling, and Walter Dubislav were the leading figures.

Both the Vienna and Berlin groups consisted mainly of philosophically interested scientists or scientifically trained and oriented philosophers. Schlick had already anticipated some of the basic epistemological tenets of the groups in his *Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre* (1918; *General Theory of Knowledge*). But the philosophical outlook was sharpened and deepened when, in the late 1920s,

the Viennese positivists published a pamphlet, *Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis* (1929; “Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle”), which was to be their declaration of independence from traditional philosophy—and, in the minds of its authors (Carnap, Hahn, and Neurath, aided by Friedrich Waismann and Feigl), a “philosophy to end all philosophies.”

Language and the Clarification of Meaning

The basic ideas of logical positivism were roughly as follows: the genuine task of philosophy is to clarify the meanings of basic concepts and assertions (especially those of science)—and not to attempt to answer unanswerable questions such as those regarding the nature of ultimate reality or of the Absolute. Inasmuch as an extremely ambitious Hegelian type of metaphysics, idealistic and absolutist in orientation, was still prevalent in the German-speaking countries, there were many who believed that the antidote was urgently needed. Moreover, the logical positivists also had only contempt and ridicule for the ideas of the German existentialist Martin Heidegger, whose investigations of such questions as “Why is there anything at all?” and “Why is what there is, the way it is?” and whose pronouncements about Nothingness (*e.g.*, “the Nothing not”) seemed to them to be not only sterile but so confused as to be nonsensical. The logical positivists viewed metaphysics as a hopelessly futile way of trying to do what great art, and especially poetry and music, already do so effectively and successfully. These activities, they held, are expressions of visions, feelings, and emotions and, as such, are perfectly legitimate as long as they make no claims to genuine cognition or representation of reality. What logical positivism recommended positively, on the other hand, was a logic and methodology of the basic assumptions and of the validation procedures of knowledge and of evaluation.

An adequate understanding of the functions of language and of the various types of meaning was another of the fundamentally important contributions of the logical positivists. Communication and language serve many diverse purposes: one is the representation of facts, or of the regularities in nature and society; another is the conveying of imagery, the expression and arousal of emotions; a third is the triggering, guidance, or modification of actions. Thus, they distinguished cognitive-factual meaning from expressive and evocative (or emotive) significance in words and sentences. It was granted that in most utterances of everyday life (and even of science), these two types of meaning are combined or fused. What the logical positivists insisted upon, however, was that the emotive type of expression and appeal should not be mistaken for one having genuinely cognitive meanings. In such expressions as moral imperatives, admonitions, and exhortations there is, of course, a factually significant core—viz., regarding the (likely) consequences of various actions. But the normative element—expressed by such words as *ought*, *should*, *right*, and their negations (as in “Thou shalt not....”)—is by itself not cognitively meaningful but has primarily emotional and motivative significance.

Early statements about moral-value judgments, such as those by Carnap or by A.J. Ayer, a more radical British positivist, seemed shocking to many philosophers, to whom it seemed that, in their careless formulation, moral norms were to be treated like expressions of taste. Equally shocking was their condemnation as nonsense (really non-sense—*i.e.*, complete absence of factual meaning) of all moral, aesthetic, and metaphysical assertions. More adequate and delicate analyses, such as that of the American positivist Charles Stevenson, were soon to correct and modify those extremes. By proper allocation of the cognitive and the normative (motivative) components of value statements, many thinkers rendered the originally harsh and implausible positivist view of value judgments more acceptable. Nevertheless, there is—in every positivistic view—an ineluctable element of basic, noncognitive commitment in the acceptance of moral, or even of aesthetic, norms.

The Verifiability Criterion of Meaning and its Offshoots

The most noteworthy, and also most controversial, contribution of the logical positivists was the so-called verifiability criterion of factual meaningfulness. In its original form, this criterion had much in common with the earlier pragmatist analysis of meaning (as in the work of Peirce and James). Schlick's rather careless formulation, "The meaning of a [declarative sentence] is the method of its verification"—which was really intended only to exclude from the realm of the cognitively meaningful those sentences for which it is logically inconceivable that either supporting or refuting evidence can be found—was close to the pragmatist and, later, to the operationalist slogan that may be paraphrased as "A difference must make a difference in order to be a difference"—or (more fully explicated) "Only if there is a difference in principle, open to test by observation, between the affirmation and the denial of a given assertion does that assertion have factual meaning." To take the classic example from Hume's analysis of the concept of causation, there is no difference between saying "A is always followed by B" and saying "A is necessarily always followed by B." That all effects have causes is true by virtue of the (customary) definitions of *cause* and *effect*; it is a purely formal or logical truth. But to say (instead of speaking of effects) that all events have causes is to say something factual—and conceivably false. (It should be noted that these rather crude uses of *cause* and *necessity* were later replaced by much more subtle analyses.)

THE MAIN PHILOSOPHICAL TENETS OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM

According to logical positivism, there are only two sources of knowledge: logical reasoning and empirical experience. The former is analytic *a priori*, while the latter is synthetic *a posteriori*; hence synthetic *a priori* does not exist.

The fundamental thesis of modern empiricism [*i.e.*, logical positivism] consists in denying the possibility of synthetic *a priori* knowledge.

Logical knowledge includes mathematics, which is reducible to formal logic. Empirical knowledge includes physics, biology, psychology, *etc.* Experience is the only judge of scientific theories; however, logical positivists were aware that scientific knowledge does not exclusively rise from the experience: scientific theories are genuine hypotheses that go beyond the limits of finite human experience.

It is not possible to establish a logically durable building on verifications [a verification is an observational statement about immediate perception], for they are already vanished when the building begins. If they were, with respect to time, at the beginning of the knowledge, then they would be logically useless. On the contrary, there is a great difference when they are at the end of the process: with their help the test is performed... From a logical point of view, nothing depends on them: they are not premises but a firm end point.

A statement is meaningful if and only if it can be proved true or false, at least in principle, by means of the experience — this assertion is called the verifiability principle [aka the “verifiability criterion of meaning”]. The meaning of a statement is its method of verification; that is we know the meaning of a statement if we know the conditions under which the statement is true or false.

When are we sure that the meaning of a question is clear? Obviously if and only if we are able to exactly describe the conditions in which it is possible to answer yes, or, respectively, the conditions in which it is necessary to answer with a no. The meaning of a question is thus defined only through the specification of those conditions...

The definition of the circumstances under which a statement is true is perfectly *equivalent* to the definition of its meaning.

... a statement has a meaning if and only if the fact that it is true makes a verifiable difference.

Metaphysical statements are not empirically verifiable and are thus forbidden: they are meaningless. The only role of philosophy is the clarification of the meaning of statements and their logical interrelationships. There is no distinct “philosophical knowledge” over and above the analytic knowledge provided by the formal disciplines of logic and mathematics and the empirical knowledge provided by the sciences.

Philosophy is the activity by means of which the meaning of statements is clarified and defined.

A scientific theory is an axiomatic system that obtains an empirical interpretation through appropriate statements called rules of correspondence, which establish a correlation between real objects (or real processes) and the abstract concepts of the theory. The language of a theory includes two kinds of terms: observational and theoretical. The statements of a theory are divided in two groups: analytic and synthetic. Observational terms denote objects or properties that can be directly observed or measured, while theoretical terms denote objects or properties we cannot observe or measure but we can only infer from direct observations. Analytic statements are a priori and their truth is

based on the rules of the language; on the contrary, synthetic statements depend on experience, and their truth can be acknowledged only by means of the experience. This conception about the structure of scientific theories is perhaps the most durable philosophical principle of the logical positivism.

Its main points are:

- The distinction between observational and theoretical terms
- The distinction between synthetic and analytic statements
- The distinction between theoretical axioms and rules of correspondence
- The deductive nature of scientific theories

These four points are linked together. Rules of correspondence give an empirical meaning to theoretical terms and are analytic, while theoretical axioms express the observational portion of the theory and are synthetic. A theory must be a deductive system; otherwise, a formal distinction between the various kinds of sentences and terms is impossible.

The distinction between observational and theoretical terms depends on the verifiability criterion of meaning. A statement is meaningful only if it is verifiable; but, in scientific theories, there are many statements which are not verifiable — for example, assertions dealing with quantum particles or relativistic gravitational fields. These statements are too “theoretical” for a direct test; strictly speaking, they are meaningless.

To avoid such a consequence, one could either deny that these were statements, or one could try to “reduce” the “theoretical terms” to “observational terms.” The theoretical terms which belong to the abstract language of a scientific theory are explicitly definable in a restricted language whose terms describe only that which is directly observable. So a distinction between observational and theoretical terms arose. But soon Carnap realized that theoretical terms are not definable by observational ones. In a first time, he proposed a partial reducibility of theoretical to observational terms (‘Testability and meaning’, in *Philosophy of science*, 3, 1936 and 4, 1937). Later, it was supposed that all theoretical terms were removable from a scientific theory. This hypothesis was supported by two outcomes of formal logic: Craig’s theorem and Ramsey statements.

Craig’s theorem is an unquestionable result of formal logic. According to this theorem, it is possible to translate a scientific theory in a purely observational language without any loss of deductive power. Ramsey sentences, named after English philosopher Frank Plumpton Ramsey (1903-1930), were used by Carnap for dividing the axioms of a theory in two sets, say A and R. Set R contains only statements which contain purely observational terms and expresses the empirical portion of the theory, the “observational data.” Set A consists of analytic statements and defines the meaning of theoretical terms. Given a typical scientific theory T containing both observational and theoretical terms, it is thus possible to rationally reconstruct that theory as theory T* which contains no theoretical terms, such that T and T* are equivalent with respect to all observational statements that can be deduced from the axioms of T*.

[While the analysis of relationships between the two kinds of terms began the object of many logical and philosophical studies, the distinction itself was criticized. According to Popper all scientific concepts are theoretical, for every assertion not only entails hypotheses but also is hypothetical, that is not sure and always falsifiable. Quine ('Two dogmas of empiricism' in *The Philosophical Review*, 60, 1951) criticized both observational-theoretical and analytic-synthetic distinction. Hempel ('The theoretician's dilemma' in *Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science*, II, 1958) noted that the theory T^* without theoretical terms, in spite of the equivalence (with respect to the observational language) to the original theory T , is not useful as T . In fact, from an inductive point of view, T and T^* are very different. Usually the original theory T suggests certain relations between its concepts, while in T^* these concepts are forbidden. The discovery of laws is almost impossible in T^* , while it is a natural consequence in T . Moreover, while the number of the axioms of T usually is finite, Craig's theorem does not assure us of the existence of a theory T^* with a finite number of axioms. So T^* is almost useless. Theoretical terms are thus necessary in science.]

In *Philosophical foundations of physics*, 1966, Carnap proposed a slightly different approach to observational-theoretical distinction. Now the starting-point is the difference between empirical and theoretical laws. It is possible to directly confirm (or disprove) an empirical law, while a theoretical law can be tested only through the empirical laws that are among its consequences. Moreover, an empirical law explains facts while a theoretical law explains empirical laws.

Thus there are three levels:

- (a) Empirical facts: these are expressed by direct "observation reports"
- (b) Empirical laws: Simple generalizations we can directly confirm by observation. They explain facts and are employed to predict empirical facts by deducing observation statements from laws and statements of initial conditions..
- (c) Theoretical laws: General principles we can use to explain empirical laws:al laws by deducing the empirical laws from such theoretical statements.

Empirical laws include only observational terms, while theoretical terms occur in theoretical laws.

The distinction between analytic and synthetic statements is another consequence of the verifiability principle and it is linked with the observational-theoretical as well as axioms-rules of correspondence distinction. According to the verifiability principle, an alleged synthetic *a priori* statement does not have a meaning; thus there are only two kinds of assertions: synthetic *a posteriori* and analytic *a priori*. What is the role of analytic sentences in a scientific theory? Only two possibilities are allowed: an analytic statement is a logical-mathematical theorem (thus it has no empirical significance) or it is a convention that defines the meaning of theoretical terms.

There is an explicit assumption in logical positivism's analysis of science: a theory is a deductive system. This means that pragmatic aspects are not considered.

Moreover, neopositivism was not interested in the real process of discovering, but it was concerned with the *rational reconstruction* of scientific knowledge, that is it dealt with *logical* (formal) relationships between statements in a given theory.

According to logical positivism, there is not any method of discovering a hypothesis prior to its test by deducing empirical consequences, and therefore a scientist can propose any hypothesis he prefers; only logical relationships between the hypothesis and the given empirical evidence are relevant. But there were some problems with this conception of science. First of all, the relation between empirical experience and theoretical principles is not a deductive one: observational statements do not imply theoretical axioms. Carnap argues that the relation is explicable with the help of the inductive logic.

LOGICAL ANALYSIS

Analytic Philosophy (or sometimes Analytical Philosophy) is a 20th Century movement in philosophy which holds that philosophy should apply logical techniques in order to attain conceptual clarity, and that philosophy should be consistent with the success of modern science. For many Analytic Philosophers, language is the principal (perhaps the only) tool, and philosophy consists in clarifying how language can be used.

Analytic Philosophy is also used as a catch-all phrase to include all (mainly Anglophone) branches of contemporary philosophy not included under the label Continental Philosophy, such as Logical Positivism, Logicism and Ordinary Language Philosophy. To some extent, these various schools all derive from pioneering work at Cambridge University in the early 20th Century and then at Oxford University after World War II, although many contributors were in fact originally from Continental Europe.

Analytic Philosophy as a specific movement was led by Bertrand Russell, Alfred North Whitehead, G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Turning away from then-dominant forms of Hegelianism, (particularly objecting to its Idealism and its almost deliberate obscurity), they began to develop a new sort of conceptual analysis based on new developments in Logic, and succeeded in making substantial contributions to philosophical Logic over the first half of the 20th Century.

The three main foundational planks of Analytical Philosophy are:

- That there are no specifically philosophical truths and that the object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts.
- That the logical clarification of thoughts can only be achieved by analysis of the logical form of philosophical propositions, such as by using the formal grammar and symbolism of a logical system.
- A rejection of sweeping philosophical systems and grand theories in favour of close attention to detail, as well as a defense of common sense and ordinary language against the pretensions of traditional Metaphysics and Ethics.

Early developments in Analytic Philosophy arose out of the work of the German mathematician and logician Gottlob Frege (widely regarded as the father of modern

philosophical logic), and his development of Predicate Logic. Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead, particularly in their groundbreaking "*Principia Mathematica*" (1910-1913) and their development of Symbolic Logic, attempted to show that mathematics is reducible to fundamental logical principles.

From about 1910 to 1930, Analytic Philosophers like Russell and Wittgenstein focused on creating an ideal language for philosophical analysis (known as Ideal Language Analysis or Formalism), which would be free from the ambiguities of ordinary language that, in their view, often got philosophers into trouble. In his "*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*" of 1921, Wittgenstein suggested that the world is merely the existence of certain states of affairs which can be expressed in the language of first-order predicate logic, so that a picture of the world can be built up by expressing atomic facts in atomic propositions, and linking them using logical operators, a theory sometimes referred to as Logical Atomism.

G. E. Moore, who along with Bertrand Russell had been a pioneer in his opposition to the dominant Hegelianism (and its belief in Hegel's Absolute Idealism) in the British universities of the early 20th Century, developed his epistemological Commonsense Philosophy, attempting to defend the "commonsense" view of the world against both Skepticism and Idealism.

In the late 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, Russell and Wittgenstein's Formalism was picked up by the Vienna Circle and Berlin Circle which developed into the Logical Positivism movement, which focused on universal logical terms, supposedly separate from contingent factors such as culture, language, historical conditions. In the late 1940s and 1950s, following Wittgenstein's later philosophy, Analytic Philosophy took a turn towards Ordinary Language Philosophy, which emphasized the use of ordinary language by ordinary people.

Following heavy attacks on Analytic Philosophy in the 1950s and 1960s, both Logical Positivism and Ordinary Language Philosophy rapidly fell out of fashion. However, many philosophers in Britain and America after the 1970's still considered themselves to be "analytic" philosophers, (generally characterized by precision and thoroughness about a narrow topic), although less emphasis on linguistics and an increased eclecticism or pluralism characteristic of Post-Modernism is also evident.

More contemporary Analytic Philosophy has also included extensive work in other areas of philosophy, such as in Ethics by Phillipa Foot (1920 -), R. M. Hare (1919 - 2002) and J. L. Mackie (1917 - 1981); in Political Philosophy by John Rawls (1921 - 2002) and Robert Nozick (1938 - 2002); in Aesthetics by Arthur Danto (1924 - 2013); and in Philosophy of Mind by Daniel Dennett (1942 -) and Paul Churchland (1942 -). Logical Analysis emerged as an important philosophy in the early 20th century and is still the dominant school of philosophy in most universities of the English speaking world. Logical analysis attempts to resolve philosophical disputes by clarifying language and analysing the expressed in ordinary assertions. Restating a philosophical problem in precise logical terminology, instead of everyday language, is likely to reveal its possible solution. Hence, it aims to resolve problems which emerge as a result of linguistic confusion.

This philosophical movement has emerged along two lines of development. One is the advancement in mathematical logic, particularly with the development of symbolic logic by Russell and Frege in contrast to Aristotelian logic. The second line is an increasing concern towards the philosophy of linguistics, the ways in which misuse of language leads to philosophical problems.

English philosophers G. E. Moore (1873 – 1958) and Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) are generally seen as the founders of contemporary analytic philosophy, while the founders of modern symbolic logic are the mathematician Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) and Bertrand Russell. Russell, along with A. N. Whitehead (1861-1947), wrote the monumental work *Principia Mathematica*, in which he showed that all of arithmetic could be deduced from a restricted set of logical axioms. Russell's work was soon eclipsed by that of Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) who became the central figure of analytical philosophy with his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Logical analysis gave rise to the movement known as Logical Positivism, whose proponents believed that the task of philosophy was to analyze problems to determine whether they belonged to the domain of logic or science, or whether they were 'meaningless'.

We can consider Russell's theory of descriptions as an illustration of this analytic technique. Description is a phrase in which an object or a person is specified by any of the properties or qualities associated with it or him, and not by a name. For example, 'George W. Bush' is a name, while 'the present President of America' is a description. Descriptions had caused a lot of confusion among philosophers. For instance, Meinong was of the opinion that as we can truly say "The golden mountain does not exist" there must be such an object as the 'golden mountain' although it must be a non-existent object. Similarly, when we say "The round square does not exist" it appears as if we are attributing some kind of existence to the 'round square', that there is a thing, the round square, which does not exist.

The theory of descriptions overcame these difficulties with an analysis of the propositions and maintained that the grammatical structure of a proposition is different from its logical structure. For example, when it is said "Scott is the author of *Waverly*" it logically means

"One and only one person wrote *Waverly* and that man was Scott."

Or in a more logical manner,

"There is an entity *c* such that the statement '*x* wrote *Waverly*' is true if *x* is *c* and false otherwise; moreover *c* is Scott."

And in symbolic notation,

$(\exists x)\{[Wx \cdot (y)(Wy \supset y=x)] \cdot Sx\}$

When this theory is applied to statements like "The golden mountain does not exist" it is seen on analysis that the 'golden mountain' is not being mentioned when this statement is said. Its logical structure is:

"There is no entity *c* such that '*x* is golden and mountainous' is true when *x* is *c*, but not otherwise."

[In simple words, it means something like 'There is no object in the world which corresponds to the description of being golden and mountainous'.]

In this manner, analysis removes the confusions associated with the descriptions. (We have seen an application of this theory on the Ontological argument.)

There is a famous mathematical problem known as Russell's paradox which was discovered by Russell in the course of writing *Principia Mathematica*. There are some sets which are members of themselves, and there are some sets which are not members of themselves [such as a null set]. Russell asks to consider the set of all sets which are not members of themselves. The question arises, is this set a member of itself?

First consider a possibility that it is a member of itself. But how can it be a member of this set, because the set contains only those sets which are not members of themselves.

So, let us consider the second possibility that it is not a member of itself, but if it is not a member of itself, it is a set which is not a member of itself, and therefore should be included in the set of all sets which are not members of themselves! As obvious, this is indeed a very puzzling paradox. A number of philosophers proposed answers to this paradox, including Russell himself, but which solution is correct is still a matter of debate.

On the metaphysical side, Russell had presented a form of Logical Atomism. But since Logical Atomism found its most complete statement in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, we'll deal with it in the chapter on Wittgenstein.

For the general public, Bertrand Russell is not famous for his mathematical philosophy but rather for his social and literary writings. Russell was a very prolific writer and wrote a large number of books and essays in his life. He is well known as a social critic, an educational innovator, a champion of intellectual, social and sexual freedom, and an active campaigner for peace and human rights.

Russell was a pacifist in the First World War and due to his constant opposition to the war, which he saw as sheer madness on part of both sides, he was not only dismissed from Trinity College but was also imprisoned for six months. Later, Russell was greatly concerned about the development of atomic weapons after the Second World War and believed that an atomic war would result in the extermination of the human race.

Russell's religious views provoked a diversity of responses from the people. While they were extremely influential in helping reduce the dogmatism of religion, they also faced extreme opposition from the conservative, religious classes of the society. These religious ideas, expressed in *Why I am not a Christian*, were generally concerned with outlining the harmful social aspects of organized religion. He showed that there were not sufficient proofs for the existence of God and analyzed how the Christian beliefs affected the social life. His early essay on religion *A Free Man's Worship* is now regarded as a masterpiece of prose.

His work on sexual ethics and his bold criticism of the traditional sexual morality in *Marriage and Morals* put Russell in social and legal trouble, when he was prevented from taking up the teaching post at City College New York in 1940. He was an excellent writer and his eloquent writings such as *What I Have*

Lived For and *A Liberal Decalogue* brought him extreme popularity and fame. Russell was awarded the Order of Merit in 1949 followed by the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1950 “in recognition of his varied and significant writings in which he champions humanitarian ideals and freedom of thought”.

Russell’s colleague and friend, G. E. Moore was also a very influential philosopher of analytical tradition. During the youth of Russell and Moore, Idealism was the dominant school of philosophy in the British and American circles, and Moore was instrumental in breaking this hold of Idealism. In *The Refutation of Idealism* Moore showed that the essential principle upon which Idealism stands is Berkeley’s “to be is to be perceived.” And this principle in itself is not necessarily true, because it is not an analytical statement. Hence, Idealists assume with any sufficient evidence the necessary truth of their basic principle.

Later Moore wrote *A Defence of Common Sense* in which he expressed the view that the ordinary, common sense beliefs humans have about the world are to be accepted at face value, such as the view that an objective world exists and that other humans also exist in this world apart from one’s own self. The purpose of analytical philosophy is to explain the precise implications of the truth of such beliefs. This has given rise to the popular image of Moore as a philosopher of plain common sense, which is a bit of injustice to Moore’s brilliance.

Moore’s work on ethics, *Principia Ethica*, is one of the most influential works on ethics. In it, Moore expounded a version of Ethical Intuitionism, defining ‘good’ to be “a simple, non-natural, indefinable quality that good things have”. That is to say, we recognize good through intuition but we cannot define it. Moore considered it an error to associate ‘good’ with some other natural property, such as pleasure, and called it the “naturalistic fallacy”. All such attempts are still unsafe from the Open Question, which states, “Is this really good?” For example, when a hedonist says that “Good is Pleasure”, the Open Question immediately arises in a person’s mind, “Is Pleasure always Good?” The Open Question is the indication that all attempts to associate good with some natural property are erroneous.

3

Functions of Philosophy of Education

Philosophy of education performs various functions.

3.7.1 Determining the Aims of Education

Philosophy of education provides original ideas regarding all aspects of education particularly educational aims. It is said that educational philosophy gives different views, but this situation is not harmful, rather it helps in providing education according to the need of society.

The difference in view of philosophy of education reflects the multiplicity and diversities of human life. Philosophy of education guides the process of education by suggesting suitable aims from the diversities of life and selecting the means accordingly.

3.7.2 Harmonizing Old and New Traditions in the Field of Education

In the process of social development the old traditions become outdated for the people.

They are replaced by the new traditions. But this process of replacement is not always smooth. It is faced with lots of opposition from certain orthodox sections of the society.

At the same time it must be kept in mind that every 'old' is not outdated and every 'new' is not perfect. Therefore, there is a need of coordinating the two in order to maintain the harmony between both. This function can be performed by philosophy of education.

3.7.3 Providing the Educational Planners, Administrators and Educators with the Progressive Vision to Achieve Educational Development

Spencer has rightly pointed that only a true philosopher can give a practical shape to education. Philosophy of education provides the educational planners, administrators and educators with the right vision which guides them to attain the educational goals efficiently.

3.7.4 Preparing the young Generation to Face the Challenges of the Modern Time

Social commentators have given many labels to the present period of history for some it is the information age and for others it is post modernity, later modernity, high modernity or even the age of uncertainty. One more addition to this list may be that 'present age is an age of Globalisation as a phenomenon arrived on the economic scene in the 1990 in India. This watchword has had its implications in the social political, economic fabric of the country of which education is a part. Philosophy of education is a guiding, steering and liberating force that helps young people to and society at large to face the challenges of the modern time.

3.8 Relationship Between Philosophy of Teaching and Teaching Styles

Philosophy guides the process of education in different ways. A teacher approaching education philosophically needs to answer four basic questions that guide the teaching learning process. They are:

What is the nature of the learner?

What is the nature of subject matter?

How should one use the subject matter to guide students towards meaningful learning activities?

What behaviour trend should one exhibit in order to carry out one's philosophical position?

The answers to these questions only will help the teacher to identify a series of preferences, as opposed to a set of behaviour that belong to mutually exclusive categories for the following questions. An attempt to answer these questions is nothing but philosophy of teaching.

Philosophy and various philosophical view points inform us that each of these questions have different philosophical perspectives that can be considered as extremes in a continuum.

3.8.1 Nature of the Learner

For the question about the nature of Learner, It will be defined in terms of extremes of the continuum by using the terms "Lockean" (passive) and "Platonic" (active)

"Lockean" is a position because it was John Locke, in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, who first wrote about mind, is a tabula rasa. He envisioned the operation of the mind as similar to a blank wax tablet on which data taken in through the senses would make "impressions". Sensory data which

a learner absorbed formed the true source of knowledge. Any complex mental operations involving association, interpretation, or evaluation of secondary data led to the formulation of increasingly complex knowledge. "Platonic" Image is that of a teacher who has so much respect for what the learner can contribute to the learning environment that he or she definitely does not want them to "absorb" prescribed subject matter, as the teacher sees the subject matter. Under such circumstances learners are viewed as the most important ingredient of the classroom environment because they teach each other and their teacher about problems which are meaningful to them. It is almost that learners have the knowledge which is locked inside them which is released through interaction. Platonic concept believes in the doctrine of Reminiscence.

3.8.2 Nature of Subject Matter

The terms "Amorphous" or "Structured" are used to delineate extremes on the continuum of teacher's view on the nature of subject matter. The term 'amorphous' label has been reserved for rote learning, which emphasizes that each item to be learned is equal in importance to every other item to be learned; hence youngsters are not encouraged to find relationships among items to be learned and no item is seen to be more important than the other.

The other extreme "structured" we may expect to find a position represented by those who have a quite realistic view of what the subject matter can never accomplish. The term "Structured" as used in this context, is from Bruner's understanding that any subject matter should be viewed as having a natural structure which can help to explain relationships among its components and which can be used to find new information.

3.9 How should Subject Matter Guide Students Learning Activities?

The Two end Points of the Continuum is "Cognitive" and "Affective".

These concepts are not mutually exclusive categories, but rather matters of emphasis and preferences. In order to illuminate factors involved in any teacher's decision to emphasize cognitive or affective learning activities it is useful to consider the following addendum.

Cognitive Domain - fact, concept and generalisation

Affective Domain- belief and value

Evidence abounds that students bring into the classroom attitudes which influence the way they perceive facts, concepts and generalisations. Sometimes teachers are fortunate to have students who bring with them positive attitudes towards the subject matter at hand. Most often we have students who bring with them not very positive attitudes. In such situations the teachers' role will be to help students think critically by transforming generalisation, beliefs and values into hypotheses that can be tested. Then the teacher resorts to the affective domain.

3.10 Behaviour Trend in Order to Carry out One's Philosophical Position

The terms authoritarian and non-authoritarian are two extremes of the continuum, but should be understood as not merely being 'strict' or 'permissive'. These words should go beyond the aspect of classroom management as it is more inclusive approach to classroom management. It is an over view of the student and the subject matter which this indicator has been designed to examine.

For instance, suppose some teachers encourage students to view subject matter only as experts in that field might view it; hence these teachers habitually accept for each major question under examination only one right answer which all students are expected to adopt and understand. We can thus say that these teachers are said to encourage convergent thinking and hence in this context we can term them as 'authoritarian' teachers.

The converse can be said of 'non- authoritarian teachers'

Teacher need to be aware of the 'Philosophical Positions' that they take and have taken while they enter into classrooms or plan to enter into classrooms. Philosophical positions affect the way they interact with students and facilitate learning in learners individually or collectively.

Thus we see that the way we answer the questions of nature of learner, subject matter, *etc.*, definitely affects our teaching style. Whether a teacher is authoritative or non- authoritarian, whether teaching methods are constructivist or lecture method are influenced based on the philosophical position that they hold.

Background for approaching the educational problems effectively. Therefore, it is essential for the educators to have the deep insight into the philosophy of education.

PHILOSOPHY AND CURRICULUM

Most of the prominent philosophers in the last 2000 years were not philosophers of education but have at some point considered and written on the philosophy of education. Among them are Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Dewey, Adler, Confucius, Al Farabi, Tagore and many others. These philosophers have been key voices in philosophy of education and have contributed to our basic understanding of what education is and can be. They have also provided powerful critical perspectives revealing the problems in education.

What is the connection between philosophy and curriculum? For example, when you propose the teaching of a particular body of knowledge, course or subject, you will be asked, "What is your philosophy for introducing that content?" If you are unable to answer the question, you may not be able to convince others to accept your proposal. Philosophy is the starting point in any curriculum decision making and is the basis for all subsequent decisions regarding curriculum. Philosophy becomes the criteria for determining the aims, selection, organisation and implementation of the curriculum in the classroom. Philosophy helps us answer general questions such as: 'What are schools for?'

‘What subjects are of value?’, ‘How should students learn the content?’ It also helps us to answer more precise tasks such as deciding what textbooks to use, how to use them, what homework to assign and how much of it, how to test and use the results.

Would you believe that the above statement was written more than 2000 years ago by the Greek philosopher Aristotle and we are still debating the same issues today. Sometimes one wonders whether we know what we want! We lament about the poor level of basic skills of students and call for a return to the basics. At the same time we want students to develop critical thinking skills and call for lesser emphasis on rote learning.

Through the centuries, many philosophies of education have emerged, each with their own beliefs about education. In this chapter, we will discuss four philosophies, namely; perennialism, essentialism, progressivism and reconstructionism proposed by Western philosophers. Also, discussed are the viewpoints of three Eastern philosophers; namely, al-Farabi, Tagore and Confucius. Each of these educational philosophies is examined to see what curriculum is proposed and how teaching and learning should be conducted.

PERENNIALISM

What is Perennialism

Perennial means “everlasting,” like a perennial flower that blooms year after year. Perennialism, the oldest and most conservative educational philosophy has its roots in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Two modern day proponents of perennialism are Robert Hutchins and Mortimer Adler. The perennialists believed that humans are rational and the aim of education is “to improve man as man” (Hutchins, 1953).

The answers to all educational questions derive from the answer to one question: What is human nature? According to them, human nature is constant and humans have the ability to understand the universal truths of nature. Thus, the aim of education is to develop the rational person and to uncover universal truths by training the intellect. Towards developing one’s moral and spiritual being, character education should be emphasised.

Perennialism is based on the belief that some ideas have lasted over centuries and are as relevant today as when they were first conceived. These ideas should be studied in school. A list of the ‘Great Books’ was proposed covering topics in literature, art, psychology, philosophy, mathematics, science, economics, politics and so forth. Examples of such books are: *Robinson Crusoe* written by Daniel Defoe, *War and Peace* written by Leo Tolstoy, *Moby Dick* written by Herman Melville, Euclid’s book *Elements* on geometry, Newton’s book on *Optics*, *The Sexual Enlightenment of Children* written by Sigmund Freud, *An inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* by Adam Smith and many others.

The book selected had to have contemporary significance, that is, it should be relevant to the problems and issues of present times. The book should espouse

ideas and issues that have occupied the minds of thinking individuals in the last 2000 years. The book should attract people to read it again and again and benefit from it. The perennialists believed that these are history's finest thinkers and writers. Their ideas are profound and meaningful even today as when they were written. When students are immersed in the study of these profound and enduring ideas, they will appreciate learning for its own sake as well as develop their intellectual powers and moral qualities.

The Perennialist Curriculum

Based on the beliefs of perennialism, the curriculum proposed had the following characteristics:

- The 'Great Books' programme or more commonly called the liberal arts will discipline the mind and cultivate the intellect. To read the book in its original language, students must learn Latin and Greek. Students also had to learn grammar, rhetoric, logic, advanced mathematics and philosophy (Hutchins, 1936).
- The study of philosophy is a crucial part of the perennialist curriculum. This was because they wanted students to discover those ideas that are most insightful and timeless in understanding the human condition.
- At a much later time, Mortimer Adler (1982) in his book the *Paideia Proposal*, recommended a single elementary and secondary curriculum for all students. The educationally disadvantaged had to spend some time in pre-schools.
- Perennialists were not keen on allowing students to take electives (except second languages) such as vocational and life-adjustment subjects. They argued that these subjects denied students the opportunity to fully develop their rational powers.
- The perennialists criticised the vast amount of disjointed factual information that educators have required students to absorb. They urge that teachers should spend more time teaching concepts and explaining how these concepts are meaningful to students.
- Since, enormous amount of scientific knowledge has been produced, teaching should focus on the processes by which scientific truths have been discovered. However, the perennialists advise that students should not be taught information that may soon be obsolete or found to be incorrect because of future scientific and technological findings.
- At the secondary and university level, perennialists were against reliance on textbooks and lectures in communicating ideas. Emphasis should be on teacher-guided seminars, where students and teachers engage in dialogue; and mutual inquiry sessions to enhance understanding of the great ideas and concepts that have stood the test to time. Student should learn to learn, and not to be evaluated
- Universities should not only prepare students for specific careers but to pursue knowledge for its own sake. "University students may learn

a few trees, perennialists claim, but many will be quite ignorant about the forests: the timeless philosophical questions “ (Hutchins, 1936)

- Teaching reasoning using the ‘Great Books’ of Western writers is advocated using the Socratic method to discipline the minds of students. Emphasis should be on scientific reasoning rather than mere acquisition of facts. Teach science but not technology, great ideas rather than vocational topics.
- Perennialists argue that the topics of the great books describe any society, at any time, and thus the books are appropriate for American society. Students must learn to recognise controversy and disagreement in these books because they reflect real disagreements between persons. Students must think about the disagreements and reach a reasoned, defensible conclusion.

ESSENTIALISM

What is Essentialism

Essentialism comes from the word ‘essential’ which means the main things or the basics. As an educational philosophy, it advocates instilling in students with the “essentials” or “basics” of academic knowledge and character development. The term essentialism as an educational philosophy was originally popularised in the 1930s by William Bagley and later in the 1950s by Arthur Bestor and Admiral Rickover.

When it was first introduced as an educational philosophy in American schools, it was criticised as being too rigid. In 1957, the Russians launched Sputnik which caused a panic in educational circles as Americans felt they had fallen behind the Soviet Union technologically. A rethinking of education followed that led to interest in essentialism.

Essentialism was grounded in a conservative philosophy that argues that schools should not try to radically reshape society. Rather, they should transmit traditional moral values and intellectual knowledge that students need to become model citizens. Essentialists believe that teachers should instill traditional virtues such as respect for authority, fidelity to duty, consideration for others and practicality. Essentialism placed importance on science and understanding the world through scientific experimentation. To convey important knowledge about the world, essentialist educators emphasised instruction in natural science rather than non-scientific disciplines such as philosophy or comparative religion.

The Essentialist Curriculum

Based on the beliefs of essentialism, the curriculum proposed has the following characteristics:

- The ‘basics’ of the essentialist curriculum are mathematics, natural science, history, foreign language, and literature. Essentialists disapprove of vocational, life-adjustment, or other courses with “watered down” academic content.

- Elementary students receive instruction in skills such as writing, reading, and measurement. Even while learning art and music (subjects most often associated with the development of creativity) students are required to master a body of information and basic techniques, gradually moving from less to more complex skills and detailed knowledge. Only by mastering the required material for their grade level are students promoted to the next higher grade.
- Essentialist programmes are academically rigorous, for both slow and fast learners. Common subjects for all students regardless of abilities and interests. But, how much is to be learned is adjusted according to student ability.
- It advocates a longer school day, a longer academic year, and more challenging textbooks. Essentialists maintain that classrooms should be oriented around the teacher, who serves as the intellectual and moral role model for students.
- Teaching is teacher-centred and teachers decide what is most important for students to learn with little emphasis on student interests because it will divert time and attention from learning the academic subjects. Essentialist teachers focus heavily on achievement test scores as a means of evaluating progress.
- In an essentialist classroom, students are taught to be “culturally literate,” that is, to possess a working knowledge about the people, events, ideas, and institutions that have shaped society. Essentialists hope that when students leave school, they will possess not only basic skills and extensive knowledge, but also disciplined and practical minds, capable of applying their knowledge in real world settings.
- Discipline is necessary for systematic learning in a school situation. Students learn to respect authority in both school and society.
- Teachers need to be mature and well educated, who know their subjects well and can transmit their knowledge to students.

PROGRESSIVISM

What is Progressivism

Progressivism is a philosophical belief that argues that education must be based on the fact that humans are by nature social and learn best in real-life activities with other people. The person most responsible for progressivism was John Dewey (1859-1952). The progressive movement stimulated American schools to broaden their curriculum, making education more relevant to the needs and interests of students.

Dewey wrote extensively on psychology, epistemology (*the origin of knowledge*), ethics and democracy. But, his philosophy of education laid the foundation for progressivism. In 1896, while a professor at the University of Chicago, Dewey founded the famous Laboratory School to test his educational

ideas. His writings and work with the Laboratory School set the stage for the progressive education movement. According to Dewey, the role of education is to transmit society's identity by preparing young people for adult life. He was a keen advocate of democracy and for it to flourish, he felt that education should allow learners to realise their interests and potential. Learners should learn to work with others because learning in isolation separates the mind from action. According to him certain abilities and skills can only be learned in a group. Social and intellectual interaction dissolves the artificial barriers of race and class by encouraging communication between various social groups (Dewey, 1920). He described education as a process of growth and experimentation in which thought and reason are applied to the solution of problems.

Children should learn as if they were scientists using the scientific method proposed by Dewey (1920):

1. To be aware of the problem (eg. plants need sunlight to grow)
2. Define the problem (eg. can plants grow without sunlight)
3. Propose hypotheses to solve it
4. Test the hypotheses
5. Evaluate the best solution to the problem

Students should be constantly experimenting and solving problems; reconstructing their experiences and creating new knowledge using the proposed five steps. Teachers should not only emphasise drill and practice, but should expose learners to activities that relate to the real life situations of students, emphasising 'Learning by doing'.

The Progressive Curriculum

- Progressivists emphasise the study of the natural and social sciences. Teacher should introduce students to new scientific, technological, and social developments. To expand the personal experience of learners, learning should be related to present community life. Believing that people learn best from what they consider most relevant to their lives, the curriculum should centre on the experiences, interests, and abilities of students.
- Teachers should plan lessons that arouse curiosity and push students towards higher order thinking and knowledge construction. For example, in addition to reading textbooks, students must learn by doing such as fieldtrips where they can interact with nature and society.
- Students are encouraged to interact with one another and develop social virtues such as cooperation and tolerance for different points of view.
- Teachers should not be confined to focusing on one discrete discipline at a time but should introduce lessons that combine several different subjects.
- Students are to be exposed to a more democratic curriculum that recognises accomplishments of all citizens regardless of race, cultural background or gender. addition,

- By including instruction in industrial arts and home economics, progressivists strive to make schooling both interesting and useful. Ideally, the home, workplace, and schoolhouse blend together to generate a continuous, fulfilling learning experience in life. It is the progressivist dream that the dreary, seemingly irrelevant classroom exercises that so many adults recall from childhood will someday become a thing of the past. Students solve problems in the classroom similar to those they will encounter outside school.

What is Reconstructionism

Reconstructionism was a philosophy uniquely popular in the U.S., during the 1930's through the 1960's. It was largely the brain child of Theodore Brameld from Columbia Teachers College. He began as a communist, but shifted to reconstructionism. Reconstructionists favour reform and argue that students must be taught how to bring about change.

Reconstructionism is a philosophy that believes in the rebuilding of social and cultural infrastructures. Students are to study social problems and think of ways to improve society. Another proponent of reconstructionism was George Counts (1932) who in a speech titled *Dare the School Build a New Social Order* suggested that schools become the agent of social change and social reform. Students cannot afford to be neutral but must take a position. Most advocates of reconstructionism are sensitive to race, gender, ethnicity and differences in socioeconomic status. Related to reconstructionism is another belief called *critical pedagogy*. It is primarily a teaching and curriculum theory, designed by Henry Giroux and Peter McLaren, which focuses upon the use of revolutionary literature in classrooms that is aimed at "liberation." Radical in its conception, critical pedagogy was based on Marxist ideology which advocates equality in the distribution of wealth and strongly against capitalism. More recent reconstructionists such as Paulo Freire in his book *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1968) advocated a revolutionary pedagogy for poor students in which people can move through different stages to ultimately be able to take action and overcome oppression. He argued that people must become active participants in changing their own status through social action to change bring about social justice.

The Reconstructionist Curriculum

- In the reconstructionist curriculum, it was not enough for students to just analyse interpret and evaluate social problems. They had to be committed to the issues discussed and encouraged to take action to bring about constructive change.
- The curriculum is to be based on social and economic issues as well as social service. The curriculum should engage students in critical analysis of the local, national and international community. Examples of issues are poverty, environment degradation, unemployment, crime, war, political oppression, hunger, *etc.*

- There are many injustices in society and inequalities in terms of race, gender, and socioeconomic status. Schools are obliged to educate children towards resolution of these injustices and students should not be afraid to examine controversial issues. Students should learn to come to a consensus on issues and so group work was encouraged.
- The curriculum should be constantly changing to meet the changes in society. Students be aware of global issues and the interdependence between nations. Enhancing mutual understanding and global cooperation should be the focus of the curriculum.
- Teachers are considered the prime agents of social change, cultural renewal and internationalism. They are encouraged to challenge outdated structures and entrusted with the task of bringing about a new social order which may be utopian in nature.
- In general, the curriculum emphasised the social sciences (such as history, political science, economics, sociology, religion, ethics, poetry, and philosophy), rather than the sciences.

NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Philosophy of education is one of the areas of applied philosophy. There are three branches of philosophy namely 'metaphysics, epistemology and axiology.

1. *Metaphysics* is a branch of philosophy that investigates principles of reality transcending those of any particular science. It is concerned with explaining the fundamental nature of being and the world. Metaphysics is the study of the nature of things. Metaphysicians ask what kinds of things exist, and what they are like. They reason about such things as whether or not people have free will, in what sense abstract objects can be said to exist, and how it is that brains are able to generate minds.
2. *Axiology*: The branch of philosophical enquiry that explores:
 - (a) *Aesthetics*: the study of basic philosophical questions about art and beauty. Sometimes philosophy of art is used to describe only questions about art, with "aesthetics" the more general term. Likewise "aesthetics" sometimes applied even more broadly than to "philosophy of beauty": to the "sublime, " to humour, to the frightening—to any of the responses we might expect works of art or entertainment to elicit.
 - (b) *Ethics*: The study of what makes actions right or wrong, and of how theories of right action can be applied to special moral problems. Subdisciplines include meta-ethics, value theory, theory of conduct, and applied ethics.
3. *Epistemology* is the branch of philosophy that studies knowledge. It attempts to answer the basic question: what distinguishes true (adequate) knowledge from false (inadequate) knowledge? Practically, this question translates into issues of scientific methodology: how can one develop theories or models that are better than competing theories?

It also forms one of the pillars of the new sciences of cognition, which developed from the information processing approach to psychology, and from artificial intelligence, as an attempt to develop computer programmes that mimic a human's capacity to use knowledge in an intelligent way. When we look at the history of epistemology, we can discern a clear trend, in spite of the confusion of many seemingly contradictory positions. The first theories of knowledge stressed its absolute, permanent character, whereas the later theories put the emphasis on its relativity or situation-dependence, its continuous development or evolution, and its active interference with the world and its subjects and objects. The whole trend moves from a static, passive view of knowledge towards a more and more adaptive and active one.

As you can tell, the different branches of philosophy overlap one another. A philosopher considering whether people ought to give excess wealth to the poor is asking an ethical question. However, his investigations might lead him to wonder whether or not standards of right and wrong are built into the fabric of the universe, which is a metaphysical question. If he claims that people are justified in taking a particular stance on that question, he is making at least a tacit epistemological claim. At every step in his reasoning, he will want to employ logic to minimize the chance of being led into error by the great complexity and obscurity of the questions. He may very well look to some of the ethical, metaphysical, and epistemological writings of past philosophers to see how his brightest predecessors reasoned about the matter.

Aspects of each branch of philosophy can be studied in isolation, but philosophical questions have a way of leading to other philosophical questions, to the point that a full investigation of any particular problem is likely eventually to involve almost the whole of the philosophical enterprise.

One view on education believes or subscribes to the view that philosophy of education comes under the umbrella of axiology. As a branch of philosophy it utilises philosophical methods for the solution of philosophical problems with a philosophical attitude to arrive at philosophical conclusion. In this comprehensive process it includes facts concerning education and synthesizes them with values. The other school of thought believes that education as a discipline utilises or needs to incorporate all modes of philosophical inquiry; metaphysical, axiological and epistemological. As individuals involved in the process of education right from the aims, purpose, functions and building theory we need to look at any body of knowledge or generate new knowledge based on the three modes of philosophical inquiry.

Analytic Philosophy of Education, and Its Influence

Conceptual analysis, careful assessment of arguments, the rooting out of ambiguity, the drawing of clarifying distinctions-which make up part at least of the philosophical analysis package-have been respected activities within

philosophy from the dawn of the field. But traditionally they stood alongside other philosophical activities; in the Republic, for example, Plato was sometimes analytic, at other times normative, and on occasion speculative/metaphysical. No doubt it somewhat over-simplifies the complex path of intellectual history to suggest that what happened in the twentieth century-early on, in the home discipline itself, and with a lag of a decade or more in philosophy of education-is that philosophical analysis came to be viewed by some scholars as being the major philosophical activity (or set of activities), or even as being the only viable or reputable activity (for metaphysics was judged to be literally vacuous, and normative philosophy was viewed as being unable to provide compelling warrants for whatever moral and ethical positions were being advocated).

The Early Work: C.D. Hardie

So, although analytic elements in philosophy of education can be located throughout intellectual history back to the ancient world, the pioneering work in the modern period entirely in an analytic mode was the short monograph by C.D. Hardie, *Truth and Fallacy in Educational Theory* (1941; reissued in 1962). In his Introduction, Hardie (who had studied with C.D. Broad and I.A. Richards) made it clear that he was putting all his eggs into the ordinary-language-analysis basket: The Cambridge analytical school, led by Moore, Broad and Wittgenstein, has attempted so to analyse propositions that it will always be apparent whether the disagreement between philosophers is one concerning matters of fact, or is one concerning the use of words, or is, as is frequently the case, a purely emotive one. It is time, I think, that a similar attitude became common in the field of educational theory. (Hardie, 1962, xix). The first object of his analytic scrutiny in the book was the view that "a child should be educated according to Nature"; he teased apart and critiqued various things that writers through the ages could possibly have meant by this, and very little remained standing by the end of the chapter. Then some basic ideas of Herbart and Dewey were subjected to similar treatment.

Hardie's hard-nosed approach can be illustrated by the following: One thing that educationists mean by "education according to Nature" (later he turns to other things they might mean) is that "the teacher should thus act like a gardener" who fosters natural growth of his plants and avoids doing anything "unnatural". He continues: The crucial question for such a view of education is how far does this analogy hold? There is no doubt that there is some analogy between the laws governing the physical development of the child and the laws governing the development of a plant, and hence there is some justification for the view if applied to physical education. But the educationists who hold this view are not generally very much concerned with physical education, and the view is certainly false if applied to mental education. For some of the laws that govern the mental changes which take place in a child are the laws of learning [which] have no analogy at all with the laws which govern the interaction between a seed and its environment.

The Dominant Years: Language, and Clarification of Key Concepts

About a decade after the end of the Second World War the floodgates opened and a stream of work in the analytic mode appeared; the following is merely a sample. D.J. O'Connor published *An Introduction to Philosophy of Education* (1957) in which, among other things, he argued that the word "theory" as it is used in educational contexts is merely a courtesy title, for educational theories are nothing like what bear this title in the natural sciences; Israel Scheffler, who became the paramount philosopher of education in North America, produced a number of important works including *The Language of Education* (1960), that contained clarifying and influential analyses of definitions (he distinguished reportive, stipulative, and programmatic types) and the logic of slogans (often these are literally meaningless, and should be seen as truncated arguments); Smith and Ennis edited the volume *Language and Concepts in Education* (1961); and R.D.

Archambault edited *Philosophical Analysis and Education* (1965), consisting of essays by a number of British writers who were becoming prominent—most notably R.S. Peters (whose status in Britain paralleled that of Scheffler in the USA), Paul Hirst, and John Wilson. Topics covered in the Archambault volume were typical of those that became the "bread and butter" of analytic philosophy of education throughout the English-speaking world—education as a process of initiation, liberal education, the nature of knowledge, types of teaching, and instruction versus indoctrination.

Among the most influential products of APE was the analysis developed by Hirst and Peters (1970), and Peters (1973), of the concept of education itself. Using as a touchstone "normal English usage", it was concluded that a person who has been educated (rather than instructed or indoctrinated) has been (i) changed for the better; (ii) this change has involved the acquisition of knowledge and intellectual skills, and the development of understanding; and (iii) the person has come to care for, or be committed to, the domains of knowledge and skill into which he or she has been initiated. The method used by Hirst and Peters comes across clearly in their handling of the analogy with the concept of "reform", one they sometimes drew upon for expository purposes. A criminal who has been reformed has changed for the better, and has developed a commitment to the new mode of life (if one or other of these conditions does not hold, a speaker of standard English would not say the criminal has been reformed). Clearly the analogy with reform breaks down with respect to the knowledge and understanding conditions. Elsewhere Peters developed the fruitful notion of "education as initiation".

The concept of indoctrination was also of great interest to analytic philosophers of education, for—it was argued—getting clear about precisely what constitutes indoctrination also would serve to clarify the border that demarcates it from acceptable educational processes. Unfortunately, ordinary language analysis did not lead to unanimity of opinion about where this border was located, and rival analyses of the concept were put forward (Snook, 1972). Thus, whether

or not an instructional episode was a case of indoctrination was determined by: the content that had been taught; or by the intention of the instructor; or by the methods of instruction that had been used; or by the outcomes of the instruction; or, of course, by some combination of these. Adherents of the different analyses used the same general type of argument to make their case, namely, appeal to normal and aberrant usage. Two examples will be sufficient to make the point: (i) The first criterion mentioned above-the nature of the content being imparted-was supported by an argument that ran roughly as follows: "If some students have learned, as factual, some material that is patently incorrect (like 'The capital city of Canada is Washington D.C.'), then they must have been indoctrinated.

This conclusion is reinforced by the consideration that we would never say students must have been indoctrinated if they believe an item that is correct!" However, both portions of this argument have been challenged. (ii) The method criterion-how the knowledge was imparted to the students-usually was supported by an argument that, while different, clearly paralleled the previous one in its logic. It ran roughly like this: "We never would say that students had been indoctrinated by their teacher if he or she had fostered open inquiry and discussion, encouraged exploration in the library and on the net, allowed students to work in collaborative groups, and so on. However, if the teacher did not allow independent inquiry, quashed classroom questions, suppressed dissenting opinions, relied heavily on rewards and punishments, used repetition and fostered rote memorisation, and so on, then it is likely we would say the students were being indoctrinated".

Countervailing Forces

After a period of dominance, for a number of important reasons the influence of APE went into decline. First, there were growing criticisms that the work of analytic philosophers of education had become focused upon minutiae and in the main was bereft of practical import; I can offer as illustration a presidential address at a US Philosophy of Education Society annual meeting that was an hour-long discourse on the various meanings of the expression "I have a toothache". (It is worth noting that the 1966 article in *Time*, cited earlier, had put forward the same criticism of mainstream philosophy.) Second, in the early 1970's radical students in Britain accused the brand of linguistic analysis practised by R.S. Peters of conservatism, and of tacitly giving support to "traditional values"-they raised the issue of whose English usage was being analysed? Third, criticisms of language analysis in mainstream philosophy had been mounting for some time, and finally after a lag of many years were reaching the attention of philosophers of education. There even had been a surprising degree of interest in this arcane topic on the part of the general reading public in the UK as early as 1959, when Gilbert Ryle, editor of the journal *Mind*, refused to commission a review of Ernest Gellner's *Words and Things* (1959)-a detailed and quite acerbic critique of Wittgenstein's philosophy and its espousal of ordinary language analysis. (Ryle argued that Gellner's book was too insulting,

a view that drew Bertrand Russell into the fray on Gellner's side-in the daily press, no less; Russell produced examples of insulting remarks drawn from the work of great philosophers of the past)

Richard Peters had been given warning that all was not well with APE at a conference in Canada in 1966; after delivering a paper on "The aims of education: A conceptual inquiry" that was based on ordinary language analysis, a philosopher in the audience (William Dray) asked Peters "whose concepts do we analyse?" Dray went on to suggest that different people, and different groups within society, have different concepts of education. Five years before the radical students raised the same issue, Dray pointed to the possibility that what Peters had presented under the guise of a "logical analysis" was nothing but the favoured usage of a certain class of persons-a class that Peters happened to identify with.

Fourth, during the decade of the seventies when these various critiques of analytic philosophy were in the process of eroding its luster, a spate of translations from the Continent stimulated some philosophers of education in Britain and North America to set out in new directions, and to adopt a new style of writing and argumentation. Key works by Gadamer, Foucault, and Derrida appeared in English, and these were followed in 1984 by Lyotard's foundational work on *The Postmodern Condition*. The classic works of Heidegger and Husserl also found new admirers; and feminist philosophers of education were finding their voices-Maxine Greene published a number of pieces in the 1970s; the influential book by Nel Noddings, *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education*, appeared the same year as the work by Lyotard, followed a year later by Jane Roland Martin's *Reclaiming a Conversation*. APE was no longer the centre of interest.

Contemporary Social, Political and Moral Philosophy

By the 1980s, the rather simple if not simplistic ordinary language analysis practised in philosophy of education, was reeling under the attack from the combination of forces sketched above, but the analytic spirit lived on in the form of rigorous work done in other specialist areas of philosophy-work that trickled out and took philosophy of education in rich new directions. Technically-oriented epistemology, philosophy of science, and even metaphysics, flourished; as did the interrelated fields of social, political and moral philosophy. John Rawls published *A Theory of Justice* in 1971; a decade later MacIntyre's *After Virtue* appeared; and in another decade or so there was a flood of work on individualism, communitarianism, democratic citizenship, inclusion, exclusion, rights of children versus rights of parents, rights of groups (such as the Amish) versus rights of the larger polity. From the early 1990s philosophers of education have contributed significantly to the debates on these and related topics-indeed, this corpus of work illustrates that good philosophy of education flows seamlessly into work being done in mainstream areas of philosophy. Illustrative examples are *Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy*, Callan (1997); *The Demands of Liberal Education*, Levinson (1999); *Social Justice and School*

Choice, Brighouse (2000); and Bridging Liberalism and Multi-culturalism in American Education, Reich (2002). These works stand shoulder-to-shoulder with semi-classics on the same range of topics by Gutmann, Kymlicka, Macedo, and others. An excerpt from the book by Callan nicely illustrates that the analytic spirit lives on in this body of work; the broader topic being pursued is the status of the aims of education in a pluralistic society where there can be deep fundamental disagreements:

... the distinction must be underlined between the ends that properly inform political education and the extent to which we should tolerate deviations from those ends in a world where reasonable and unreasonable pluralism are entangled and the moral costs of coercion against the unreasonable variety are often prohibitive. Our theoretical as well as our commonsense discourse do not always respect the distinction.... If some of the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church conflict with our best theory of the ends of civic education, it does not follow that we have any reason to revise our theory; but neither does it mean we have any reason to impose these ends on Catholic schools and the families that they serve. (Callan, 1997, 44)

Callan and White (2003) have given an analysis of why the topics described above have become such a focus of attention. "What has been happening in philosophy of education in recent years", they argue, mirrors "a wider self-examination in liberal societies themselves". World events, from the fall of communism to the spread of ethnic conflicts "have all heightened consciousness of the contingency of liberal politics". A body of work in philosophy, from the early Rawls on, has systematically examined (and critiqued) the foundations of liberalism, and philosophy of education has been drawn into the debates. Callan and White mention communitarianism as offering perhaps "the most influential challenge" to liberalism, and they write:

The debate between liberals and communitarians is far more than a theoretical diversion for philosophers and political scientists. At stake are rival understandings of what makes human lives and the societies in which they unfold both good and just, and derivatively, competing conceptions of the education needed for individual and social betterment. (Callan and White, 2003, 95-96)

It should be appended here that it is not only "external" world events that have stimulated this body of work; events internal to a number of democratic societies also have been significant. To cite one example that is prominent in the literature in North America at least, the US Supreme Court issued a ruling (*Wisconsin v. Yoder*) in which members of the Amish sect were allowed to withdraw their children from public schools before they had reached the age of sixteen-for, it had been argued, any deeper education would endanger the existence of the group and its culture. In assessing this decision-as of course philosophers have frequently done, a balance has to be achieved between (i) the interest of civic society in having an informed, well-educated, participatory citizenry; (ii) the interest of the Amish as a group in preserving their own culture;

and (iii) the interests of the Amish children, who have a right to develop into autonomous individuals who can make reflective decisions for themselves about the nature of the life they wish to lead. These are issues that fall squarely in the domain covered by the works mentioned above.

So much work is being produced on the complex and interrelated issues just outlined, that in a different context it seemed fair for me to remark (descriptively, and not judgementally) that a veritable cottage industry had sprung up in post-Rawlsian philosophy of education. There are, of course, other areas of activity, where interesting contributions are being made.

Other Areas of Contemporary Activity

As was stressed at the outset, and illustrated with a cursory listing of examples, the field of education is huge and contains within it a virtually inexhaustible number of issues that are of philosophical interest. To attempt comprehensive coverage of how philosophers of education have been working within this thicket would be a quixotic task for a large single volume, and is out of the question for a solitary encyclopaedia entry. Nevertheless, a valiant attempt to give an overview was made in the recent *A Companion to the Philosophy of Education* (Curren, 2003), which contained more than six-hundred pages divided into forty-five chapters each of which surveyed a sub-field of work.

The following random selection of chapter topics gives a sense of the enormous scope of the field: Sex education, special education, science education, aesthetic education, theories of teaching and learning, religious education, knowledge and truth in learning, cultivating reason, the measurement of learning, multi-cultural education, education and the politics of identity, education and standards of living, motivation and classroom management, feminism, critical theory, postmodernism, romanticism, purposes of universities in a fluid age, affirmative action in higher education, and professional education. There is no non-arbitrary way to select a small number of topics for further discussion, nor can the topics that are chosen be pursued in great depth.

The choice of those below has been made with an eye to filling out-and deepening-the topographical account of the field that was presented in the preceding sections. The discussion will open with a topic that was not included in the Companion, despite it being one that is of great concern across the academic educational community, and despite it being one where adherents of some of the rival schools of philosophy (and philosophy of education) have had lively exchanges.

Philosophical Disputes Concerning Empirical Education Research

The educational research enterprise has been criticised for a century or more by politicians, policymakers, administrators, curriculum developers, teachers, philosophers of education, and by researchers themselves-but the criticisms have been contradictory. Charges of being "too ivory tower and theory-oriented" are found alongside "too focused on practice and too atheoretical"; but

particularly since publication of the book by Stokes mentioned earlier, and also in light of the views of John Dewey and William James that the function of theory is to guide intelligent practice and problem-solving, it is becoming more fashionable to hold that the "theory v. practice" dichotomy is a false one. A similar trend can be discerned with respect to the long warfare between two rival groups of research methods-on one hand quantitative/statistical approaches to research, and on the other hand the qualitative/ethnographic family. (The choice of labels here is its not entirely risk-free, for they have been contested; furthermore the first approach is quite often associated with "experimental" studies, and the latter with "case studies", but this is an over-simplification.) For several decades these two rival methodological camps were treated by researchers and a few philosophers of education as being rival paradigms (Kuhn's ideas, albeit in a very loose form, have been influential in the field of educational research), and the dispute between them was commonly referred-to as "the paradigm wars". In essence the issue at stake was epistemological: members of the quantitative/experimental camp believed that only their methods could lead to well-warranted knowledge claims, especially about the causal factors at play in educational phenomena, and on the whole they regarded qualitative methods as lacking in rigour; on the other hand the adherents of qualitative/ethnographic approaches held that the other camp was too "positivistic" and was operating with an inadequate view of causation in human affairs-one that ignored the role of motives and reasons, possession of relevant background knowledge, awareness of cultural norms, and the like.

Few if any commentators in the "paradigm wars" suggested that there was anything prohibiting the use of both approaches in the one research programme-provided that if both were used, they only were used sequentially or in parallel, for they were underwritten by different epistemologies and hence could not be blended together. But recently the trend has been towards rapprochement, towards the view that the two methodological families are, in fact, compatible and are not at all like paradigms in the Kuhnian sense(s) of the term; the melding of the two approaches is often called "mixed methods research", and it is growing in popularity.

The most lively contemporary debates about education research, however, were set in motion around the turn of the millenium when the US Federal Government moved in the direction of funding only rigorously scientific educational research-the kind that could establish causal factors which could then guide the development of practically effective policies. (It was held that such a causal knowledge base was available for medical decisionmaking.) The definition of "rigorously scientific", however, was decided by politicians and not by the research community, and it was given in terms of the use of a specific research method-the net effect being that the only research projects to receive Federal funding were those that carried out randomised controlled experiments or field trials (RFTs). It has become common over the last decade to refer to the RFT as the "gold standard" methodology.

The National Research Council (NRC)-an arm of the U.S., National Academies of Science-issued a report, influenced by postpositivistic philosophy of science (NRC, 2002), that argued this criterion was far too narrow. Numerous essays have appeared subsequently that point out how the "gold standard" account of scientific rigour distorts the history of science, how the complex nature of the relation between evidence and policy-making has been distorted and made to appear overly simple (for instance the role of value-judgements in linking empirical findings to policy directives is often overlooked), and qualitative researchers have insisted upon the scientific nature of their work.

Nevertheless, and possibly because it tried to be balanced and supported the use of RFTs in some research contexts, the NRC report has been the subject of symposia in four journals, where it has been supported by a few and attacked from a variety of philosophical fronts: Its authors were positivists, they erroneously believed that educational enquiry could be value-neutral and that it could ignore the ways in which exercise of power constrains the research process, they misunderstood the nature of educational phenomena, they were guilty of advocating "your father's paradigm" (clearly this was not intended as a compliment). One critic with postmodernist leanings asserted that educational research should move "towards a Nietzschean sort of 'unnatural science' that leads to greater health by fostering ways of knowing that escape normativity"-a suggestion that evokes the reaction, namely, one of incomprehension on the part of most researchers and those philosophers of education who work within a different tradition where a "way of knowing", in order to be a "way", must inevitably be normative.

The final complexity in the debates over the nature of educational research is that there are some respected members of the philosophy of education community who claim, along with Carr, that "the forms of human association characteristic of educational engagement are not really apt for scientific or empirical study at all". His reasoning is that educational processes cannot be studied empirically because they are processes of "normative initiation"-a position that as it stands begs the question by not making clear why such processes cannot be studied empirically.

The Content of the Curriculum, and the Aims and Functions of Schooling

The issue of what should be taught to students at all levels of education-the issue of curriculum content-obviously is a fundamental one, and it is an extraordinarily difficult one with which to grapple. In tackling it, care needs to be taken to distinguish between education and schooling-for although education can occur in schools, so can mis-education (as Dewey pointed out), and many other things can take place there that are educationally orthogonal (such as the provision of free or subsidised lunches, or the development of social networks); and it also must be recognised that education can occur in the home, in libraries and museums, in churches and clubs, in solitary interaction with the public media, and the like.

In developing a curriculum (whether in a specific subject area, or more broadly as the whole range of offerings in an educational institution or in a system), a number of difficult decisions need to be made. Issues such as the proper ordering or sequencing of topics in the chosen subject, the time to be allocated to each topic, the lab work or excursions or projects that are appropriate for particular topics, can all be regarded as technical issues best resolved either by educationists who have a depth of experience with the target age group or by experts in the psychology of learning and the like.

But there are deeper issues, ones concerning the validity of the justifications that have been given for including particular subjects or topics in the offerings of formal educational institutions.

(Why is evolution included, or excluded, as a topic within the standard high school subject Biology? Why is Driver Education part of the high school curriculum, and methods of birth control usually not-even though sex has an impact on the life of teenagers that at least is comparable to the impact of car-driving? Is the justification that is given for teaching Economics in some schools coherent and convincing? Does the justification for not including the Holocaust or the phenomenon of wartime atrocities in the curriculum in some countries stand up to critical scrutiny?)

The different justifications for particular items of curriculum content that have been put forward by philosophers and others since Plato's brilliant pioneering efforts all draw upon, explicitly or implicitly, the positions that the respective theorists hold about at least three sets of issues. First, what are the aims and/or functions of education (aims and functions are not necessarily the same), or alternatively, what constitutes the good life and human flourishing. These two formulations are related, for presumably our educational institutions should aim to equip individuals to pursue this good life. Thus, for example, if our view of human flourishing includes the capacity to act rationally and/or autonomously, then the case can be made that educational institutions-and their curricula-should aim to prepare, or help to prepare, autonomous individuals. How this is to be done, of course, is not immediately obvious, and much philosophical ink has been spilled on the matter.

One influential line of argument was developed by Paul Hirst, who argued that knowledge is essential for developing a conception of the good life, and then for pursuing it; and because logical analysis shows-he argued-that there are seven basic forms of knowledge, the case can be made that the function of the curriculum is to introduce students to each of these forms. Luckily for Hirst, the typical British high school day was made up of seven instructional periods.

Second, is it justifiable to treat the curriculum of an educational institution as vehicle for furthering the socio-political interests and goals of a ruler or ruling class; and relatedly, is it justifiable to design the curriculum so that it serves as a medium of control or of social engineering? In the closing decades of the twentieth century there were numerous discussions of curriculum theory, particularly from Marxist and postmodern perspectives, that offered the sobering

analysis that in many educational systems, including those in Western democracies, the curriculum did indeed reflect, and serve, the interests of the ruling class. Michael Apple is typical:

... the knowledge that now gets into schools is already a choice from a much larger universe of possible social knowledge and principles. It is a form of cultural capital that comes from somewhere, that often reflects the perspectives and beliefs of powerful segments of our social collectivity. In its very production and dissemination as a public and economic commodity-as books, films, materials, and so forth-it is repeatedly filtered through ideological and economic commitments. Social and economic values, hence, are already embedded in the design of the institutions we work in, in the 'formal corpus of school knowledge' we preserve in our curricula.

Third, should educational programmes at the elementary and secondary levels be made up of a number of disparate offerings, so that individuals with different interests and abilities and affinities for learning can pursue curricula that are suitable? Or should every student pursue the same curriculum as far as each is able-a curriculum, it should be noted, that in past cases nearly always was based on the needs or interests of those students who were academically inclined or were destined for elite social roles. Mortimer Adler and others in the late twentieth century (who arguably were following Plato's lead in the *Republic*), sometimes used the aphorism "the best education for the best is the best education for all".

The thinking here can be explicated in terms of the analogy of an out-of-control virulent disease, for which there is only one type of medicine available; taking a large dose of this medicine is extremely beneficial, and the hope is that taking only a little-while less effective-is better than taking none at all! Medically, this probably is dubious, while the educational version-forcing students to work, until they exit the system, on topics that do not interest them and for which they have no facility or motivation-has even less merit.

It is interesting to compare the modern "one curriculum track for all" position with Plato's system outlined in the *Republic*, according to which all students-and importantly this included girls-set out on the same course of study. Over time, as they moved up the educational ladder it would become obvious that some had reached the limit imposed upon them by nature, and they would be directed off into appropriate social roles in which they would find fulfilment, for their abilities would match the demands of these roles. Those who continued on with their education would eventually be able to contemplate the metaphysical realm of the "forms", thanks to their advanced training in mathematics and philosophy. Having seen the form of the Good, they would be eligible after a period of practical experience to become members of the ruling class of Guardians.

Rousseau, Dewey, and the Progressive Movement

Plato's educational scheme was guided, presumably, by the understanding he thought he had achieved of the transcendental realm of fixed "forms". John Dewey, ever a strong critic of positions that were not naturalistic, or that incorporated a priori premises, commented as follows:

Plato's starting point is that the organisation of society depends ultimately upon knowledge of the end of existence. If we do not know its end, we shall be at the mercy of accident and caprice.... And only those who have rightly trained minds will be able to recognise the end, and ordering principle of things. (Dewey, 1916, 102-3)

Furthermore, as Dewey again put it, Plato "had no perception of the uniqueness of individuals.... they fall by nature into classes", which masks the "infinite diversity of active tendencies" which individuals harbour (104). In addition, Plato tended to talk of learning using the passive language of seeing, which has shaped our discourse down to the present (witness "Now I see it!" when a difficult point has become clear).

In contrast, for Dewey each individual was an organism situated in a biological and social environment in which problems were constantly emerging, forcing the individual to reflect and act, and learn. Dewey, following William James, held that knowledge arises from reflection upon our actions; and the worth of a putative item of knowledge is directly correlated with the problem-solving success of the actions performed under its guidance. Thus Dewey, sharply disagreeing with Plato, regarded knowing as an active rather than a passive affair—a strong theme in his writings is his opposition to what is sometimes called "the spectator theory of knowledge". All this is made clear enough in a passage containing only a thinly-veiled allusion to Plato's famous analogy of the prisoners in the cave whose eyes are turned to the light by education:

In schools, those under instruction are too customarily looked upon as acquiring knowledge as theoretical spectators, minds which appropriate knowledge by direct energy of intellect. The very word pupil has almost come to mean one who is engaged not in having fruitful experiences but in absorbing knowledge directly. Something which is called mind or consciousness is severed from the physical organs of activity.

This passage also illuminates a passage that many have found puzzling: "philosophy is the theory of education" (387). For in the sentences above it is easy to see the tight link between Dewey's epistemology and his views on education—his anti-spectator epistemology morphs directly into advocacy for anti-spectator learning by students in school—students learn by being active enquirers. Over the past few decades this view of learning has inspired a major tradition of research by educational psychologists, and related theory-development (the "situated cognition" framework); and these bodies of work have in turn led to innovative efforts in curriculum development.

The final important difference with Plato is that, for Dewey, each student is an individual who blazes his or her unique trail of growth; the teacher has the task of guiding and facilitating this growth, without imposing a fixed end upon the process. Dewey sometimes uses the term "curriculum" to mean "the funded wisdom of the human race", the point being that over the course of human history an enormous stock of knowledge and skills has accumulated and the teacher has the task of helping the student to make contact with this repertoire-

but helping by facilitating rather than by imposing. (All this, of course, has been the subject of intense discussion among philosophers of education: Does growth imply a direction? Is growth always good-can't a plant end up misshapen, and can't a child develop to become bad? Is Dewey some type of perfectionist? Is his philosophy too vague to offer worthwhile educational guidance? Isn't it possible for a "Deweyan" student to end up without enough relevant knowledge and skills to be able to make a living in the modern world?)

Dewey's work was of central importance for the American progressive education movement in its formative years, although there was a fair degree of misunderstanding of his ideas as progressives interpreted his often extremely dense prose to be saying what they personally happened to believe. Nevertheless, Dewey became the "poster child" or the "house philosopher" of progressive education, and if he didn't make it onto many actual posters he certainly made it onto a postage stamp.

His popularity, however, sharply declined after the Soviets launched Sputnik, for Dewey and progressive education were blamed for the USA losing the race into space (illustrating the point about scapegoating made at the start of this essay). But he did not remain in disgrace for long; and for some time has been the focus of renewed interest-although it is still noticeable that commentators interpret Dewey to be holding views that mirror their own positions or interests. And interestingly, there now is slightly more interest in Dewey on the part of philosophers of education in the UK than there was in earlier years, and there is growing interest by philosophers from the Continent.

To be a poster child for progressivism, however, is not to be the parent. Rather than to Dewey, that honour must go to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and to his educational novel written in soaring prose, *Emile* (1762). Starting with the premise that "God makes all things good; man meddles with them and they become evil" (Rousseau, 1955, 5), Rousseau held that contemporary man has been misshapen by his education; the "crushing force" of social conventions has stifled the "Nature within him". The remedy adopted in the novel is for the young Emile to be taken to his family estate in the country where, away from the corrupting influence of society, and under the watchful eye of his tutor, "everything should ... be brought into harmony with these natural tendencies". (This idea of education according to nature, it will be recalled, was the object of Hardie's analytic attention almost two centuries later.) Out in the countryside, rather than having a set curriculum that he is forced to follow, Emile learns when some natural stimulus or innate interest motivates him-and under these conditions learning comes easily. He is allowed to suffer the natural consequences of his actions (if he breaks a window, he gets cold; if he takes the gardener's property, the gardener will no longer do him favours), and experiences such as these lead to the development of his moral system.

Although Rousseau never intended these educational details to be taken literally as a blueprint (he saw himself as developing and illustrating the basic principles), over the ages there have been attempts to implement them, one

being the famous British "free school", A.S. Neill's Summerhill. (It is worth noting that Neill claimed not to have read Rousseau; but he was working in a milieu in which Rousseau's ideas were well-known-intellectual influence can follow a less than direct path.) Furthermore, over the ages these principles also have proven to be fertile soil for philosophers of education to till.

Even more fertile ground for comment, in recent years, has been Rousseau's proposal for the education of girls, developed in a section of the novel (Book V) that bears the name of the young woman who is destined to be Emile's soul-mate, Sophy. The puzzle has been why Rousseau—who had been so far-sighted in his discussion of Emile's education—was so hide-bound if not retrograde in his thinking about her education. One short quotation is sufficient to illustrate the problem: "If woman is made to please and to be in subjection to man, she ought to make herself pleasing in his eyes and not provoke him ...her strength is in her charms" (324).

The educational principles developed by Rousseau and Dewey, and numerous educational theorists and philosophers in the interregnum, are alive and well in the twenty-first century. Of particular contemporary interest is the evolution that has occurred of the progressive idea that each student is an active learner who is pursuing his or her own individual educational path. By incorporating elements of the classical empiricist epistemology of John Locke, this progressive principle has become transformed into the extremely popular position known as constructivism, according to which each student in a classroom constructs his or her own individual body of understandings even when all in the group are given what appears to be the same stimulus or educational experience. (A consequence of this is that a classroom of thirty students will have thirty individually-constructed, and possibly different, bodies of "knowledge", in addition to that of the teacher!)

There is also a solipsistic element here, for constructivists also believe that none of us-teachers included-can directly access the bodies of understandings of anyone else; each of us is imprisoned in a world of our own making. It is an understatement to say that this poses great difficulties for the teacher. The education journals of the past two decades contain many thousands of references to discussions of this position, which elsewhere I claimed has become a type of educational "secular religion"; for reasons that are hard to discern it is particularly influential in mathematics and science education.

4

Thoughts on Various Aspects of Education

MOTHER TONGUE FUNDAMENTAL

I must cling to my mother tongue as to my mother's breast, in spite of its shortcomings. It alone can give me the life-giving milk.

National Language

It behoves us to devote attention to a consideration of a national language, as we have done to that of the medium of instruction. If English is to become a national language, it ought to be treated as a compulsory subject. Can English become the national language? Some learned patriots contend that even to raise the question betrays ignorance. In their opinion, English already occupies that place. His Excellency the Viceroy in his recent utterance has merely expressed a hope that English will occupy that place. His enthusiasm does not take him as far as that of the former. His Excellency believes that English will day after day command a larger place, will permeate the family circle, and at last rise to the status of a national language. A superficial consideration will support the viceregal contention. The condition of our educated classes gives one the impression that all our activities would come to a stand-still if we stop the use of English. And yet deeper thought will show that English can never and ought not to become the national language of India. What is the test of national language?

1. For the official class it should be easy to learn.
2. The religious, commercial and political activity throughout India should be possible in that language.
3. It should be the speech of the majority of the inhabitants of India.
4. For the whole of the country it should be easy to learn.
5. In considering the question, weight ought not to be put upon momentary of shortlived conditions.

The English language does not fulfil any of the conditions above-named. The first ought to have been the last, but I have purposely given it the first place, because that condition alone gives it the appearance of being applicable to the English language. But upon further consideration we should find that for the officials even at the present moment it is not an easy language to learn. In our scheme of administration, it is assumed that the number of English officials will progressively decrease, so that in the end only the Viceroy and others whom one may count on one's finger-tips will be English. The majority are of Indian nationality today, and their number must increase.

And every one will admit that for them, English is more difficult to be learnt than any Indian language. Upon an examination of the second condition, we find that until the public at large can speak English, religious activity through that tongue is an impossibility. And a spread of English to that extent among the masses seems also impossible.

English cannot satisfy the third condition, because the majority in India do not speak it.

The fourth, too, cannot be satisfied by English, because it is not an easy language to learn for the whole of India.

Considering the last condition we observe that the position that English occupies today is momentary. The permanent condition is that there will be little necessity for English in national affairs. It will certainly be required for imperial affairs. That, therefore, it will be an imperial language, the language of diplomacy, is a different question. For that purpose its knowledge is a necessity. We are not jealous of English. All that is contended for is, that it ought not to be allowed to go beyond its proper sphere. And as it will be the imperial language, we shall compel our Malaviyajis, our Shastriars and our Banerjees to learn it. And we shall feel assured that they will advertise the greatness of India in other parts of the world. But English cannot become the national language of India. To give it that place is like an attempt to introduce Esperanto. In my opinion, it is unmanly even to think that English can become our national language. The attempt to introduce Esperanto merely betrays ignorance. Then which is the language that satisfies all the five conditions? We shall be obliged to admit that Hindi satisfies all those conditions.

I call that language Hindi which Hindus and Mohammedans in the North speak and write, either in the Devanagari or the Urdu character. Exception has been taken to this definition. It seems to be argued that Hindi and Urdu are different languages. This is not a valid argument. In the Northern parts of India,

Mussalmans and Hindus speak the same language. The literate classes have created a division. The learned Hindus have Sanskritized Hindi. The Mussalmans, therefore, cannot understand it. The Moslems of Lucknow have Persianized their speech and made it unintelligible to the Hindus. These represent two excesses of the same language. They find no common place in the speech of the masses. I have lived in the North. I have freely mixed with Hindus and Mohammedans and although I have but a poor knowledge of Hindi, I have never found any difficulty in holding communion with them. Call the language of the North what you will, Urdu or Hindi, it is the same. If you write it in the Urdu character, you may know it as Urdu. Write the same thing in the Nagari character and it is Hindi.

There, therefore, remains a difference about the script. For the time being Mohammedan children will certainly write in the Urdu character, and Hindus will mostly write in the Devanagari. I say mostly, because thousands of Hindus use the Urdu character, and some do not even know the Nagari character. But when Hindus and Mohammedans come to regard one another without suspicion, when the causes begetting suspicion are removed, that script which has greater vitality will be more universally used, and therefore, become the national script. Meanwhile those Hindus and Mohammedans who desire to write their petitions in the Urdu character, should be free to do so and should have the right of having them accepted at the seat of the National Government.

There is not another language capable of competing with Hindi in satisfying the five conditions. Bengali comes next to Hindi. But the Bengalis themselves make use of Hindi outside Bengal. No one wonders to see a Hindi-speaking man making use of Hindi, no matter where he goes. Hindu preachers and Mohammedan Moulvis deliver their religious discourses throughout India in Hindi and Urdu and even the illiterate masses follow them. Even the unlettered Gujarati going to the North, attempts to use a few Hindi words whereas a gate-keeper from the North declines to speak in Gujarati even to his employer, who has on that account to speak to him in broken Hindi. I have heard Hindi spoken even in the Dravid country. It is not true to say that in Madras one can go on with English. Even there I have employed Hindi with effect. In the trains I have heard Madras passengers undoubtedly use Hindi. It is worthy of note that Mohammedans throughout India speak Urdu and they are to be found in large numbers in every Province. Thus Hindi is destined to be the national language. We have made use of it as such in times gone by. The rise of Urdu itself is due to that fact. The Mohammedan kings were unable to make Persian or Arabic the national language. They accepted the Hindi grammar but employed the Urdu character and Persian words in their speeches. They could not, however, carry on their intercourse with the masses through a foreign tongue. All this is not unknown to the English. Those who know anything of the sepoy, know that for them military terms have had to be prepared in Hindi or Urdu.

Thus we see that Hindi alone can become the national language. It presents some difficulty in the case of the learned classes in Madras. For men from the

Deccan, Gujarat, Sind and Bengal it is easy enough. In a few months they can acquire sufficient command over Hindi to enable them to carry on national intercourse in that tongue. It is not so for the Tamils. The Dravidian languages are distinct from their Sanskrit sister in structure and grammar. The only thing common to the two groups is their Sanskrit vocabulary to an extent. But the difficulty is confined to the learned class alone. We have a right to appeal to their patriotic spirit and expect them to put forth sufficient effort in order to learn Hindi. For in future when Hindi has received State recognition, it will be introduced as a compulsory language in Madras as in other Provinces, and intercourse between Madras and them will then increase. English has not permeated the Dravidian masses. Hindi, however, will take no time.

Religious Education

The question of religious education is very difficult. Yet we cannot do without it. India will never be godless. Rank atheism cannot flourish in this land. The task is indeed difficult. My head begins to turn as I think of religious education. Our religious teachers are hypocritical and selfish; they will have to be approached. The Mullas, the Dasturs and the Brahmins hold the key in their hands, but if they will not have the good sense, the energy that we have derived from English education will have to be devoted to religious education. This is not very difficult. Only the fringe of the ocean has been polluted, and it is those who are within the fringe who alone need cleaning.

We who come under this category can even cleanse ourselves, because my remarks do not apply to the millions. In order to restore India to its pristine condition, we have to return to it.

AIMS OF EDUCATION AND NATIONALISM

Education is just a means. If it is not accompanied by truthfulness, firmness, patience and other virtues, it remains sterile, and sometimes does harm instead of good. The object of education is not to be able to earn money, but to improve oneself and to serve the country. If this object is not realized, it must be taken that the money spent on education has been wasted.

Public Good

The Indian community has a moral to learn from this case. Without the right kind of education, the community will not only remain backward, but become increasingly so. Education in England, the study of English, world history and of the sciences—all these are essential in the world of today. Without them one is crippled. It is also necessary to learn how to put the knowledge thus acquired to proper use. In itself knowledge is only a means.

It can be employed for good, for making money, and in the service of public causes. Knowledge is justified only when it is put to good use and employed in the public cause. Otherwise, as we pointed out once earlier and as everyone will readily admit, it is like poison.

National Service

Pupils are to receive education which will incline them to do nothing but national service when their studies are over. If, on growing up, they leave the Ashram, the education will have failed to that extent. Should any occasion of the kind arise, the student will be free [to follow his inclination]. It is not the aim, however, that the students should return to their parents and get lost in the sea of practical affairs.

Manliness and Self-Respect

If education is to be bought at the price of manliness and self-respect, the price is too heavy. "Man does not live by bread alone." Self-respect and character are above means of livelihood or a career. I am sorry that so many students have taken their expulsion so much to heart. The parents as well as students must revise their ideas about education. Education is treated merely as a means of earning a livelihood and acquiring a status in society. These are not unworthy ambitions. But they are not everything in life. There are many other honourable means of acquiring wealth and status. There are many independent activities in life which one may undertake without having to contemplate loss of self-respect. And there is no better or cleaner passport to status in society than honesty and selfless service of fellow-beings. If, therefore, after due effort, the college door remains banged in the students' faces, they should not lose heart but seek other means of livelihood. And if the other students will empty the recalcitrant colleges as a matter of respectful protest, they and India will not be losers, but both will be considerable gainers.

Service of Humanity

In asking them to study the lives of lawyers like Ghose, Mahatma Gandhi asked them not merely to be satisfied with the heritage those great lawyers had left for them, but wished the present generation to do better. They should become the poor man's friend in every sense and then alone would they be able to justify the legal profession. Their end was not to get more than a decent livelihood or how to shine in life, but to serve humanity in order to serve the motherland. They ought not to become lawyers in order to increase cases. The education they received ought not to be prostituted to the base use of earning a livelihood, it ought to be used to promote moral growth to enable them to realize themselves, to understand that there was the Maker who saw everything and registered all thoughts, pure and impure, and the learning they derived should be dedicated to a vigorous self-analysis and not prostituted.

Wholesome Educational Environment

That boy will grow into a courageous, healthy and service-minded boy, provided he gets a wholesome, environment.¹ His body as well as his mind will develop in right proportion. He will be free of any fraud or immorality. Staying

in the village he will serve the villagers and will be content to live on the subsistence provided by the villagers. Through his service and the knowledge acquired by him he will provide proper guidance to the people around him and thus train more young men. I expect that a student trained under the Nayee Talim would develop on these lines.

Fasting as Penance

Day by day it became increasingly clear to me how very difficult it was to bring up and educate boys and girls in the right way. If I was to be their real teacher and guardian, I must touch their hearts, I must share their joys and sorrows, I must help them to solve the problems that faced them, and I must take along the right channel the surging aspirations of their youth.

I hold, however, that some occasions do call for this drastic remedy. But it presupposes clearness of vision and spiritual fitness. Where there is no true love between the teacher and the pupil, where the pupil's delinquency has not touched the very being of the teacher and where the pupil has no respect for the teacher, fasting is out of place and may even be harmful. Though there is thus room for doubting the propriety of fasts in such cases, there is no question about the teacher's responsibility for the errors of his pupil.

EXPERIMENTS ON EDUCATION IN INDIA

Shantiniketan

From Rajkot I proceeded to Shantiniketan. The teachers and students overwhelmed me with affection. The reception was a beautiful combination of simplicity, art and love. The Phoenix family had been assigned separate quarters at Shantiniketan. Maganlal Gandhi was at their head, and he had made it his business to see that all the rules of the Phoenix Ashram should be scrupulously observed. I saw that, by dint of his love, knowledge and perseverance, he had made his fragrance felt in the whole of Shantiniketan.

Andrews was there, and also Pearson. Amongst the Bengali teachers with whom we came in fairly close contact were Jagadanandbabu, Nepalbabu, Santoshbabu, Kshitimohanbabu, Nagenbabu, Sharadbabu and Kalibabu. As is my wont, I quickly mixed with the teachers and students, and engaged them in a discussion on self-help. I put it to the teachers that, if they and the boys dispensed with the services of paid cooks and cooked their food themselves, it would enable the teachers to control the kitchen from the point of view the boys' physical and moral health, and it would afford to the students an object-lesson in self-help. One or two of them were inclined to shake their heads. Some of them strongly approved of the proposal. The boys welcomed it, if only because of their instinctive taste for novelty. So we launched the experiment. When I invited the Poet to express his opinion, he said that he did not mind it provided the teachers were favourable. To the boys he said, 'The experiment contains the key to Swaraj.'

Pearson began to wear away his body in making the experiment a success. He threw himself into it with zest. A batch was formed to cut vegetables, another to clean the grain, and so on. Nagenbabu and others undertook to see the sanitary cleaning of the kitchen and its surroundings. It was a delight to me to see them working spade in hand.

But it was too much to expect the hundred and twenty-five boys with their teachers to take to this work of physical labour like ducks to water. There used to be daily discussion. Some began early to show fatigue. But Pearson was not the man to be tired. One would always find him with his smiling face doing something or other in or about the kitchen. He had taken upon himself the cleaning of the bigger utensils. A party of students played on their *sitar* before this cleaning party in order to beguile the tedium of the operation. All alike took the thing up with zest and Shantiniketan became a busy hive.

Changes like these when once begun always develop. Not only was the Phoenix party's kitchen self-conducted, but the food cooked in it was of the simplest. Condiments were eschewed. Rice, *dal*, vegetables and even wheat flour were all cooked at one and the same time in a steam cooker. And Shantiniketan boys started a similar kitchen with a view to introducing reform in the Bengali kitchen. One or two teachers and some students ran this kitchen.

The experiment was, however, dropped after some time. I am of opinion that the famous institution lost nothing by having conducted the experiment for a brief interval, and some of the experiences gained could not but be of help to the teachers.

TRUE NATIONAL EDUCATION

Our teachers must be men of high moral character. Conditions must be created to enable the poorest Indian to receive the best possible education. There must be a happy union of literary knowledge and *Dharma*. Education must be related to the conditions of life in our country.

And the heavy burden on the minds of our young men resulting from the use of an alien language as the medium of instruction must be removed. Unless we reshape our education so as to fulfil the foregoing the level of the life of our people cannot be raised.

True national education should be imparted through the language of each province. The teachers must be men of high ability. The school should be located at a place where students would get clean drinking water, pure air and a peaceful atmosphere. The surroundings must be perfectly healthy. The scheme of education must provide for securing to the students a knowledge of the main occupations and religions of India.

[Except]... the first five years of a child's life, the rest of his education is given through a foreign language. Besides, in the first five years, which are in some respects the most useful and of the greatest importance, education is usually imparted by the most ordinary type of teachers. Then begins English. At this stage the boys pass as if into a different world altogether. The education which

is given to them has no relation to the life at home. The boys who till then were quite happy to do their lessons sitting on the ground now have benches. At home, even today, the prevailing custom in most homes is to sit on the floor. Until then, the boy, if he was a Hindu, was content to wear a *dhoti*, a *kurta* and the *angarakha* and, if a Muslim, to wear the *payjamas* instead of the *dhoti*; but now he uses a coat and trousers. Until then, he could do with the homely *kalam*, but now he has a pen with a steel nib. Thus, many significant changes take place in his outer living and a wide gulf divides the home and the school. Gradually, but definitely, this change begins to enter his inner life too. How are these changes in the outer life and the inner mental make-up of the boy going to affect his home and the way his people live at home? His parents have no idea at all as to what sort of education the boy is getting and their faith in that education is negligible.

Parents only know that it will help the boy to earn money. And this satisfies them. If this situation lasts long, we might all become foreigners! What is worse even the Swaraj for which we are struggling may become foreign in character when we finally get it, with the result that the very burden under which we are crushed today may continue even after Swaraj. There is only one way to escape this danger. It is to change and overhaul our system of education. In the national education to be evolved:

1. Education must be imparted through the mother-tongue.
2. There must be accord between the education a child receives at school and the environment of the home.
3. It must be so planned as to meet the needs of the majority of the people.
4. The teachers in primary classes must be competent men of good character right from the first class.
5. Education must be free.
6. Overall control must be in the hands of the people.

Education must be imparted through the mother-tongue. It is a pity that we are required to prove this self-evident truth. If we had not been dazzled by the lure of English, there should have been no need to prove this most obvious truth.

The advocates of English say:

1. It is through English that an awakening has been created in the country.
2. English literature is so rich and vast that to give it up would be a great misfortune. It is not possible to translate it all into our language.
3. We can achieve unity only through English. To try to encourage and promote the different languages of India would amount to disrupting this unity and retarding the growing feeling that we are one nation.
4. English is the language of the rulers.

These are the main arguments of the advocates of English. They have many other things to say, but they have no more substance or importance than is included in the above.

To say that all the awakening we see in the country has been brought about through English is only a half-truth. The fact is that all the education in the

country is being imparted through English. And because the Hindus are not absolute blockheads they have imbibed and utilized the good they have found in it. And yet the overall result which this education has yielded has been disappointing. Everybody admits that the present system of education suffers from some grave defects. We have not received from it the results which we are entitled to expect of an education which has now lasted for more than fifty years. Why is it so? If it had been imparted from the beginning through the mother-tongue it would have produced much good by this time. What only a few English-knowing people know at present would have spread and reached crores of our people—who would have shown the spirit and the strength which is now shown only by the English-knowing handful. At present, our young men, when they pass out of the college, appear to be devoid of all energy and just wander about in search of jobs. Instead, if they had been educated through the mother-tongue, then having been spared the strain of cramming, they would have been stronger both in body and mind and would have therefore rejected Government service as something inferior.

No one suggests that English literature should be given up. We should have translated what is precious in it into our different languages. Japan and South Africa have done it. In Japan, they taught German and French to some who then translated good books from German and French into Japanese. It is not that German has nothing to borrow from English. Even so, not all Germans learn English. No German receives his education through English. Only a few Germans learn English and then translate into German whatever they think will be of value to their nation, and thus serve their mother-tongue. We should do the same.

As to the assumption that we have received a sense of unity by using English, the fact is that we become sharply aware of the illusion of our separateness from one another only after this alien language was introduced into our country, though it may be admitted that once we had seen through that illusion we strove to throw it off and regain our national solidarity. We observe that in many countries the oneness of the people is not always due to the oneness of the language. There are two languages in South Africa. But the people are striving to achieve unity because their interests are the same. Similar is the case with Canada.

In England, Scotland and Wales they still speak three different languages. Mr. Lloyd George is making great efforts to revive Welsh, the language of Wales. And, yet, in all the three parts of Great Britain there is a strong feeling that they are one nation. Development of the regional languages of our country will produce social, political and economic awakening amongst our people. They will have a better appreciation of their condition and position in the picture of the wider whole of the country.

They will know that though belonging to different provinces they are sailing in the same boat. Thus they will forget differences of language, appreciate the unity of their interests and be ready to fight for it, and protect it from dangers.

Besides, the better educated amongst us will have to learn Hindi—as the common medium of speech. The effort required to learn Hindi is as nothing compared to that needed to learn English.

That English is the language of the rulers proves nothing beyond the fact that some of us have to master this alien tongue. I do not dislike English; I am only pleading that it be put in its proper place. Then, we can truly appreciate its merits, and derive such benefit as we can. It cannot, however, continue to be the medium of our education; nor can it be the language of inter-provincial communication. In our schools and colleges we must provide for imparting even the highest education through the mother-tongue.

There must be accord between the education given in the school and the home. The reason for this is obvious. Today, there is no such accord between the two. In national education, we must see that such accord is achieved and maintained.

We will now pass on to the third attribute of national education, namely, that *it should be so designed as to meet the needs of the majority of the people.* The great bulk of our people are peasants. So, if our boys had been given, from the very beginning, a knowledge of agriculture and weaving and if they had cultivated an appreciation of the needs of these two classes, and if these classes had received the scientific training in these vocations, our peasants today would have been happy and prosperous. Our cattle would not have been weak and diseased as they are today. Our peasants would not have been crushed with the weight of debt—incurred by poverty. Our produce would not have first gone to foreign countries as raw material and then brought back to us in the shape of finished goods to drain us of wealth. Today, we feel ashamed of such a state of affairs. We could not have paid England 85 crores rupees a year for cotton cloth. The prevailing system of education has made slaves of us instead of masters.

In the lower stages of primary education teachers must be men of high character. There is a proverb in English: ‘The child is the father of the man.’ We have a similar proverb: ‘A child, even while in the cradle, shows signs of what he is going to be in the future.’ If we entrust our children, in their most impressionable years, to incompetent teachers, we have no right to expect that they will grow to be men of good and strong character. That would be as absurd as to sow the seeds of *kauvach* and expect from them the flowers of *mogra*. We must procure the best teachers for our children whatever it may cost. In ancient times, our children received their education from learned and wise *Rishis* and *Munis*.

The fifth requirement of national education is that it *should be free*. Education should not be made to depend on money. Just as the sun gives light to all equally and rain pours down for all, even so learning must be made available to all.

Lastly, *the people themselves must have control over the planning and carrying out of education.* In the exercise of this control lies education too. People will then have faith in the education meted out to their children, and feel

their responsibility towards it. When this stage is reached and education occupies an important place in the life of our people, it will be possible for us to obtain Swaraj with no trouble at all. Therefore, it is our duty to initiate such education. It is also our right to ask the Government for it. But we can approach the Government about this matter only after we start the ball rolling ourselves. However, it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the steps we should take for organizing such a type of national education. Let people first accept the view expressed herein.

NATIONAL HIGHER EDUCATION

I have done a good many things in my life; some of them I feel proud of, though some others I regret. A few of them were very responsible undertakings. But I should like to state here—I am sure I am guilty of no exaggeration—that nothing I have done so far can stand comparison with what we are about to do today. I am aware of a great risk in this undertaking, but not because I fear that it may prove harmful to the nation; what pains me, or rather the incongruity I feel, is this that I am not fit for the task I have undertaken. I do not say this as a matter of formality, I speak from the heart. If I knew that the present undertaking related to education in the real sense of the term, this preface would not have been necessary. This Mahavidyalaya is not being established with the sole object of imparting education; it [also] aims at helping the student to acquire a means of livelihood and when, in this respect, I compare it with Gujarat College and other similar institutions, I simply shudder.

In this, too, I am not exaggerating. What comparison is possible between Gujarat College and other similar colleges, on the one hand, and this small Mahavidyalaya of ours? To my mind, of course, it is great, but I am afraid that in your eyes, as you compare this Vidyalaya with the colleges you have in India, this Maha-vidyalaya¹ probably appears an Anuvidyalaya². You are very likely thinking in terms of brick and mortar. Of this, to be sure, I see more in Gujarat College.

Today, not an inch of the ground is ours. Everything belongs to the Government. This land, these trees, everything belongs to Government, even this body, and I have now begun to doubt whether our soul also is ours. Placed in this pitiable condition, why go looking for good buildings to house our Mahavidyalaya? How can we afford to wait till we had found men of great learning? Even if the most ignorant of ignorant men, a mere simpleton, were to come forward and could succeed in convincing us that our *atman* had been starved, that this country had lost its light—its knowledge of things of the spirit—I would appoint him as the principal. I am not sure that you would be ready to appoint a shepherd as principal and so we have had to find Shri Gidwani¹. I have not been attracted by the position he occupied. Perhaps you do not know him apart from that position. I should, however, like you to adopt a different criterion, some another touchstone, for judging the worth of this Vidyalaya if you test it on the common touchstone, it will seem to be brass but it will be found to be gold if you test it on the touchstone of character.

The coming together of [talented] men for educational work here is like the holy confluence of rivers. We have men of character assembled here. Fine men from Sind, Maharashtra and Gujarat have banded together here. How could we have, ordinarily, secured this?

I shall first address my prayer to the sisters and brothers who have come here for the function. You are witnesses to the establishment of this Mahavidyalaya. If there are any among you who feel that what is taking place is a farce, I would ask them not to be so conscientious and sit through the function. They should remain only if they wish to give their blessings. With the blessings of you all, the Mahavidyalaya will earn a name as a great institution. But they should not be blessings merely uttered with the lips; bless it from your heart. This you can do only by offering your sons and daughters to the institution. People in India have plenty of capacity to contribute money. In no field is progress held up for lack of funds. It is held up for want of men—of teachers or leaders, or if a leader is forthcoming, for want of pupils, *i.e.*, soldiers. It is my belief that, if the leader is worthy, there will be no lack of soldiers. A carpenter will not quarrel with his tools, however bad they may be. He will handle the bluntest of them with the utmost ease. Likewise, if the leader is a real artisan, whatever the quality of the material, he will produce gold from it, will produce gold from the country's clay. This is my prayer to the principal.

You, principal and teachers, have been inspired by one ideal only in joining this institution. You have undertaken to secure freedom through the miracle not of learning but of character, secure it not by meeting the Government, sword against its shining sword, but with peaceful, spiritual effort—howsoever imperfect it be—against its aggressive, Satanic way. We want just now to sow the seed of freedom and afterwards we will water the plant and rear it into a tree. This tree can be raised only through character, with pure, spiritual strength. So long as the principal and the teachers go on working with their eyes on this one aim, we shall never be put to shame. May God justify in your experience the faith which is mine. Were it not for this unshakable faith of mine, I would not at all have accepted the sacred position of chancellor. I am ready to live and die for this cause, thinking that to die in this cause is to live; it is because I know that this is also true of you that I live among you and have accepted this exalted position.

We are establishing this Vidyalaya, not with an educational, but with a national aim in view. Advising that students be taught to cultivate strength and character, I have been saying everywhere that in the measure we succeed with them we shall make ourselves fit for Swaraj in the country. Swaraj cannot be secured in any other way. No amount of money we can spend or strength of character we can employ to ensure the success of such colleges will be enough.

This is a time not for words but for action. I have placed my thoughts before you as they came. I asked of you what you could give. Now I shall ask something of the students as well. There is no doubt at all that they have in them the courage which takes risks. I shall not look upon them—upon those who have

already joined—as mere students and, therefore, I will not treat them as being free from responsibility. Those who have registered their names here are half teachers. It is they who have provided the foundation for the Mahavidyalaya. It is on them that the structure of the institution has been raised. Had they not joined, this Mahavidya-laya could not have been started. They also, therefore, share equal responsibility. You are equal partners in this and, if you do not play your part well, no efforts on the part of the teachers will succeed or, at any rate, succeed completely. Students who have left their colleges should understand why they have joined here and what they should expect to gain. May God grant them the strength to go on with their work, no matter how long this grim war continues. If they do, I am sure that, even if they are a mere handful, this Mahavidyalaya will shine forth and be a model institution for the whole country.

The reason will not be that Gujarat has wealth or that it has learning; it will be rather, that non-co-operation had its origin here. The seed was sown and watered here, the required *tapas-charaya* was performed here. Do not think from this that I am a conceited man to speak in this manner, or that all the *tapascharaya* has been mine and the seed was sown by me. I merely gave the *mantra*, I fulfilled the function of a *rishi*, if a *Vanik's* son can do so.

I have done nothing more than this. The planting was done by my co-workers. It is because their faith was greater than mine that we have succeeded. I claim the knowledge which comes from direct perception. Even if the gods came down and tried to persuade me to the contrary, my faith would not be shaken. As surely as I see, with my eyes, the trees in front of me, so surely I know that there is no salvation for India except through non-violent non-co-operation. As for my co-workers, however, they have believed this through logic or reasoning or accepted it on faith.

My co-workers have laid the foundation. Many of them are Gujaratis; there are Maharashtrians, too, but having been in Gujarat, they have become half or three-quarters Gujaratis or, perhaps, more Gujaratis than the Gujaratis themselves. They have made this a weapon of shining strength. We have not yet seen all its miraculous power. Within six months, you will see more of the miraculous power of this programme for which young girls handed over their bangles to me. But the source of it all—the visible image—is this Mahavidyalaya. Hindus are worshippers of images and we are proud of being so. This image has its various limbs: one of them is the chancellor and that is myself. The teachers, the principal and the students are other limbs. I am, myself, an old man, a withering leaf, and busy with other work. The falling away of such a leaf as I am can do no harm to a tree. The principal and the teachers, too, are no more than leaves, though green leaves as yet. In a short while, they also will grow old and, perhaps, fall off. The students, however, are the branches of this beautiful tree and it is on them that principals and teachers will grow as leaves.

I request them to put the same faith in their teachers as they do in me. Should they, however, see that the principal or any of the teachers is weak, let them burn him to ashes with the fire which was Prahlad's and go ahead with their work. This is my prayer to God and my blessings to the students.

I shall end with a prayer to God and I want you all to say “amen” to it. Join me in my prayer, all of you, with a pure heart, “God! Make this Mahavidyalaya of such worth that through it we may win the freedom for which we offer prayers day and night and grant it that, through that freedom, not only India but the entire world, in which India is but a dot, may be happy.”

Self-supporting Education

In spite of the weak state of his health and the quantities of rest that he needs, Gandhiji has shown his readiness to discuss his theory of self-supporting education with anyone who has thought about the subject and wants to contribute his share to making the new experiment a success. The discussions have been, in view of his health, necessarily few and brief, but every now and then something new has emerged, and whenever he has talked, he has had some fresh suggestion to make and fresh light to throw. Thus on one occasion he sounded a warning against the assumption that the idea of self-supporting education sprang from the necessity of achieving total prohibition as soon as possible. “Both are independent necessities,” he said. “You have to start with the conviction that total prohibition has to be achieved revenue or no revenue, education or no education. Similarly, you have to start with the conviction that looking to the needs of the villages of India our rural education ought to be made self-supporting if it is to be compulsory.”

“I have the first conviction deep down in me,” said an educationist who carried on the discussion. “Prohibition to me is an end in itself, and I regard it as a great education in itself. I should, therefore, sacrifice education altogether to make prohibition a success. But the other conviction is lacking. I cannot yet believe that education can be made self-supporting.”

“There, too, I want you to start with the conviction. The ways and means will come as you begin to work it out. I regret that I woke up to the necessity of this at this very late age. Otherwise I should have made the experiment myself. Even now, God willing, I shall do what I can to show that it can be self-supporting. But my time has been taken up by other things all these years, equally important perhaps; but it is this stay in Segaoon that brought the conviction home to me. We have up to now concentrated on stuffing children’s minds with all kinds of information, without ever thinking of stimulating and developing them. Let us now cry a halt and concentrate on educating the child properly through manual work, not as a side activity, but as the prime means of intellectual training.”

“I see that too. But why should it also support the school?”

“That will be the test of its value. The child at the age of 14, that is, after finishing a seven years’ course, should be discharged as an earning unit. Even now the poor people’s children automatically lend a helping hand to their parents—the feeling at the back of their minds being, what shall my parents eat and what shall they give me to eat if I do not also work with them? That is an education in itself. Even so the State takes charge of the child at seven and returns it to the family as an earning unit. You impart education and simultaneously cut at the root of unemployment. You have to train the boys in

one occupation or another. Round this special occupation you will train up his mind, his body, his writing, his artistic sense, and so on. He will be master of the craft he learns.”

“But supposing a boy takes up the art and science of making Khadi. Do you think it must occupy him all the seven years to master the craft?”

“Yes. It must, if he will not learn it mechanically. Why do we give years to the study of history or to the study of languages? Is a craft any the less important than these subjects which have been up to now given an artificial importance?”

“But as you have been mainly thinking of spinning and weaving, evidently you are thinking of making of these schools so many weaving schools. A child may have no aptitude for weaving and may have it for something else.”

“Quite so. Then we will teach him some other craft. But you must know that one school will not teach many crafts. The idea is that we should have one teacher for twenty-five boys, and you may have as many classes or schools of twenty-five boys as you have teachers available, and have each of these schools specializing in a separate craft—carpentry, smithy, tanning or shoe-making. Only you must bear in mind the fact that you develop the child’s mind through each of these crafts. And I would emphasize one more thing. You must forget the cities and concentrate on the villages. They are an ocean. The cities are a mere drop in the ocean. That is why you cannot think of subjects like brick-making. If they must be civil and mechanical engineers, they will after the seven years’ course go to the special colleges meant for these higher and specialized courses.

“And let me emphasize one more fact. We are apt to think lightly of the village crafts because we have divorced educational from manual training. Manual work has been regarded as something inferior, and owing to the wretched distortion of the *varna* we came to regard spinners and weavers and carpenters and shoe-makers as belonging to the inferior castes, the proletariat. We have had no Cromptons and Hargreaves because of this vicious system of considering the crafts as something inferior, divorced from the skilled. If they had been regarded as callings having an independent status that learning enjoyed, we should have had great inventors from among our craftsmen. Of course the ‘Spinning Jenny’ led on to the discovery of water-power and other things which made the mill displace the labour of thousands of people. That was, in my view, a monstrosity. We will by concentrating on the villages see that the inventive skill that an intensive learning of the craft will stimulate will subserve the needs of the villages as a whole.”

NAYEE TALEEM

This work of basic education is the last work of my life. If, by the grace of God, it is completed, Hindustan will be totally transformed. The present system of education is useless. Those boys who get their education in schools and colleges, they get only literacy, but over and above literacy something more is needed. If that literacy renders our other parts of the body inactive, I would say

I don't need such literacy. We need black-smiths, carpenters, oil millers, masons, carders, spinners and labourers. In essence, we need persons ready to do all sorts of physical work and along with that literacy for all is also necessary. Knowledge that is confined to a handful of individuals is not useful to me. Now the question is, how could that knowledge be available to all? Nai Talim has emerged from this consideration. I say that Nai Talim should start with the conception by the mother rather than at the age of seven years. Please try to understand its mystery. If mother would be the one inclined to do physical labour, be thoughtful, be systematic, be under self-restraint, her child would inherit her qualities from the time of his very conception.

My definition of *Nayee Taleem* is that if the person who has received *Nayee Taleem*, is enthroned, he would not feel vanity of power, on the other hand, if he is given a broom, he will not feel ashamed. For him both the jobs will be of equal importance. There would be no place to vain rejoicing in his life. None of his actions will be unproductive or useless. No student of *Nayee Taleem* shall be dull, because each part of his body would be active and he would have nice neuro-muscular co-ordination. When the people would do manual labour, there would be no unemployment or starvation. My *Nayee Taleem* and the village industries are mutually complementary. When they both will be a success, we will attain true Swaraj.

Newness and Originality

It is necessary to understand the newness or originality in the Nai Talim. Whatever good there is in the old education will of course, be retained in the *Nayee Taleem*; but there will be enough of the new element besides. If *Nayee Taleem* is really new it should lead to the following results: Our sense of frustration should give place to hope; our penury and starvation to a sufficiency of means to maintain ourselves; unemployment to industry and work; discord to concord. It should enable our sons and daughters to learn to read and write and know along with it a craft through which they will acquire knowledge.

BASIC EDUCATION

This Basic Education has grown out of the atmosphere surrounding us in the country and is in response to it. It is, therefore, designed to cope with that atmosphere. This atmosphere pervades India's seven hundred thousand villages and its millions of inhabitants. Forget them and you forget India. India is not to be found in her cities. It is in her innumerable villages.

The following are the fundamentals of Basic Education:

1. All education to be true must be self-supporting, that is to say, in the end it will pay its expenses excepting the capital which will remain intact.
2. In it the cunning of the hand will be utilized even up to the final stage, that is to say, hands of the pupils will be skilfully working at some industry for some period during the day.

3. All education must be imparted through the medium of the provincial language.
4. In this there is no room for giving sectional religious training. Fundamental universal ethics will have full scope.
5. This education, whether it is confined to children or adults, male or female, will find its way to the homes of the pupils.
6. Since millions of students receiving this education will consider themselves as of the whole of India, they must learn an inter-provincial language. This common inter-provincial speech can only be Hindustani written in Nagari or Urdu script. Therefore, pupils have to master both the scripts.

Basic School Product

Shri Aryanayakam brought nine boys of the 7th class to meet Gandhiji. These had all practically completed their seven years' course in the Sevagram Basic School. They were village lads from Sevagram and the neighbouring villages. Compared to those whom one sees working in the fields and who have never been to school, they were a heartening result of a first endeavour. They were clean, well-groomed, disciplined well-mannered. Gandhiji cracked a few jokes with them which they entered into with merry laughter. One of them had the temerity to ask Gandhiji what type of boys of fourteen he expected to be turned out after a seven years' course at a Basic School? Gandhiji seized the opportunity of telling them that if the school had done its duty by them, boys of fourteen should be truthful, pure and healthy. They should be village-minded. Their brains and hands should have been equally developed. There would be no guile in them. Their intelligence would be keen but they would not be worried about earning money. They would be able to turn their hands to any honest task that came their way. They would not want to go into the cities. Having learnt the lessons of co-operation and service in the school, they would infect their surroundings with the same spirit. They would never be beggars or parasites.

NAYEE TALEEM AND MEDICAL EDUCATION

Being engrossed in her work and being considerate of my time, Ashadevi never takes it unnecessarily. She did, however, come to me for five minutes the day before my departure for Delhi, to ask whether, in my opinion, there was need for teachers in the Talimi Sangh to study medicine and whether she herself should have the same four or five years' course that doctors have.

I at once realized that in spite of utmost trying, it is difficult for one like Ashadevi who has taken her M.A. under the old system of education to break away completely from its influence.

I have no degrees to boast of. And I forgot long ago to attach any value to the little knowledge I acquired in a high school. And I have drunk deep at the fountain of nature cure. So I said to her:

“You say that the first lesson our children have to learn is how to keep fit and how to keep themselves and their surroundings, clean in every respect. I say to

you that all the medical knowledge you require comes into this. Our education is conceived for the crores of villagers, it is for their benefit. They live close to nature, but even so they do not know the laws of nature. What little they know they do not carry out. *Nayee Taleem* is derived from our knowledge of the piteous condition of the villagers. We cannot, therefore, know much about this *Nayee Taleem* from books. What we have hitherto acquired is from the book of nature. In the same way, we have to learn village doctoring from nature too. The essence of nature cure is that we learn the principles of hygiene and sanitation and abide by those laws as well as the laws relating to proper nutrition. Thus does every one become his own doctor. The man who eats to live, who is friends with the five powers, earth, water, ether, sun and air, and who is a servant of God, the Creator of all these, ought not to fall ill. If he does, he will remain calm relying on God and die in peace, if need be. If there are any medical herbs in the fields of his village he may make use of them. Crores live and die like this without a murmur. They have not so much as heard of a doctor, much less seen one face to face. Let us become really village-minded. Village children and adults come to us. Let us teach them how to live truly. Doctors aver that 99 per cent of the patients suffer from diseases due to insanitation, eating the wrong food and under-nourishment. If we can teach this 99 per cent the art of living, we can afford to forget the 1 per cent. They may find a philanthropic doctor like Dr. Sushila Nayyar to look after them. We need not worry about them. Today pure water, good earth, fresh air, are unknown to us. We do not know the inestimable value of ether and the sun. If we make wise use of these five powers and if we eat the proper and balanced diet, we shall have done the work of ages. For acquiring this knowledge, we need neither degrees nor crores of money. What we need are a living faith in God, a zeal for service, an acquaintance with the five powers of nature and a knowledge of dietetics. All this can be acquired without wasting time in schools and colleges.”

5

Philosophy in Elementary School

The reasons most often given for engaging young children in philosophy have to do with strengthening their cognitive and communicative skills, and introducing them to formative ethical and political ideas. These ways in which philosophy is “good for” children are valuable objectives, to be sure, but they all derive from a more primary reason to do philosophy with young children: that it is meaningful for them. Young children are naturally inquisitive. They struggle to make sense of their everyday experience and of the academic, social and cultural knowledge they begin to acquire at school – a process they typically enjoy, at least until it becomes routinized and associated with high-stakes rewards and punishments. Young children’s curiosity and wonderment are easily triggered. They are full of questions – and significantly, many of their questions have philosophical content:

- Is my dog a person?
- Is it fair for the boys to always use the soccer field?
- Is it OK to kill some bugs but not others?
- What did mom mean, that I need to come up with a ‘better reason’?
- Where did grandpa go when he died?
- Why does time move so quickly sometimes and so slowly other times?
- How can anyone think beetles are beautiful?
- What does it mean to be a ‘best friend’?
- Can anyone know everything?

Young children’s experience is already replete with philosophical meaning. They have strong, even visceral, intuitions of what is beautiful and ugly, fair and unfair, right and wrong. They enjoy playing with language and are intrigued

by logical puzzles. They are given to metaphysical speculation and frequently engage in epistemology: asking how we know what we think we know. Indeed, many professional philosophers date their interest in philosophy to their early childhoods. And as children approach adolescence, they begin to confront existential questions such as: What does it all mean? Is life ever fair? and What do I think my life is for?

Elementary school philosophy, therefore, is not about imposing an unfamiliar, ancient and highly intellectual discipline on children, in hopes it might be good for them, but about giving them the opportunity to explore ethical, aesthetic, political, logical and other philosophical aspects of their experiences that are already intensely meaningful for them, but that are not often given attention in schools (or elsewhere). In that regard, the reasons for elementary school philosophy should be the same as those for every other school subject, *e.g.*, science, mathematics, literature and history. We expect these subjects to not only prepare children to study them at advanced levels later in life, but to enrich their lives now with scientific, mathematical, literary, historical – and philosophical – meaning.

OBJECTIVES OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL PHILOSOPHY

Elementary school philosophy draws students' attention to philosophical concepts like fairness, person, mind, beauty, cause, time, number, truth, citizen, good and right – concepts that are already implicated in children's experience, and that children need to make their experiences more meaningful, in both senses of that word: more understandable and richer, more worthwhile. The content of elementary school philosophy, therefore, is not the traditional philosophical problems and arguments that are the stuff of high school and college philosophy courses, or the traditional philosophical sub-disciplines of ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics, political philosophy and logic, or even the important figures in the history of philosophy – though some of this may become meaningful for older children who have some experience with philosophy. An important objective of elementary school philosophy is to help children become conversant with philosophical concepts, and to discern them wherever they arise – sometimes referred to as developing “a philosophical ear.”

As we become more sensitive to the philosophical dimensions of our experiences, what we find are not fixed meanings, but questions, problems and vague opportunities that call for investigation, judgment and action—in a word, inquiry.

As children learn to recognize when situations have an ethical dimension, for example, they begin to wonder about what is good, right or just in those situations, how to resolve conflicting ethical claims, and what kind of community and world they want to help to create. They begin to appreciate that the ways in which they respond in such situations will help determine their ethical outcome, both in terms of whether those situations become more or less good, right or just, and in terms of the kind of persons they are becoming.

The central method of philosophical inquiry is careful thinking, and helping children learn to think well is one of the most important objectives of elementary school philosophy. Philosophy has always been preoccupied with good thinking, logic being one of its oldest branches. While formal logic is beyond the ken of young children, they are very capable of the informal logical operations that constitute basic reasoning, including giving reasons, considering evidence, agreeing and disagreeing, giving examples and counterexamples, and making comparisons and distinctions. Elementary school philosophy should familiarize children with both the concept of inquiry – as an ideal of working towards reasonable judgment – and a number of practical methods and strategies for conducting their own philosophical inquiries. Reasoning, as just described, is one important method.

Another is attempting to discover a wide range of ideas and points of view relevant to the question under consideration, so that our judgments will be well-informed as well as well-reasoned.

One of the most ancient, the most effective and the most widespread methods of philosophical inquiry is dialogue: a conversation centered on a particular question or problem, in which the participants share diverse views about it, clarify each other's thinking, offer multiple possible answers, and test those answers by coming up with reasons for and against them.

The teacher or “facilitator” of these dialogues neither leads the children to a predetermined answer nor attempts to validate every opinion as equally sound. Instead, she models and prompts careful thinking, helps the children to see the structure that emerges in each dialogue, and encourages them to follow the inquiry where it leads, *i.e.*, in the direction of the strongest arguments and evidence. The goal of dialogue is not complete consensus, but that each participant be able to decide what s/he thinks is most reasonable, whether that judgment puts her in league with a majority of her peers, with a minority, or by her/himself.

Dialogue also provides a concentrated opportunity for children to practice important communicative and social skills, such as attentive listening, mindful speech, helping another person express his idea, building on the ideas of others, offering and accepting criticism respectfully, sharing important but unpopular opinions, and self-correcting. Many philosophers and educators have noted the pedagogical benefits of dialogue, which brings its own ethical and rational discipline.

A successful dialogue has energy and a sense of adventure – something even young children avidly enjoy – but it also requires rigorous thinking, wide-ranging participation and the coordination of the participants' various communicative strengths and points of view.

Children who participate in disciplined dialogue learn to overcome shyness, aggression and attention-grabbing behaviours for the sake of cooperating in a kind of group work they find meaningful.

SOME PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR ELEMENTARY SCHOOL PHILOSOPHY

Age

The question is often asked, at what age are children capable of doing philosophy? While no definitive answer to this question has emerged, a number of innovative pre-school and kindergarten programmes have demonstrated that even very young children are able to take turns giving each other reasons they find different insects ugly, scary or beautiful – and to alter their judgments as a result of the conversation. Of course, the objectives and contours of any programme of elementary school philosophy should reflect the children's age and socio-cultural context. Some youngsters may need several months of practice in order to understand the difference between a question, an answer and a reason, or to be comfortable taking turns talking in a group. In any case, philosophical engagement with young children needs to be more playful and multi-sensory than philosophy with older children.

Professional Development

Neither parents nor classroom teachers unfamiliar with philosophy, nor philosophy professors or graduate students unfamiliar with elementary school pedagogy, will necessarily find it easy to engage children in doing philosophy. Teaching elementary school philosophy requires someone who loves ideas but doesn't think s/he knows everything; who listens to children with a sensitive philosophical ear; who thinks carefully and is transparent in doing so; who is procedurally rigorous – asking open-ended questions, posing alternative views, asking for clarification, helping make connections and challenging reasons – but is comfortable with ambiguity; and who sees her/himself as a co-inquirer with the children.

Curriculum

Teachers and students who are new to philosophy may find it advantageous to begin with a curriculum designed specifically for doing philosophy with children. The advantages of such materials are that they make philosophical themes easy to recognize and include reasoning exercises and other philosophical activities. There is a wealth of materials available for introducing philosophy in elementary school classrooms, and many are listed on this website here. Those with greater sensitivity to philosophical themes and skill at reasoning and dialogue may use all manner of materials to stimulate a philosophical inquiry, *e.g.*, film clips, stories the children bring to the classroom, current events, and children's literature. It is important that such materials not only present one or more philosophical themes, but present them as contestable – as something that provokes questioning and inquiry. Preferably, a variety of perspectives on the theme should be represented.

TEACHING MEDITATION TO CLASSES IN PHILOSOPHY

A PROPOSAL: SITUATING THE NEED AND PROPOSING A RESPONSE

The grand theme of our Congress is “Philosophy Educating Humanity”. It is heartening to see philosophers from all over the world pondering how we can be of service to our species; refocusing on the root meaning of “philosophy” as “love of wisdom”, we seek to be of real help in a world in the throes of many transformations. Those of us who teach philosophy in formal academic environments are already in a position to make a direct difference in the lives of our students; like it or not, we are at some level opinion leaders in our communities—what we teach and how we teach matters. And so we ask ourselves how can we best use the power that we have?

Clearly we can help our students and fellow human beings by teaching them skills of discursive rationality; when we can define our meanings precisely, use our terms consistently, argue coherently, and adhere to high standards of evidence, then we are better able to avoid dogmatism and bring an effective intelligence to bear on the problems of living that face us. These skills will always be a precious resource philosophy can offer humanity.

And yet there is much more to philosophy than this. Even in the classic European tradition there is vision as well as analysis, the intuitive as well as the discursive, noesis as well as *dianoia* (Plato), *intellectus* as well as *ratio* (Aquinas), meditative thinking as well as calculative thinking (Heidegger). The classic Asian traditions of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism are, of course, even stronger in their emphasis on meditation as a path to wisdom. As we seek to inspire our students with a love of wisdom, then, we need to convey both dimensions of philosophic thought.

And that brings me to my particular proposal: I propose that teachers of philosophy seriously consider instructing their students in simple techniques of meditation. Competency in basic meditation is not that difficult to achieve, and the long term benefits of conveying this skill and perspective to a wide spectrum of people is potentially very great. I believe that the benefits that can be gained are academic, personal, social, and potentially even planetary in scope. I have been exploring the uses of meditation in the undergraduate classroom for 13 years now originally in connection with courses in Asian philosophy and would like to

- Share some thoughts on how practically to integrate meditation into a philosophy classroom and
- Sketch out some of the potential benefits just alluded to.

A MODEL: INTRODUCING MEDITATION TO THE CLASSROOM

By meditation I mean the practice of mindfulness, training the mind to focus in a steady and non-judging way on the different phases of human experience.

Mindfulness is an ancient practice cultivated strongly in Buddhist traditions but which overlaps contemplative practices in many other traditions. Mindfulness practice typically begins by paying clear, steady, non-reactive attention to the sensations of one's own breathing and then extending this wise and compassionate attention to embrace all bodily sensations and then feelings, moods, thoughts, and intentions. One way to describe the goal of mindfulness is the cultivation of bare attention: the ability to focus on any aspect of life whatsoever with this calm concentration.

Introducing students to meditation takes some careful preparation; turning the lights out and asking them to sit up straight, close their eyes, and pay attention to their breathing would otherwise be distractingly strange to them. I have found the following process to be successful. On the first day of class, after presenting the syllabus, I mention my intention to offer meditation as part of the course and give a brief rationale for doing it. The second day of class I devote entirely to meditation. I spend the first 20 minutes or so presenting meditation in as accessible and non-threatening a way as I can. I refer to the medical research done by such people as Dr. Herbert Benson of Harvard Medical School, and I show a video from Bill Moyers' series *Healing from Within* that focuses on Dr. Jon Kabat-Zinn's stress reduction clinic at the University of Massachusetts Medical Center. There is something comforting to many students about hearing meditation prescribed by what they see as establishment doctors; the message is that "it's good for you."

Then it's down to technique, talking a minute or so about the practicalities of bodily posture; people stay right in their chairs—any attempt to sit cross-legged on a zafu on the floor, even if they were available, would again make it seem too strange and is in any case unnecessary. So prepared I have found even crowded classes of 35-40 willing to settle down and give it a try. The meditation instructions themselves are severely simple: gently notice the feeling of breathing in your body and as often as the mind wanders away from that object simply to notice that it wandered and return simply and without judgment to the breathing. 12-15 minutes has proved not to be more than they can handle, as long as I quietly remind them every 3 or 4 minutes of the task at hand and encourage them in it.

I then remind them that the first 6-8 minutes of every class will be devoted to continuing and extending the practice of meditation. I make it clear that anyone who does not wish to participate for any reason need only come to class six minutes late. As the semester goes on and the novelty wears off and the pressures of other duties mount, more and more people take advantage of that loop-hole, unfortunately, but there is no way to avoid it—the meditation must be entered into willingly or there will be no progress. Occasionally someone will have religious scruples about doing meditation: I point out how compatible meditation is with certain forms of prayer found in every tradition. And if a student is already a practitioner of a style of meditation or silent prayer, I invite them to continue with that during the meditation period if they prefer.

Soon after the semester begins I announce what is in effect a lab in meditation. I arrange to use a small chapel on campus for a one hour session once a week for more intensive practice of meditation. I divide the hour this way: 15 minutes of the basic practice of observing the breath; 10 minutes of simple walking meditation; 15 minutes where the meditation is extended to a wider array of objects (sensations, feelings, thoughts, *etc.*), and the rest of the time for any sharing or questions they may have. Only a handful of students will respond to the invitation, but those that do are the ones who will profit most from the course.

Let us look at some objections that could be raised to this use of meditation in the classroom and then offer some replies.

Objection 1: the amount of time devoted to classroom meditation would subtract from the presentation of material.

Reply: When the time involved is only 6-8 minutes per class, as I have advocated, the problem would seem rather minor. More generally, though, this question is but another example of the eternal tension between breadth and depth in classroom presentation: should fewer ideas be done intensively or more ideas in survey-fashion? In my judgment short consistent experiences of meditation so enhance students' appreciation of Asian ideas that it is worth the sacrifice of wider coverage.

A first course in Asian philosophy should, like any good introductory philosophy course, give students a sense of doing philosophy and not just talking about what others have done. Meditation can bring to students a sense of the immediacy of some of these ideas and give them an experience of personal investigation that some find most intriguing.

Objection 2: meditation could introduce a hierarchy of learners into the classroom, a division between adepts and non-adepts that could compromise the candid exchange of ideas by undervaluing the contributions of those without meditation experience.

Reply: Such a division could happen and would be most unfortunate if it did. But this problem is no different in kind from teaching a class that has both majors and non-majors in it. There will always be different levels of ability and experience in our students. The instructor's responsibility is to make sure that all students feel welcome and their questions respected. The more detailed and complex questions will likely come from those with significant background in the area, but the fresh 'naive' question of a beginner may well be more challenging and profound. Objection 3: Meditation may provoke emotional crises in students that may require the instructor to act in the role of a spiritual director rather than that of an academic philosopher; this confusion will detract from the intellectual rigour appropriate to the university classroom.

Reply: It is true that long-term or intensive meditation can soften repressions and so allow difficult memories to emerge provoking an emotional crisis. But in ten years of using the meditation in the short gentle way I have described, I have never seen or heard of such a crisis in any of my students. And to the

extent that difficult mind-states occur, the meditator may, with guidance, be able to handle them in the meditation itself and so have a valuable opportunity to deepen their personal grasp of certain Asian ideas; what better way to grasp the Buddhist teaching on the Five Hindrances in the Satipatthana Sutra, for example, than by grappling with desire, fear, anger, *etc.*, in oneself? In the unlikely event of a truly major emotional upheaval, the instructor must, of course, be willing and able to refer the student to professional help.

But once again, this problem is not unique to meditation. We have all, I think, heard stories of students being thrown into profound bewilderment and even despair by their first philosophy course when they hear how easily their long-cherished but unexamined beliefs may be criticized. Socrates, it seems, knew all about this.

And here too the student's emotional crisis could conceivably be so intense that outside professional help would be required, though in twenty years of teaching I have never actually seen this happen. The proper response to this remote possibility is not to stop challenging students' ideas in philosophy classes, but to make use of their bewilderment to motivate deeper philosophical inquiry, along the lines of Socratic method; most painful experiences provoked by philosophizing can be handled within philosophy itself.

A PARADIGM: SOME BENEFITS TO THE WISDOM OF NON-ATTACHMENT

The benefits of meditation in the classroom are, first of all, academic. The content of certain courses can be importantly clarified. In courses in Asian philosophy, for example, reading classic texts like the Bhagavad Gita, the Dhammapada, and the Tao Te Ching often reinforces a western student's feeling of strangeness. One should, of course, draw analogies to traditions they are more likely to know something about such as Judaeo-Christian religion and Greek philosophy; for example Krishna as avatar is like Jesus as god-incarnate, the Dhammapada is similar to such wisdom books of the Hebrew scriptures as Proverbs, and the Tao Te Ching echoes themes of relativity and impermanence in Heraclitus and Plato. Useful though this is, I would also like them to have, in Bertrand Russell's usage, knowledge by acquaintance as well as knowledge by description; I would like them to "get it" as well as know about it.

This is where meditation helps. Meditation is earnestly recommended by most Asian teachings as a way to wisdom, so it is consistent with the subject matter of the course. The texts are often written from the perspective of those experienced in meditation; they will be opaque to those without at least a taste of it but to those with some experience, the claims become intelligible or even obvious. The concept of non-attachment, for example, as used in Hinduism and Buddhism makes more sense to people who have some experience with the 'attention without tension' that is part of meditation.

There are benefits to meditation that go well beyond the formally academic and yet are part of the wisdom philosophers can offer humanity. One could

loosely but helpfully distinguish four areas of benefit: body, mind, society, and world. The fundamental themes that play through all four areas are how the wisdom of non-attachment leads to compassion and freedom, attitudes that meditation naturally evoke as practice continues. Let me first discuss these general themes and then briefly indicate their possible application to body, mind, society, and world.

Mindfulness meditation cultivates a clear, steady, non-reactive, non-judging attitude towards the full range of our experience; the intent is to simply notice experiences as they are with as little interpretation as possible. Over time the meditator typically gains a direct and personal sense of the pervasive impermanence of experience: sensations, feelings, thoughts, and intentions are ceaselessly changing; the transient and ephemeral character of life becomes abundantly and even shockingly clear. This insight into impermanence naturally encourages non-attachment which is a subtle attitude to express.

On the one hand is attachment which is the common human impulse to seek happiness by clinging to some object, person, or experience. Attachment is seen ultimately to be futile since all things are continually passing away. On the other hand detachment, its opposite, is also futile. Detachment seeks to avoid suffering by being aloof from life, cultivating a stoic indifference or even hostility to the complex demands life makes.

But inaction is simply another form of action; it is an act of omission that, regardless of our intentions, has consequences for ourselves and others. Attachment is governed by craving, detachment is governed by fear; each attitude wants things to be different from how they are, each attitude is out of harmony with reality.

Non-attachment seeks a middle path between craving and fear by learning to attend with great care to the exact and specific reality of this moment while yet being able to let it go to experience the fullness of the next moment and the next and so on.

Non-attachment savors life without clinging to it; non-attachment is in close appreciative attunement with the way things are and so is sensitive enough to intuit the appropriate response that this specific situation calls for.

Out of close attention comes a wise, non-arbitrary response; out of compassion comes freedom. And though this may seem to be simply a string of bald assertions, it seems to be the experience of those who have practiced mindfulness meditation with enough patience.

The paradigm of non-attachment, with its union of compassion and freedom, can be fruitfully applied to many areas of life. Here are some very brief indications of how this might be so.

The body is a major focus for mindfulness practice. In compassion one comes to know the lived body in direct intimate detail. This attitude of gently exploring the body as a shifting field of sensation can lead to a joyful appreciation of its intricacies which in turn encourages health and healing.

Even sensations of pain and stress can be fruitfully worked with, indeed these sensations can become the special focus of compassionate healing attention. And along with this wise action there is also the freedom to let go and the equanimity to accept illness, aging, and death as inevitable aspects of nature's impermanence.

The mind with its patterns of feeling and thought can be approached with the same non-judging attitude as one approaches sensations in the body. In compassion one can explore the joys of love and creativity as well as the painful realities of anger, fear, grief, and confusion. Especially with such difficult emotions one can develop poise and equanimity right in their midst, neither running away from them nor getting stuck. One can thus cultivate freedom and psychological health.

The social dimension of life can be explored in ways analogous to the bodily and the mental. One can cultivate a compassionate appreciation for the wonders of culture, language, and nurturing human support while remaining fully aware of the wide range of conflicts and painful difficulties societies have.

By paying close, non-dogmatic attention to the specific realities of violence and injustice, one may discover fresh, creative, and more effective responses; there is the freedom to innovate. And there is the freedom to let go-attachment to the results of one's actions often leads to frustration and 'burn-out'; the wisdom of non-attachment can sustain steady appropriate effort over the long haul and so contribute to social health.

As the science of ecology is showing us in detail, we humans live in a wider community of all the beings on Earth. Careful compassionate attention can develop into a direct sense of wonder and communion with the natural forces of our planet. Such compassion makes it clear how many forms of ecological imbalance humans have caused and can motivate us to undertake the patient long term effort needed to enhance the health of the planet.

Please note that the benefits indicated here gradually accumulate over time for those who integrate a meditation practice into their daily lives. Meditation is not a quick fix, nor does it substitute for any of the other arts, sciences, and skills of life. But it can provide a paradigm for engaging the tasks and experiences of life in a way that keeps them all in perspective without neglecting their detail. Introducing our students to the basics of meditation simply opens an option for them which can encourage wisdom if they choose to pursue it. And as we philosophers ponder how we may "teach humanity", this proposal is worth some consideration. It may be the most practically helpful thing your students take from your class.

6

Teaching Philosophy

Philosophical thinking includes an educational dimension, according to the dialogical structure of human thinking. First of all a preliminary question: is philosophy teaching and learning possible? This is the main problem, from Socrates to today: if a science exists and can be transmitted: without any objective and universal philosophical knowing about justice, goodness, truth, man becomes the measure of all things (according to Protagoras; science becomes sensation and human knowing is under subjectivism. But it's possible to get truth by dialogue: then it is also possible teaching and philosophically thinking using argumentation and research of universal ideas, transcending simple and unfounded opinions. This thesis, from Plato to Kant and German idealism (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) seems the main scientific trend up to today, in spite of contrasting voices, like Rousseau, against any guidance in philosophical education: the tradition of philosophical schools seems to deny these assumptions, at least "in actu exercito". A problem arises about the teacher, whose duty would be to propose and not to impose his ideas: truth, freedom and human person could be at risk, particularly in developing situations. It is possible to overcome these problems by a philosophical education that could be able to teach critical thinking as a method to evaluate, assess and verify ideas, events and everything that is transmitted. This is a way philosophy can maintain its main traits. The present communication will say how we can teach philosophy, and how we can evaluate philosophical learning, and how we can evaluate critical philosophical learning.

The teaching of philosophy want to obtain the integral education of human person, to know the meaning of human existence and activity.

The teaching of philosophy is a contribute to «complete formation of the human subject, specially in doing philosophy, asking to know, to look for the truth, to compare opinions, to dialogue with others subjects, with nature, with God. This kind of teaching significantly contributes to know the human nature and to discover values and meanings of life and community.

SOME GENERAL IDEAS ABOUT TEACHING PHILOSOPHY

A statement of teaching philosophy answers two questions: “Why do I teach?” and “How do I teach?”. It should communicate the goals of your teaching and your corresponding actions as a teacher. It becomes the central point of your teaching portfolio; and around it you arrange a collection of artefacts that support this philosophy both directly and indirectly. Your statement about your teaching philosophy gives the reader of your teaching portfolio a context within which to understand and assess your teaching activities.

A statement of teaching philosophy is a very personal statement - one which people often have difficulty writing. It derives from your basic values and beliefs about yourself and your teaching. We all have a philosophy by which we live although many of us never stop to put this philosophy into words and some of us remain blissfully unaware of it. However, most of us can articulate the values that contribute to this philosophy. And while our values tell us who we are and who we want to become, our statement of philosophy goes one step further by telling us how we would like to become this person.

A statement of teaching philosophy is usually brief - only one or two pages long - and presents an integrated view of some of the values we hold about various aspects of teaching such as:

- How we think learning and teaching happen;
- How we understand learners, their differences and what motivates them;
- How we interact with learners;
- What we think the primary purposes of education, teaching and learning are;
- How we view the primary role of the teacher or instructor;
- What teaching and learning methods we value; and
- How we think evaluation of learning should be conducted.

Teaching philosophy statements should avoid technical terms and jargon, and favour language and concepts that can be broadly understood. If the statement is being submitted with an application for a new position, it should be written for a specific audience; otherwise it should be written for a more general audience. It should be reviewed and revised every year to reflect changes in your understanding of your own teaching. The statement should be reflective and personal. What brings a teaching philosophy to life is the extent to which it creates a vivid portrait of you as a person who is intentional and authentic about teaching practices and committed to your vocation as a teacher. The best way to write your statement is to write it as a narrative, in the first person singular (I, me, mine). Avoid using

impersonal pronouns (you, one, it) because such pronouns create confusion for the reader. In some fields, a more creative approach, such as a poem, might be appropriate and valued. But in most situations, a straightforward, well-organized statement is preferred. Include examples to illustrate your points. Those with little experience as teachers should write about their future plans and desires for their teaching. Those with experience should reflect on how they have taught in the past and how they plan to improve in the future.

WRITING YOUR TEACHING STATEMENT

You can begin the process of writing your statement in different ways, all of them designed to help you assemble a set of ideas about what you value in your teaching practice - what is most important to you. I have listed several different approaches to this task. Select one or two that seem best suited to your style of thinking and use them to generate lots of different information. You will use this information to write an integrated statement. Do not use the questions you answer as headings and do not use just the answers - they must be combined into a logical narrative.

Option 1: Generate a list of single words or short phrases that represent what you value most about yourself and your teaching. Examples of such words and phrases might be:

- Equitable communication
- Good relationships
- Independent thinking
- Patience
- Strong work ethic

Next, take each one of these words or phrases and write a statement around each that reflects its importance in your teaching. In the examples provided below, the first part of each is a general statement and is turned into a teaching statement by the second part:

“I value independent thinking and encourage students to both critically analyse the ideas of experts in the field and develop their own ideas.”

“I try to be open to new or different ideas or perspectives although I sometimes find it very difficult. I try to see the value in students’ ideas before responding to them.”

“I recognize that how I react to a situation depends largely on my past experiences. I plan to seek out new experiences to change some of my more negative reactions.”

“I believe that knowledge is power; and the purpose of my teaching is to help students learn the knowledge and skills that will help them feel empowered.”

“I believe that learning should be fun and that learners should be as active as possible while they are learning.”

Option 2: Another way to write your statement of teaching philosophy is to develop answers to questions such as:

- Why do I teach? Where does my passion for teaching come from?
- What techniques do I use in the classroom to encourage student learning?

- What do I expect to be the outcomes of my teaching?
- How do I know my students are “getting it”? How do I know when I have taught successfully?
- What values and attitudes do I consciously attempt to impart to my students? What values and attitudes do I unconsciously impart?
- How do my approaches to teaching reflect who I am?
- What code of ethics guides my teaching and my relationships with my students?

Option 3: Another approach is to identify the assumptions that underlie your understanding of teaching and learning processes. Think through the answers to the following questions:

- What are three assumptions I make about teaching?
- What are three assumptions I make about learning?
- How does each of these assumptions appear in my courses?
- How does each of these assumptions facilitate/guide my teaching?
- How does each of these assumptions hinder my teaching?

Option 4: For those who are really stuck trying to generate information about your teaching, you can consult the resources listed below. Each will give you some information about your teaching that could then be used in combination with some of the answers you generated to previous techniques.

- The Teaching Goals Inventory, developed by Thomas Angelo and Patricia Cross (Classroom Assessment Techniques, 1993). Follow the directions. The results will indicate which of six clusters of teaching goals - higher-order thinking skills, discipline-specific facts and principles, work and career preparation, student development and personal growth, basic learning skills, and providing a role model for students - are most typical in your courses.
- The Teaching Perspectives Inventory, developed by Daniel Pratt (Five perspectives on teaching in adult and higher education, 1995). The results will indicate which of five teaching perspectives - transmission, apprenticeship, nurturing, developmental or social reform - are most typical of your teaching.
- The Teaching Styles Inventory by Anthony Grasha. The results indicate which of five teaching styles - expert, formal authority, personal model, facilitator, and delegator - are most typical of your teaching.
- Instructions for developing a statement of teaching philosophy for working with adult learners, prepared by Roger Hiemstra (1988), helps the reader translate personal values and philosophy into practical action.

CONCLUSION

Make your statement concise, specific and vivid; organize it around one or two main ideas and limit the length to no more than two pages.

Be concrete; avoid writing in an abstract manner about general principles. Include brief examples of how your approach to teaching plays out in your courses.

Whenever possible, be discipline specific, especially if you are writing your statement for inclusion in a job application. Keep up-to-date with pedagogical journals in your field. Read widely enough to frame your views wisely. Avoid too much educational jargon but show that you have a good understanding of teaching issues in your particular discipline.

Reflect carefully on your experience as a student and an instructor. Consider both your positive role models and those instructors whose mistakes you swore you would never repeat. Make your statement unique to you. Write in the first person singular. Think of your statement of teaching philosophy as an opportunity to express something about who you are that readers will remember.

PHILOSOPHY FOR A 'THINKING CURRICULUM'

If we are serious about teaching children to think, then we need to be serious about structuring the curriculum around thinking. This requires us to pay attention to the general thinking strategies and broad conceptual understandings that find a natural home in philosophy. By looking to the concepts and procedures of philosophy, we can help to integrate the curriculum and at the same time make children more effective participants in the process of learning. Phil Cam

Children are growing up in a world increasingly flooded with information, in which they will have to deal with diverse opinions and uncertain claims, and to decide for themselves what is important and what is not. It is a world in which change is often rapid and unpredictable, and there is a constant need to adapt. Society has become more complex and culturally diverse in recent years, and our country is finding its way in a region that is undergoing considerable transformation. In such conditions, the need for our children to develop into adaptive, open-minded citizens can hardly be ignored, and the general intellectual skills, attitudes and values that encourage critical and creative thinking are needed as never before.

Fortunately, many schools already have sessions in critical thinking, or something of the kind, which is certainly to be applauded. All the same, we need to confront this issue in the way that we teach across the whole curriculum. Philosophy for Children is designed to do just that. By integrating general thinking skills and broad conceptual understandings into the curriculum, it can help students to make connections between different areas of study, and help them to become more flexible, adaptable thinkers, who seek a broader and more integrated understanding of things.

DEVELOPING HABITS OF GOOD THINKING

Philosophy is a discipline with a particular kind of focus on thinking. To use a fashionable word, it is highly meta-cognitive. It involves not only careful thinking, but also thinking about thinking. Since philosophical thinking always has one eye on the thinking process, philosophy has developed general-purpose tools for conceptual exploration and reasoning. By adapting these tools to the classroom, and teaching our students to use them, we can help them to acquire

the kinds of mental habits that enrich conceptual development and promote better reasoning. This is very important. For these are the habits that make children effective participants in their own intellectual development, and it is only by being involved in this way that children learn to think for themselves.

Although philosophy has refined these tools, in a simple form they are the basis of reflective thinking in everyday life. They include such things as:

- Asking appropriate questions
- Making important distinctions
- Discovering useful connections
- Drawing relevant inferences
- Seeking better alternatives
- Giving good reasons
- Using reliable criteria
- Making careful judgments

Suitably sharpened, these tools are useful in almost any learning area, and those who learn to use them well will bring an intelligent approach to whatever they do. When we consider the school curriculum, we need to make provision for them. In Philosophy for Children we have an effective means of developing the skills, capacities and dispositions that are involved.

INTEGRATING THE CURRICULUM

Philosophy is the one form of inquiry that makes contact with every learning area. We can see this immediately from the various areas of study that make up academic philosophy, such as philosophy of science, social and political philosophy, philosophy and literature, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of mathematics, of biology, of history, and so on. Philosophy is not just a Central Station through which one can travel backwards and forwards to other areas of study in all directions. To vary the metaphor, it can provide the connective tissue that would enable the different parts of the curriculum to form a more effective whole.

While the connections between philosophy and the school curriculum can hardly be conveyed in a few words, the following sample of typical philosophical questions may help to show how it brings together issues from various learning areas:

Philosophical Question	Learning Areas
What is it to be a person? What is a rule? Where do rights come from? Does everything have a cause? What is knowledge and how can we come by it?	Human Society and Its Environment Personal Development English Mathematics English Human Society and Its Environment Personal Development Human Society and Its Environment Personal Development Science Education Human Society and Its Environment All curriculum areas

In an appropriate classroom setting, broad questions such as these can be a vehicle for inquiry. An example may help to give the general idea. Questions about human rights, for instance, are directly relevant to Human Society and Its Environment and Personal Development. Even so, let's begin with our Year 5 reading programme in English, and suppose that class has read a story about a ten-year-old boy named Ahmed whose community is in conflict over what seem to be people's rights.

The children in the class have been encouraged to raise questions or other matters of interest in response to the story, and the teacher has written the children's questions and comments on the board, so that the class is now ready to conduct a discussion.

In order to pay attention to the issue of rights, the teacher looks over the children's questions and notes those that seem particularly relevant, such as the following:

Is it fair that Ahmed had to leave school when he was only ten? (Robert)

Shouldn't Ahmed's mum be allowed to have another baby if she wants one? (Maria)

Why do the people at the factory think that they have a right to pollute the river? (Sandy)

A discussion about rights might begin with any of these questions, and once it is underway the teacher who is alert to the issue can then work questions from the following plan into the discussion in order to give it structure and focus:

DISCUSSION PLAN: Rights

- Ahmed has been at school for only five years. Does he have a right to more education?
- Where Ahmed lives, there are not enough teachers and schools for everyone to become educated. Do all the children still have a right to be educated?
- Ahmed has to sleep in the same room as his sisters. Does he have a right to a room of his own?
- Ahmed's mother loves his dad. Does she have a right to as many children as she wants?
- Ahmed lives by a polluted river. Does Ahmed have a right to clean water?
- If Ahmed's river is to be made safe, the factory where his dad works will have to close. Does Ahmed's dad have a right to a job?
- Can you think of any cases outside of the story where some rights might conflict with other rights?
- What should we do when rights conflict?
- Do people just naturally have rights?
- Where do rights come from?

Just as we can use the philosophical content of Human Society and Its Environment and Personal Development to set children thinking, so philosophical

inquiry can be used to explore concepts and engage children in reasoning in other curriculum areas. Addressing significant concepts and issues across learning areas in this way does more than provide superficial thematic connections. It helps to supply the connective tissue that makes sense of the curriculum as a whole. So Philosophy for Children not only helps children to develop habits of good thinking, it provides them with a means of making those broader connections out of which richer and deeper understandings can grow.

LEARNING IN INTRODUCTORY PHILOSOPHY

PROBLEM BASED LEARNING

Problem-Based Learning (PBL) is a method of teaching and learning that stresses problem solving activities as a means to encountering and applying knowledge. It develops out of a strong concern that traditional education stresses the acquisition of factual knowledge without long term retention of that information, the ability to apply the material, the skill to think critically, or the understanding of the context in which knowledge develops and relates.. PBL uses a set of problems - simulations, ethical dilemmas, case studies, medical diagnoses or decisions, legal disputes, public policy issues - as the framework for student learning. The closer the problem is to a real life, relevant problem, the better it functions as a learning motivator.. In traditional lecture and discussion format classes, the instructor introduces the material that he/she deems appropriate and then tests the students knowledge of the material. In PBL, the student is initially confronted with a problem that requires a solution. The problem drives the student assignments and learning tasks. It is the avenue through which students become acquainted with the material. Barbara Duch says “In a traditional science class, learning tends to proceed from the abstract to the concrete, with concepts being introduced first, followed by an application problem. In Problem-Based Learning, students are presented with an interesting, relevant problem ‘up front’ so that they can experience for themselves the process of doing science.” Those who use PBL are convinced that learning a discipline within the context in which it occurs intensifies and enhances student learning and increases the ability to apply and understand what is being learned.

PBL is often used with collaborative or cooperative learning strategies and utilizes small student groups of three to six students each. The groups formulate an understanding of the problem and key questions which have to be answered in order to “solve” it. They examine relevant resources to obtain the data necessary to develop a tentative solution, and they then write group or individual papers articulating their solutions.

In PBL the student is the primary agent of his/her own learning with guidance and support from the professor. The professor shifts from the centralized, authoritative source of information to a combination facilitator, tutor, coach, and problem poser. “By decentralizing the classroom., students discover the latitude to explore ideas and express themselves. They also find they must engage

others and confront ideas novel to them.”. Not all students react positively to such responsibility at first and so the faculty member has to find the best ways to motivate students to bring about a constructive learning experience and to lead the student through a process of educational reacculturation.

The goals of this approach are that knowledge will become more practical, arise out of ordinary contexts, and thus be less isolated. Also, students learn skills necessary to sustain them as life-long learners.

A problem-based learning experience has the additional benefit of helping students understand how interrelated important questions tend to be. In the Introduction to Philosophy class covered in this chapter, for example, problems often required students to consider epistemological, ontological, and moral issues at the same time. Students gained a feel for the interdependence of fundamental questions about human experience through the use of PBL.

PBL has been popular in the last decade in medical schools, science courses, and math courses. There are numerous web sites that highlight PBL including Problem-Based Learning at the University of Delaware and the Illinois Mathematical and Science Academy’s Center for Problem-Based Learning. Though its use in basic humanities courses is certainly not the norm, there are other non-science applications. For instance, The University of Delaware, one of the leaders in PBL, offers an Art History Course taught by this method.

We began using problem based learning in their individual Philosophy classes two years ago. This spring we are team teaching an Introduction to Philosophy course in which this method is employed.

We structured the course around four units. Each unit features a core problem. The students are introduced to the problem on the first day of the unit. In the sessions following, class time was spent working in small groups on understanding the issues and materials related to the problem. Students had 3 to 4 weeks to work on the problem. We provided students with a list of resources to use in developing the problem solution, and arranged working class experiences which accompanied these. Students were not limited to these resources, but we did regard these resources as sufficient to handle the problem we gave them.

As to the resources, they were of many types. Some were books and essays which were placed on reserve in the university library. Other resources were lectures and brief papers by the professors, which were placed at the course web site. Internet and CD-Rom resources were identified. We targeted 3 or 4 sources as required and had discussions in class on these essays. Every assignment we gave, every class period we conducted, and every meeting with the students was directed towards giving them the information necessary to solve the problem they were assigned.

A sample problem we used is Dax’s Case. Here is the information we gave the students:

I. The Problem. The fifth problem for this unit is “Dax’s Case.” In the early 1970’s Douglas “Dax” Cowart was severely burned over 65 per cent of his

body in a propane gas explosion. The explosion left him blind, severely disfigured, and in tremendous pain. He requested that he be allowed to die. The Hospital refused his request. Dax survived his ordeal and today is a successful attorney, yet he still argues that he should have been allowed to die.

Your assignment is to write a philosophical argument making a case for why Dax either should or should not be allowed to die. Assume you are the hospital ethics board making the decision on Dax's request. In this argument you are to develop the ethical basis for the position that you choose to defend. You are to weave a careful series of supports for your claim. You are to anticipate critical points against your argument and provide a rebuttal to those anticipated criticisms. If you are of the strong opinion that Dax should not be allowed to die, you should read at least one article that argues against your viewpoint, and vice-versa.

The problem solution should take the form of a board meeting in which the members of the group argue their resolution to the problem. Though you are working together in analyzing the case, reading the material, discussing it, and putting together the final presentation, each person must craft their own argument in order to sustain the debate..

The objectives of this section are to introduce you to the basic issues of ethics through an examination of one real life case, to familiarize you with a few basic sources, and to enable you to develop, articulate, and defend your ethical reasoning in medical ethics.

REQUIRED VIEWING

A Right to Die? - The Dax Cowart Case(CDROM) - This CD-ROM presents the conflicting evidence of this case through a variety of resources that enable you to participate in an interactive decision making process and to develop your ethical reasoning skills via an actual real life dilemma. This CD-ROM, along with a copy of instructions on how to use it, will be placed on reserve at the Circulation Desk in the Bunch Library.

There are 3 computers with CD-ROM capabilities in the computer lab. There are three copies of this CD-ROM on reserve in the library. The interactive portion of this CD-ROM will help you in developing, supporting, and defending your argument.

III. Recommended Reading. None of this is required, but it is strongly recommended that you read some of this material. It will provide you models of how to approach this case and will provide you with helpful material to use in constructing your own argument. We would recommend that you team up with three or four other students and collaborate in reading as much of this material as you can.

USE OF THE WEB AS A TEACHING TOOL

The web is the second key teaching tool we are using in the class and it serves as a support for the problem based learning approach. We created a web

site for our Introduction to Philosophy course. At this site we have our syllabus; course requirements; the description of the four unit problems; links to various philosophy resources on the internet; a collection of essays and class readings; a collection of lecture notes, briefs, and outlines; texts of listserv discussions we provide on-line; and other pertinent material.

Along with a traditional classroom, we reserved use of one of the computer labs on campus and often conducted class meetings there. Sometimes the entire class met in the computer lab, and sometimes only a specific group met there while other groups met in the classroom or library. During these meetings we used the homepage to look at various articles, lectures, and problems we were using in class. We also used these meetings to allow students to conduct in class research via the internet. Students were aided in appreciating some ontological issues of one of the class problems by using several virtual reality exercises in the computer lab. We also found an effective use of the lab was to turn it into a chat room which enabled students not only to participate in class in a different sort of way, but also we were able to surface some key philosophical problems about personal identity in this manner. Students participated as well in one of four listservs offered during the semester.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we offer two observations based on our initial efforts at PBL in a Philosophy class. These observations seem consistent with the literature on PBL. First, students initially resisted the different learning experience demanded of them in this class. They felt too much responsibility was placed on them and they wanted the professors to simply tell them what they needed to know. One student complained on a feedback exercise after the first major unit that he was paying a lot of money to go to Belmont and the instructors had not taught him anything. He had to learn everything on his own. He then proceeded to give a list of things he had indeed learned. He then reluctantly admitted that he probably had learned more on this unit than he had in other more traditional courses, but he still didn't like to do it all himself. A number of students complained about group work and felt work was unevenly distributed and performed. We responded to these criticisms not by changing the teaching strategy or the amount expected of the students, but by giving clearer set of directions and guidelines, allowing more time for discussion, clarification, and feedback from the professor, and by making changes in group set up to allow better recognition of individual performance. These changes worked and class performance, class attitude, and class motivation increased significantly the second half of the semester.

Second, the quality of work and the involvement of the students with the material was better than in most introductory classes we had taught using more traditional methods. We have submitted five papers from the PBL course for campus writing awards and one paper for publication in an undergraduate journal. Student presentations were well-designed and the students demonstrated the ability to think on their feet, respond to difficult questions, and to exude a sense

of passion about the problems they had chosen to solve. We witnessed numerous students approach a problem with their mind made up about how to solve it, only to take a completely different approach after encountering the philosophical texts and the critical opinions of their peers.

The authors are continuing to improve the Introduction to Philosophy course using PBL and to develop the Web site to support this educational strategy. The site is expected to become the fulcrum for all philosophy faculty members to draw on as a resource. It is anticipated that new problems and resources will continue to be added. The authors are committed to the concept that students learn best when they are actively involved in their own learning. Problem-Based Learning, supplemented by the Web as a research resource, appears to be an effective way to actively involve students in their own learning.

EXPLORING SUBJECTIVITY IN TEACHING PHILOSOPHY

“Know Thyself!” This oracle at Delphi which was Socrates’ motto inspires many philosophers but also psychologists and even psychotherapists. Each of them has good reasons for insisting that this is his domain. Several questions could be raised: Was Socrates a philosopher or a ‘psychologist’? What kind of knowledge is this self-knowledge? How do these domains differ and do they have something in common? How are they related to spirituality? And many others. My interest, however, is more narrow. Although we can suppose there is an overlap between philosophy, psychology and psychotherapy, in this paper I will focus on the overlap between teaching philosophy and psychotherapy. More precisely: how can Gestalt principles and techniques help in the teaching of the topic of selfhood. I will outline some theoretical background of the importance of Gestalt in relation to didactics of philosophy and describe some possible applications.

When I ask whether Socrates was a philosopher or a psychologist, this is also a question about what kind of knowledge is involved. Do I really want to know myself or do I just search for general knowledge about human nature? This is the difference between a subjective knowledge on individuality and a knowledge seeking for objectivity and universality. It seems that Socrates’ main concern was to overcome subjectivity. While his partner in a dialogue insisted in the particular, individual, he was interested in common characteristics which would enable him to form a definition and consequently a concept. Truth has been understood in terms of universality and objectivity since the time of Socrates. If we exclude some exceptions like Kierkegaard, who reestablished the concept of subjective truth, we can say that this tendency for objectivity and universality was, and is, the main characteristic of western philosophy. The teaching of philosophy, consequently, followed and still follows the same route. The question is, how can this traditional approach successfully deal with questions of selfhood which by their nature are subjective as well? With regard to didactics, the consequence of the re-evaluation of the concept of subjective truth could be the re-evaluation of didactic principles. How can this be performed in teaching practice?

The difficulty in introductory courses is that students have to deal with philosophical problems at quite an abstract level. The task can be made easier if the problems have some personal significance to them; motivation is higher when students acquire more knowledge about themselves. From a philosophical perspective it is expected that this knowledge would be a basis of a philosophically relevant discussion. Is this possible? Regarding the topic of selfhood many philosophy textbooks present different philosophical perspectives. Although these theories of human nature are sometimes preceded by interesting questions and illustrations related to everyday life, they are just an introduction. The answers to these questions are to be found only in the theories and the link is missing. Philosophy itself, or its didactics does not offer tools for this kind of exploration in philosophy class. I have found appropriate tools in the domain of psychotherapy, or more specifically in Gestalt psychotherapy. Although other approaches can also be successfully applied, there is a specific aspect of Gestalt therapy which is in this case advantageous - the emphasis on personal experience. The application of the principles of Gestalt therapy means introducing a new dimension into the teaching of philosophy. On one hand it is a challenge and offers great potentials, on the other it bears considerable risks and requires responsibility.

DIMENSIONS OF ‘EXPERIENCE BASED TEACHING PHILOSOPHY’

Questioning the Basic Concepts

When describing their experiences, students often use expressions or concepts which need to be examined. One of the aims of philosophical analysis is to become aware of what we assume and to clarify our understanding of basic terms.

If we take a simple example, the statement “I knew it was you”, questions which should be raised are: “What does it mean ‘to know’?” or “What is knowledge?” Other simple statements related to the topic of Selfhood are “I know you!” or “I don’t know you.” In these cases the questions is: “What does it mean ‘to have knowledge of another person’?” This is the level of questioning the basic concepts.

Exploring Presuppositions and Implications

An experience can also be a starting point for new questions which are already present in a situation or can be derived from it. From the statement “I know you!” several questions can be raised: Is it possible to have knowledge of another person? What kind of knowledge is that? Can it be true? What kind of truth is that? If they are different, what is the difference? What are the implications? Each question usually has more than one answer, and consequently new questions are multiplied. Nevertheless, these different answers introduce different philosophical perspectives from which problems can be analysed. Since these

differences have their origin in the understanding of basic concepts, it is evident that this aspect is connected and interwoven with the first one. This level is the questioning of presuppositions and implications.

Personal Experience

The basis of both previous dimensions is personal experience, which either precedes them or is incorporated in them. It is a basis for philosophical reflection and questioning which offers the possibility to students of getting to know themselves better. It can appear spontaneously in relation to certain topics, or it can arise from a teacher's initiative in the form of questions or by planned exercises and experiments. It can happen that a student comes across something very significant to her. In Gestalt terms we say that becomes a figure which can be explored further, but with clear limitations and cautions, since the aim is philosophical questioning and not psychotherapy. Nevertheless, tools are borrowed from psychotherapy and this fact requires an appropriately skilled teacher who can manage and control the process.

In experience-based teaching of philosophy all three dimensions form a whole. Despite common points in the first two dimensions, there is still a difference. While in the first dimension the emphasis is on reflection and questioning, in the second dimension the emphasis is on analysis and argument as the method of philosophical inquiry.

DIDACTIC PRINCIPLES IN EXPERIENCE-BASED TEACHING PHILOSOPHY

How to incorporate experience into the teaching process, and where is its place? From a didactic perspective, in the teaching process as well as in the examination process students are supposed to solve certain philosophical problems by using philosophical perspectives(theories) and using appropriate examples. An appropriate example expresses the essence of a given problem, and in course of successful analysis its use demonstrates the student's understanding of a problem and the appropriateness of the relationship between philosophical perspectives and everyday life. In our case of applying Gestalt principles when proceeding from personal experience, this is not just an example but a student's real situation. Personal experience can, therefore, offer a better understanding of concepts, problems and perspectives. Since this is her personal experience and possible new insight (which has its own value), there is a possibility of a higher motivation.

In the teaching process there are three important elements: the requirements of the institution, such as syllabus, the needs of students, and as the teacher I (hopefully) have my needs for creativity. All the three are part of the field, and although it seems impossible to expect complete compatibility between them, acknowledging this reality and seeking a reconciliation is already a significant step further. If I admit that students' needs are not in accordance with aims and objectives of a subject like philosophy, I can consider how they might become

in accordance or how the choice of topics and their treatment can contribute to finding a meeting point. Choosing the topic of Selfhood and its related problems is more likely to be in accordance with students' personal experiences than other topics. I look for a need which is not only intellectual curiosity but also a need for self-knowledge which has its background in personal experience. According to my experience this is the most successful way to finding that meeting point. I try to find a way to offer something that would draw the students' attention and become figural to them but in a way that emerges from the phenomenological field of each individual. Regarding my teaching aims and objectives, this should be something that carries a potential philosophical problem or is a philosophical problem itself. There are several group exercises and experiments which, on one hand contain particular philosophical problems, and on the other hand are designed to evoke particular kinds of experiences. If I wait for a discussion to emerge instead of imposing it, I follow a phenomenological method and allow students to raise a problem that really concerns them. The benefit is higher motivation and the possibility of a link between personal experience and philosophical inquiry. Not only do philosophical concepts get meaning, but they also become personally significant. If a student is in contact with herself and the experience cycle develops further, in a practical way she answers for herself the philosophical question, Who am I?

Experience-based teaching philosophy is, therefore, an attempt to make a philosophical inquiry a cycle of experience where a philosophical problem emerges as a figure, goes through the phases of sharpening, scanning, resolution and assimilation and by withdrawal allows a new need to emerge. I would call this cycle of experience educational gestalt. This cycle is based on a personal cycle of experience and an effective outcome is expected if these two cycles correspond, *i.e.*, if a philosophical problem has its basis in a personal experience either of an individual or of most of the individuals in a class. If we agree that, apart from a personal gestalt or cycle of experience, there is also a group gestalt or group cycle of experience, then I can say that in experience-based teaching philosophy I follow the educational gestalt of a group. Experience-based teaching of philosophy would be, therefore, a correspondence between a personal and educational gestalt.

FORMS OF EXPERIENTIAL WORK AND THEIR PURPOSES

I believe that this phase (part, stage, component) of a philosophy class can be very creative and challenging. Although some basic forms of work can be mentioned, there can be many others with innumerable varieties. The right moment to employ them can be a sensitive question and the outcome unpredictable. It is thus difficult to make a detailed plan. Among the most useful forms of work are group exercises and experiments. These can be combined with working in pairs or small groups or with individuals. The question of confidentiality is, naturally, also a very sensitive and an extremely important

issue. So the teacher can suggest, that the students share their experiences or keep them to themselves. It may be that they have very rich experiences but nobody wants to share. It seems that we can not continue with the work. However, we can still perform the task: each of them can keep her own experience private and follow the discussion on its basis. The point is in the purpose of an exercise or experiment and this is the second aspect of experiential work. Let us look at some examples.

Personal Experience as an Introduction to a Philosophical Topic or theme

If we want higher motivation of students, and present them the significance of a certain topic, it is appropriate to introduce the topic with an experiment that has some general characteristics but also opens different possibilities. Several such exercises and experiments are available from different sources. One of them is 'The Rosebush fantasy' described in J.M. Stevens' book *Awareness: exploring, experimenting, experiencing*, and also by Violet Oaklander in her book *Windows to Our Children*. Although it is very frequently used with children, older students take it seriously and with interest as well. Confidentiality is a good reason for students to work in pairs, choosing a close friend. They are invited to imagine what it is like to be a rosebush and asked several questions about themselves, their relations and their environment. Then they open their eyes, draw their rosebushes, and tell each other a story. One partner writes it down and reads it back. As a projective technique it is a very rich source of possible self-awareness and self-knowledge. If the students tell their stories, we can relate them to implicit or explicit philosophical questions and their solutions, and always return to the students' personal situations. This can be an introduction to the topic of selfhood in general or to any philosophically relevant question which arises. One of the philosophical problems that can be introduced is the problem of personal identity, which brings us to the next purpose.

Personal Experience as an Introduction to a Philosophical Problem

One of the most fruitful exercises for philosophical purposes is 'Disidentification Exercise' which originally appeared in Assagioli's *Psychosynthesis* and was later described by Janette Rainwater in her book *You're In Charge*. For our purpose it could be summarised to three statements: "I have a body, but I am not my body.... I have emotions, but I am not my emotions.... I have an intellect, but I am not my intellect." It is very rich exercise from the point of view of variety of different experiences, insights, awareness, as well as from the point of view of philosophical questions which arise. The most important is the possibility of experiencing identification and its opposition. Immediately after the exercise several questions can be discussed and clarified as for example: "What is the difference between I have and I am? What does it mean if I identify myself with something? What is identity (in general)? What kind of identities are there? What is personal identity?" There are also some

other important concepts such as polarities, self, *etc.* The exercise offers also a specific and unusual look at the basic principle of Descartes' philosophy.

Experience of a Philosophical Concept before its Rational Examination

We can propose the following group exercise to students. They are invited to imagine a situation where each of them is treated by another person in a way that she has pleasant feelings, like as in genuine friendship. It could be an experience from the past but as experienced here and now. They are asked to be aware of thoughts, feelings and sensations. Then we switch to the opposite situation of being a little bit mistreated or abused. We ask them again to evoke thoughts, feelings, sensations. To end the exercise we ask them how they would like to be treated in this situation. From discussion of their different experiences we derive the common ground, in this case the opposition between being (and feeling) an end in itself and being (and feeling) just as a means. In this case we were introducing Kantian distinction between means and ends. Although the explanation is clear and understandable, it can happen (and it usually happens) that the understanding of conceptual distinction is not satisfactory. In that case this exercise prepares in advance the ground for better understanding which is just a part of holistic experience and remains much more solidly in memory. This conceptual difference can be employed in dealing with Kantian ethics as well as with the concept of person. The same exercise can also be used after the usual presentation, in that case as an illustration.

Individual work with Students, Related to their Essays

It happens that a student chooses for her written work (Essay, Guided Coursework) a topic that is related to her personal issue, whether she is aware of it or not. A motive is not necessarily only of theoretical interest. Exploration of this background can significantly contribute to the outcome.

Other forms of Experiential Work

Since it is impossible to predict or plan the course of a philosophical discussion in details, occasions for experiential work can occur at any point. Sometimes an idea to illustrate something or to explore a certain point can emerge suddenly and it is worth-while to trust our intuition and try. Very different things can be done: already known exercises, adaptations to a situation or completely new experiments. A special case in experiential work is working on dreams. This is an extremely challenging field and many important philosophical questions, themes and theories can be related to it. We can discuss the nature of dreams and their role, the distinction between the conscious and unconscious or being aware and not being aware, repression, symbolism, even the transition to collective unconscious and mythology. The field is also of strong personal interest to students: they are curious about the meaning of their dreams. However, apart from the challenge, there is a risk and special attention is necessary.

EDUCATION AND PHILOSOPHY LEARNING: CRITICAL THINKING EVALUATION

EVALUATION AND CRITICAL THINKING

Educational research about critical thinking is increasing in the last decades, at least in the U.S.A., The main interest is about intelligence education and evaluation ability; that ability is to make a guided judgement based on logical and epistemological criteria guided. There are discussions and debates about theory and educational methods and instruments. Researchers emphasise the value of human person, the social, educational and curricular dimension, including teaching and evaluating. Why so much interest for this topic? Critical thinking research have originally a social and philosophical-educational dimension: one of the first book on this subject was edited by National Council for the social Studies, in Washington D.C. in 1942: the editor was H.R. Anderson associated professor at the Cornell University, which presented a series of studies by G. Marcham, professor of English History at the Cornell University, H. Taba, assistant professor of Education and Research Associates at the University of Chicago ("The evaluation of critical thinking"), H.E. Wilson, associate professor at Harvard University. Theoretical debate emphasises many aspects of the critical thinking idea: for many authors it is quite the same as logical thinking or problem solving thinking. The researchers stress the social motivation, the value of human person: the education of critical thinking could be a good defence against propaganda, advertisement and all the enemies of freedom and democracy. Others emphasise the critical evaluation in scientific method, specially about the hypothese's nature and analysis. Other authors underline critical thinking as a cognitive act: the main components are logical analysis, data and experience evaluation, problem solving steps evaluation. Analysing different researches through the years, we can see a common trend that unifies many authors: critical thinking is theorised as an intelligence ability, but as a particular one, like a thinking directed to evaluate and verify a process or a product of mind. This trend is clearly exposed by an italian pedagogist: critical ability is a control on mind product and it is different from any other mental activity, for example verbal understanding and logical thinking or problem solving activity.

Methods to evaluate critical thinking. Different methods are used to evaluate critical thinking. Among written tests, one of the first tools is the "Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal": published in the U.S.A., in many editions, «is broken up into five parts, each of which has its own set of directions and examples. The parts are called "Inference" (Items 1-20), "Recognition of Assumptions" (Item 21-36), "Deduction" (Item 37-61), "Interpretation", and "Evaluation of Arguments". (...) The materials were developed in the late 30's and have since been revised several times. The items consistently require students to examine evidence and to think (...).The Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal is a popular critical thinking, and as such, deserves careful examination» Example from the Watson-Glaser-Critical-Thinking-Appraisal -

section on assumption identification: “If you think the assumption is not necessarily taken for granted in the statement, blacken the space under “ASSUMPTION NOT MADE” - “I’m travelling to South America. I want to be sure that I do not get typhoid fever, so I shall go my physician and get vaccinated against typhoid fever before I begin my trip”. Proposed Assumption: Typhoid fever is more common in South America than it is where I live. MADE or NOT MADE?”. This test aims to assess evaluative and reasoning abilities, including the critical ones. «However, many studies stress the necessity of a better validation: the main objection is that this test seems more similar to a reading test than to a critical thinking test. The “Cornell Critical Thinking Test” instead, by R.H. Ennis e J. Millman aims to evaluate critical abilities, but in fact is a test of logical thinking. The Ennis model of critical evaluation and thinking: «Critical thinking is reasonable and reflective thinking that il focused on deciding what to believe or do. Based upon this definition, I suggested a conception of critical trthinking utilizing the simple idea that a decision about belief or action involves four basic elements:

- Basic support (especially information) on which the decision is grounded,
- The inference to the decision,
- Clarity, and
- A set of critical thinking dispositions. These four major categories generate a set of aspects that could be a sest of specifications for the critical thinking component of a teacher-competence test, both in and out of teachers’ subject-area specialities.
- Basic support:
 - Judging the credibility of sources;
 - Observing and judging observation statements.
- Inference:
 - Deducing, and judging deductions;
 - Inducing, and judging inductions;
 - Value judging.
- Clarity:
 - Focusing on a question;
 - Analyzing arguments;
 - Asking and answering clarifying questions;
 - Defining terms, and judging definitions;
 - Identifying assupntions;
- Dispositions, including these:
 - Being openminded;
 - Looking for other alternatives;
 - Being well informed;
 - Using one’s critical thinking abilities

The American Council on Education built a test to evaluate critical thinking: in this case too there is an overlapping between critical evaluation and other

intellectual abilities, like verbal competence and problem solving capacity. The test of critical thinking by S.W. Lundsteen is directed to evaluate this ability in a sample of preadolescents, and aims to assess it more exactly, without overlapping with any other intellectual (verbal, logical,...) abilities. «What is meant by critical thinking and by critical listening? The opinion presented in this report is taken from the definition by Russell, also found in the descriptions by Guilford (cit) and Bloom (cit) for evaluation. Russell distinguished this basic mental process from the five others (perceptual, associative, conceptual, creative and problem solving) by insisting

- That a standard or highly conscious criteria be present in the mind of the thinker at the same time the process takes place;
 - That as the thinker sifts the evidence regarding an object or statement and suspends evaluation, he does then make a critical judgment;
 - Finally, that the thinker, who is able to support his judgment with reasons derived from either internal logic or external values, in the form of consensual data, acts or concludes on the judgment made.
- «Critical listening was defined as a fourfold process that included examining spoken materials in the light of related objective evidence, comparing the ideas under evaluation with some criteria, making a judgment on the ideas, and acting on the judgment made. B.S. Bloom says the evaluation «is defined as the making of judgments about the value, for some purpose, of ideas, works, solutions, methods, material, *etc.* It involves the use of criteria as well as standards for appraising the extent to which particulars are accurate, effective, economical, or satisfying. The judgments may be either quantitative or qualitative, and the criteria may be either those determined by the student or those which are given to him. (...) After an individual has comprehended and perhaps analyzed a work, he may be called upon to evaluate it in terms of various internal criteria. Such criteria are for the most part tests of the accuracy of the work as judged by the logical relationship evident in the work itself. Has the writer (or speaker) been consistent in his use of terms, does one idea really follow from another, and do conclusions follow logically from the material presented. (...) Judgments in terms of external criteria. Evaluation of material with reference to selected or remembered criteria. The criteria may be ends to be satisfied; the techniques, rules, or standards by which such works are generally judged; or the comparison of the work with other works in the field. This type of evaluation involves the classification of the phenomena that the appropriate criteria for judgment may be employed. Thus, a work of history is to be judged by criteria relevant to historical works rather than to works of fiction. A rhetorical work is to be judged by criteria relevant to such works rather than criteria appropriate to different kinds of verbal presentations (...) All of this involves the assumption that each phenomenon is a member of a class and is to be

judged by criteria which are appropriate to that class. This also includes the possibility of comparing a work with other members of the same class work.

J.P. Guilford & ass. studied also a way to analyse intelligence and critical thinking, and a method to evaluate it: an interesting distinction Guilford does about the contents critical thinking can be applied: verbal or non verbal, auditory, perceptual, behavioural, *etc.* «Evaluation involves reaching decisions as to the accuracy, goodness, suitability, or workability of information. «The best established evaluation factor is that of logical evaluation. This is defined as the ability to judge the soundness of conclusions where logical consistency is the criterion. The factor has sometimes been called “deduction”, with the belief that it is the ability to draw conclusions logically consistent with premises. If this were the case, the factor would belong with the production-factors group. Most tests in which the factor has been found to be a component are the true-false or multiple-choice form, in which the examinee is given conclusions.; On the light of these and others studies we built a new test, the “Caccia all’errore 12A”. This test has been originally built for a Ph.D. in Education, in the University “La Sapienza” of Roma. It’s a non verbal test, including 60 multiple alternative items, experimentally validated on a sample of preadolescents.

The model is strictly based on the idea we described (and criticized) in the previous sections: the test consists in comparing different geometrical figures in logical order; one of the elements can be a mistake: the task is to find the mistake, if there is one. The logical operations are selected among seriation and classification, the only ones children 11 years old usually master. So we can be sure that the evaluation is only about critical ability, without any verbal overlapping.

7

Learning Philosophy

To ensure that real learning takes place and endures, we emphasize and encourage a holistic approach by integrating both formal and informal elements. We believe that the most effective way to learn and develop a new skill or behaviour is to apply and practice it on the job and in real life situations.

Our learning and development philosophy is built upon how individuals internalize and apply what they learn based on how they acquire the knowledge. We rely on the 70/20/10 formula* that describes how learning occurs:

- 70 per cent from real life and on-the-job experiences, tasks and problem solving. This is the most important aspect of any learning and development plan.
- 20 per cent from feedback and from observing and working with role models.
- 10 per cent from formal training.

We believe that the key elements to a successful learning process include both the 70/20/10 formula and how individuals internalize and apply what they've learned.

RELATED THEORIES OF LEARNING (PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIENTATIONS)

Related to both the metaphysical worldview philosophies and the educational philosophies are theories of learning that focus on how learning occurs, the psychological orientations. They provide structures for the instructional aspects of teaching, suggesting methods that are related to their perspective on learning. These theoretical beliefs about learning are also at the epistemic level of

philosophy, as they are concerned with the nature of learning. Each psychological orientation is most directly related to a particular educational philosophy, but may have other influences as well. The first two theoretical approaches can be thought of as transmissive, in that information is given to learners. The second two approaches are constructivist, in that the learner has to make meaning from experiences in the world.

INFORMATION PROCESSING

Information Processing theorists focus on the mind and how it works to explain how learning occurs. The focus is on the processing of a relatively fixed body of knowledge and how it is attended to, received in the mind, processed, stored, and retrieved from memory. This model is derived from analogies between how the brain works and computer processing. Information processing theorists focus on the individual rather than the social aspects of thinking and learning. The mind is a symbolic processor that stores information in schemas or hierarchically arranged structures.

Knowledge may be general, applicable to many situations; for example, knowing how to type or spell. Other knowledge is domain specific, applicable to a specific subject or task, such as vowel sounds in Spanish. Knowledge is also declarative (content, or knowing that; for example, schools have students, teachers, and administrators), procedural (knowing how to do things—the steps or strategies; for example, to multiply mixed number, change both sides to improper fractions, then multiply numerators and denominators), or conditional (knowing when and why to apply the other two types of knowledge; for example, when taking a standardized multiple choice test, keep track of time, be strategic, and don't get bogged down on hard problems).

The intake and representation of information is called encoding. It is sent to the short term or working memory, acted upon, and those pieces determined as important are sent to long term memory storage, where they must be retrieved and sent back to the working or short-term memory for use. Short term memory has very limited capacity, so it must be kept active to be retained. Long term memory is organized in structures, called schemas, scripts, or propositional or hierarchical networks. Something learned can be retrieved by relating it to other aspects, procedures, or episodes. There are many strategies that can help in both getting information into long term memory and retrieving it from memory. The teacher's job is to help students to develop strategies for thinking and remembering.

BEHAVIORISM

Behaviorist theorists believe that behaviour is shaped deliberately by forces in the environment and that the type of person and actions desired can be the product of design. In other words, behaviour is determined by others, rather than by our own free will. By carefully shaping desirable behaviour, morality and information is learned. Learners will acquire and remember responses that

lead to satisfying aftereffects. Repetition of a meaningful connection results in learning. If the student is ready for the connection, learning is enhanced; if not, learning is inhibited. Motivation to learn is the satisfying aftereffect, or reinforcement.

Behaviorism is linked with empiricism, which stresses scientific information and observation, rather than subjective or metaphysical realities. Behaviorists search for laws that govern human behaviour, like scientists who look for pattern in empirical events. Change in behaviour must be observable; internal thought processes are not considered.

Ivan Pavlov's research on using the reinforcement of a bell sound when food was presented to a dog and finding the sound alone would make a dog salivate after several presentations of the conditioned stimulus, was the beginning of behaviorist approaches. Learning occurs as a result of responses to stimuli in the environment that are reinforced by adults and others, as well as from feedback from actions on objects. The teacher can help students learn by conditioning them through identifying the desired behaviours in measurable, observable terms, recording these behaviours and their frequencies, identifying appropriate reinforcers for each desired behaviour, and providing the reinforcer as soon as the student displays the behaviour. For example, if children are supposed to raise hands to get called on, we might reinforce a child who raises his hand by using praise, "Thank you for raising your hand." Other influential behaviorists include B.F. Skinner (1904-1990) and James B. Watson (1878-1958).

COGNITIVISM/CONSTRUCTIVISM

Cognitivists or Constructivists believe that the learner actively constructs his or her own understandings of reality through interaction with objects, events, and people in the environment, and reflecting on these interactions. Early perceptual psychologists (Gestalt psychology) focused on the making of wholes from bits and pieces of objects and events in the world, believing that meaning was the construction in the brain of patterns from these pieces.

For learning to occur, an event, object, or experience must conflict with what the learner already knows. Therefore, the learner's previous experiences determine what can be learned. Motivation to learn is experiencing conflict with what one knows, which causes an imbalance, which triggers a quest to restore the equilibrium. Piaget described intelligent behaviour as adaptation. The learner organizes his or her understanding in organized structures. At the simplest level, these are called schemes. When something new is presented, the learner must modify these structures in order to deal with the new information. This process, called equilibration, is the balancing between what is assimilated (the new) and accommodation, the change in structure. The child goes through four distinct stages or levels in his or her understandings of the world.

Some constructivists (particularly Vygotsky) emphasize the shared, social construction of knowledge, believing that the particular social and cultural context and the interactions of novices with more expert thinkers (usually adult)

facilitate or scaffold the learning process. The teacher mediates between the new material to be learned and the learner's level of readiness, supporting the child's growth through his or her "zone of proximal development."

HUMANISM

The roots of humanism are found in the thinking of Erasmus (1466-1536), who attacked the religious teaching and thought prevalent in his time to focus on free inquiry and rediscovery of the classical roots from Greece and Rome. Erasmus believed in the essential goodness of children, that humans have free will, moral conscience, the ability to reason, aesthetic sensibility, and religious instinct. He advocated that the young should be treated kindly and that learning should not be forced or rushed, as it proceeds in stages. Humanism was developed as an educational philosophy by Rousseau (1712-1778) and Pestalozzi, who emphasized nature and the basic goodness of humans, understanding through the senses, and education as a gradual and unhurried process in which the development of human character follows the unfolding of nature. Humanists believe that the learner should be in control of his or her own destiny. Since the learner should become a fully autonomous person, personal freedom, choice, and responsibility are the focus. The learner is self-motivated to achieve towards the highest level possible. Motivation to learn is intrinsic in humanism.

Recent applications of humanist philosophy focus on the social and emotional well-being of the child, as well as the cognitive. Development of a healthy self-concept, awareness of the psychological needs, helping students to strive to be all that they can are important concepts, espoused in theories of Abraham Maslow, Carl Rogers, and Alfred Adler that are found in classrooms today. Teachers emphasize freedom from threat, emotional well-being, learning processes, and self-fulfillment.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: HOW DOES LEARNING TAKE PLACE

This question should feel like a challenge because it is. Most faculty members do not have any background in educational theory. Indeed, faculty can be disdainful and suspicious of discussions about educational theory because it is so outside of their experience. Fortunately, you can still write your teaching statement if you are in that group! First, think deeply about more and less productive episodes of learning (not teaching) that you have been a part of, and then try to capture the essence of those experiences to guide your thinking about designing instruction.

Many people find it useful to think of a metaphor that can capture the spirit of a successful learning experience. Are students empty vessels into which instructors pour well-organized information? Are students members of the learning team where instructors are the coaches? In any case, be prepared to add a sentence or two of explanation about your metaphor so that readers get the sense of what you mean. A theoretical framework can have multiple targets. For instance, one

statement might assume an individual learner is its focus, while another might proceed from the idea that groups of learners are key. Alternatively, an institution's mission and how it allocates its resources might be the framework selected by someone else. In the following three passages, taken from authentic statements, notice how rapidly you can get a sense of the individual authors and their relationship to teaching and learning. Again, these excerpts have not been selected for their excellence, but rather to give you a range of choices that have been made by people writing their teaching philosophies.

My philosophy is based on a proposition that "Teaching is about Learning." This means that to improve teaching I must focus on the learning needs of the future that will be shaped by today's students.... Learning is not something that can be defined as a procedure; learning is something that occurs in a rather unstructured and ad-hoc way. However, learning can be built into structures and processes. As we make new connections between known concepts, add new strategies, link those new concepts to old concepts, then we begin to learn and our body of knowledge grows. Thus, knowledge is a web of concepts with a whole lot of connections between them. (Jambekar, 2000)

In the sciences in particular, students must acquire a working knowledge of the fundamental principles and associated terminology of a given area. Much of this must be memorized. The "facts and jargon" must be presented in a highly organized fashion, showing the necessary connections, but without overwhelming the student with quantity at any one time. (Powell, 2000)

The primary purpose of U.S., colleges and universities should be teaching, not the preparation of professional athletes. So the question is: How are we to assure that the brightest students select science as a major in college and then as their career? The answer is clear; quality undergraduate education must be made a high priority.... I posit that all teaching opportunities should be founded on the idea of individual inquiry by the student. This principle makes education a learner-centered process, not one that is teacher-centered. Individual inquiry does not necessarily mean undergraduate research, but it could. The central goal of this pedagogy is to empower students in their education by providing dynamic learning situations and exciting research opportunities. (Wallace, 2000)

Instructional goals are an important starting point in your instructional design. Goals are often construed naively as a syllabus of topics ("Students will learn the Crossed Cannizzaro reaction during lecture number 24," for instance). In your statement of teaching philosophy, you should not only consider examples of what subject matter items you think students should learn, but also some of the broader issues that add value to the education students can be expected to obtain by working with you. You might also consider the question of why these goals are important. It is useful to think in terms of three levels of educational goals represented by these three questions.

- What goals do you have for students as learners in the specific subject matter?
- What goals do you have for students as learners in chemistry, as a science, and as science learners, in general?

- What goals do you have for students as learners in general, within the liberal arts educational framework where chemistry sits?

My goals as a teacher are rooted in my scientific objectives. As a scientist my objective is to provide information to help individuals and agencies responsible for land management to make sound and ecologically based decisions. Along with informing scientists and land managers of important results, I must also do my part to educate the public, especially future generations of voters. I have addressed this goal by gaining experience as a science educator at a wide variety of levels. (Hopkins, 2000)

My teaching goal is to link course performance with the development of general learning skills, general chemical science skills, and specific subject matter skills. For instance, I want students to derive meaning from new information in a way that engages a variety of learning strategies and the ability about how to make an appropriate choice about what strategy to use. In the subject matter, I want students to understand the development of the molecular structural model in chemistry (from constitution to connectivity, and then the three dimensional aspects of conformation and configuration).

Why does chemistry seem so hard to a typical college student?... The first goal in teaching any subject is to have a solid curriculum and to provide the students with the framework of knowledge. I strongly believe that in chemistry the understanding of concepts and the ability to solve problems should be emphasized over memorization.... How should the transmission of information take place?... Ultimately, the goal of education is learning, not teaching. I believe that students should be stimulated to think on their own. (Gamamick, 2000)

Design and Implementation: How do you plan to accomplish your goals?

Design and implementation are different. You can have a good plan (the skill) but still not be able to enact it (the will) (Paris, 1983; Paris, 1983; McKeachie, 1994). This is because teaching is a complex social activity that requires physical and emotional behaviours in addition to just a good idea. A smoker who decides to quit for lots of good reasons demonstrates the skill, or understanding, of what to do, but this alone does not constitute the behavioural will to enact the plan.

Once you have constructed your instructional goals, you need to address how you think you can help students accomplish them. This is the first time when your reader will look for congruence, or alignment, in your thinking. Your design and implementation plans should clearly reflect and be informed by your goals. If your goals emphasize higher level learning but your design looks like a plan for students to memorize and feed back large amounts of factual information, then your reader might conclude that you have not thought deeply about your ideas.

A short narrative snippet of a teaching situation can be quite effective in revealing your thinking about instructional design and implementation.

- What kinds of learning environments do you think can accomplish your goals?
- What is your role, and that of your students, in this design?

- What sorts of technological requirements come with your plan (from classroom laboratory design to computational infrastructure)?
- What does it look like when you implement your design?

I especially enjoy designing learning experiments for my students in Chemical Engineering 140, our introductory course. At the beginning of each lecture a student chosen at random to stand up and review, in his or her own words, what they found important from the previous lecture. In this way I am conducting a teaching reflective learning, helping the students organize information in such a way as to put it into perspective.

Computers and calculators are tools, like chalk boards and overheads, which can be used to the professor's and student's advantage.

Of course I encountered the difficulty of facilitating discussion in a classroom of thirty bolted-down seats, many of which held students either unprepared or too shy to speak. Here, then I must add a corollary to my first principle: facilitate different kinds of learning activity in the classroom. After attending two presentations by Karl A. Smith, I decided to introduce an element of cooperative learning into the undergraduate class I am teaching this Spring.

Assessment and Evaluation: What constitutes evidence of student learning and effective instruction?

Instructors collect (assess) information from students in order to judge (evaluate) it. When an evaluation is summative, it results in rankings of student performance (*e.g.*, grades) and certifies a level of competence against some standard. When an evaluation is formative, it feeds information back to students and instructors during the teaching and learning process so that corrections and improvements can be made. Summative and formative evaluation are complementary goals of assessment. No single assessment strategy can reveal all aspects of teaching and learning comprehensively, so many approaches are necessary.

Your instructional design should achieve your instructional goals, and the assessment methods you use should measure how well you have accomplished this. Readers will notice if you have congruence between your instructional goals, your instructional methods, and your assessment programme. Attending to this alignment in your statement can also have an impact on the way you think about your own practice.

Do you think that you should only give multiple choice exams after each unit without collecting intermediate feedback? If so, does this follow from your teaching methods and your goals? Can you support this position with examples from your experience?

In this section as well as the Design and Implementation discussion, separating your comments into separate categories might be useful. Some faculty see clearly different demands coming from Introductory Undergraduate Teaching, Upper Level Undergraduate Teaching, Undergraduate Research, Graduate Teaching, Graduate Research, and so forth.

- What kinds of classroom assessments do you use, if you do, and why are these effective for you?

- How do students developing self-assessment skills play out in your assessment programme?
- What is your experience or position on conducting classroom research on student learning?
- What are your principles for creating good examinations (and other assessment tasks), and how are these aligned with your goals and methods?
- What is your basis for assigning grades?

In this peer-led programme, students have a structured opportunity to make, recognize, and correct their errors before they get to an examination. After the reviewing of each other's is completed, the reviews and the unmarked papers are returned to the originator, and he or she has a chance to decide if any corrections are needed. This second set of assignments and the reviews are collected, and they form part of the basis for the leader's evaluation of the student's performance that day.

Learning organic chemistry is structured so that state-of-the-art information from the primary literature can be presented to novice students on examinations. This assures us that we are true to the facts of science and not simply inventing trivial derivatives of classroom examples.

We include the citation along with some contextualizing statements, which sends two messages to our students: (i) memorizing the previous examples is not enough, and (ii) understanding the subject matter of the introductory course lets you understand some of what chemists actually say about what they study. The context of these problems has a great deal of intrinsic interest or relevancy because many examples come from medicinal and pharmaceutical chemistry or materials science.

Documentation and Reflection: What information do you keep to document student learning, and how do you use it?

Documentation of teaching and learning, usually via a portfolio, is relatively new in higher education. Increasingly, interviewees need to present evidence from their graduate teaching experiences while looking for jobs, and most assistant and associate professors need to do this for promotion. Even if you have never kept anything more than a grade book and end-of-term surveys to represent teaching and learning in your courses, you might soon need to collect, select and assemble artifacts from your teaching in order to create a more documented picture of your classroom work. More than that, it is useful.

Documentation should be gathered over time with a sense that the narrative you are constructing gives evidence of your goals, methods, and assessments. An important text piece is the running commentary, or reflection, that you should keep on your experiences and your practices. By annotating the artifacts that you collect in the context of your overall instructional plan, you can build a case for the strategies you use and simultaneously identify targets for improving your work.

Once you start the habit of writing written reflections, you will recognize these to be as valuable to your teaching as keeping a laboratory notebook is to

your research. As with a laboratory notebook, the notes you keep about your teaching are used precisely to preserve crucial information and ideas that can be too soon forgotten when the time comes to modify or repeat an experiment.

- What have you learned from examining or analyzing student work about your own teaching, or about student learning, that you have fed back to your instructional practices?
- What have some of the most profound impacts on you as an educator, and how have they affected your teaching?

I have also seen the profession from the perspectives of both administrator and teacher, and from the advantage points of more than one discipline. No matter what I am teaching, the bottom line for me is to make my classes relevant and accessible to a diverse student population. (Newitz, 2000)

As a mathematics teacher, I am personally interested in my students, both in their mathematical endeavors and in their academic career as a whole. (McAllister, 2000)

I used to think that student errors resulted only from their inability to use the correct set of rules correctly; in other words, that they were behaving with inconsistency. I have learned, however, that student errors can be a consequence of their constructing an incorrect set of rules that, when properly deployed, gives solutions that sometimes overlap with the correct rules and sometimes not.

Uncovering these student-generated rules makes each new interaction with a student another intriguing mystery to solve. This strategy, which I uncovered by working closely with students in the first place, let me know that errors can also be the result of consistency.

How is the Statement of Teaching Philosophy used?

A statement of teaching philosophy has many uses, and these depend on why the statement is being written, who requests it, and who might eventually read it. As with any piece of writing, your teaching philosophy will reveal you as a person, your values, your style, and your experience. Are you sincere? Do you have integrity? Are you dogmatic and opinionated? Are you thoughtful and fair? A well-crafted statement will reveal your character.

A statement of teaching philosophy is:

- *Personal:* It is a individual narrative that should complement the other sources of information available about you. It should give the reader a glimpse into you motivations and practices as an instructor, your sense of values regarding teaching and learning, and it should do this honestly and sincerely.
- *Metaphorical.* When you do not have the breadth of shared experience, or even the language, to describe something to an unfamiliar audience, metaphor is a useful strategy. Because your writing will reveal your self to a reader, searching for a shared cultural experience will allow your reader to connect with your thinking.

- *Political*: Like the other information you provide to a department or an institution (curriculum vitae, cover letter, research statement, promotion and tenure documents), the statement may be used for decision-making. You should be able to defend any assertion or idea in your statement if called upon to do so. Your institution might also begin to require these statements as part of your annual review process, or as a way to build a more comprehensive sense of a faculty about teaching and learning.
- *Professional*: Documentation of your scholarly progress in thinking about teaching and learning issues is becoming an expected part in the life of a faculty member. Because codifying your thinking at a moment in your career allows you and others to step back, react and reflect on it, it can carry the same impact as writing in any other part of your scholarly work. A statement of teaching philosophy is the most common organizer used to introduce a course or teaching portfolio.
- *Pedagogical*: By externalizing your thinking, and particularly by sharing it with others, you are compelled to think differently about your teaching. Resolving internal inconsistencies and clarifying your thinking always happens when you write down your ideas (this is why we value the role that editors and other reviewers have on our work). Once you have a statement, it will inevitably begin to shape the discourse in your classroom. As you write down and refine your thinking, you will want to share these ideas with students so that they can understand better your goals, your methods, and your mode(s) of assessment.
- *Reflective and Iterative*: Inevitably, you will have cause to return to your statement, perhaps because you are asked to by your department or administration, perhaps you will simply need to modify your statement as a normal consequence of reflective practice. Either way, any statement of teaching philosophy should be seen as a work in progress.

What is the Structure of the Statement

There is no consensus about the structure and content of a statement. Some institutions are providing their faculty with guidelines, while others leave it to the sensibility of the author.

By examining the literature on teaching philosophies and analyzing a large number of statements that are available, we have crafted the following guidelines.

A statement of teaching philosophy should be:

- Between 1-2 pages long
- A personal narrative
- Evidence of your sincerely held beliefs
- Representative of your experience and practice
- A showcase for your strengths

- A place that points to directions in your future growth
- An effective abstract for your teaching portfolio

If you answer the questions detailed in the earlier sections, you will end up with more than 1-2 pages of text. That is good.

You can use this long document as the starting point and edit it back to a reasonable length. You will want to try to keep all of the information, but that will not be possible within the constraint of 1-2 pages. Study the information, draw together parts that fall under the same principles, and begin to see the commonalities in your work that you might not have otherwise known existed.

The following elements are suggested as a starting point for a statement of teaching philosophy:

- *Title:* Identify yourself and the document, even if it is “Statement of Teaching Philosophy for Professor Leslie Jemail.” You might also use a creative title that represents your philosophy, such as “The Value of Teaching in Learning: a Statement of Teaching Philosophy by Professor Leslie Jemail.” If you publish your statement at a web site, it is a good idea to include your institutional and contact information.
- *Quote (optional):* A well-selected quotation can provide the reader with an early insight into your thinking, and this can be as powerful as a good metaphor. The quotation can be either an aphorism (proverb, maxim, saying, *etc.*) or a longer passage from another text that has inspired you or which represents a useful insight into your principles. You should include enough of a citation so that the reader can identify the source.
- *Thesis statement:* In 1 to 3 declarative sentences, set out your principles. Like a good thesis statement, the rest of your statement should be geared to reinforcing these principles as a matter of evidence and example. Sometimes it makes sense to set out your propositions as questions. If so, you must make sure you answer them clearly.
- *Narrative:* Depending on how you see the answers to the questions in the first part of these guidelines, there are different organizational styles that can use to tell your story. One of these organizations might follow the 3-6 different principles on which your thesis statement is based. In the main part of your statement, take each of the main principles (perhaps set out as an ordered list that follows the thesis statement) and take them, in order. Each principle will need to be elaborated. Restate the principle in basic terms and then explain what it means to you. Throughout this discussion, you should try to think of a discipline-based example that illustrates your idea, perhaps a short snippet from a classroom event, perhaps a passage that comes from your reflective writing. Include, as needed to make your point, the kinds of assessment, documentation and reflection that follow from or support the teaching principle that you are advocating.

Another organization for your statement might be the categories used in the first part of these guidelines (Theoretical Framework, Goals, Design and

Implementation, Assessment and Evaluation, Documentation and Reflection). Yet another might be to integrate these under categories of instructional interventions (Introductory Undergraduate Teaching, Upper Level Undergraduate Teaching, Undergraduate Research, Graduate Teaching, Graduate Research).

Remember that a reader is interested in understanding you and your position, in language that is accessible, and with examples that make good sense. Readers will also look for alignment, or congruence, in the different parts of your statement as a way to judge your own internal consistency, the thoughtfulness with which you have constructed your statement, and as a clue to the sincerity with which you take your teaching.

What is Good Advice for Writing a Statement

- *Build your general literacy about teaching and learning:* There are many books and articles written about education, and specifically about science education. Among many, I think the books by Brookfield (1990) and Weimer (1993) are an excellent starting point, while Palmer (1998) is a provocative starting point for faculty to begin to think of themselves as more whole and well-rounded people. The disciplinary societies have publications, journals and conference venues for discussing issues in education. A list of resources is provided at the end of this article. For readings and advice about higher education in general, there are many national organizations to consider: *American Association for Higher Education*, *The Association of American Colleges and Universities*, and *The Preparing Future Faculty Programme* are all useful resources. Contact information for these is also provided below.
 - *Consult with a Teaching and Learning Center:* Centers for teaching and learning, or teaching excellence, can be found on most campuses today. They can provide numerous resources to individuals, often including the opportunity to set up campus-wide workshops on writing statements of teaching philosophies! If your campus does not have such a resource, or even if it does, you can also find a variety of useful on-line resources provided by teaching and learning centers at most of the major institutions in the world.
 - *Read some teaching statements:* As described earlier, some of these guidelines were developed by examining and analyzing actual statements written by faculty members who had published them on their web sites.
 - *Share and critique:* Do not work in isolation. Share your statement with others (that is the idea, anyway!). If you are not part of a group that is willing to do this with each other, then rely on friends whom you trust to give you honest, constructive feedback.
- Write reflective pieces on your academic experiences. If you have not done so, begin to keep an academic diary on your computer. What things have you tried in the classroom and how have they turned out?

What you think about your own experiences as a learner? If you work in an open intellectual environment, ask permission to visit classes being given by others (faculty and graduate students alike), then take notes and create questions for that person. Invite them out for coffee and ask them your questions.

- *Write more than you need and edit:* With the goal of 1-2 pages, your statement might start out as 8-10 pages if your answer thoroughly all of the questions posed earlier in these guidelines. Answer all of these questions in the first round of writing, and edit a copy of the document. You will find that the longer answers and examples can be a good starting point for other writing and thinking about your teaching.
- *Write in a personal way:* Your statement is a first person narrative, not a journal article on teaching and learning. Make sure your readers are getting to understand you. If they know you well enough, ask your critic-readers whether what they are reading accurately reflects their more intimate knowledge of who you are.
- *Do not try to be perfect or complete:* A statement of teaching philosophy is always a work in progress. Every new teaching and learning situation has the opportunity to impact your statement because of the new experience. Your statement should be a simple, declarative position statement of who you are as a teacher at the moment you write it.
- *Include the future:* Everyone should acknowledge areas where they need to learn and to grow. Do not hesitate to include any new actions and areas of interest that have resulted from your experiences. Be careful, though, not to over-emphasize your ignorance of something that might be a reasonable expectation for you to know. Addressing the future is best in terms of an action plan.
- *Be informed about your audience:* This simple principle of good writing cannot be ignored. The statement you write for a job application might differ from institution to institution depending on the aspects of yourself you want to emphasize. Certainly, constructing a statement for personal use will differ from one that is requested from the institution for whatever political purposes are operating.
- *Consider “hot button” areas carefully:* Be aware that departments and individuals may have had varying levels of success with novel teaching strategies such as group learning, teaching modules, instructional technology, and the lecture-less classroom. As in research, if you choose to highlight your advocacy for controversial ideas, you should also be prepared to polarize some audiences and to engage in some lively discussions with your detractors.
- *Avoid technical terms and jargon:* Be aware that most of your audience will not have a background that will allow you to use many terms from educational psychology or educational theory. If you do, be sure that you know what the ideas are and explain them carefully as part of your text.

The most important audience for your statement of teaching philosophy is yourself. Because we all have teaching philosophies, writing these down makes us understand ourselves better and can hopefully improve and refine our skills as educators. If you can share your statement in an open, critical environment, then it can also become a catalyst for meaningful conversations about teaching and learning in your discipline and in your institution.

8

Viewing Education through a Gandhian Perspective

"Basic Education is my most important gift to the world" said Gandhi who is known for his cautiousness in whatever he speaks. And so what it means needs to be thought through.

Gandhi wanted to construct a new society, a value-based new society. A society built on inequality, exploitation, and violence was not acceptable to him. In Vinoba's words, new social order of Gandhi's vision, is not based on violence nor on punitive power, but on a 'third power' which is the basis of non-violent, Sarvodaya Society.

The means, the instrument of this new social order is basic education. Basic education is not merely an educational methodology. Of course, it is best as a method of education, but it is more of a life style. The fundamental unity of goals and means is Gandhiji's contribution to theory and practice. He was a practitioner. He diagnosed the sickness of the civilization and started treating it. He gave the constructive programme to counter the poverty, unemployment, ignorance, superstitions, addictions, till social practices and inequality which were eating into the body of the society. At the top of the constructive programme is the key, the basic education.

Gandhi made a plan in which basic education illuminated the constructive programme. Basic education was a laboratory for the creation of a new social order. It is an ideal device of the demonstration of the constructive programme.

What is not understood by speech opens up its secrets through action. The constructive programme such as communal harmony, eradication of

Untouchability, khadi and village industries, prohibition, *etc.* do bring about certain results but basic education has a special capability to bring these values to the new generation.

Basic education brings about silent, nonviolent revolution. It merits a deep study. If basic education which is education for life based on industry, community and social service is properly understood and practised, then the new generation can not only be saved from the destruction inherent in today's world but new values can also take root. Of course, how much can be saved is a moot question. This is where a light generating faith and hope is needed.

We need to understand that first and experiment has to be conducted, a seed bed has to be prepared. Only then a wider use is possible. So also basic education is a seed from. All the seeds sowed do not grow into plants. They need time for growth. Similarly, the production of basic education need not be all good. The best seed could sown and gradually the new seed will take root. Twenty -fifty years in human history is not a long time. We need to be patient to allow the time necessary for the basic education to come to fruition.

Gandhi, whose eyes were set on the north pole star, always set his feet on the ground. He was a practical idealist. That which cannot take a life form had no attraction Gandhi. And so the means he selected for the implementation of basic education, which is post- modern in so many its aspects, are often unfathomable by modern scholars.

What are these means? Spinning- wheel, the broom, cow, agriculture, and the boarding house for the students.

These traditional instruments were understood by Gandhi in a new context. Spinning wheel is the means of the old women for centuries. But Gandhi's touch illuminated it to a revolution. These are the ways of the seers, the alchemists of the yore. Those of us who do not understand it turn it into a magic or a superstitions practice.

Why is this so? It is like the story of the four blind men and the elephant. Whatever parts came to each one's hands were seen as the elephant and so they all fought. Spinning-wheel is basic education, cleanliness is basic education. Incomplete and one-sided observations have created misunderstandings about basic education. Of course the spinning -wheel and cleanliness both have their place in basic education. But that does not complete it. It is neither its beginning not its end.

Industry may appear to be basic education. But without experience, how could it be understood that industry is one of the parameters of basic education.

To Gandhi, education is a process from pregnancy to death. Formal school education is a small part of it. Today we see that education is limited to school, is bound by the school. But as long as Gandhi's concept of education is not accepted, the problems of the world of education will remain unsolved. Because we tend to divide life into small parts, atomise it, we look for the solutions in the law, the rules and the punishment. In each new rule or a new law is seen the solution. We no longer trust the understanding of the thought, the cultivation of thought, the development of the virtues, habit formation, the development of

skills, *etc.* Like the man, education is indivisible too. In education we have divided man into intelligence, mind, limbs, *etc.* And as if this is not enough, it is hierarchised. At the top is intelligence; at the bottom are the lowly hands and legs. In Gandhi's basic education, we talk of the harmony of 3 Rs in education. Head, heart, and hand - the integrated development of the three is education. The united growth of the three is at the base of varied problems, of today. The verticality of intelligence and manual labour is at the root of permanent violence and ceaselessness, as all of us can see.

We can see that Gandhi has Brahmin's knowledge, Kshatriya's power, Vaishya's productivity - Creativity and Shudra's service orientation

It is today's time this varnashram division of labour cannot be revived not it needs to be revived. But its basic substance is the quality of each. Attributing such a quality to any social group is not consistent with today's society. But education and socialisation could be such that all the four qualities can flower in each individual, each citizen. This is the task of education. And this is the approach of basic education.

There are five aspects to basic education:

1. Industry,
2. Community living,
3. Social Service,
4. Environment,
5. Holistic View.

Industry

Educationists before Gandhi did consider activity as a part of education. But the inclusion of industry is the contribution of Gandhi. Industry means socially productive labour. One must participate in the production of what one needs - food and clothing. Without this classless society is not possible. "Industry in education" principle is integral to the new social order. Basic education does not mean vocational education for employment or the reduction of unemployment. Industry is the main vehicle of education. Without it the total education of man is incomplete. This is the concept of "Industry in education." Industry does not mean mere labour with hands and legs. It includes the machine, the non-polluting machine which helps in development of skills and competent production. The use of machines in vocational training are not negative. He said that even a spinning wheel is a machine. I am not opposed to machine; my opposition is against the craze of machine. Spinning and weaving are not the only vocations in the basic education. The basic education also includes agriculture, instrumentation, forestry, home science and several other vocations.

Community Living

Like industry, community living is also an indivisible part of basic education. The bane of Indian Social life is its lack of team spirit though an individual we have high standards. We must accept that social aspect of community life is less

developed. The characteristic of our culture is that though our culture has produced persons like Ram and culture is that though our culture has produce persons like Ram and Gandhi, our common man is superficial. Education for citizenship knows more by its absence. It is the other way round in the West. A common man there will not throw not produce many great persons. A common man there will not throw dirt around, he will in a queue; he will not escape work, he will not waste time in gossip. Yes, he drinks alcohol, eat meat, and his of concept man-women relationship has no conspicuous differences. But he is far above us in his capacity to shoulder responsibility and commitment to work. Perhaps our other - worldly view is responsible for our behaviour. Such wrong notions as nobody belongs to you, your parents, husband or wife or children are not with you when you leave this world as also you seek you rowan salvation and basic alones are common. Have such notions corroded social aspects of community life? We are taken aback by the crude behaviour of young adolescents of otherwise as individuals are good enough. We have outcome if we have to work together as a group.

Education can correct this deficiency. Training for group life in education can do this. This is the reason why training for hostel lair is emphasised basic education. Here students can live together transcending differences due to the caste, community, and religion. They work and live together as a group. It is through camps, study - tour, cleanliness, cooking, service, industry and cultural activities that one learns spontaneously that the group is above the individual self.

The fact that the present generation is in the grip of corruption, communalism, violence is symptomatic of the deficiency in the training for group and social life. Given such training, the new generation will shine in industries, business, and politics.

Social Services

Social service is the third medium of basic education the Students should be helped to realise that this parents are not the only ones who have contributed to whatever he is or he will become. It is due to the labour of so many people in the society that he can study and use the things that he does. Our debt to society is so great that any amount of hard and severe work will not balance it. We owe our knowledge, career, comforts of life and even security to so many people's service whom we have never met. Then should we not whatever we can in return for the society? A student can comprehend this debt only through small service-action while he is studying. Three plantations, cleanliness, manual labour, eradication of illiteracy, nursing the sick, and relief work during famine, flood, earth-quake and fire-it is only through this action that not only can a student be socialized but he can also become conscious of his responsibility to the society.

Environment:

Education is receiving and not giving. Nobody can educate others. That I teach a student is an illusion of the teacher. What can then a teacher do? He can create an environment. Education means environment. And so basic education is the education through environment. Three types of environment educate the

child: (1) Natural (2) Social, and (3) vocational. Today the word environment is well accepted. The skill of the teacher lies in how he creates these three environments. One who knows this art is a true teacher. A skilful teacher raises the consciousness of the students so that they can learn from each environment. The paucity of such teachers has reached education bookish.

Holistic View: Integration is the soul of education. The words childhood, youth, and old age are used to describe life but life itself is indivisible. So also various class room subjects, industry, community life, social service and cultural activates not different components of education. They are educational means of life to flower as a whole. How and when to use these means Mediums is the skill of the teacher. Without such integration, education can become a mere ritual which eventually generates boredom and mechanical ways. Teacher's ability to integrate prevents such an outcome. "Holistic view is knowledge a science that accrues from human action and brought creatively by the teacher to the students." A student's interest and motivation would increase when he understands the concept behind whatever he does. Without against each concrete act. Once the student understands this, his consciousness would expand. It is axiomatic that the teacher needs training of competence in bringing the holistic view to the students. There is no doubt that with such a competent teacher a student would learn any subject easily. Basically a holistic view is a scientific orientation.

This is not a complete exposition of the essence of Gandhi's basic education. It is only a general overview. Often Gandhi's basic education has been ludicrously equated with vocational training. But one who goes in depth would soon find that it sees a "revolutionary vision" for the fundamental transformation of human beings. The transformation of theist revolutionary means to educational practice is a challenge for the modern educationalist. The acceptance of such a challenge would open a new horizon. Shall we accept that this new vision is a proper response to day's age of science?

The acceptance of basic education as an educational methodology is not enough. The goal is for it to become a way of life in the new society. The aim of basic educationist to research and demonstrate the development of this new way of life. Gandhi's vision of education means habit formation and development of virtues and skills through education. The vision and philosophy of his education of 'new man' through basic education is Gandhi's gift to us.

GANDHIAN EXPERIMENT IN PRIMARY EDUCATION

THE STORY OF TAMAN KANAK-KANAK 'GANDHI'

*Nothing turns out right so long as there is no harmony between body,
mind, and soul.*

— M.K. Gandhi

'Taman kanak-kanak' is the Indonesian term for kindergarten, and in further references the letters TK will be used. As background to TK 'Gandhi' in Candi

Dasa should be mentioned the Bali Canti Sena Foundation, established in Denpasar, Bali, on 10 December 1970. Its objective was to meet the needs of the time, *i.e.*, to disseminate Gandhian ideas which would give the right orientation to our young generation and make them responsible citizens of the Republic of Indonesia. This, we believed, could only be done when the basis of our life and attitude was *ahimsa* and *satya*, the great twin principles of *Vedanta* successfully demonstrated by Mahatma Gandhi. We endeavoured to do this by starting a monthly that would bring out suitable articles to promote open minds, a spirit of enquiry and constructive activities. Holding camps and outdoor activities for students were part and parcel of this endeavour.

Several of such engagements, however, met with little success. It turned out that camps and outdoor activities were popular, but little was achieved in terms of sustained work. The Gandhian way required a more solid interaction.

Then with great trepidation we made bold to try out a Gandhian Ashram which we named 'Canti Dasa'—servants of peace—which, as if so ordained, was located at a beautiful spot at the foot of an ancient temple.

The urge to be of some service to our immediate community led to a concern for health. A modest dispensary was started, which brought in its wake a free lunch programme for our neighbour, the village school with its 300 or so pupils.

Hardly a year had this project been underway when we decided to suspend our activities due to strained relations with the provincial religious body, who were suspicious of the motives behind the lunch programme. In order to continue our feeding programme, we hit upon the idea of starting our own school. Our financial limitations compelled us to be modest and imposed severe economy in our approach. For this purpose a kindergarten seemed to be feasible, since our area had no kindergarten.

Candi Dasa derives its name from an ancient temple built around the year 800. It must have been some kind of retreat or hermitage, judging from the austere architectural style. It is an exceedingly beautiful spot: a strip of golden beach with hills as a backdrop, on top of which is perched this austere temple. A small freshwater lake fed by many springs on its banks runs into the ocean.

On the banks of the little lake is Ashram 'Canti Dasa', dedicated to the great soul of Mahatma Gandhi, whom we look upon as our guru, although he himself during his life emphatically refused to be anybody's guru. Such was his humility and honesty.

Looking back over the years we realize that, unknowingly, we started some pioneering work of the most difficult kind, *i.e.*, to change people's minds by using persuasion and personal example, the Gandhian way *par excellence*. And that, it should be added, in the teeth of opposition of vested interests.

With a kindergarten to be developed, our own objectives and goals began to take clearer shape. As a concrete manifestation of the Bali Canti Sena Foundation's aim, which has for its guiding principles *ahimsa* and *satya*, the objectives of TK 'Gandhi' are:

- (a) To apply a holistic approach to the education of our pupils. The holistic approach, which is derived from the noble Vedantic dictum *tat tvam asi*—oneness of life— should be reflected in the methods and methodology of the school;
- (b) To bring out and foster all the potential in the child and help it express these through *ahimsic* channels; and
- (c) To make school a happy adventure of discovery for the child.

Candi Dasa cannot be properly called a village, as it consists of a score of hamlets sprawling across the beach area of the village of Bugbug. Its inhabitants number not more than 750 to 800 people. Their source of living is petty farming. Only coconut groves thrive in the locality. Cattle raising adds to their income, but in the dry season grass is scarce. Fishing is also taken up, but it seems that of late the catch has decreased due to superior methods of fishing by people with capital. Of the lime kilns that used to help a few families, some have had to be closed down due to the enforcement of laws supporting ecological balance. Even from colonial times this area has been a poor one and many of its people have over the years migrated to more prosperous parts of the island and of late also to other islands.

There used to be one village school only, our neighbour, but the new drive for education made Candi Dasa one school richer. However, now there is already the problem of filling the first grades of these schools with enough pupils. Apart from two or three carpenters and one blacksmith, no village industry can be discerned. These are only to be found in the adjacent village of Tenganan, which is famous because of its indigenous government and life-style that has remained intact for almost a hundred years. It has become one of the highlights of tourist interest. Although the tourist industry tries hard to sell this area it does not seem likely that hordes of tourist will come in the near future.

EXPERIMENT

In Indonesia even private schools have to follow the syllabus set by the government, with some concessions so long as there is no clash with the country's philosophy, *Panchashila*. In practice, thus, there is some leeway for teaching to depart from the government's dictates. In fact a good deal depends on the creativity and inventiveness of the teacher, who should know how to interpret the spirit of directives creatively. The teachers should be resourceful in integrating and weaving their own outlook and approach towards education into the government guidelines.

The ultimate objective of our educational approach being the attainment of true freedom of the individual, the immediate goal is how to foster those qualities and potential in the child that would help to bring about a peaceful, nonviolent human community where relationships are conducive to harmony and creativity.

The method of teaching emphasizes the self-activity of the child, in which the teacher participates and stimulates rather than teaches as understood generally. The main idea that a teacher should bear in mind is that whatever is

done in class should be rooted in the children's environment. Whatever is artificial should be avoided; in other words, there should be harmony between life at home and in school.

The poverty prevailing in this area means that parents should be saved school expenses. Therefore the only money parents spend is on the few things absolutely needed in class, such as two or three cheap copybooks and a pencil every other month, while no fees or other expenses are charged.

It goes without saying that in our system the principle of *Swadeshi* is given prime importance. To make or produce whatever we need for our food or use is religiously practised in our school. This is possible because we grow our own food, have our own carpenter and tailor/dressmaker as well as musicians. The material we need also should be found in our environment.

TEACHERS

Ashram Canti Dasa, which runs the TK 'Gandhi', is truly a self-supporting community and receives no aid or subsidy from the government or other sources. Therefore our financial means are very limited and only the utmost economy enables us to survive. In such a situation there is no question of hiring teachers. When we opened the TK 'Gandhi' qualified kindergarten teachers were scarce anyway, while those who had been trained in government institutions were cut according to government taste. Luckily a teacher was found who due to political stigma had been jobless for a number of years. She was more than willing to accept our offer, even on a truly 'honorary' basis, her salary being of 'a basic need sufficiency'. The good luck was that she was a good singer and could teach the basics of Balinese dance as well.

After two years we drew the central government's attention and were then given by way of support a woman teacher to help out in our TK. However, as is usually the case with government employed people, she proved more of a liability than a real help. In effect all Ashram members get turns in assisting in the TK whenever they are free from their own duties in the Ashram.

For everyone of us knows something that could be put to good use in the TK class. One older woman is a master at making offerings and palm frond cuttings, so indispensable in Balinese ceremonies and decoration. Another knows how to play the flute and yet another girl teaches swimming. Thus our TK has quite a few different teachers in a week. This is how we make the most of our limitations. Finding the children to people our newly opened TK also presented a slight problem at first. As is well-known, in farming families children have to help out at home or in the field at an early age. For girls, from the age of four daily task could be from collecting firewood, minding younger siblings or just watching the new paddy harvest drying in the sun. Little boys are made to mind grazing cows or the ducks that are let loose in fields that have just been harvested, or perhaps simply watch the house while their mothers are fetching water.

With the cooperation of the village chief some kids were rounded up and within a month we had a class of 27 children. We considered ourselves fortunate

that someone, and a woman at that, could be found willing to mind the children. To disseminate the ideas we nurse about education through this TK, all the members of the Ashram eventually became some sort of teachers according to their skills. Our children come from very poor backgrounds. Their parents struggle the whole day just to scrape a living. Therefore the principle of *Swadeshi*, aside from being an ideal — one that we try to follow faithfully, is pure necessity.

Teaching aids that seem to be a common sight in city or town kindergartens are conspicuous by their absence here. Thus, in this regard, the recourse taken to environment is a must. A real blessing for TK ‘Gandhi’ is its paradisiacal environment. We are, as it were, drenched in the gifts of nature: water, air, both pure and clear, plants in all shades of green, and healthy-looking animals and pets, the expanse of the blue ocean take our children daily in their happy embrace, stimulating in them free spontaneous movements, laughter and song. That our place is a veritable paradise is apparent from the fact that most of the children are already on the TK premises long before school starts. We can see them on the swing or the seesaw, running back and forth on the sandy beach, the little girls walking hand-in-hand while collecting edible berries and fruit that has dropped to the ground; or intently watching a newborn calf drink milk from its mother.

With the hills right behind us, as well as a freshwater lake, the Ashram’s site indeed fulfils the three requirements mentioned in the *Vedas* to make it a fit spot for meditation and other noble pursuits.

Where the hills meet the ocean

And there are springs nearby.

Verily, that is the place for meditation.

The surrounding coconut groves offer plenty of yellow palm fronds for the children to practise on when weaving little mats to sit on, or when cutting decorative streamers and a variety of geometrical forms so indispensable in our celebrations.

The beautiful beach at the doorstep of our school can at any time be used as a vast sandbox in which the children can model, build castles of sand or simply draw and scribble to their hearts’ content. Once the government supervisor of kindergartens came to inspect our school. His only remark was, ‘The only pity is that there is no sandbox here for the children’, to which our teacher replied: ‘Sir, the whole ocean and its beach is the best sandbox one can think of’. What an apt remark to show how hidebound we often are, a result of our parrotlike education.

Twice a week the school goes for a walk in the nearby cluster of hamlets or in the hills, for the beach is their daily fare. This is the occasion to make them aware of the beauty of our surroundings and the industry of the villagers. For at any given time some activity is going on, be it feeding the pigs, pounding rice, weaving mats or a carpenter giving shape to the boat under his hands. Then all their senses can be stimulated, which is later reflected in the drawing class. Swimming is almost a daily feature of our curriculum. Simple exercises and

postures, derived from yoga and Balinese dance, are integrated in their physical exercise hour, while indigenous children's games are promoted. We do not follow the teaching of the three Rs too closely, for we believe that drawing, games and singing are more beneficial and anyway the primary school will offer enough opportunity for the three Rs. The managing of the garden's fruits, leaves, shells, stones, *etc.*, more readily captures the children's attention. Singing and dancing are daily occurrences. The idea behind these two activities is to help preserve and promote the vernacular and local culture, since in the ethnic communities of Indonesia, of which there are many, vernaculars and their attending cultures run the danger of disappearing, the more so now, with the national language rapidly gaining ground and popularity due to its being identified with progress. Artistic Bali offers a wide range of local instruments which can be used in kindergartens and are inexpensive compared to instruments that are imported. In our TK we have a few wooden xylophones on which the kids can beat to their hearts' content.

HYGIENE AND CLEAN HABITS

Holistic or integrated health is a supreme consideration in our approach. Consequently health of body, mind, and soul should be promoted whenever and wherever possible. But the stimulation should take place in a natural way. For instance the singing of *mantras* before starting the morning and when leaving the premises as well as before partaking of lunch is our way of getting involved in religion and a reverent attitude. *Mantras* promoting love for parents, teachers and guests, or for instilling a feeling for God as being the essence of life as so well expressed in '*tvameva mata, cha pita tvameva*', or for promoting friendship, fill the Ashram atmosphere at set times of the day.

Keeping the little hands busy at something useful and meaningful fosters healthy minds, whereas bodily health is taken care of by exercise, walks, swimming and games. In order to stimulate them in a natural way it is especially important that the teacher teaches by example and by personal participation in these activities.

An important feature of the hygiene and health concern is the free school lunch we offer our children. It is through the school lunch that many things are passed on, such as: (a) nutritious food for our lunches is so planned that the parents can make the most of whatever the environment offers in the way of greens, fats, protein, *etc.*; in fact their habit, dictated by poverty, of eating a variety of green leaves from hedges nearby proves to be most wholesome. It has been found that, for instance, the consumption of three different kinds of green leaves as mixed vegetables more than matches two carotene intake we get from carrots, which are alien to villagers anyway besides requiring 'sophisticated' methods for their cultivation; (b) fermented tapioca cake is an excellent way of taking in vitamins B-complex, while such cake is very cheap and thus considered a 'poor people's snack'; (c) *tempe*, a fermented soya bean item, contains the best and most easily digested vegetable protein. At first it

was rejected by the children, as it originated in Java, where it is a 'people's food item. Persistent persuasion has now made *tempe* acceptable and popular.

Neat eating habits should be established and brushing teeth afterwards is to habituate the children to a clean feeling in the mouth. From remarks among the parents when they bring their kids to school we can conclude that our free lunch programme does not stop at lunchtime in our premises, as every newly introduced food item is heatedly discussed. The pros and cons are debated, but it is certain that there are always a few who adopt our novelties. Our dispensary, which serves the schoolchildren's health without excluding others from the village, has also helped in lessening the habit of smoking, for no smoker is served. Of late we have begun to offer acupuncture. The hardest fight was against the national habit of the Balinese of spitting. Luckily, this habit is dying out in our neighbour, the village school. A five-year campaign about plastic littering has yielded results, but not at the public level. That is, now people are careful about keeping their compounds plastic free, but this feeling of responsibility for public places is still very thinly spread.

THE SCHOOL'S INTERACTION WITH OTHERS

Interaction forms the basis of social intercourse of human society. It may be said that perhaps interaction beyond the family circle starts for the child in kindergarten. For the TK 'Gandhi' interaction has an added dimension. Naturally the children's interaction with Ashram members has its merits as well as a negative side. But an unusual opportunity is there due to our foreign guests' presence. Not a few of them took an interest in our TK kids and more often than not joined in by teaching simple songs and games from their own cultures.

Guests with small children loved to have their own offsprings join the kindergarten while they were holidaying with us. In the first year of the kindergarten children were afraid of our foreign guests, a few even immediately started crying at seeing a foreigner, but now we have to take care that they do not bother the guests, because of few of them like to spoil the children with all kinds of little presents, which can easily develop into some form of bribery. This aspect of interaction is conducive to developing the sense of 'one world' and the beginning of appreciation of cultures other than our own.

Instilling a sense of community is done through the children's participation in works of construction, repairs or building a new cottage. On such occasion the little kids can be seen joyfully carrying bricks or buckets on their heads and walking in single file to the site of construction. The weekly general cleaning-up of our premises always affords great hilarity as this gives them an occasion for running about everywhere, while not only collecting plastic rubbish but also firewood for the kitchen.

Interaction with nature at this tender age could be decisive for a child's later development. Our Ashram grounds and situation offer such interaction in abundance. Natural vegetation, stretches of green lawn, the beach and blue sea only a few metres away, the fresh pond bordering the Ashram grounds on one

side, animals such as cows, calves, dogs, cats and a chicken or two, provide another living aspect of nature which may easily awaken a sense of wonder in the young child. And what is life worth without this sense of wonder?

Before school starts children take turns in tending the school garden, watering plants, pulling up dead parts; thus early they are trained to take an interest in whatever they do. Especially in gardening it is always an uplifting experience to watch a bean forcing up its way through the soil in a day or two and see it daily growing to full maturity, followed by the excitement of picking it and having it served as lunch afterwards.

THE PLACE OF NATURE AND CULTURE IN OUR SCHOOL

Nature is divine for the Balinese. The primordial, deeply inbuilt respect and reverence for nature of the Balinese was a ready substratum for the *mahavakya* or great utterance in *Vedanta* introduced by the Hindus to Java and later Bali, in around the fourteenth century. This utterance *tat tvam asi* has even more strengthened our deeply-felt awe and reverence for nature, as is manifested on Plant Day, Animal Day, Tool Day, culminating in the feast of Sarasvati, the goddess of learning and the arts, and Earth Cleansing Day, which comes on the eve of our new year. These ceremonies, except for Earth Cleansing Day, come around every seven months, making Bali an island of daily festivals if individual birthdays and temple anniversaries are included. As a school we especially make much of Plant Day, Animal Day, Tool Day and Ganapati Day. The most festive is Sarasvati Day, celebrated by all schools and institutions or organizations engaged in artistic and literary pursuits.

On that day a priest is invited to lead the function of worship. Sweet and intimate is the celebration of Plant Day. On that occasion a good, fruit-bearing coconut tree in our garden is selected and decorated by the children. They come in their best dress to the school, each with a little offering of fruit and flowers. Sitting around the tree they sing devotional songs, glorifying and blessing the plants in the garden. After the prayer and *mantras* the kids and the decorated tree are sprinkled with holy water. This and the partaking of fruit and cakes in the offering is enjoyed by all.

Days before a ceremony takes place one can feel the increased activity in the air, for everyone is up and doing something. So it is in our school, as the children have to make the decoration and offerings themselves while only for intricate designs do adults come in to assist. With frequent celebrations, hardly a week goes by in our Ashram without this joyous and busy atmosphere.

Thus reverence and identification with plants, animals, in short with the whole of creation, are fostered in the young child. Gradually through devotional songs, dignified language and a respectful attitude towards creation, culture is instilled in the young souls. Our school celebrations culminate in the commemoration of Gandhi Jayanti on 2 October each year. Then the whole day our place rings with laughter, chatter and the joyful shouts of some two hundred or so kindergarten kids coming from several schools of the region to celebrate

with us. Competitions are held in drawing, singing local children's songs and reciting *mantras* especially selected for young children, games and various skills such as cutting palm-leaf decorations, making little offerings, dancing and drawing. Viewing a whole year from this stance, indeed life for the Balinese is centred around celebrations. The whole of life in Bali is a celebration.

TRUE VALUE OF EDUCATION

The real difficulty is that people have no idea of what education truly is. We assess the value of education in the same manner as we assess the value of land or of shares in the stock-exchange market. We want to provide only such education as would enable the student to earn more. We hardly give any thought to the improvement of the character of the educated. The girls, we say, do not have to earn; so why should they be educated? As long as such ideas persist there is no hope of our ever knowing the true value of education.

NOT MERE LITERACY

In Western countries education is so highly valued that senior teachers are treated with much respect. There are at present in England, schools that have been running for hundreds of years and have turned out many renowned men. One of these famous schools is Eton. A few months ago the Old Boys of Eton presented an address to the Head Master, Dr. Weir, who is well known throughout the British Empire. Writing about the occasion, *The Pall Mall Gazette*, a well-known journal in England, has explained the nature of real education. Its comments deserve the attention of us all. The writer in *The Pall Mall Gazette* says:

We hold that real education does not consist merely in acquainting oneself with ancient or modern books. It consists in the habits which one knowingly or unknowingly imbibes from the atmosphere, one's surroundings and the company one keeps and above all in work. It is all very well to acquire a stock of knowledge from good books or from other sources. But the more important thing is to learn humanity. The primary function of teachers is, therefore, not to teach the alphabet, but to inculcate humanity. Aristotle said that virtue is not learnt by reading big volumes. It is by doing good deeds that we learn virtue. Another great writer also says that it is well for one to know what is good, but one will be considered a happy person only if one acts upon that knowledge.

Judged by these standards, English schools will not be found wanting. If we think of English schools as places for turning out human beings, we shall see that they give us statesmen and administrators. Those educated in German schools may have greater knowledge, but if they become also men of action like the pupils of Eton, it is not by virtue of their training in the schools. Despite the defects that may exist in English schools, it is these that produce true men. They are men who are ever ready to meet an enemy threatening at the gates of England.

We can readily realize how a country that invests education with such a noble purpose becomes prosperous. India's star will shine bright when Indian children receive such education. Parents, teachers and pupils ought to ponder over the passage quoted above. It would not do merely to know it, it is necessary to act upon it. That is to say, parents should provide for excellent education, teachers should discharge their responsibility and pupils should recognize that mere literacy is not education.

EDUCATION AS TRAINING

Now I have read a great deal in the prison. I have been reading Emerson, Ruskin and Mazzini. I have also been reading the *Upanishads*. All confirm the view that education does not mean a knowledge of letters but it means character building, it means a knowledge of duty. Our own word literally means 'training'. If this be the true view and it is to my mind the only true view, you are receiving the best education—training—possible.

Education as Service

True education lies in serving others, oblige them without the least feeling of one-uppishness. The more mature you grow, the more you will realise this. A great deal of religious obligations on us are fulfilled when we nurse the sick. I am not worried about your bookish learning so long as you perform your duties and observe solemn ethical conduct. For me carrying out the fundamentals of ethics is *duty*. I shall support you if you want to study further out of your love for it or for excellence. But I won't scold you if you do not do it. Try your best to carry out the decisions you have made. Write to me what you do at the press, at what time do you get up and about your work at the farm.

Service before Self

I was extremely glad to read your letter of the 21st (ultimo) about Mr. West. I read the letter twice. I felt proud of you and thanked God that I had such a son. I wish you to remain such for ever. To do good to others and serve them without any sense of egoism—this is real education. You will realize this more and more as you grow up. What better way of life can there be than serving the sick? Most of religion is covered by it.

Moral Path

The true occupation of man is to build his character. It is not quite necessary to learn something special for earning [one's livelihood]. He who does not leave the path of morality never starves, and is not afraid if such a contingency arises.

Living a Good Life

The service you are rendering to Mr. West and others is the best study for you. He who does his duty is all the while studying. You say that you had to leave your studies; but it is not so. You are certainly studying when you are

serving. It would be correct to say that you had to give up reading books. There is no harm in thus leaving studies. One can get academic education later on. One cannot say that one will get an opportunity of serving others later on...' Let this be inscribed in your heart that, since your mind is pure, you will not fall ill while serving others. And even if you fall ill, I will not worry. You and I, all of us, will achieve perfection only by being moulded in this manner. Learning to live a good life is in itself education. All else is useless. (*Letter to Manilal Gandhi, 12 October 1909 (CW 9, p. 475)*)

Laying Strong Foundation

What is the meaning of education? It simply means a knowledge of letters. It is merely an instrument, and an instrument may be well used or abused. The same instrument that may be used to cure a patient may be used to take his life, and so may a knowledge of letters. We daily observe that many men abuse it and very few make good use of it; and if this is a correct statement, we have proved that more harm has been done by it than good.

The ordinary meaning of education is a knowledge of letters. To teach boys reading, writing and arithmetic is called primary education. A peasant earns his bread honestly. He has ordinary knowledge of the world. He knows fairly well how he should behave towards his parents, his wife, his children and his fellow villagers. He understands and observes the rules of morality. But he cannot write his own name.

What do you propose to do by giving him a knowledge of letters? Will you add an inch to his happiness? Do you wish to make him discontented with his cottage or his lot? And even if you want to do that, he will not need such an education. Carried away by the flood of Western thought we came to the conclusion, without weighing pros and cons, that we should give this kind of education to the people.

Now let us take higher education. I have learned Geography, Astronomy, Algebra, Geometry, *etc.* What of that? In what way have I benefited myself or those around me? Why have I learned these things? Professor Huxley has thus defined education:

That man, I think, has had a liberal education who has been so trained in youth that his body is the ready servant of his will and does with ease and pleasure all the work that as a mechanism it is capable of; whose intellect is a clear, cold, logic engine with all its parts of equal strength and in smooth working order;... whose mind is stored with a knowledge of the fundamental truths of nature;... whose passions are trained to come to heel by a vigorous will, the servant of a tender conscience;... who has learnt to hate all vileness and to respect others as himself. Such a one and no other, I conceive, has had a liberal education, for he is in harmony with nature. He will make the best of her and she of him.

If this is true education, I must emphatically say that the sciences I have enumerated above I have never been able to use for controlling my senses. Therefore, whether you take elementary education or higher education, it is not required for the main thing. It does not make men of us. It does not enable us to do our duty.

Reader: If that is so, I shall have to ask you another question: What enables you to tell all these things to me? If you had not received higher education, how would you have been able to explain to me the things that you have?

Editor: You have spoken well. But my answer is simple: I do not, for one moment, believe that my life would have been wasted, had I not received higher or lower education. Nor do I consider that I necessarily serve because I speak. But I do desire to serve and in endeavouring to fulfil that desire, I make use of the education I have received. And, if I am making good use of it, even then it is not for the millions, but I can use it only for such as you, and this supports my contention. Both you and I have come under the bane of what is mainly false education. I claim to have become free from its ill effect, and I am trying to give you the benefit of my experience and in doing so, I am demonstrating the rottenness of this education.

Moreover, I have not run down a knowledge of letters in all circumstances. All I have now shown is that we must not make of it a fetish. It is not our *Kamadhuk*. In its place it can be of use and it has its place when we have brought our senses under subjection and put our ethics on a firm foundation. And then, if we feel inclined to receive that education, we may make good use of it. As an ornament it is likely to sit well on us. It now follows that it is not necessary to make this education compulsory. Our ancient school system is enough. Character-building has the first place in it and that is primary education. A building erected on that foundation will last. (*Hind Swaraj, Chapter XVIII, 21 November 1909 (CW 10, pp. 54–55)*)

The Three R's

But although much good and useful work can be done without a knowledge of the three R's, it is my firm belief that we cannot always do without such knowledge. It develops and sharpens one's intellect, and it increases our capacity of doing good. I have never placed an unnecessarily high value on the knowledge of the three R's. I am only attempting to assign its proper place to it.

Again, the true knowledge of self is unattainable by the millions who lack such education. Many a book is full of innocent pleasure, and this will be denied to us without education. It is no exaggeration to say that a human being without education is not far removed from an animal. Education, therefore, is necessary for women as it is for men. (*Speech at Bhagini Samaj, Bombay, 20 February 1918 (CW 14, p. 206)*)

Education as Liberation

“That is true education which leads to freedom.” That alone is true education which enables us to preserve our dharma. This is the motto accepted by our

university. The idea has appealed to me very much: “That is true education which leads to freedom.” That which liberates is education. Liberation is of two kinds. One form of liberation consists in securing the freedom of the country from foreign rule. Such freedom may prove short-lived. The other kind of liberation is for all time. In order to attain *moksha*, which we describe as our *paramadharma*, we should have freedom in the worldly sense as well. He who is ridden with many fears cannot attain the ultimate *moksha*. If one would attain this, would achieve the highest end of human effort, one has no choice but to attain that *moksha* which is nearest to one. That education which delays our freedom is to be shunned, it is Satanic, it is sinful. Whatever the quality of the education given in Government schools and colleges, it is to be shunned because the Government which imparts it is Satanic and deserves to be shunned. (*Speech to students, Ahmedabad, 18 November 1926 (CW 18, p. 471)*)

Education as Assimilation

But I must advise you, students, to read these prize-books carefully, to reflect over their real import and, keeping in mind all the profound truths set out in them, follow the path enjoined by religion. Whether you are a girl or a boy, you will grow up one day and have to carry a heavy burden of worldly duties; give some thought, therefore, to the future. Truth is revealed not only in our scriptures but in the scriptures of other religions as well.

It is the duty of students to assimilate whatever they have learnt. They should have religious and moral instruction, as much of it as they can usefully apply. They need education in such measure that it would not become too much of a useless burden on them. I should like to address a few words exclusively to students.

Men and women students, you will benefit from what you have learnt only to the extent that you have assimilated it. That should be the object of this institution too. You should ponder over the element of truth in whatever books of religion you read. If you cling to truth, success is yours. I would advise you from my experience, to profit well from your education. That will be to your advantage and to your country's as well. (*Speech to students in Bombay, 14 February 1915 (CW 13, p. 23)*).

Overcoming Fear

Speaking about the timidity induced by their education, Gandhiji said: We may feel in our heart any measure of devotion for Tilak Maharaj, but where is the student who will express it freely?

For us, fear has become synonymous with life. What is the use of that education which does not help us to overcome fear, but which, on the contrary, strengthens it? What kind of an education is it which does not teach us to follow truth and to cultivate devotion for the country? (*Speech at students' meeting, Agra, 23 November 1920 (CW 19, p. 16)*)

Culture of the Heart

There is one thing which, as I am speaking to you occurs to me, which comes to me from my early studies of the Bible. It seized me immediately. I read the passage:

But seek ye first the Kingdom of God, and his righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you.

I tell you that if you will understand, appreciate and act up to the spirit of this passage, you won't even need to know what place Jesus or any other teacher occupies in your heart. If you will do the proper scavenger's work, clean and purify your hearts and get them ready, you will find that all these mighty teachers will take their places without invitation from us. That, to my mind, is the basis of all sound education. Culture of the mind must be subservient to the culture of the heart. May God help you to become pure! (*Speech at Central College, Jaffna, The Hindu, 2 December 1927 (CW 35, p. 343)*)

Learning and Courage

Let them (students) realize that learning without courage is like a waxen statue beautiful to look at but bound to melt at the least touch of a hot substance. (*Young India, 12 July 1928, p. 236*).

Character vs Knowledge

In brief, formation of character should have priority over knowledge of the alphabet. If this order is reversed, the attempt would be like putting the cart before the horse and making it push the cart with its nose, and would meet with the same success as the latter course. (*9 January 1924 (CW 37, p. 248)*)

Education as Contemplation

Education, character and religion should be regarded as convertible terms. There is no true education which does not tend to produce character, and there is no true religion which does not determine character. Education should contemplate the whole life. Mere memorizing and book-learning is not education. I have no faith in the so-called systems of education which produce men of learning without the backbone of character. (*Interview with W.W. Hall, October 1928 (CW 37, p. 320)*)

Education of the Whole Child

Education does not mean a knowledge of the alphabet. This type of knowledge is only a means to education. Education implies a child's learning how to put his mind and all his senses to good use. That is to say, he really learns how to use his hands, feet and other organs of action and his nose, ear and other organs of sense. A child who has acquired the knowledge that he should not use his hands for stealing or for killing flies nor for beating up his companions or younger brothers and sisters has already begun his education. He has started it, we can

say, when he understands the necessity of keeping his body, his teeth, tongue, ears, head, nails, *etc.*, clean and keeps them clean. That child has made good progress in education who does not indulge in mischief while eating and drinking, eats and drinks alone or in society in a proper manner, sits properly and chooses pure foodstuffs knowing the difference between pure and impure foodstuffs, does not eat like a glutton, does not clamour for whatever he sees and remains calm even if he does not get what he wants.

Even that child has advanced on the road to education whose pronunciation is correct, who can recount to us the history and geography of the country surrounding him without knowing those terms and who understands what his country means. That child has made very good progress in his education who can understand the difference between truth and untruth, worth and worthlessness and chooses the good and the true, while rejecting the bad and the untrue. (*Navajivan*, 2 June 1929 (CW 41, p. 6))

Education as Self-discipline

All your scholarship, all your study of Shakespeare and Wordsworth would be vain if at the same time you do not build your character, and attain mastery over your thoughts and actions. When you have attained self-mastery and learnt to control your passions you will not utter notes of despair. You cannot give your hearts and profess poverty of action. To give one's heart is to give all. You must, to start with, have hearts to give. And this you can do if you will cultivate them. (*Speech to students, Agra, 19 September 1929 (CW 41, p. 391)*)

Right Learning

I have been all this time looking at the motto in front of me: "Learning owes its worth to dharma." What the motto says is true. I have discovered in the course of my travels in India that, without dharma, learning is barren. This raises the question: "What is right learning?" I have given my reply often enough. We shall settle afterwards the issue of what manner of learning to provide. For the present, we may follow one definite method and include religious instruction in it. Religion is not a matter for reflection but of conduct. It is not a subject for talking about, be it noted.

Teachers can create the thing only by their conduct. Gurjarat itself should produce such teachers; it is shameful to go looking for them outside. (*Speech at foundation laying of Vanita Vishram, Ahmedabad, 13 July 1919; (CW 15, p. 410) (Translated from Gujarati)*)

Becoming Strong

In the circumstances in which you pursue your studies, you can only learn to fear man. I would say, on the other hand, that he alone is a real M.A. who has given up the fear of man and has learnt to fear God. Any education you receive will have justified itself only when you have become so strong that you will not beg of anyone for your living. It will have justified itself when the feeling has

grown in you that, so long as you are strong of limb, you need not humble yourselves before anyone for a livelihood. (*Speech at students' meeting, Banaras; Navajivan, 5 December 1920 (CW 19, p. 27)*)

Literary Training

Literary training by itself adds not an inch to one's moral height and that character-building is independent of literary training. (*Young India, 1 June 1921, p. 172*)

Development of Body, Mind and Spirit

The English word 'education' etymologically means 'drawing out'. That means an endeavour to develop our latent talents. The same is the meaning of *kilavani*, the Gujarati word for education. When we say that we develop a certain thing, it does not mean that we change its kind or quality, but that we bring out the qualities latent in it. Hence 'education' can also mean 'unfoldment'. In this sense, we cannot look upon knowledge of the alphabet as education. This is true even if that knowledge gains us the M.A. degree or enables us to adorn the place of a Shastri in some *pathshala* with the requisite knowledge of Sanskrit. It may well be that the highest literary knowledge is a fine instrument for education or unfoldment, but it certainly does not itself constitute education.

True education is something different. Man is made of three constituents, the body, mind and spirit. Of them, spirit is the one permanent element in man. The body and the mind function on account of it. Hence we can call that education which reveals the qualities of spirit. That is why the seal of the Vidyapith carries the dictum 'Education is that which leads to *moksha*'.

Education can also be understood in another sense; that is, whatever leads to a full or maximum development of all the three, the body, mind and spirit, may also be called education. The knowledge that is being imparted today may possibly develop the mind a little, but certainly it does not develop the body and spirit. I have a doubt about the development of the mind too, because it does not mean that the mind has developed if we have filled it with a lot of information. We cannot therefore say that we have educated our mind. A well-educated mind serves man in the desired manner. Our literate mind of today pulls us hither and thither. That is what a wild horse does. Only when a wild horse is broken in can we call it a trained horse. How many 'educated' young men of today are so trained?

Now let us examine our body. Are we supposed to cultivate the body by playing tennis, football or cricket for an hour every day? It does, certainly, build up the body. Like a wild horse, however, the body will be strong but not trained. A trained body is healthy, vigorous and sinewy. The hands and feet can do any desired work. A pickaxe, a shovel, a hammer, *etc.*, are like ornaments to a trained hand and it can wield them. That hand can ply the spinning-wheel well as also the ring and the comb while the feet work a loom. A well trained body does not get tired in trudging 30 miles. It can scale mountains without

getting breathless. Does the student acquire such physical culture? We can assert that modern curricula do not impart physical education in this sense.

The less said about the spirit the better. Only a seer or a seeker can enlighten the soul. Who will awaken that dormant spiritual energy in us all? Teachers can be had through an advertisement. Is there a column for spiritual quest in the testimonials which they have to produce? Even if there is one, what is its value? How can we get through advertisements teachers who are seekers after self-realisation? And education without such enlightenment is like a wall without a foundation or, to employ an English saying, like a whited sepulchre. Inside it there is only a corpse eaten up or being eaten by insects. (*Navajivan Education Supplement*, 28 February 1926 (CW 30, pp. 58-59))

Science and Responsibility

At the time when emphasis in education is put more upon literary knowledge than upon character building, the following from the article of Principal Jacks in the *Sunday School Chronicle* will be read with profit:

Our life presents itself as an endless movement, in which the march of science never quite overtakes the final problem of its own application. The point where responsibility rests upon us all is always just ahead of the last point reached by advancing science. The more the pursuer quickened his pace the more the fugitive quickens his. This inability of science to overtake responsibility is what I mean by its limitations. Applied science will tell you how to make a gun, but it will not tell you when to shoot nor whom to shoot at. You say that moral science will look after that. I answer that moral science in revealing the right use of my gun, inevitably reveals the wrong use also, and since the wrong will often serve my selfish purpose better than the right, my neighbours run a new risk of being shot at and plundered. A bad man armed with moral science is another name for the devil. If Mephistopheles had been examined in moral science in the University of London, he would have carried off all the prizes. At that point moral science and natural science are both in the same boat. How shall we name this fugitive thing which science never catches? I have called it life, others call it spirit or soul or sense, or perhaps the will. I do not think it matters greatly what we call it, so long as we recognize that it exists and that it carries in its arms the fortunes of mankind. Let education look to that. This is the point where all the enterprise of education and all the activities of religion come to their focus—the point of responsibility. If we do it at all other points and leave the point of responsibility uncared for, we shall inevitably come to grief. (Young India, 30 September 1926)

Against Atheism

My association with the students of our country dates back to 10 years, since my return to India. I know the hardships and the difficulties of the students. I have

been seeing them every day. I also know their weak points. It has been my privilege to have a corner in their hearts. They have not hesitated to open their hearts to me, to tell me even what they had concealed from their parents. I do not know how I could bring them peace, or what message I could give them. I share in their sorrows, and I have been striving to alleviate their hardships. But in this world, we have to look only to God for help. None other could render any effectual help.

There is no sin equal to that of disbelieving in Him, in denying Him. Amongst the students of today the spirit of atheism is gaining ground. I am deeply grieved that things should be so. Whenever I see Hindu students, I ask them to think of God, to pray, to repeat Ramanama. They ask me where is God, where is Rama and such other questions. When I see Musalman youths and ask them to read the Koran, and to live the life enjoined therein, they also ask me similar questions. The education which leads to the negation of God cannot make for the service of the country nor of humanity. In your address, you have referred to my service to my country. Whatever I have been doing is done with a sense of my duty to God. And this I consider to be the right thing. God is not seated in the skies, in the heavens, or elsewhere. He is enshrined in the heart of everyone—be he a Hindu, Mohammedan, Christian or Jew, man or woman. (*Speech to students, Mysore—The Hindu, 21 July 1927 (CW 34, pp. 203–04)*)

Education and Culture

“Culture” means refinement of feelings and “education” means knowledge of literature. Education is a means and culture is the end. The latter is possible even without education. For instance, if a child is brought up in a truly cultured family, it will unconsciously imbibe culture from its environment. In our country at any rate, present-day education and culture have no connection with each other. If the educated still retain some culture, that is in spite of their education. This fact shows that the roots of our culture are deep. (*Letter to Premabehn Kantak—5 January 1931 (CW 45, pp. 63–64)*)

Strengthening of Character

In my wanderings among the students I made the discovery at an early stage of the movement that in order to conduct a movement of this kind character must be the foundation. We also found that real education consists not in packing the brain with so many facts and figures, not in passing examinations by reading numerous books but in developing character. I do not know to what extent you students of France lay stress upon character rather than upon intellectual studies, but I can say this that if you explore the possibilities of nonviolence you will find that without character it will prove a profitless study. (*Speech at meeting of students, Marseilles—Young India, 1 October 1931 (CW 47, p. 422)*)

Knowledge of the Self

True education is that which helps us to know the *atman*, our true self, God and Truth. To acquire this knowledge, some persons may feel the need for a

study of literature, some for a study of physical sciences and some others for art. But every branch of knowledge should have as its goal knowledge of the self. That is so in the Ashram. We carry on numerous activities with that aim in view. All of them are, in my sense of the term, true education. Those activities can also be carried on without any reference to the goal of knowledge of the self. When they are so carried on, they may serve as a means of livelihood or of something else, but they are not education. In an activity carried on as education, a proper understanding of its meaning, devotion to duty and the spirit of service are necessary. (*10 July 1932 (CW 50, p. 182)*)

Ideal Education

When it is remembered that the primary aim of all education is, or should be, the moulding of the character of pupils, a teacher who has a character to keep need not lose heart. (*Harijan, 1 December 1933, p. 3 (CW 56, p. 296)*)

Real Education

Real education has to draw out the best from the boys and girls to be educated. This can never be done by packing ill-assorted and unwanted information into the heads of the pupils. It becomes a dead weight crushing all originality in them and turning them into mere automata. (*Harijan, 1 December 1933 (CW 56, p. 295)*)

Book of Humanity

Real education consists in drawing the best out of yourself. What better book can there be than the book of humanity? (*Harijan, 30 March 1934, p. 55*)

Education of the Hand

Literary education should follow the education of the hand—the one gift that visibly distinguishes man from beast. It is a superstition to think that the fullest development of man is impossible without a knowledge of the art of reading and writing. That knowledge undoubtedly adds grace to life, but it is in no way indispensable for man's moral, physical, or material growth. (*Harijan, 8 March 1935, p. 28*)

Fighting Social Evils

All this means education of a character that will revolutionize the mentality of the youth of the nation. Unfortunately the system of education has no connection with our surroundings which therefore remain practically untouched by the education received by a microscopic minority of the boys and girls of the nation. Whilst, therefore, whatever can be done to abate the evil must be done, it is clear to me that this evil and many others which can be named can only be tackled if there is education which responds to the rapidly changing conditions of the country. How is it that so many boys and girls who have even passed through colleges are found unable or unwilling to resist the manifestly evil

custom which affects their future so intimately as marriage does? Why should educated girls be found to commit suicide because they are not suited? Of what value is their education if it does not enable them to dare to defy a custom which is wholly indefensible and repugnant to one's moral sense? The answer is clear. There is something radically wrong in the system of education that fails to arm girls and boys to fight against social or other evils. That education alone is of value which draws out the faculties of a student so as to enable him or her to solve correctly the problems of life in every department. (*Harijan*, 23 May 1936 (CW 62, p. 436))

Making the Whole Man

Man is neither mere intellect, nor the gross animal body, nor the heart or soul alone. A proper and harmonious combination of all the three is required for the making of the whole man and constitutes the true economics of education.... I hold that true education of the intellect can only come through a proper exercise and training of the bodily organs, *e.g.*, hands, feet, eyes, ears, nose, *etc.* In other words an intelligent use of the bodily organs in a child provide the best and quickest way of developing his intellect. But unless the development of the mind and body goes hand in hand with a corresponding awakening of the soul, the former alone would prove to be poor lopsided affair. By spiritual training I mean education of the heart. A proper and all-round development of the mind, therefore, can take place only when it proceeds *pari passu* with the education of the physical and spiritual faculties of the child. They constitute an indivisible whole. According to this theory, therefore, it would be a gross fallacy to suppose that they can be developed piecemeal or independently of one another. (*Harijan*, 8 May 1937, p. 104).

Self-supporting Schools

By education I mean an all-round drawing out of the best in child and man—body, mind and spirit. Literacy is not the end of education nor even the beginning. It is only one of the means whereby man and woman can be educated. Literacy in itself is no education. I would therefore begin the child's education by teaching it a useful handicraft and enabling it to produce from the moment it begins its training. Thus every school can be made self-supporting, the condition being that the State takes over the manufactures of these schools. (*Harijan*, 31 July 1937 (CW 65, p. 450)).

Training in Crafts

Do not think that I say this because I wish to run down book-learning. I fully understand its value. You will not easily come across many men who put such knowledge to better use than I do. My purpose in saying this is to put training in crafts on the same footing as education in letters. Those who thoroughly understand this point will never be eager for a literal education at the cost of training in crafts. Their book-learning will shine better and also prove of greater benefit to the people. (*Letter to Ashram boys and girls*, 17 December 1932 (CW 52, p. 226))

Nayee Taleem

It is necessary to understand the newness of *Nayee Taleem*. The new scheme of basic education will retain whatever was good in the old system. However, it will have newness in abundance. If there is something genuinely new in it, it should result in hope taking up place of despondency, food of poverty, work of unemployment, unity of dissensions and in our boys and girls learning along with reading and writing some craft, for only through the latter will they gain the knowledge of the alphabet. (*Utmanzai, 14 October 1938 (CW 67, p. 438)*)

Making the Right Choice

Our education has got to be revolutionized. The brain must be educated through the hand. If I were a poet, I could write poetry on the possibilities of the five fingers. Why should you think that the mind is everything and the hands and feet nothing? Those who do not train their hands, who go through the ordinary rut of education, lack ‘music’ in their life. All their faculties are not trained. Mere book knowledge does not interest the child so as to hold his attention fully. The brain gets weary of mere words, and the child’s mind begins to wander. The hand does the things it ought not to do, the eye sees the things it ought not to see, the ear hears the things it ought not to hear, and they do not do, see, or hear, respectively, what they ought to. They are not taught to make the right choice and so their education often proves their ruin. An education which does not teach us to discriminate between good and bad, to assimilate the one and eschew the other is a misnomer. (*Discussion with Teacher Trainees—Harijan, 18 February 1939 (CW 68, pp. 372–73)*)

Freedom from Servitude

The ancient aphorism, “Education is that which liberates”, is as true today as it was before. Education here does not mean mere spiritual knowledge, nor does liberation signify only spiritual liberation after death. Knowledge includes all training that is useful for the service of mankind and liberation means freedom from all manner of servitude even in the present life. Servitude is of two kinds: slavery to domination from outside and to one’s own artificial needs. The knowledge acquired in the pursuit of this ideal alone constitutes true study. (*Harijan, 10 March 1946, p.38 (CW 83, p. 208)*)

Culture as the Foundation

I attach far more importance to the cultural aspect of education than to the literary. Culture is the foundation, the primary thing which the girls ought to get from here. It should show in the smallest detail of your conduct and personal behaviour, how you sit, how you walk, how you dress, *etc.*, so that anybody might be able to see at a glance that you are the products of this institution. Inner culture must be reflected in your speech, the way in which you treat visitors and guests, and behave towards one another and your teachers and elders. (*Speech at Kasturba Balika Ashram, 20 April 1946 (CW 84, p. 36)*)

Education for a New World

Education must be of a new type for the sake of the creation of a new world.
(*Harijan*, 19 January 1947, p. 494)

LEGACY OF GANDHIAN EDUCATION

Like many Indian philosophers, Gandhi subsumed freedom under truth. Only the free man, that is, one able to make his choices and decisions himself was able to discover, develop and live by his unique ontological truth. Freedom was thus the necessary basis and precondition of one's ability to be true to oneself. To deny, a man freedom was to force him to be untrue to himself and to live by someone else's truth. For Gandhi the case for freedom was simple, and the same as that for truthfulness. Respect for truth implied respect for human beings as they were constituted at a given point in time, and for their desire to live by their truth. Love of truth involved love of one's fellow-men as they were constituted, and not as one would like them to be. It could never therefore justify 'forcing them to be free' or sacrificing them at the altar of an abstract and impersonal ideal.

Even as Gandhi radically redefined the concept of freedom, he redefined the concept of equality. In much of the liberal and socialist literature on the subject, equality is defined in comparative, contractual, competitive and individualist terms. As we saw earlier, for Gandhi men were necessarily interdependent, rose and fell together, and were born subject to non-repayable debts. He located the idea of equality in this context. Relations between human beings were mediated by their membership of the social whole, and thus non-atomic and noncontractual in nature. Human beings grew and fell together, and hence their relations were necessarily noncompetitive and non-conflictual. And since they were uniquely constituted and had different needs and capacities, they were inherently non-comparable and could not be treated according to a uniform standard.

Since society was necessarily a fellowship of unique and interdependent beings, the concept of equality had to be defined in non-comparative, noncompetitive and non-atomic terms. For Gandhi, it basically consisted in each individual enjoying full access to his community's economic, political, moral and cultural resources in order to realise *his* unique potential; that is, not an abstract human potential as determined by a philosophical conception of human nature or by an arbitrary moral standard, but his potential *as an uniquely constituted being*. As a progressive and reflecting being each individual 'grew from truth to truth' and strove to enrich, deepen and reconstitute his being. Equality of human beings consisted in all alike being able to do so. It did not mean that I should get what others get, but rather that I should get what I need for my development as I define it. It was not only in my interest but that of all others that they should treat me equally, for in degrading and demeaning me they degraded and demeaned themselves and deprived themselves of the

contribution I would make as a rich human being. Equality thus was not a mechanical concept or a synonym for uniformity. It was at bottom a relationship of mutuality and fellowship.

Gandhi also redefined the concept of citizenship. As a political activist he knew that not consent, nor will, nor fear, but cooperation was the basis of the state. Every state, democratic or otherwise, depended on the cooperation of its citizens, be it silent or vocal, passive or active, willing or unwilling. Since the state was an agency of action, their cooperation consisted in rendering it such specific services as carrying out its orders, paying taxes, and obeying the law. The state did not exist independently of its citizens, and was ultimately nothing more than a system of institutionalized cooperation between them. Since the state was a vast and complex organisation, they did not notice that it was their acts of daily cooperation that sustained it and that they were morally responsible for all it said and did. Every government was tempted to misuse its power, and the democratic government was in that respect no better than the autocratic.

What distinguished the two was the fact that one did and the other did not succumb to the temptation. And that was so because a democratic government knew that if it did, its citizens would refuse to cooperate with it. Notwithstanding all its institutional checks and balances, a democratic government could easily turn evil if its citizens became apathetic, vulnerable to corruption and manipulation, or lost their sense of moral responsibility. For Gandhi the virtues and vices of a government were not inherent in it but derived from those of its people. It was the coward who created the bully, the worm which encouraged others to trample on it, the morally irresponsible citizen who created a tyrant.

As a moral being the citizen had a duty to decide whom to give his loyalty and support and under what conditions. His self-respect and dignity required that his loyalty should not be unconditional or taken for granted. When a law was just, he had a 'sacred duty' to give it his 'willing and spontaneous obedience'. The duty had a dual basis.

As a moral being he had a general duty to do or support the good. And as a citizen he had a specific moral duty to the community into which he was born and rooted, by which he was profoundly shaped, whose benefits he had enjoyed, and to whose members he was bound by the ties of loyalty and mutual expectation. If a law was unjust or morally unacceptable, he had a duty to protest against and even to disobey it.

To obey an unjust law was to 'participate in evil' and to incur moral responsibility for its immoral consequences. In Gandhi's view it was a 'mere superstition' and an attitude worthy of a 'slave' to believe that a citizen should uncritically obey all laws. To be a citizen was to be co-responsible for the activities of the government. And to obey a law was necessarily to support the government. Citizenship was not an autonomous and discrete role, but a mode of expressing and realizing one's wholeness and humanity through the medium of the state. No human being could extend uncritical and absolute support to the state without forfeiting his humanity.

I have so far concentrated on Gandhi's thought, and that is only a small and ultimately perhaps not the most important part of his remarkable life. Unlike men of thought whose ideas can be detached from and examined in isolation from their lives, Gandhi's thought, like that of Jesus and the Buddha, is deeply embedded in and of a piece with his way of life. His ideas grew out of his reflections on his experiences, even as his life represented a determined attempt to live out the ideals he espoused. The two formed a unity such that his ideas are best articulated not in the books and articles he wrote but in the kind of life he lived. His life was his greatest book and provides the most reliable clue to his writings.

For the first thirty odd years of his life, Gandhi was a *Grihasthi* who, in dutiful obedience to the conventions of his society, married, raised children, and discharged his social obligations. After that he felt free to disregard the social conventions and to write the script of his life as he thought proper. His central moral passion from now onwards was to attain *moksha*" a Hindu concept which had exercised him greatly for the past few years and which he radically redefined in the light of his understanding of his own religious tradition as well as Christianity and Judaism. In this redefinition *moksha* meant three things: first, total mastery of all 'the senses including sexuality; second, a mind freed of fear, jealousy, pettiness, meanness, vanity, and so on; and third, total dissolution of the sense of selfhood and the consequent identification-with all living beings in a spirit of universal love and dedication to the cause of 'wiping away every tear from every eye'. The first two primarily related to the personal, and the third to the social and political areas of life. Gandhi carried on an intense struggle at all three levels and sought to forge a pure and beautiful soul. The struggle was fierce and uncompromising and marked by moments of doubts and despair, but the overall result was a life of rare moral and spiritual grandeur.

A few random incidents of his remarkable life tell the story. During one of his many periods of incarceration, a black warder was bitten by a scorpion. When Gandhi heard his screams, he rushed to the spot, called for a doctor, and in the meantime started sucking out the poisoned blood, without the slightest thought for his life and in utter disregard of his own bleeding teeth. He went on spitting out the sucked blood until the victim felt relief, and quietly left the place as if nothing had happened.

Indulal Yajnik, his one-time close colleague, turned against him and wrote a vicious attack on him. He regretted this later and went to Gandhi to apologise. It was Gandhi's day of silence. He saw Yajnik among his visitors and, before the latter could say anything greeted him with a reassuring smile and sent him a hastily scribbled note complementing him for changing sides only once whereas he, Gandhi, had done so more often. The poor Yajnik was in tears.

Maulana Azad, the Congress President, had without Gandhi's knowledge and against his wishes sent Stafford Cripps, the visiting British minister, a confidential note saying that he and the Congress had an open mind on the partition of India. When Cripps called on Gandhi, he was surprised to find that

Gandhi knew nothing about the note and left it with him to mull over. When Azad went to see Gandhi the next day, the latter asked him if there was any communication between him and Cripps. Azad lied. Although his note to Cripps was lying on Gandhi's desk, Gandhi kept quiet. After Maulana's departure Gandhi's secretary suggested that the note should be copied and kept for a future occasion. Gandhi rebuked him, asked him to return the original to Cripps, and blamed himself for being unworthy of Azad's trust.

At one of his prayer meetings in 1947, a bomb exploded. As the frightened crowd began to scatter, Gandhi rebuked it for being frightened of a 'mere bomb', and continued to pray unperturbed. When the Government of India insisted that he should henceforth curtail his activities or at least accept protection, he rejoined that both courses of action compromised his commitment to nonviolence and were unacceptable to him. When Indian independence was drawing near, there was extensive inter-communal violence. Gandhi was deeply distressed and thought his entire life a failure. Not given to despair and defeat, he decided to fight the wave of violence single-handed.

Disregarding their physical safety, he and his followers fanned out into remote trouble spots and strove to create inter-communal peace. Believing, wrongly in my view, that he would be able to end the violence only if he eliminated all traces of violence and aggressiveness in himself, he embarked upon the daredevil experiments of sleeping naked with his female associates to achieve total purity. Although attacked and shunned by his colleagues, he stuck to his guns. Just because they had made him a Mahatma, he was not prepared to confirm to their expectations of him. His life was his and it had to be based on *his* truth. If that meant losing his Mahatmahood, he was only too happy to shed the burden, and if it involved public criticism, he was prepared to brave it so long as he was convinced after deepest reflection that his action was right. Such an uncompromising spirit of moral independence is rare in any society; in a largely conventional India, it stood out as an enduring public symbol of dissent and defiance.

It is difficult to say whether or not and which of Gandhi's ideas would prove of lasting value. However there is little doubt that his life had a rare grandeur about it. His uncompromising commitments to truth and justice, his courage to write the script of his life himself, his relentless search for coherence and wholeness, his total lack of fear, his constant experiments with the possibilities of human existence, and so on are lasting sources of inspiration. As Gandhi said in 1937, 'My writings should be cremated with my body. What I have done will endure, not what I have said or written'. His life is surely his greatest legacy. And since it was a carefully crafted text, his thought too shares in its permanence.

WORDS AS DEEDS: GANDHI AND LANGUAGE

A half century after Mahatma Gandhi's assassination at the hands of a member of an ideological movement dedicated to an anti-Muslim construction of the Indian nation, the political wing of that movement finally achieved sufficient

electoral success to become the leading coalition partner of an Indian government and to bring South Asia to the threshold of nuclear holocaust. This may be an appropriate time to reflect, once again, on the figure of Gandhi, what he said and did as well as what people have made of him, as a way of understanding some of the central issues of modern South Asian history.

In recent years the relationship between what Gandhi said and what others understood him to say has been examined with considerable subtlety and imagination. Shahid Amin, first in his now classic *Subaltern Studies* article, then in his fine book on Chauri Chaura, finally gave substance to all the talk of Gandhi as a mobilizer of widespread popular resistance to British rule by showing how Gandhi's message of democratic empowerment was understood in ways that swept aside a good many of its finer nuances, such as nonviolence. That Gandhi's Satyagraha campaigns stimulated violence is nothing new: it was continually pointed out at the time, not only by British authorities and conservative Indians, but even more insistently by Gandhi himself. What Amin documents, however, is the perspective of people who found in Gandhi a liberation from established authority. In one vivid scene, Amin describes crowds of people in the middle of the night at the Kumshi railway station, eight miles from Chauri Chaura, demanding that Gandhi present himself, though he was fast asleep. What happened when they finally got him up was what Amin calls a "slanging match" with a very angry Mahatma.

The significance of such an event is not merely a matter of miscommunication, however; it is, in fact, the breakdown of established lines of dominance and maybe the beginning of a new self-conscious social collectivity. Amin doesn't tell us much about the "slanging match," but what he does tell us is enough to suggest that Gandhi and his unruly devotees, however much they differed, were able to speak something like the same language. And the crowd was not wholly wrong in perceiving in Gandhi the rejection of the established authority of the British regime and an affirmation of what they were: the rural, as we now say, "subaltern" the people of India.

Gandhi, however, had his own notions of authority; it was his task to educate, discipline and control what he freely called the "mob." That others were able to appropriate Gandhi's powerfully mobilizing presence for a far less radical project, as Partha Chatterjee argues, was also, for better and for worse, part of the making of the Indian nation-state. "My language is aphoristic, it lacks precision. It is therefore open to several interpretations." Chatterjee uses this quotation as the epigraph to his chapter on Gandhi in *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World*. What I want to consider here, in a very preliminary way, are questions about Gandhi's language or languages as well as what Gandhi said about language. It is remarkable that questions of language—speaking, listening, reading and writing—have hardly ever been taken up in any detail in all the vast literature on Gandhi. For such questions, the problem of what language to use on what occasion, who should be authorized to speak, who was in a position to hear, were explicitly matters of long-standing concern in Gandhi's

life and thought and have had, I would argue, a direct relevance to an evaluation of the significance of Gandhi's role in overturning British rule and in creating modern India.

Hind Swaraj, probably the central text in Gandhian thought, was written, it has been said—I am not qualified to judge—in a somewhat nonstandard Gujarati in 1908, when Gandhi was still an expatriate. It is a comprehensive rejection, as Chatterjee says, not only of industrial society but of civil society altogether, including newspapers, parliaments and the whole apparatus, as it existed then, of modern communications. The vision of society, particularly Indian society, which Gandhi presented in that work and which he held to throughout his life was one of strong local communities, a subsistence economy, and a weak state.

Yet as early as *Hind Swaraj* Gandhi sets out a notion of a national linguistic order consisting of “provincial languages” and “a universal language for India[...] Hindi, with the option of writing it in Persian or Nagari characters.” In later years, Gandhi spoke frequently of the need to enforce compulsory study of Hindi throughout India, to establish it as the *rashtra bhasha*, the state language of a united India, leaving English to a limited role in international communications. As a major formulator of India's national linguistic order, Gandhi seems to be making space for a surprisingly far-reaching measure of bureaucratic uniformity of the sort examined by the French anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu:

Only when the making of the ‘nation’, an entirely abstract group based on law, creates new usages does it become necessary to forge a standard language, impersonal and anonymous like the official uses it has to serve.... The normalized language is capable of functioning outside the constraints and without the assistance of the situation, and is suitable for transmitting and decoding by any sender and receiver, who may know nothing of one another. Hence it concurs with the demands of bureaucratic predictability.

There is, then, a striking disjunction between Gandhi's decentralized, pre-industrial utopia and his insistence on a political structure of national and provincial languages, the basis, more or less, of what emerged after independence as India's linguistic states and so-called three language formula. But it couldn't have been otherwise because, as Bourdieu points out, any language that “makes itself heard by an entire group is an authorized language.”

The business of Gandhi, after all, was to mobilize a population to break with established authority, and that, in Bourdieu's terms, was a matter of constructing a new language by means of “the labour of enunciation,” “the labour of dramatization.”

By performing such labours, Gandhi was harnessing far-flung points of discontent and rebelliousness in a vast land to constitute new categories and social spaces for the exercise of authority. This is, of course, Chatterjee's argument about the role Gandhi played, for all his personal ambivalence, in constituting the Indian nation-state.

The context in *Hind Swaraj* of Gandhi's brief mention of Hindi and what he called provincial languages—at a time, of course, when no Indian province had been defined on the basis of language—was his rejection of the purported benefits of English education and the entire role of the English language in British India. Imperfectly educated in English, Indians had to continually defer to British authorities, British ideas and British institutions. That Indians communicated with each other in English and took their quarrels to British courts in English were marks of the humiliation of colonial rule and sources of organized social enmity, as between Hindus and Muslims. But it was not the British who were to blame. “It is we, the English-knowing Indians, that have enslaved India.”

To break the bonds of British rule and, even more importantly, of British cultural and psychological domination, it was necessary to reject the English language as a language of the state, the schools and even private communication among Indians.

The central point of *Hind Swaraj* is that Indian self-rule must be more than what later came to be called a transfer of power from British to Indian officials or, as Gandhi put it, “English rule without the English.”

Yet Gandhi seems to suggest here, as elsewhere, that Hindi or a combination of Hindi, Urdu, and “provincial languages” would occupy the public, official and educational niches already established for English. Indians would no longer have to defer to British rulers or British ideas, but Gandhi leaves open the possibility of a political order that would merely translate the colonial systems from one language to another.

I will try to sketch an outline, then, of Gandhi's role in the creation of the linguistic order of the modern Indian state by examining, first, Gandhi's own linguistic practice—his “enunciative labour,” if you please—then his ideas about the languages of India, and finally the organizations and policies that he advocated and participated in.

GANDHI'S LANGUAGE

It is significant that Gandhi's major writings—*Hind Swaraj*, his autobiography, *Satyagraha in South Africa*, his lectures on the Gita—are all in Gujarati. He tells us in his autobiography that he studied in the English medium from the Fourth standard and there was little or no formal space in the curriculum for Gujarati after that. He did, however, study Sanskrit in school, though he was briefly tempted to switch to Persian because it would have been so much easier. But the bulk of his education was in English, and one of the repeated refrains in his writings on language was how difficult, time consuming and ultimately frustrating it was to learn that language. He came to realize the futility of perfecting his command of English when, along with his French and his dancing lessons, he studied English elocution in London with a Mr. Bell. “Mr. Bell rang my bell,” he says in his autobiography. I suspect the phrase gains something in translation.

In any case, Gandhi's Gujarati was no doubt heavily influenced by his English. He used English texts as models, notably in his rendering of Ruskin's *Unto This*

Last; often the English versions are pervaded with little knots of embedded quotations and idiomatic expressions—"a consummation devoutly to be wished," "the unkindest cut of all," or for that matter, "Mr. Bell rang my bell,"—that raise suspicions about what came first, the English or the Gujarati. But these are matters that others would have to study.

What is clear is that it was Gandhi's intention to break the spell of English on India. It was a theme he returned to again and again, even as he continued to use English for a significant portion of his own writings, publications, and speeches. When he returned to India from South Africa in 1915, his first address to a welcoming party was in Gujarati and it was primarily about why Gujaratis should not speak English to each other.

His first major public address after the year of silence that Gokhale had mandated for him, at the inauguration of Banaras Hindu University (BHU), denounced the language that it was delivered in, English, and called upon Indians to speak Indian languages.

In the course of his life, Gandhi spent a great deal of time trying to learn the rudiments of several Indian languages, including the scripts. It is not clear to me whether he had any significant multilingual exposure in his childhood in Porbhandar and Rajkot, though there are scattered references to Tulsidas's *Ramcaritmanas* and Surdas, texts in literary Avadhi and Braj respectively. On his return from London as well as in an interval during his South African period, Gandhi spent a number of months in Bombay, and it is reasonable to suspect that he picked up some colloquial Hindustani there. But Gandhi's major exposure to Indian languages was in South Africa. It was there that he started his career as a writer of Gujarati, and, he later said, that he learned to speak what he variously referred to as Hindi or Hindustani, if only in a rudimentary form, with others who knew it no better than he did. On shipboard between South Africa and India, he joined an Englishman in hiring an Urdu teacher from steerage, though the Englishman made more progress than he did.

He also worked on learning some Tamil from a British primer. Later at Tolstoy farm, he used this knowledge to teach Tamil and Urdu script to children in the school, though it should also be noted that he terminated the Tamil and Hindi editions of the *Indian Opinion*, when he became editor, continuing to publish it in Gujarati and English. In later years, Gandhi continued to study Hindi, Urdu and, to some extent, Tamil whenever he had a chance, mostly in jail.

On the basis of these experiences, Gandhi maintained that a North Indian could learn Hindi in just a few months. It would take a South Indian somewhat longer but, in any case, far less time than the many hard, laborious years it takes to learn English. In his speaking and correspondence, he attempted to use Gujarati with other Gujaratis—though probably not with Jinnah. Increasingly, he relied on Hindi-Hindustani whenever he could, and complained when circumstances required him to speak or write to Indians in English. When he spoke or wrote in Hindi, he often apologized for the imperfections it contained. He was well aware that there were standards of Urdu and Hindi, exemplified in speeches by such

figures as Hasrat Mohani or Madan Mohan Malaviya, which were beyond him. He insisted that it was preferable to speak the language poorly than to speak English, but he still aspired to learning to speak the standard language. The criteria for defining the standard language was a matter he considered of central political importance.

POLICIES AND ORGANIZATIONS

Soon after returning to India, Gandhi took up language issues with renewed attention. His BHU address in 1916 was preceded by one to the Nagarini Prachar Sabha, the organization which is the centrepiece of Christopher King's valuable book and which was at the forefront of promoting the use and official recognition of the *devanagari* rather than the Urdu script. In that brief speech, he apologized for his poor command of Hindi, learned in South Africa, but supported the cause of the organization. Two years later, in a presidential address to the other major Hindi organization, the Hindi Sahitya Samelan, he was better prepared and more careful, arguing, as he had in *Hind Swaraj*, that the term "Hindi" must be conceived to include Urdu and that the Urdu script also deserved recognition. In these speeches, Gandhi argues that the work of national leadership requires people to speak Hindi rather than English, because, as he said in the BHU speech, only then could they "speak to the heart of the people."

One way of interpreting what Gandhi said in 1916 is that he was not calling for a universal knowledge of Hindi, but rather a trickle down of knowledge and political persuasion from English to Indian languages, a policy not really all that different from Macaulay's overly quoted "Minute on Education." The English language creates too great a barrier between an educated leadership and the public. Hindi is more accessible than English, he claimed, because its grammar and vocabulary are closer to the other languages of north India, and its vocabulary, if not its grammar, is closer to the languages of the south. Using Hindi rather than English, then, was a matter of efficiency: it was easier to learn. But Gandhi also argued that there was a cultural spirit in the languages of India that separated them from English: "Our languages is a reflection of ourselves, and if you tell me that our languages are too poor to express the best thought, then I say that the sooner we are wiped out of existence, the better for us." The argument for cultural self-sufficiency, for not deferring to Britain for authoritative speech, raises, however, the question of the sources of authority in an independent India.

In 1920, in the wake of the Rowlatt Satyagraha and the onset of the Khilafat Movement, Gandhi became the unquestioned leader of the Indian National Congress. At the Nagpur Congress, the discussion was all about noncooperation, but along with that, and without extensive discussion, came a new constitution for the organization that, among other things, reflected Gandhi's ideas about language. Although three years earlier the Congress had recognized provincial organizations for Andhra and Sind (neither of them political entities in British India) based, more or less, on linguistic criteria, the idea of linguistic provinces

had not inspired widespread discussion or significant support. Now, however, the local and provincial subdivisions of the Congress, which were to be much more active and ongoing under Gandhi's leadership, were totally redefined along linguistic lines, virtually the same lines that were to become the basis for independent India many years later with the States Reorganization Act of 1956. Gandhi continued to reiterate his opposition to the role of English as a language of authority in India, as "a permanent bar between the masses and the English-educated classes." But, of course, English continued to be used in the deliberations of the Congress, and Gandhi himself published an English periodical, *Harijan*, alongside his Gujarati one, *Navajivan*, and the short-lived Hindi-Urdu *Harijansevak*—a three language formula operation in itself. In his 1935 speech, once again to the Hindi Sahitya Samelan (HSS), he stated the matter clearly: the ultimate linguistic order of India should be "to use the language of the province in the province, to use Hindi for all-India purposes and to use English for international purposes."

The recognition of linguistic provinces, reiterated in the Nehru Report of 1927, was consistent with Gandhi's own advocacy and devotion to Gujarati, even as he supported Hindi or Hindustani as the national language, the language that would take the place of English for communication among Indians of different linguistic backgrounds. In that spirit, Gandhi campaigned most vigorously for Hindi in the south, establishing in 1927 the Hindi Prachar Sabha, a network of teachers and a body of instructional materials aimed at teaching Hindi to speakers of Tamil, Telugu, Kannada and Malayalam, all in the name of patriotism and national service. Ignoring anti-Sanskrit sentiment in Tamil Nadu, Gandhi argued that the common Sanskrit vocabulary would serve to bind the languages of India together. At the same time, Gandhi advocated that all Indian languages be written in the same script, *devanagari*, in order to make them easier to learn.

The one exception to Gandhi's notion of the unity of Indian languages and the desirability of a common script was his consistent concession to the legitimacy of Urdu's separate script and, to some extent, its Persian and Arabic vocabulary. Gandhi's definition of Hindi, Hindustani and Urdu and their interrelatedness varied from time to time and from setting to setting, and is closely bound up with his abiding concern about the relationship of Muslims to the Indian nation. In *Hindi Swaraj*, he appears to think of Hindi as a single language that can be written in either *devanagari* or Persian script, the latter a concession to Muslim sensitivities.

In 1917 Gandhi defined Hindi as "that language which Hindus and Muslims in the North speak and which is written either in the Devanagari or Urdu script." The difference between Hindi and Urdu, he then said, was merely a matter of the script. He dismissed the distinctions of lexicon—Hindi as "Sanskritized" and Urdu as "Persianized"—as trivial, of interest only to a few among "the educated classes," not to the "masses." Some years later, in 1937, Nehru, in an essay on language written with Gandhi's guidance elaborated this argument as follows:

Most of our present troubles are due to highly artificial literary languages cut off from the masses. [But if writers] think in terms of a mass audience, [t]his will result automatically in a simplification of language.... Language which is to make appeal to the masses must deal with the problems of those masses.

There is no recognition here that there might exist significant linguistic variation aside from class or religion, or that “simplification” might also restrict the range of what people might want to say—when they are not speaking English. As for script, Gandhi conceded in his 1917 speech that “for the present, Muslims will certainly use the Urdu script and Hindus will mostly write in Devanagari.” He recognizes here that among Hindus there was some significant identification with Urdu. He says, however, that once there is mutual trust and harmony among Hindus and Muslims, the matter of selecting an appropriate script will be decided on practical and scientific grounds.

In fact, Gandhi believed that ultimately *devanagari* would become the universal Indian script, but he was careful to mute that idea in most of his public statements on the issue. In his presidential address to the (HSS) in 1918, Gandhi stated that the term Hindi subsumed Urdu and that those who advocate the advance of the language should welcome the enrichment that Urdu might bring to it. By the mid 1930’s Gandhi had formulated an idea of Hindi vs. Hindustani as the difference between a literary standard language and a language for oral communication, thus alienating a significant constituency of Urdu supporters. Then he shifted to the term “Hindi-Hindustani” to indicate that he advocated a language that freely used words of Persian or Arabic or, for that matter, any other origin, and to disassociate himself from those in the HSS who sought to purge Hindi of any marked Urdu words while opening the language freely to unmodified Sanskrit ones.

Finally, in 1942, Gandhi decided that the term Hindi had become irretrievably bound up with hostility to Urdu, so he shifted entirely to “Hindustani,” forming a new organization, the Hindustani Prachar Sabha (HPS), and resigning, after much private and public negotiation, from the HSS. The HPS devoted itself to preparing teaching materials in a “Basic Hindustani,” a concept first put forward by Nehru in his 1937 essay. It was to be modeled on something called “Basic English,” an 800 word package that C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards had devised as a universal language. The Quit India Campaign and subsequent imprisonment of the Congress leadership interrupted the project, but it was briefly revived in 1945 before being swept away by the partition.

The purpose of Gandhi’s campaign for Hindustani was to stop what he claimed was an increasing differentiation between Hindi and Urdu, both of which he defined as “diseases” of the cities. As before, Gandhi claimed that there was a single unified “dehati,” that is, rural, language, spoken by both Hindus and Muslims. As a national language, Hindustani should be learned in both scripts, though now he suggested that the language could also be learned in the scripts of other regions. Gandhi’s position on script and Hindustani was entirely

motivated by his concerns about Muslim-Hindu relations. Here he was torn between a desire to recognize the otherness of Muslims in a plural India and a desire to incorporate them into his vision of a monolithic India. In 1920, Gandhi had made a huge personal commitment to the Khilafat Movement entirely on the basis of its religious importance to Muslims. If it is important to our brothers and fellow countrymen, he argued, that in itself is sufficient reason to support the cause. His attitude towards Urdu script was similar: it was a matter of religious importance to Muslims and should be respected and nurtured for that reason. Hindus should learn Urdu in order to appreciate the culture of their Muslim neighbours.

Eventually, however, the two streams, Hindi and Urdu, would flow together, restored to what Gandhi claimed was their prior unity: “The source of the river of language lies in the Himalayas of the people.” “Ultimately, when our hearts have become one, ... we shall reach a common language with a common script, whilst we shall retain provincial languages for provincial use.”

I have argued that Gandhi sought to establish a new linguistic order to eliminate the dominance of English. Robert King has shown how Nehru handled the language issues, holding back for a time and then conceding on the issue of provincial languages, keeping the door open for the continued use of English but basically resisting the more vociferous attempts to impose compulsory language regimes upon India. Now, on reflection, fifty years after independence, the grand disputes about language have largely died down and the result has been something fairly close to what both Gandhi and Nehru had in mind. The standardized regional languages of India are in place at the state levels. What of Hindi-Urdu-Hindustani? If the guardians of a more Hindustani *shudh* Hindi are somewhat more relaxed now, it is because Urdu has virtually no official function and little educational recognition in contemporary India. In old Delhi’s Urdu bazaar, on the steps of the Jumma Masjid, in the *maktab* at the Fatehpuri *masjid*, even Islamic texts are increasingly being sold and studied in *devanagari*. And English? You don’t have to read the *New Yorker* to know that it is still there and not going away, and that it is the mark of class privilege. At least it isn’t British anymore. Nor is it, by the way, American. “It is not that I am making a fetish of language,” Gandhi said in 1937. “It is not that I would refuse to have Swaraj if I could have it at the cost of our language, as indeed I should refuse to have it at the cost of Truth and Non-Violence.” He would not be pleased at the continued hegemony of English in significant sectors of Indian life, but then there is much in contemporary India that he would find far more appalling.

PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Philosophy of education explores fundamental questions about the nature, purpose, and methods of education, serving as a foundation for guiding educational practices and policies. It examines key philosophical concepts such as knowledge, truth, ethics, and human nature to elucidate the aims and values of education. One central inquiry within the philosophy of education is the nature of knowledge and its acquisition. Philosophers debate whether knowledge is objective and universal or subjective and culturally constructed, influencing educational theories about curriculum, pedagogy, and assessment. Moreover, philosophy of education delves into the purpose and goals of education, addressing questions about the aims of schooling and the desired outcomes for students. This includes considerations of individual development, societal needs, and the cultivation of critical thinking, creativity, and ethical behavior. Philosophical perspectives on education also inform discussions about the role of the teacher, the structure of the curriculum, and the assessment of learning outcomes. Additionally, philosophy of education explores ethical dimensions of education, examining issues such as social justice, equity, and the moral responsibilities of educators. It considers how education can promote democratic values, respect for diversity, and the empowerment of marginalized groups. By engaging with philosophical debates about education, educators and policymakers can critically evaluate educational practices, advocate for ethical principles, and contribute to the development of more inclusive and equitable educational systems. The book on Philosophy of Education provides a comprehensive exploration of fundamental questions regarding the nature, purpose, and methods of education, guiding educators and policymakers in shaping educational theory and practice.



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