

LITERARY THEORY AND CRITICISM AN INTRODUCTION

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CHAPTER 1

ARISTOTLE'S LIFE, PHILOSOPHY, AND LEGACY: A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF HIS INTELLECTUAL JOURNEY AND CONTRIBUTIONS

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ABSTRACT:

Aristotle was a key figure in Western philosophy. He was born in Stagira, Macedonia, around 384 B.C. His early study at Plato's Academy served as a springboard for his wide-ranging interests in politics, biology, ethics, and metaphysics. Throughout his life, Aristotle had a significant impact, from his time at Plato's Academy to founding his school, the Lyceum, in Athens. Even with all of Aristotle's accomplishments, it is still difficult to completely comprehend his intricate ideas, especially when it comes to government, ethics, and metaphysics. Scholarly discussion has not abated over his philosophical positions on matters such as the function of government, hostility to communism, and the idea of happiness. This study provides a thorough analysis of Aristotle's philosophical theories, with a focus on his conceptions of God, ethics, and government.

The purpose of this study is to shed light on Aristotle's philosophical contributions and his lasting influence on Western thinking by looking at these areas. Aristotle's aversion to communism, logical approach to government, and sophisticated conception of pleasure and virtue are what define his philosophical legacy. His writings, which provide insights into human nature, the function of government, and the pursuit of pleasure, continue to be a mainstay of philosophical study. Future studies might examine how Aristotle's ideas have influenced metaphysics, ethics, and contemporary political thought. Furthermore, analyzing how his concepts have been construed and modified throughout time might provide further perspectives on the applicability of his philosophy in modern settings.

KEYWORDS:

Academy, Ethics, God, Government, Philosophical.

INTRODUCTION

In 384 B.C., Aristotle was born in the Macedonian town of Stagira into a prosperous family. Hence, the Pope gave him the moniker "Stagirite." Aristotle lost his father, Nicomachus, a physician, when he was a little boy. Aristotle was seventeen years old in 367 when his uncle Proxenus sent him to Plato's Academy in Athens. For the following twenty years, he stayed there first as a student and then as an associate.

At Plato's Academy

Aristotle started his first professional phase at the age of seventeen, in B.C. 368–368, spending twenty years living in Athens as a member of Plato's Academy. Following Plato's death in 347, his nephew Speusippus took over the Academy. Speusippus was partial to the mathematical components of Platonism, which Aristotle, who was more interested in biology, found objectionable. Aristotle decided to leave Athens, maybe for this reason but more likely due to the rising anti-Macedonian feeling in the city. He agreed to join his intellectual group on the

coast of Asia Minor at Assos, where his friend and old Academy classmate Hermeias, a former slave, had taken over as king. For three years, Aristotle stayed there. He wed Pythias, Hermeias's niece, around this time, and the two had a daughter, Pythias. Aristotle traveled to Mytilene, on the adjacent island of Lesbos, in 345, where he met Theophrastus, a resident of the island and another former academic [1], [2].

Up until the time of Aristotle's passing, Theophrastus first his student and then his closest colleague remained a part of his life. Aristotle and Theophrastus' biological studies blossomed when they were in Lesbos. Aristotle was called to Philip of Macedon's court in 343 to act as a teacher for his thirteen-year-old son Alexander. It is unknown what advice Aristotle provided the young man who would become Alexander the Great, but it seems probable that while he was living at the Macedonian court, Aristotle's interest in politics grew. Alexander's association with Aristotle came to an end when he was named regent for his father in 340.

The following five years hold unknown happenings. Aristotle could have returned to Stagira or lingered at the court. But he made his second, protracted trip back to Athens in 335 after Philip's death. He created his school, the Lyceum, just outside the city, where he gave lectures, wrote, and had philosophical discussions with his students and colleagues. He did this by renting many buildings. They conducted studies on biological as well as other philosophical and scientific subjects under his leadership. Meno wrote about medicine, Theophrastus about physics, cosmology, and psychology, Eudemus about mathematics and astronomy, and Aristoxenus about music. Theophrastus focused on botany. Aristotle also prepared a vast record of 158 Greek city-state constitutions with his group; he used this description in his own *Politics*.

Alexander's tutor

The second stage of his career may be said to have started when, after three years at Lesbos, he achieved a passing grade in Biology in B.C. 343–342. Philosophical thought was present in Pella's court, but the atmosphere was nonetheless dark and brutal. Philip banished his Queen Olympias to wed a new wife; she had him killed in 336 B.C., and her son Alexander ascended to the throne. Aristotle returned to the calm of Athens after a twelve-year hiatus. He had around twelve more years to live. This marked the start of his third professional phase.

Going Back to Athens: His School

The return of this foreigner undoubtedly raised eyebrows among Athenian patriots like Demosthenes because he was a hereditary friend of the Macedonian monarchy that had crushed Greek freedom at Chaeronea (338); he was also friendly with Antipater, who was appointed regent of Macedon while Alexander swept through Asia; and he was opposed to extreme democracy, as he was to all extremes. However, Aristotle was a self-possessed individual. His customary response, upon learning of someone else's mistreatment of him, was to "let him even beat me, as long as I'm not there." Even though it was destroyed, Athens remained Greece's intellectual center and "the eye of Greece." There, in a grove of Appollo near Lyceus, south of Lycabettus, and not far from the current British School, Aristotle established his school, the Lyceum. Its structures comprised a museum, a library, and a covered walkway or walkways. He would walk up and down the grove while imparting knowledge, which is how his philosophy came to be known as "peripatetic." His focus seemed to be shifting more and more toward the scientific study of tangible reality, as if he had embraced the proverb from ancient China that goes, "I stood on tiptoe for a good view better had I climbed a hill; I spent a whole day meditating I should have done better to learn." He so began to arrange studies in the fields of politics, history, literature, natural science, and biology on an encyclopedic scale. His notoriety grew. He developed into "the Master of those who know," as Dante refers to him.

Final Years and Demise

But there were dark clouds over his later years. After his wife passed away, Alexander, despite having sent his old tutor biological data from his conquests, grew conceited and decided to become a god. He disregarded Aristotle's advice to treat his Greek subjects better than their Oriental counterparts and executed Aristotle's nephew, the clumsy Callisthenes. Last but not least, when Alexander himself perished in Babylon, Athens launched an offensive against the Macedonians. Aristotle was charged with impiety during this battle, mostly because of the compliments he had given to his deceased father-in-law Hermeias years before in a poem. The elderly philosopher left Chalcis in Euboea to prevent the Athenians, in his own words, "from sinning against philosophy a second time." He passed away there the next year (B.C. 322), at the age of sixty-three [3], [4].

His Desire

We still possess the will he left behind, which was written with great care and consideration for his family and slaves, especially for his mistress Herpyllis, and her son. She requested that his ashes be interred beside those of his late wife Pythias. He stipulated in his will that his slaves would be freed, saying, "It is the first emancipation proclamation in history."

His Opinions About God

To fully comprehend Aristotle's philosophy of poetry and the fine arts as it is developed in *The Poetics*, it is necessary to briefly examine his ideas on God, the state and governance, morality, and ethics. Thus, we provide below the key points of his opinions on these topics. According to Aristotle's philosophical theory, God is the Cause of the universe's motion rather than its Creator. For a dreamer is an unhappy personality, a soul that longs for something that is not, an unhappy being that pursues happiness that is, an imperfect creature striving for perfection and a creator is a dreamer. However, since God is flawless, he is unable to feel uncomfortable or unsatisfied. Consequently, he is the universe's Mover rather than its Maker. He is the universe's immovable mover.

Aristotle defined a moving mover as any other source of motion in the universe, including people, things, and thoughts. As a result, the ground is moved by the plow, the hand is moved by the brain, the brain is moved by the need for food, the instinct for life is moved by the want for food, and so on. Stated differently, every movement originates from a previous movement. Every slave's master is also a slave of another master. The desire of the tyrant even owns him. However, God exists as a consequence of nothing. He has no master and is a slave. He is the origin of all movement and cognition, the master of all masters, and the source of all activity. Moreover, while the world is interested in God, God is not interested in the world. Because to be interested in the world is to be flawed; to be susceptible to emotion, to be influenced by praise or disapproval, to be able to change one's viewpoint according to the deeds, wishes, or ideas of others. However, God is impersonal, unchanging, and flawless. The way a loving thing moves its lover, so he changes the world. The Aristotelian God is a cold, impersonal, and, from our contemporary theological perspective, "perfectly" unsatisfying form of Supreme Being, even if he is adored by all men and cares nothing for their destiny. Rather than the Heavenly Father of the poets, he is more like the Primal Energy of the scientists.

DISCUSSION

Aristotle's thinking grows more rational, intelligible, and tangible as he descends from heaven to earth. He addresses each kind of governance that has been attempted all across the globe, including oligarchy (the rule of the few), democracy, monarchy, and dictatorship. He evaluates

each one separately, acknowledging their advantages and highlighting their disadvantages. Dictatorial governments are the worst kind of all. Because it places the aspirations of one person above the interests of everyone. On the other hand, the kind of government that “enables every man, whoever he is, to exercise his best abilities and to live his days most pleasantly” is the most ideal.

Whatever name it takes, such a government will always be based on the Constitution. Whether it be the government of one man, a few men, or many men, any government operating without a constitution is a tyranny. A few aristocrats or a swarm of ordinary folk exercising their unbridled will may be just as tyrannical as one individual exercising their unbridled will. A class dictatorship is no more acceptable than an individual tyranny.

Opposition to Communism

First of all, the government shouldn't be communist, like in Plato's Republic. Property ownership by everyone, particularly women and children, would lead to constant miscommunications, arguments, and criminal activity. Personal responsibility would be destroyed under communism.

Everyone owns something, but nobody gives a damn. Individual carelessness is referred to as common responsibility. "Everyone tends to avoid doing something that they expect someone else to do." Human values and human character cannot be communalized, nor can one seek to do so. Aristotle supports the private ownership of each man's property as well as the unique character development of each man.

Public Assistance

However, just as every man's private property must be used for the benefit of the public, so too must every man's character be oriented toward the general good. "And the unique responsibility of the legislator is to instill this cooperative disposition in all men." The whole responsibility of the lawmaker is to serve the public interest of the people. To do this, there shouldn't be a rigid division made between the classes, especially between the governed and the rulers. With the broad caveat that "the old is more fitted to rule, the young to obey," all citizens should take turns ruling and being ruled.

Instruction

The education of the youth must be of utmost importance to the ruling class. Additionally, this schooling ought to be perfect and useful. In addition to giving the young people the tools to support themselves, it should also educate them how to live within their means. The state will be guaranteed a wealthy, enlightened, cooperative, and competitive citizenry in this manner.

Democracy

The satisfaction of the ruled must be the rulers' priority. They ought to use justice to find satisfaction. This is the only way they can keep revolutions at bay. "No reasonable man will put up with an unjust government if he can get away from it or overthrow it." This kind of governance is like a fire that burns people's long-stolen anger to the bone. It will inevitably lead to a catastrophic explosion. "Democracy appears to be safer and less liable to revolution than any other form of Government," according to the assessment of justice toward its inhabitants [5], [6]. The nations with dictatorships are the most likely to have an early-stage uprising. Aristotle noted that "dictatorships are the most fragile of governments."

Conditions for Achieving Happiness

According to Aristotle, the purpose of government is to protect the interests of the governed. Thus, ethics was turned into politics. Man does not exist for the state; the state exists for man. The only reason a man is created is to find happiness. However, what is happiness? It is that joyful mental state that results from consistently doing nice things. However, being excellent is not enough to make one happy. Additionally, it is essential to have an abundance of excellent things, such as good beauty, good money, good companions, and a fortunate birth. Above all, achieving happiness requires living a long and healthy life. "Neither a day nor a swallow makes a summer." We need enough days, enough brightness, and plenty of singing to create the ideal summer.

The Need for "Virtue" in Happiness

However, a nobleman may still be happy even if his life is brief and filled with hardship. It is a gift in and of itself that the noble spirit may learn to be insensitive to sorrow. Stated differently, we could sometimes achieve pleasure via renunciation. Furthermore, if a guy behaves honorably, he cannot be said to be miserable. Such a guy "will never do anything mean or harmful." And as we've previously seen, pleasure comes from carrying out good actions. "However, the only entirely contented individual lives a fully virtuous life and is adequately blessed with prosperity, health, and friendship not just for a brief moment, but for the entirety of one's life."

The Virtue Conception in Greek

Virtue leads to happiness, therefore the word "virtue" is broad. The Greeks understood this term to signify more than only moral superiority, unlike us. It denoted any level of superiority. Because he was an effective lover, a Greek Casanova may have been referred to as a virtuous lover. Merciless but capable. In Athens, the general would have been considered a brave warrior. According to Aristotle's philosophy, a virtuous person has strength, skill, and mental virtuosity. Aristotle then added moral nobility as a fourth need for pleasure to these three attributes.

The Golden Ratio

This multifaceted brilliance was summed up by Aristotle in his well-known "golden mean" theory. The person who maintains the golden medium between the two extremes is the happy guy, the good man. He is the one who stays in the center, avoiding the shoals that may destroy his happiness on either side. A guy may be overdoing, underdoing, or doing his job just correctly in every action, thought, or feeling. Therefore, when it comes to giving away his possessions, a man might be liberal doing it just right or stingy underdoing it or extravagant overdoing it. When it comes to embracing life's risks, a man might be reckless, cowardly, or bold [7], [8].

He may be moderate, gluttonous, or abstemious in how he manages his appetites. The sensible course of action in any situation is to choose the medium path rather than going too far or too little. A decent man will be justly and intelligently normal, neither supernormal nor subnormal. He teaches us in *The Rhetoric* that a good man will behave in the proper ways and at the appropriate times, toward the appropriate people and objectives, and with the appropriate motivation. Put simply, he will always and everywhere follow the golden mean. Since the royal way to happiness is the golden mean. Knowledge of Aristotle's "Catharsis" thesis requires a knowledge of this point of view.

The Perfect Man

Aristotle continues by describing the perfect guy who deserves happiness the most. The Aristotelian gentleman, the embodiment of the ideal man, "does not expose himself unnecessarily to danger, but is willing to give his life, if necessary, in great crises." He enjoys lending a hand to other guys, but when other men lend a hand to him, he feels embarrassed. "Because showing kindness is a sign of superiority while receiving it is a sign of inferiority." But his selflessness is just an elevated, enlightened version of selfishness. Acts of kindness are acts of self-preservation rather than self-sacrifice. A man is a communal being, not a solitary one. Furthermore, all good deeds are lucrative ventures. It will inevitably be refunded with interest at some point. Therefore, since he is intelligent, the perfect man is selfless. He never harbors animosity and consistently forgets his wounds. To put it simply, he is a good friend to others because he values friendship above everything else.

A Brief Overview of Aristotle's Poetics

Aristotle must have written *The Poetics* after settling in Athens about 335 B.C. as a teacher and researcher and before he departed the city in 324 B.C. This brief book, spanning twenty-six chapters and forty-five pages, is not complete nor comprehensive, but it does provide a cogent analysis of the topic it addresses [9], [10]. It doesn't seem to be a piece that will be published. It hardly discusses the epic, says nothing about comedy, and offers just a cursory explanation of the well-known idea of "catharsis." It is an unbalanced text that mostly discusses the tragic ideas of Greek philosophers.

CONCLUSION

The voyage that shaped Aristotle's life and philosophy had a significant impact on Western philosophy. Aristotle studied philosophy and biology while attending Plato's Academy after being born in Stagira. As Alexander the Great's teacher, he developed his political interests, which subsequently influenced his important writings on ethics and administration. Aristotle, who established the Athens Lyceum, taught a wide variety of subjects, including political philosophy and the scientific sciences. His practical theories of government, which support constitutional law and strike a balance between private property rights and the general welfare, are still influential in modern political theory. He opposed communism, stressed human responsibility and integrity, and made the case that a well-ordered society must have strong morals. Aristotle made significant philosophical contributions that probed the essence of life and human well-being. Examples of these include his investigation of pleasure and virtue and his conception of God as the "Unmoved Mover". Democratic values were founded on his conviction that the state should serve humankind, not the other way around. Aristotle faced obstacles in his latter years, both personal and governmental, yet his impact persisted thanks to his many books and pupils. His unwavering quest for knowledge and reason has left a lasting legacy that highlights his profound influence on human civilization and continues to provide insightful perspectives on life, politics, and the pursuit of pleasure.

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CHAPTER 2

EXPLORING THE CONCEPT OF CATHARSIS IN ARISTOTLE'S TRAGEDY: DEFINITIONS, THEORIES AND INTERPRETATIONS

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ABSTRACT:

Aristotle first proposed the idea of catharsis when he defined tragedy as an audience member's experience of emotional purification brought on by dread and sympathy. The meaning of catharsis has been hotly contested since the Renaissance, despite its importance in theatrical arts. There is uncertainty over the precise definition and purpose of catharsis in tragedy since it has been interpreted in a variety of ways, including "purgation," "purification," and "clarification." Due to Aristotle's lack of a comprehensive explanation, researchers have looked at a variety of viewpoints, including ethical, psychological, religious, and medical ones. Through an examination of notions like purgation, purification, and clarity, the research seeks to shed light on the many interpretations of catharsis and its function in tragedy. It aims to provide a cogent account of catharsis in Aristotle's Poetics and how it affects the moral and emotional experiences of the audience. The research concludes that while ideas of purgation and purification provide insightful information, their applicability is restricted. A more thorough explanation is offered by the clarification hypothesis, which emphasizes the audience's comprehension and appreciation of the tragic experience. This approach, which emphasizes the moral and pedagogical components of tragedy, is consistent with Aristotle's larger philosophical viewpoints. Future investigations should examine the clarifying hypothesis in current settings, especially how it relates to media and psychological research. A deeper analysis of Aristotle's political and ethical writings may provide more light on the intricate nature of catharsis and its relevance in both ancient and contemporary literature.

KEYWORDS:

Aristotle, Catharsis, Purgation, Purification, Tragedy.

INTRODUCTION

The theory of Catharsis originates as the function of tragedy, as shown in the definition of tragedy explanation. The hypothesis of catharsis is supported by the definition's last paragraph, which reads, "through pity and fear affecting the proper purgation of these and similar emotions." According to his idea, catharsis is the purging or cleansing of overwhelming feelings of dread and pity. The audience's emotions and sentiments are cleansed as they see the protagonist struggle and die on stage. They feel relieved and become better versions of themselves as a result of the purging of these emotions and sentiments. As a result, Aristotle's conception of catharsis has a morally elevating purpose. However, there has been much debate over the ages about the precise definition and idea of catharsis among academics and critics. Prolonged discussion by detractors of catharsis has not resulted in clarifying the notion; rather, it has only served to cause uncertainty. However, because of Aristotle's ambiguous use of this term, critics must interpret it for him. Although there is a need for a wide interpretation of the word, efforts to derive the functions of the tragedy from this are ludicrous and foolish [1], [2]. Aristotle defines tragedy in Poetics by saying that its purpose is to evoke feelings of terror and sympathy to influence the Katharsis of these (or similar) emotions.

Although Aristotle only used the term "Katarsis" once, there have been many peculiar interpretations of it since the Renaissance. Perhaps no word in classical or contemporary literature has been discussed by commentators, critics, poets, Greek-speaking men, and non-Greek-speaking men as much. The most creative and diversified justifications have been offered. This difficulty stems from the fact that neither Aristotle nor the *Poetics* directly assist us in understanding the Greek term, nor does he clarify what he intended by the word. Because of this, one must consult his other writings for support and direction, particularly his *Politics* and second *Ethics*. Moreover, there are three definitions for the Greek term *Katharsis*. Its meanings include purgation, purification, and clarification, and each critic has used the term in one or more of these diverse contexts to arrive at a unique interpretation of the purpose and psychological impact of the tragedy. Everyone acknowledges that tragedy inspires feelings of terror and sympathy, yet there are notable distinctions in the manner in which arousing these emotions results in pleasure. First, we would look at the many meanings of the term *catharsis*, and then we would provide the explanation that makes the most sense.

Theories of "Purgation"

It has been suggested that the term "katharsis" refers to a medical metaphor known as "purgation," which describes a pathological impact on the soul comparable to what medication does on the body. It is stated that the act of arousing pity and dread leads to their "purgation" since some have compared it to homeopathic therapy, where similar things cure like things. This opinion is supported by a section in the *Poetics* where Aristotle claims that some songs that incite religious fervor may heal religious fever. Milton also shares this opinion in the Preface to *Samson Agonistes*, where he claims that tragedy tempers or reduces them to a just measure by inspiring feelings of pity and terror, which cleanse the mind of similar feelings. Pity and terror, artificially aroused, expel the latent pity and fear that we bring with us from real life, according to Tragedy. Additionally, incidental feelings like self-pity, worry, and so on are subdued. We forget about our problems and concerns as we feel sorry for the suffering on stage. An emotional remedy is produced in the delicious peace that follows after the passion is spent. When used in a medical context, the term "Katarsis" denotes alleviation from the agonizing feelings that were previously aroused. Prominent critics such as Twining and Barney (1957) concur that *Katharsis* might be considered a kind of homeopathic remedy. This perspective is also supported by Freud and other psychologists who claim that neurosis may be healed by letting patients remember traumatic childhood memories [3], [4].

Catharsis was believed to be an allopathic remedy in the neo-classical period, with the unlike treating the unlike. They took their cue from the Italian 16th-century scholar Giraldo Cinthio in this regard. It was thus intended that the incitement of dread and sympathy would lead to the "evacuation" or purging of other emotions, such as pride, rage, etc. (Adoration and commiseration were meant to be the appropriate sad feelings, not dread and pity). We become fearful and sympathetic to the pain, and we get "purged" of the feelings that brought about the misery. We are "purged" of such unwanted emotions if the pain is brought on by feelings like rage, wrath, or disobedience to the gods because we are aware of their terrible effects. "We learn to avoid the vices that evil men manifest by learning from their terrible fates." Thomas Taylor shared this opinion in his introduction to *Poetics* (181–18).

Psychological Explanation

According to F.L. Lucas, "the theatre is not a hospital," refuting the notion that Aristotle's usage of the term "Katarsis" is a metaphor for medicine. Herbert Reed and F.L. Lucas see it as a kind of safety valve. Emotional release follows the secure and unrestricted release of fear and sympathy, which we let run wild and which we are unable to accomplish in real life. They are

suppressed in real life, but at the theater, we may freely revel in these feelings that the hero's suffering has sparked. This is safe and helps release our bottled-up feelings. I.A. Richards takes a psychological perspective to the process, seeing fear as the drive to turn away and pity as the impulse to approach. Tragic events harmonize and mix these two drives, and this equilibrium promotes comfort and relaxation.

Theological and Ethical Explanations

The tragic process is seen ethically as a kind of soul lustration or inner enlightenment that leads to a more balanced perspective on life and its suffering. According to John Gassner, mental balance and relaxation can only be achieved and total aesthetic satisfaction guaranteed by "only enlightenment, a clear comprehension of what was involved in the struggle, an understanding of cause and effect, a judgment on what we have witnessed." Tragic events serve as a wake-up call that everything in the cosmos is shaped for the best by divine rule.

DISCUSSION

Robertello and Castelvetro proposed throughout the Renaissance that tragedy served to "temper" or harden emotions. Just as soldiers grow numb to death after experiencing it repeatedly in combat, so too do onlookers grow numb to the dreadful and pathetic events of life after experiencing tragedies.

The Theory of Purification

As a result, there has been constant disagreement throughout history. The fact that the Greek word "katharsis" has three meanings is often overlooked. It denotes clarification, purgation, and another medical word for purification. Given that his father practiced medicine and that he was a passionate student of the subject, Aristotle naturally developed a bias toward medicine. However, as he had little inclination for religion, it has been assumed that he only used the term in a medical context. Proponents of the "purgation" notion point to the previously mentioned paragraph in *Politics* at the conclusion when he describes how certain religious music might heal insanity or frenzy. This brings to mind Plato's idea that an outward agitation might calm an interior agitation, as in the instance of a nurse rocking a kid to help him fall asleep. The critics conclude that Aristotle's definition of "katharsis" is synonymous with homeopathic medicine based on all of this data. The activation of pity and terror and the subsequent purging of everything that is unhealthy and unpleasant from these feelings result in a kind of mental recovery. This reduces them to a fair amount.

Humphrey House disagrees with this viewpoint, however. He becomes the strongest proponent of the "purification" approach, which incorporates the concepts of moral training and moral learning, and rejects the notion of purgation in the medical meaning of the word. It is akin to "moral conditioning" that the onlookers experience. As Humphrey House notes in his insightful and erudite analysis of the whole issue, "purgation means cleansing." A state of health relies on the preservation of this balance, therefore cleaning may be a "quantitative evacuation" or a "qualitative change" in the body brought about by a restoration of healthy equilibrium. Tragic events teach us empathy and dread rather than stifling them and restoring equilibrium to the spirit. He considers Katharsis to be a governing and instructive process and cites Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* among other writings. Aristotle states in his *Ethics* that virtue must possess the ability to reach for the middle ground. I'm referring to moral virtue since it deals with emotions and behavior, which include excess, imperfection, and the middle ground. To feel something too much, too little, or poorly is not uncommon. However, feeling the right emotions at the right moment, concerning the right things, toward the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way is what is best and characteristic of virtue. Examples of these

emotions include fear, confidence, appetite, anger, pity, and general pleasure and pain. Within the confines of the play, tragedy exercises the emotions of the wise and the good by bringing them to life via appropriate stimuli that arouse pity and dread from potentiality to reality. It also manages and trains these emotions by guiding them to the correct objects in the right manner.

After the play, they revert to potentiality, but this time, it is potentiality that has been better trained. We have educated our emotions to more closely resemble the emotions of the righteous and intelligent. Our system of emotional reactions has undergone a qualitative shift, leading to an improvement in emotional health. They have been "tempered and reduced to a just measure," to use Milton's words. It is the regular directing of these emotions toward worthwhile things that determines their appropriate growth and balance. Humphrey House claims that this "controlling and educative" perspective is consistent with Aristotle's whole philosophy.

Hence, Katharsis suggests that our emotions are cleansed of excess and fault, reduced to an intermediate stage, taught and directed toward the appropriate objectives at the appropriate times, and ultimately, we are made good and virtuous, following "the purification" doctrine. Katharsis is thus a kind of moral indoctrination. Seeing a catastrophe teaches the observer how to handle sympathy, fear, and other comparable emotions appropriately. When Butcher states that "the tragic Katharsis involves not only the idea of emotional relief, but the further idea of purifying the emotions to relieved," he is in agreement with proponents of the "purification" thesis [5], [6]. He continues, "The poets discovered how human fear and sympathy could be transported and transformed into joy by artistic expression, while human suffering could be released into the pure current of human compassion."

Fundamental Deficiencies in the Above Theories

But neither the "purgation" hypothesis nor the "purification" idea fully accounts for the situation. The fundamental flaw in these ideas is that they speculate excessively on the psychology of the audience and the impact of tragedy on theatergoers. It is sometimes overlooked that Aristotle was writing a book on the craft of poetry rather than psychology. He is less interested in the psychological ramifications of tragedies and more focused on the craft and nature of writing a perfect tragedy. Prominent contemporary critics such as G.E. Else, O.B. Hardison, and Leon Golden support the "clarification" idea because of this. The pertinent passage from Aristotle's well-known definition of tragedy is translated by Leon Golden as follows: "Through the representation of pitiable and fearful incidents, tragedy achieves the Catharsis of such incidents." Thus, in contrast to the other two hypotheses, he links "Catharsis" to the events that make up the tragedy's storyline and to what transpires inside the play itself. The "clarification" hypothesis is the outcome, which we must now examine in more depth.

The Theory of Clarification

As O. B. Hardison notes, *The Poetics* itself gives clues about Aristotle's interpretation of the term "catharsis." In Chapter IV, he discusses the pleasure of imitation art and notes that both the philosopher and mankind in general get pleasure from it. He links this pleasure to learning. He makes the argument that images of dead people and unsightly animals may still be amusing if they are done effectively. Tragic events also entail the contradiction of pleasure being triggered by the repulsive and unpleasant in daily life. Tragic events are heartbreaking and terrifying. They also contain terrible incidents like a guy killing himself, a lady killing her spouse, or a mother killing her kids. When such situations are conveyed in a great tragedy, they make us happy rather than repulsing us as they might in real life. This is the distinctive joy of tragedy, and it also represents the tragic contradiction. Aristotle makes it very evident that we need to "seek only the pleasure proper to it," rather than seeking for every pleasure from

tragedy. The tragic kind of pleasure is referred to as "catharsis." The purpose of tragedy, as well as the reason why people compose, perform, and watch tragedies, is to provide such pleasure. Therefore, the Catharsis clause defines the purpose of tragedy rather than the audience's emotional response to it. According to O.B. Hardison, most translators have made a mistake by connecting catharsis to the audience's feelings of dread and sympathy rather than the events of the tragedy.

The Cathartic Process: An Educational Process

How does the joy inherent in tragedy come about? Imitation only brings about the specific joy of tragedy and the kind of pleasure that results from learning, not pleasure in general. Learning now comes from figuring out the relationship between the specific thing or activity being represented and the universal concepts that are embodied in it. The poet may draw inspiration from history or custom, but he chooses and arranges his materials according to need and likelihood, portraying what "might be" as opposed to "what is." He is more universal, more philosophical—to use Aristotle's term—and more favorable to understanding than history, which only addresses the specific. This is because he moves from the particular to the general. Tragic stories promote knowledge by presenting events devoid of chance or accidents that would disguise their true meaning and importance. As Butcher put it, they put the viewer "face to face with the universal law."

The tragic poet starts by choosing a sequence of events that are inherently dreadful or pitiful. Like most contemporary authors, he could create them or take them from myth or history. He then arranges them to highlight the likely or essential ideas that tie them together in a single action and establish how they relate to it as it moves from start to finish. Aristotle claims that after seeing a tragedy of this kind, the viewer will have gained knowledge, the episodes will have grown clearer in the sense that their relationship to universals will now be apparent, and learning itself will be pleasurable.

This interpretation therefore defines "catharsis" as the process of elucidating the fundamental and universal significance of the incidents portrayed, which leads to a deeper comprehension of the universal law that determines human life and destiny. Even in cases where the incidents portrayed are repulsive, this comprehension produces pleasure the proper pleasure of tragedy. This perspective defines catharsis as an intellectual process rather than a physiological, religious, or moral one. It does not allude to the audience's emotional reactions being cleansed of the unpleasant, exaggerated, or morbid, nor does it allude to their emotions being morally indoctrinated. The phrase does not refer to the audience's psychology. It alludes to the events in the tragedy and how the poet exposes their universal importance via his creative approach. "Catharsis" is a joyful process that involves learning.

Explaining Theory: Its Advantages

The explanation idea is very beneficial. First of all, it acknowledges the Poetics' real status as a technical book by interpreting the sentence as referring to the tragedy's method rather than the audience's psychology. Second, the theory does not need the assistance or validation of Aristotle's other writings on Politics and Ethics since it is based only on what he says in The Poetics. Thirdly, it connects Catharsis to the topic of probability and necessity in Chapter IX as well as to the idea of imitation presented in Chapters I–IV. Fourthly, the idea aligns exactly with the theories of aesthetics as they exist now. To provide a few instances: "Perception" is the term used by Francis Ferguson. The phrase "rage for order" is used by Austen Warren and James Joyce's "Epiphany" or inner vision to describe the kind of satisfaction or pleasure that may be obtained from tragedy. All these critics are trying to convey is that experiencing tragedy is a kind of "insight experience," and that this experience is enjoyable because it teaches one

the genuine relationship between the specific plot events and the universal rule of human existence [7], [8]. When understood to imply "clarification," the term "inside experience," which contemporary critics use to describe the purpose of tragedy, has a striking resemblance to Aristotle's Catharsis.

Purification and Purgation, although only incidentally

But it's important to keep in mind that pity and fear both of which are unpleasant emotions are Aristotle's core tragic emotions. Tragedy must somehow erase the unpleasant aspect of dread and pity if it is to provide pleasure, the joy that comes from learning. When we see someone similar to us in anguish, we get fearful that we may have a similar destiny. This is very painful. A sense of anguish brought on by seeing the unjustified suffering of others' struggles that we may assume would eventually afflict us as well is called sympathy. Fear and pity are mutually harmful emotions. Tragic occurrences are pathetic because they seem "undeserved," and they are frightening because we worry that they may happen to us. Through the tragedy, the viewer gains insight into the universal relationship between fate and character, seeing that pain is the product of the hero's fatal mistake, or hamartia. By the conclusion, he recognizes a logical connection between the hero's personality and his destiny. This will lessen his self-doubt and, in turn, lessen his sympathy, if not completely eradicate it. Keep in mind that the relief is not the primary goal of the learning that yields the tragic pleasure, but rather a byproduct of it (O.B. Hardison). As a result, there is some "purgation" or "purification," but it is just accidental.

The Hamartia

Aristotle used the term "hamartia" to characterize tragedy. Instead of being the result of a deliberate transgression of the rules of the gods, Hamartia leads to the fall of a nobleman due to some excess or error in conduct. Hubris, which was more of an activity than an attitude, is connected to hamartia.

When the person impacted or the outcomes differ from what the agent believed they were, this is known as hamartia, or harm done without knowledge. Hamartia is often defined as a hero's fatal defect in tragedies. Aristotle coined the phrase in his book *Poetics*. The term "hamartia" refers to a wide range of actions, including intentional wrongdoing, error, or sin, as well as uninformed, careless, or unintentional misconduct (hamartanein).

Greek plays are known for using this technique to elicit strong emotions from the audience. Greek tragedies that include hamartia-afflicted characters often adhere to a similar pattern. As said, the term "hamartia" refers to the hero's unintentional blunder or error in judgment. For instance, the hero could set out to accomplish goal X, but due to a mistake in judgment, the hero ends up doing the opposite of X, which has fatal results. But hamartia is difficult to describe precisely or provide a precise definition.

As a result, it has been linked to many different interpretations, including those found in the Bible. Hamartia is the Greek word for "sin." R. D. Dawe disagrees with Stinton's opinion, pointing out that in other circumstances hamartia might even imply not to sin. T. C. W. Stinton believes Bible translators may come to this conclusion because another prevalent meaning of hamartia can be understood as a "moral deficit" or a "moral error". In this opposite situation, it may be seen if the main character abstains from doing something since it is immoral. For it to be a true hamartia, the main character's circumstances must deteriorate as a result of this inaction. When used in a medical context, the term "hamartia" refers to a localized malformation made up of anatomically normal tissue types arranged in an unorganized way.

The history of Hamartia

In his work, *Poetics*, Aristotle first introduced hamartia. However, the definition of the term has evolved throughout time. Numerous academics have contended that there is a deeper meaning for a term than what is implied by the definition provided in Aristotle's book. The academic J.M. Bremer first clarified the overall poetics argument and, specifically, the term's immediate context in the paper "Tragic Error in the Poetics of Aristotle." He then follows the semasiological development of the hamart-group of words from Homer (who also attempted to interpret the word) to Aristotle, concluding that the Stagirite employs the second of the three meanings of hamartia (missing, error, and offence) in our passage from *Poetics* [9], [10]. A "tragic error" is, thus, an incorrect action done without understanding its nature, consequences, etc., that catalyzes a series of causally related events that ultimately lead to catastrophe. Even though the definition of the term is still debatable, it is nevertheless used to analyze several plays, including *Oedipus Rex* and *Hamlet*.

CONCLUSION

The idea of catharsis as articulated by Aristotle in his *Poetics* exemplifies a sophisticated fusion of psychological, emotional, and instructional components. With origins in Greek words signifying "purgation," "purification," and "clarification," the idea has spawned a variety of overtime interpretations. According to the "purgation" notion, catharsis is a kind of medicinal purification in which tragedy aids viewers in letting go of negative feelings like dread and sympathy. This approach may downplay the creative and technical elements of tragic works, but it does propose that tragedy serves as a therapeutic agent for emotional discomfort. According to the "purification" viewpoint, tragedy serves a moral and pedagogical purpose by reshaping the audience's feelings and encouraging virtue and balance. Although this approach incorporates Aristotle's ethical principles, it may oversimplify the range of reactions and the influence of tragedy on education. The "clarification" idea places a strong emphasis on the intellectual satisfaction that comes from comprehending universal truths that are presented in tragic stories. This point of view emphasizes the educational aspect of tragedy and contends that its enjoyment stems from delving into deep issues and moral realizations. The investigation of various hypotheses reveals that catharsis serves a variety of purposes, including intellectual illumination, moral instruction, and emotional release, despite the ambiguity in Aristotle's original statement. The idea still sparks academic debate and provides insightful understanding of the nature of tragedy and its impact on viewers.

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CHAPTER 3

AN EXPLORATION OF ARISTOTELIAN TRAGIC HERO

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ABSTRACT:

Aristotle's Poetics, which emphasizes the tragic hero and the idea of hamartia tragic imperfection, provides a fundamental framework for comprehending Greek tragedy. This research looks at how these components affect the emotional experience of the viewer. According to Aristotle, a tragic hero is a person of intermediate moral standing whose fall from grace is due to an error rather than innate evil. The difficult part is trying to figure out how this idea affects the story and the emotional resonance of tragedy. This study examines how Aristotle defines a tragic hero and the function of hamartia, delving into how these aspects inspire sympathy and terror in readers. It also looks at how Aristotelian ideas influenced later dramatic writing, such as Shakespeare's works. Aristotle's tragic hero strikes a balance between virtue and vice, while having a major fault that ultimately brings them to ruin. This presentation highlights the essential elements of tragedy by evoking a powerful emotional reaction. Despite their strictness, Aristotle's standards still have an impact on how tragedies are interpreted today, according to the research. Further studies might look at how Aristotle's ideas relate to current dramatic forms and media, analyzing how contemporary tragedies adhere to or depart from Aristotelian ideals.

KEYWORDS:

Aristotle, Dread, Poetics, Sympathy, Tragic Hero.

INTRODUCTION

Aristotle's Book Poetics outlined his definition of a tragic hero. According to Aristotle, "the change of fortune presented must not be the spectacle of a virtuous man brought from prosperity to adversity," meaning that the hero of a tragedy should inspire sympathy or dread in the audience. He presents the idea that dread arises when tragedy strikes a guy like us and that the feeling of sympathy does not originate from a person becoming better but rather from when they experience unmerited sorrow. For this reason, Aristotle emphasizes the obvious truth that "The change of fortune should be, reversely, from good to bad, rather than from bad to good." Additionally, according to Aristotle, the hero must be "virtuous," or "a morally blameless man." It is his imperfection that will ultimately lead to both triumph and death for the hero.

According to Aristotle, a man "who is not eminently good and just, yet whose misfortune is brought about not by vice or depravity, but by some error or frailty" is what makes a tragic hero. Instead of making the hero perfect, incapable of doing any wrong, he makes the hero suffer an injury or grave wrong that brings about his misery. Aristotle does not contradict himself when he says that a hero must possess virtue without being exceptionally excellent. Being morally superior to others is a sign of noble character. He still has to be decent in some way. Aristotle adds, "He must be highly renowned and prosperous," to the requirement of being virtuous but not perfectly excellent. He continues by citing figures like Oedipus and Thesestes

as examples. "Protagonist" or the primary character of a tragedy is known as a tragic hero [1]. Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Seneca, Marlowe, Shakespeare, Webster, Marston, Corneille, Racine, Goethe, Schiller, Kleist, Strindberg, and many other authors' dramatic works all have tragic heroes. A tragic hero has one significant weakness, and the viewer often feels sorry for them.

Greek Tragedy Theory: Aristotelian Poetics

Aristotle's *Poetics* is a classic examination of Greek tragedy. He describes tragedy as "the imitation of an action that is serious and also as having magnitude, complete in itself." He goes on, "Tragedy is a kind of drama that arouses feelings of dread and sympathy. It should be written in poetry and adorned with all forms of creative expression. Its action should be unique and comprehensive, depicting a reversal of fortune and featuring well-known individuals with exceptional accomplishments." To explain the catharsis of these kinds of emotions, the author gives "incidents arousing pity and fear" (according to Aristotle, catharsis refers to the eradication or washing away of the sorrow and fear generated by the tragic event). Aristotle states that the "tragic pleasure of pity and fear" that an audience experiences while seeing a tragedy is the fundamental distinction between tragedy and other genres like comedy and the epic. The tragic hero must be someone the audience can relate to to evoke these emotions in them; nonetheless, if he is superior in any manner, the tragic pleasure is further enhanced [2], [3]. His terrible demise is the consequence of an error in judgment or a catastrophic fault that leads to a misguided action. Hubris, or an overabundance of pride that leads the hero to disobey a divine warning or violate a moral code, is often the fatal defect. It has been proposed that the audience feels sympathy for the tragic hero because of his greater pain than his transgression; also, audience members may feel sympathy if they believe they might act similarly.

The Sadistic Warrior

Greece is the birthplace of the tragic drama, which dates back to the fifth century BCE. Actors embodied the mythic and legendary heroes in plays presented at the City Dionysia, an Athenian festival. Aristotle said in his *Poetics* that tragedy is a copy of "events terrible and pitiful." 'A moral man dragged from wealth to adversity: this evokes neither sympathy nor dread; it only shocks us,' Aristotle said, is hardly the ideal tragic figure. He shouldn't be seen as "a bad man going from adversity to prosperity," however, since nothing could be farther from the spirit of tragedy; it lacks any one tragic element and neither inspires sympathy nor terror. Lastly, Aristotle issues a warning: Again, the fall of the complete villain should not be demonstrated. Such a story would undoubtedly satisfy moral sensibilities, but it would not evoke sympathy or dread since sympathy is sparked by unjustified misery, while fear is sparked by the tragedy of a man like ourselves.

According to Aristotle, the ideal tragic hero is "the character between these two extremes that of a man who is not eminently good and just, yet whose misfortune is brought about by some error or frailty, rather than by vice or depravity." He has to be a very well-known and wealthy figure, someone along the lines of Oedipus, Thyestes, or other notable members of these kinds of families. The tragedies of Roman dramatist Seneca, as well as the *Poetics*, had a significant impact on Elizabethan literature [4], [5].

Shakespeare's tragic heroes. They could be famous military commanders, family relatives of royalty, or both. They may display villainy, but this is often the product of a tragic weakness in character that drives them to make mistakes or carry out violent deeds rather than the villainy of an outright tyrant. Thus, although partially brought on by his circumstances, Hamlet's sadness and inner agony also seem to be a part of who he is. Othello kills Desdemona because

of his jealousy and inability to see through Iago's deceit. Lear becomes insane and dies as a result of his pride and rejection of Cordelia, whereas Antony is weakened by his overwhelming love for Cleopatra. According to Aristotle, imperfect characters are ones that the audience may relate to rather than ones that are completely evil. Seneca's tragic heroes are often more severe, acting immorally on purpose and motivated by intense emotions. Shakespeare broke from the traditional pattern by including comedic aspects, which may have contributed to the audience's capacity to identify in another way. For instance, a large portion of Hamlet's speech is darkly humorous.

Shakespeare's tragic protagonists are either deceived by themselves or victims of their own excesses. They could fall victim to cunning characters like Goneril and Regan in *Lear* or Iago in *Othello*, but for some reason, they are unable to see the reality. Desdemona is won over by Othello's charm and storytelling skills, but he fails to recognize Iago's employment of comparable strategies and believes Iago's tales to be true. One reason for these heroes' struggle with self-awareness may be their internal conflict: Lear's conflicting desires for absolute power and true love drive him from order and control into chaos and madness; Hamlet is conflicted between wanting to exact revenge and realizing the futility of life and action; Othello is troubled by the discrepancy between Iago's lies and what he knows Desdemona to be; Antony is caught between Egypt, the source of his passions, and Rome, the location of his military obligations; and so on.

DISCUSSION

All of the heroes exhibit the weakness of hubris, or excessive pride, to some degree. Othello feels he has the right to get rid of Desdemona, while Hamlet kills Rosencrantz and Guildenstern and Polonius with ease. Lear feels he has the right to arrogate human emotion and authority over his kingdom, which he ends up giving to France, whereas Antony prioritizes his love life above the destiny of countries. Shakespeare emphasizes that the heroes are virtuous to the very end, despite their eventual fall: Othello is described as having a "great heart" by Cassio, Caesar remarks that no grave on earth could contain the remains of two such famous people, Antony and Cleopatra, and Fortinbras writes an epitaph for Hamlet that reads, "Let four captains/ Bear Hamlet like a soldier to the stage, For he was likely, had he been put on,/ To have proved most royal." And for his departure, let the ritual of battle and the soldiers' song speak loudly for him. Shakespearean tragedies conclude with a moving feeling of what may have happened if the protagonist had been able to go over his or her unfortunate situation and defect.

Comedies

Aristotle, who makes conjectures on the subject in his *Poetics*, claims that the komos, an odd and fantastical performance in which a group of joyous men supposedly sung, danced, and frolicked around the likeness of a massive phallus, was the source of ancient comedy. (Incidentally, if this hypothesis is correct, it redefines the term "stand-up routine.") Whatever the truth of the beginnings of comedy, it makes sense to connect it to a phallic ritual or festival of merriment, as comedy has always celebrated human sexuality and eros' victory for most of its history, from Aristophanes to *Seinfeld*. Tragedies often take place in a palace's great hall or on the battlefield; bathrooms and bedrooms are more likely to be the scene of comedies. However, it's untrue that a piece of literature or a movie has to have sexual humor or even just be humorous to be considered a comedy. All that's needed is a happy conclusion. As far back as Aristotle, the fundamental formula for comedy has less to do with the need for vulgar jokes or ridiculous pratfalls and more to do with the traditions and expectations of story and character. In summary, a comedy tells the tale of a likeable main character's ascent to prosperity.

The Humorous Hero

Naturally, this definition does not imply that the protagonist of a comedy must be a perfect hero in the traditional sense. It simply implies that to get the audience's fundamental acceptance and support, she (or he) must exhibit at least the bare minimum of personal appeal or character value. It's not funny when an absolute scoundrel or a useless individual rises to prominence; this is more akin to a dark satire or gothic tale. However, based on the traits of many of the most well-known comedic characters in literature (such as Falstaff and Huck Finn), audiences have no problem at all rooting for a charming outlaw or carefree scamp. Aristotle, possibly thinking of the cunning servant or clever knave who was already a standard character in ancient comedy, indicates that comedic individuals are mostly "average to below average" in terms of moral quality [6], [7]. He goes on to say that the only people who can make us laugh are those who are lowly or ignoble. But rather than being virtuous, the most absurd characters are often those who, despite being well-born, are just conceited or self-important. Comparably, the most endearing comedic characters are usually courageous underdogs, young people from lowly or disadvantaged origins who, during a play or tale, demonstrate their true value basically, their "natural nobility" through a variety of character tests.

The Perfect Tragic Hero

The first basic guideline established by Aristotle is that characters in a tragedy should be "good" or, if that is not feasible, "better" than the "good." Like a painter, a playwright renders his characters such that their "goodness" is more apparent than it is in real life. He then goes on to discuss the characteristics that the perfect tragic hero should possess. His conception of the tragic hero has garnered more critical attention than any other line in *Poetics*, with the possible exception of the *Catharsis* phrase.

Not a Complete Villain

The purpose of a tragedy is to evoke feelings of terror and sympathy; Aristotle infers his hero's characteristics from this purpose. A perfectly excellent guy falling into unhappiness would be repulsive and offensive. Therefore, he should be good but not too perfect. Since he is not like us, his unjustifiable fall will simply shock and disgust us, and it would not inspire sympathy. Similar to this, although it may satiate our moral sense, seeing an entirely immoral individual go from bliss to pain lacks the appropriate tragic elements. Such a guy is not like the rest of us, and it is believed that his downfall was well-earned and compliant with the standards of "justice." It arouses neither fear nor sympathy. Therefore, both completely virtuous and completely evil people are unfit to be heroes in tragedies, according to Aristotle. But as Elizabethan tragedy has shown, even villains like Macbeth may play legitimate tragic heroes and their downfall can evoke particular sad feelings if they are done with the right ability and artistic intent. "There is no denying that there is something dreadful and sublime about pure willpower acting evilly and using superhuman energy to dominate its surroundings" (Butcher). We are moved by the terrible compassion evoked by the wreckage of such power and feel sorrow for the mishandled or wasted talents.

Not Virtuous or Saintly

Aristotelian canon also states that a saint figure who is entirely good would not be appropriate for the role of a tragic hero. Because he supports morality and is not against it, his fall-off shocks and repulses. In addition, his martyrdom represents a spiritual triumph, and the sense of his moral success overrides any sympathy for his physical agony. The saint tends to be docile and uninvolved since he is humble and altruistic. Drama, on the other hand, needs a combative

and militant hero to be successful [8], [9]. But in more modern times, saints have proven to be remarkable tragic heroes for writers like T.S. Eliot and Bernard Shaw. Regarding this, it is important to keep in mind two things: first, that Aristotle drew his findings from Greek play, which he was acquainted with; and second, that he is outlining the characteristics of the ideal tragic hero that is, he is talking about the very best, not the good. His opinions are often well-founded since it takes a Shakespearean genius to make the reader feel sorry for a completely bad guy, and effective tragic heroes like saints are quite uncommon.

A Person of Intermediate Sort

Aristotle notes that the ideal tragic hero "must be an intermediate kind of person, a man not pre-eminently virtuous and just, whose misfortune, however, is brought upon him not by vice or depravity but by some error of judgment." This is in contrast to his rejection of both perfection and complete depravity and villainy. A guy who occupies the middle ground between the two extremes is the perfect tragic hero. Despite his tendency toward kindness, he is neither exceptionally good nor just. He is similar to us, but as Butcher notes, elevated above the common plane by a more profound vein of emotion or stronger will or intelligence. Even if he is idealized, he yet has enough humanity to capture our attention and compassion [4], [10].

Various Interpretations of "Hamartia"

Tragic heroes are flawed individuals who bring their misery upon themselves; they are neither wicked nor evil. Hamartia is the Greek term that is employed here. "Missing the mark" is how Hamartia is interpreted at its core. He fails due to Hamartia, or "miscalculation," on his part rather than an external force, sin, or depravity. Since Hamartia is not a moral shortcoming, it is regrettable that Bradley has interpreted it rather loosely as a "tragic flaw." Aristotle himself establishes a clear distinction between hamartia and moral weakness, indicating that the former refers to a mistake in judgment. According to him, the hero's fall must have been brought about by a mistake or act of Hamartia on his side, not by wickedness. Butcher, Bywater, and Rostangi concur that "Hamartia" is a mistake in judgment that a man makes or commits rather than a moral condition. But as Humphrey House explains, Aristotle says neither affirmative nor negative on the association between hamartia and the hero's immorality. "It is not a moral imperfection in and of itself, though it may be accompanied by normal imperfection; in the most tragic scenario, the suffering hero is not morally at fault."

Hamartia: The Triple Origin

As a result, hamartia is a math mistake, but there are three possible ways this error might occur. One of three possible causes for this mistake might be ignorance of some material fact or circumstance; a hasty or careless interpretation of the particular instance; or a willful but unintentional error, such as when an act is done out of rage or fury. Prominent critics Else and Martin Ostwald actively read Hamartia, arguing that the hero's propensity for error stems from ignorance and that he may make several mistakes. They go on to explain that the hero's propensity for error is a feature that he has from the start and that, at the play's crisis, it is balanced by the recognition scene (Anagnorisis), which represents a dramatic shift "from ignorance to knowledge."

The True Significance and Meaning of Hamartia

Since the term hamartia permits several interpretations, different commentators have given it diverse interpretations. Nonetheless, even though it may be associated with moral defects, all legitimate contemporary Aristotelian scholarship agrees that hamartia is an error of judgment that can result from passion, rashness impetuous temper, or ignorance of some material

circumstance. It may even be a character attribute, as the hero might have a propensity to make poor decisions and might even make several mistakes. Aristotle often alludes to the play *Oedipus Tyrannosus*, which may be seen as his ideal, and it supports this conclusion. The protagonist of this play has a life beset by mishaps, the most disastrous of which is his union with his mother. As Butcher states, "his conception of Hamartia includes all the three meanings mentioned above, which in English cannot be covered by a single term," if King Oedipus is Aristotle's ideal hero. Whether morally guilty or not, hamartia is an error or a succession of errors committed by an otherwise honorable individual that ultimately leads to his demise. The terrible irony is that, even if the hero makes mistakes unintentionally and with good intentions, he will ultimately perish much like others who deliberately sin and are perverted [5], [11]. Because of his hamartia and subsequent mistakes, his own merits ultimately lead to his downfall. Butcher said, "The two most notable examples of the ruin wrought by characters, noble, indeed, but not without defects, acting in the dark and, as it seemed, for the best, are Oedipus in the ancient drama and Othello in the modern drama."

The Perfect Hero: His Magnificence

Aristotle establishes an additional prerequisite for the tragic hero. Among the number of those in the enjoyment of great reputation and prosperity" is what he must be. Put otherwise, he has to be someone who holds a high position of authority within society. He must be a well-known, well-placed person. This is the case since Aristotle was only acquainted with Greek tragedy, which was written by a select few aristocratic families. Aristotle believes that prominence is a prerequisite for the tragic hero, based on his knowledge of what constitutes a tragic hero. However, contemporary theatre has shown that even the cruellest person can play both a tragic hero and a blood royal prince, and that tragedies of Sophoclean grandeur may be performed even in isolated rural areas.

CONCLUSION

Aristotle's *Poetics* provides a thorough analysis of the tragic hero, outlining traits that have shaped dramatic writing for ages. He views the tragic hero as someone who embodies a combination of human frailty and moral integrity, rather than being completely good or evil. Rather than being the result of pure wickedness, the hero's fall from grace must be the result of a basic mistake in judgment or weakness, inspiring fear and pity in the audience. Aristotle highlights that tragedy differs from simple misfortune or comedy in that the hero's affliction should originate from a reversal of fate, shifting from affluence to hardship. This change, together with the hero's relatability and important social status, guarantees that the tragedy strikes a deep chord with the viewer and inspires catharsis by arousing feelings of terror and sympathy. Thus, the ideal tragic hero is a person with great reputation and decency who yet has shortcomings. This harmony produces an emotionally stirring and captivating story that shows the nuanced interactions between many human qualities and situations that ultimately result in the hero's demise. Aristotle's *Poetics* offers a timeless framework for comprehending the nature of tragedy and the tremendous influence of the tragic hero on theater and literature by examining these elements.

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CHAPTER 4

STANLEY FISH AND THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION: ANALYZING SUBJECTIVITY, INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES AND CRITICISMS IN LITERARY THEORY

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ABSTRACT:

Leading American literary theorist Stanley Fish has challenged conventional wisdom on textual interpretation and the reader's role, reshaping literary criticism in the process. He proposes interpretive communities as a way to rethink how literary works produce meaning. Fish questions the formalist view that meaning is found only in the text. He contends that readers' social and cultural surroundings shape meaning, stressing that literary interpretation emerges from readers' interactions with their interpretative communities rather than from the text alone or readers' subjective points of view. The effect of Fish on literary theory is examined in this study, with particular attention paid to his criticism of formalism and the idea of interpretative communities. It examines how his ideas impact our comprehension of literary works and their interpretations, while also addressing critiques and disputes around his body of work. Fish's ideas have challenged the idea of objective textual analysis, highlighted the socially constructed aspect of interpretation, and emphasized the significance of interpretative communities in meaning-making. As a result, they have had a considerable effect on literary theory. His theories provide a solid foundation for comprehending literary interpretation, notwithstanding criticism. Subsequent investigations may examine the applicability of Fish's ideas in domains other than literary studies, such as political theory and law. It would also be helpful to look at the relationships between Fish's concepts and post-modernist or post-structuralist theory, as well as the larger philosophical and cultural ramifications of these concepts.

KEYWORDS:

Formalism, Literary Theory, Subjectivity, Stanley Fish, Textual Interpretation.

INTRODUCTION

Stanley Fish is among the most influential literary thinkers in America. He thoroughly reexamines some of the fundamental presumptions of criticism in this work. He delves deeply into the current interpretation dispute, dismantles many fallacious claims, and makes an astounding suggestion for a fresh perspective on reading. Fish starts by looking at the relationship that exists between a reader and a book, refuting the formalist idea that the text is the only fundamental, observable, impartial, and constant aspect of literary experience. However, he deftly sidesteps the age-old pitfalls of subjectivity in his defense of the reader's right to understand and, in a sense, create the literary work. He demonstrates that saying that every reader effectively contributes to the creation of a poem or book is not a call for unbridled subjectivity and an infinite number of divergent interpretations. Because every reader encounters a literary work as a member of a community of readers rather than as an isolated individual. "Meanings are produced by interpretive communities rather than by the text or the reader," the author states.

Stanley Fish is a thought-provoking literary theorist and intellectual prankster who has gained recognition for his studies on the subjectivity of textual interpretation, particularly for his

explanation of the idea of an interpretive community. Fish eventually adapted his unique brand of literary theory to legal studies, having spent most of his publishing career exploring the reader's role in deciphering a text through the prism of seventeenth-century English literature [1], [2]. He has also questioned the propensity of English literary scholars to politicize their publications and criticized the work of his colleagues. Fish's provocative views are well-known among his colleagues, if not always well-received.

Biographical Information

On April 19, 1938, Fish was born in Providence, Rhode Island. After his family relocated to Philadelphia, he studied at the University of Pennsylvania, where he graduated with a B.A. in 1959. He wed Adrienne A. Aaron after earning his college degree, and the two had a daughter. Fish and Aaron separated in 1980. He pursued academic studies at Yale, where he graduated in 1962 with a doctorate focused on the English poet John Skelton. Fish published his first book, *John Skelton's Poetry* (1965) when he was a student at Berkeley. He has published several books that helped to build his name as a critic. Fish relocated to Johns Hopkins University in 1974 and took up the position of Kenan Professor of English there. It was around this time that he wed Jane Parry Tompkins, a professor, as his second wife in 1982. Fish started working at Duke University in 1985. He held positions as executive director of Duke University Press, head of the English department, assistant vice provost, and Arts and Sciences Distinguished Professor of English and Law. He has been the dean of the University of Illinois at Chicago's College of Liberal Arts and Sciences since 1999.

Large-scale Works

Fish started out writing just about academic topics, but as time went on, he began to address issues beyond the classroom. His first book, *John Skelton's Poetry*, was inspired by his PhD thesis and approached Skelton's writing from a radical standpoint. Fish argues that Skelton was essentially a private poet and that the poet's religious evolution is documented in his implicitly Christian poems; the crucial point of Fish's theory is the "psychological (spiritual) history" of what he terms the "protagonist." Fish boldly contends that the reader is the real topic of John Milton's classic *Paradise Lost* in his subsequent work, *Surprised by Sin* (1967). Fish tries to demonstrate how the poem's text, guided by its author's didactic objectives, employs a variety of form and theme-related strategies to draw the reader's attention to their shortcomings in interpretation; the poem exposes the reader's shortcomings and opens them up to learning about "the ways of God to men." *Self-Consuming Artifacts* (1972) tackles the issue of form in a book in a more direct manner [3], [4]. Fish distinguishes between two categories of literature in this book: dialectical literature, which "consumes" the reader's self-esteem by challenging presumptions and subverting expectations, and rhetorical literature, which affirms the author's position and thus confirms the reader's expectations.

DISCUSSION

According to Fish, authors from the seventeenth century including Milton, George Herbert, John Bunyan, and Donne created works that were read and understood by their authority, which made them popular with Fish. The author's idea that the reader genuinely chooses the meaning of a work rather than just learning it is expanded upon in this collection of studies. The author also challenges the veracity of facts, arguing that what is accepted as true inside a certain organization is predicated on certain presumptions. Therefore, the consensus of an institution's members determines the facts; if the institution's legitimacy is called into question, the facts it upholds may likewise be in dispute. Is this class using a text? highlights the significance of an "interpretive community," in which readers who belong to this group and share certain "interpretive assumptions" are responsible for giving a text meaning. The author expands the

literary critique she has done in *Doing What Comes Naturally* (1989) to incorporate legal studies. Fish explores the relationship between theory and practice, the relationship between context and meaning, and the impact of rhetoric on argument in this collection of studies. Fish rejects liberals who think that free speech may be neutral in *There's No Such Thing as Free Speech and It's a Good Thing, Too* (1994) by arguing that free speech and party politics are inextricably linked. Fish's political interests persisted in *Professional Correctness* (1995), where he criticizes scholars for imbuing their academic writings with political significance, and *The Trouble with Principle* (1999), where he argues that democracy is hampered by an emphasis on principles and cites the debate over affirmative action as one example among many.

Disagreements with Stanley's Work

Fish has received a broad range of criticism since she often contributes to the editorial pages of the *Wall Street Journal* and the *New York Times*. Fish believed that "ideas have no consequences. Shulevitz describes Fish as not the unprincipled relativist he's accused of being" for adopting this position. Fish has also faced harsh criticism from academics. According to the conservative R. V. Young, Fish falls short of the particular requirements of a university scholar, which call for learning to be used in the service of truth, since his overall conception of human nature and the human situation is incorrect. Ultimately, this is the crucial problem facing the modern university, of which Stanley Fish is a classic example: sophistry blurs the definition of truth and takes away the purpose of academic study. His outspoken contempt for morality and his acceptance of sophistry exposes the hollowness that lies at the core of the modern academic endeavor.

Prominent British Marxist Terry Eagleton denounces Fish's "discreditable epistemology" as "sinister." For Eagleton, "Like almost all diatribes against universalism, Fish's critique of universalism has its rigid universals: the priority at all times and places of sectoral interests, the permanence of conflict, the a priori status of belief systems, the rhetorical character of truth, the fact that all apparent openness is secretly closure, and the like." Therefore, it is essentially counterproductive. The felicitous conclusion is that nobody can ever criticize Fish because, if their criticisms are understandable to him, they belong to his cultural game and are therefore not criticisms at all; if they are not understandable, they belong to some other set of conventions entirely and are therefore irrelevant. This is Eagleton's response to Fish's attempt to coopt the criticisms leveled against him [5], [6].

In "Sophistry about Conventions," Martha Nussbaum, a philosopher, contends that Stanley Fish's theoretical perspectives stem from "extreme relativism and even radical subjectivism." Nussbaum writes that Fish relies on the regulative principle of non-contradiction to adjudicate between competing principles, so depending on normative norms of argumentation even as he argues against them, dismissing his work as mere sophistry. As an alternative, Nussbaum highlights "an example of a rational argument; it can be said to yield, in a perfectly recognizable sense, ethical truth" by using the work of John Rawls in *A Theory of Justice*. Nussbaum appropriates Rawls's criticism of utilitarianism's shortcomings to demonstrate that a reasonable person would always choose a justice system that recognizes the boundaries between distinct individuals rather than depending on the accumulation of all wants. "This," she says, "is altogether different from rhetorical manipulation."

The public intellectual and author of *Sexual Personae*, Camille Paglia, attacked Fish as a "totalitarian Tinkerbell," accusing him of being hypocritical for discussing multiculturalism from the insulated and homogenous ivory tower of Duke University.

Fish received criticism from renowned post-structuralist critic David Hirsch for lapses in logical rigor and carelessness toward rhetorical precision. Hirsch looks at Fish's arguments to show that Fish himself had not managed to rid himself of the shackles of New Critical theory, not only was a restoration of New Critical methods unnecessary. Hirsch remarks, "What one critic weaves by day, another unweaves by night, drawing a comparison between Fish's output and Penelope's loom in the *Odyssey*. "Nor," he says, does this weaving and unweaving constitute a dialectic, since no forward movement takes place. Fish is ultimately left to wander in his Elysian fields, hopelessly alienated from art, from truth, and humanity, according to Hirsch.

Author's intention

Fish rejects the notion that authorial purpose should serve as the foundation for interpretation in a similar way. He says that when he examined one of his earlier critical writings, he "saw" what his interpretative principles allowed or guided him to see, and then he "attributed what I had seen to a text and an intention." This is standard practice for critics. Formal units, in my opinion, are never "in" the text; rather, they are always a product of the interpretative model that is applied. I would argue the same thing about intents. According to Fish's view, saying that the author meant to say or do anything is a proclamation about the interpretation. Consequently, because the intents are the product of the reader and not the author, several interpreters will see them differently. Similar to the New Critical theory, the author is unable to transcend the production of the text; in Fish's view, the author is also a product of the reader.

Fish's epistemic convictions that everything we see, experience, or believe is open to interpretation allow him to make this step. The author's aim is not something that exists in an objective or uninterpreted world that can be communicated to our awareness without being understood, thus he views the effort to reach it as foolish. records revealing the author's genuine intentions may be available to us, but they "would yield no more literal reading than the literal reading it would yield" (i.e., the records that would give us that intention are not more accessible to a literal reading). We are thus no closer to John's aims when he says, "These things have been written that you might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the son of God; and that believing you may have eternal life in his name," than if he had said and written nothing at all.

Fish is emulating the New Critical school, which as we've seen ignored historical interpretation in addition to the author's intention. For Fish, finding meaning does not need knowledge of the original context. According to him, "to consult dictionaries, grammars, and histories is to assume that meanings can be specified independently of the activity of reading." However, as we've seen, reading is the primary action involved in creating meaning. Fish makes this claim because he thinks that translators like us are shut off from other planets or civilizations. Put another way, he feels that there is a total disjuncture since there is nothing that our civilization has in common with earlier ones. The author and the interpreter are from separate worlds.

Communities of Interpretation

Fish's current line of reasoning is based on a solid theory of how reality is constructed by society. Fish is certain that knowledge is socially constructed and never objective. All that one "knows" and believes they are thinking is an interpretation made possible solely by the social environment in which they live. According to Fish, the very assumptions of the society in which one lives enable one to think at all. In addition, the socially conditioned individual whom society confines to some extent is unable to conceive beyond the constraints imposed by culture. Insofar as they both permit and restrict the activities of an interpreter's awareness, Fish refers to this culture as an "interpretive community" and his methods are communal property.

People who share interpretative practices for creating texts that is, for constructing their properties make up interpretive communities. According to Fish, interpretative communities are entirely conventional that is, arbitrary constructions just like languages. A community's way of life is a building, a superstructure built via consent, not a reflection of some greater truth. This is true of both the concepts of good and wrong that a culture or institution uses, as well as the interpretative techniques they use. Language and morals inside a society are based on no external fact. Furthermore, it is impossible to define how language interacts with the outside environment. The use of language and conventions around it are arbitrary judgments, much as the fact that we refer to the north as "North" when it should be something different [7], [8].

M. H. Abrams made a complaint, and Fish responded by explaining some of his theories on the customary character of language. If there is any communication or understanding after this, it won't be because he and I speak the same language, in the sense that we understand each word's meaning and how to combine them, but rather because we have a similar way of thinking and living that unites us in a world with established objects, purposes, goals, procedures, values, and so forth. Any reference we make to these aspects of that world will be understood as necessarily referring to them.

Comparably, what we refer to as literature is not what it is because of some universal truth or work of art that exists in an atemporal condition; rather, it is what it is because the culture values it for its purposes, i.e., because it in some way represents the culture's values and beliefs. Therefore, identifying literature is not limited by anything found in the text, nor does it stem from a free and arbitrary will; rather, it is the result of a consensus about what constitutes literature, which will only hold for as long as a community of readers or believers upholds it.

According to this perspective, literature is only an ideological statement. Because of his opinions, literature sometimes loses its "special status" as literature and instead becomes a mirror of societal ideals, which are just as prone to change as civilizations. That's not to suggest that the person or culture selects their values on purpose since it would require objectivity or the capacity to reject one's values. According to Fish, it is impossible to separate oneself from one's principles. Without the capacity to choose his ideas and values, Fish is only a product of his surroundings. Rather, they are influenced or dictated by the culture, which is historically shaped and has no more capacity for objectivity than the person.

In the next chapters, I will examine Fish's ideas about post-modernism, using him as an example of post-structuralist critical theory. The analysis that follows looks at postmodernism from the standpoint of philosophy or a history of ideas viewpoint. It is meant to be a concise analysis of some of the key elements that, in my opinion, have contributed to the emergence of what is now referred to as post-modernism rather than a whole history of Western philosophy. In closing, I will focus on the "linguistic turn," as Rorty has dubbed the twentieth-century philosophical movement, by studying some of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy. Wittgenstein's ideas are similar to Stanley Fish's, and he laid some of the foundations for the current situation. Wittgenstein is significant because his ideas are often misinterpreted as being utterly conventional.

We also want to critically evaluate some of Fish's theories and consider some of the ramifications of his ideas in this unit. Fish often encourages his detractors "not to worry," claiming that since his reasoning is theoretical, it has no real repercussions. His claims are, at the very least, deceptive, if not manifestly dishonest, given the serious consequences of his theories particularly for those who would hold to any transcendent norm.

I am fully aware of Fish's attitude toward those who reject his theories or who, in his words, "feel threatened" by his ideas because I am adopting a critical position toward his literary theory. He refers to adherents of the "intellectual right" and foundationalists who support the concept of essences, or the existence and approachability of transcendent truths. Additionally, he charges them with adhering to a simplistic epistemology that sees the mind as nothing more than the mirror of reality. They are also said to be ignorant of the importance of language in shaping one's worldview and the underlying cultural presumptions. I am obligated to acknowledge that I am a foundationalist who has issues with Fish's thesis. Despite Fish's assertions to the contrary, I shall argue that his theory lacks coherence because it is predicated on flawed premises [9], [10]. Fish would respond to these critiques by claiming that I am not one of his assumptions and that only members of a community are capable of comprehending its ideas, thereby denying me access to his theory in the first place. But as we will see, it is not the only thing that grounds my complaint.

CONCLUSION

Stanley Fish's contributions to literary theory represent a significant change in our understanding of the function of readers and textual interpretation. Fish emphasizes the dynamic relationship between readers and their interpretative communities by challenging the formalist notion that texts have fixed, objective interpretations. His argument, which offers a critical challenge of conventional literary criticism, is that meanings are created within these groups rather than coming either from the text or individual readers. Beyond literary studies, Fish's notion that all knowledge is socially constructed has an impact on subjects like legal theory by analyzing the interplay between theory and practice as well as the significance of rhetoric and context. Though some have criticized Fish's relativistic method for adding extreme subjectivism and thus compromising objective standards, his work forces us to reevaluate how our judgments are shaped by intellectual and cultural surroundings. Fish's work is an important step forward for literary theory as it promotes a more thorough examination of how sociocultural contexts shape and create meaning. Engaging with Fish's theories provides important insights into literature, philosophy, and our larger grasp of knowing, even despite current disagreements.

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CHAPTER 5

EVOLVING INTERPRETATIONS: ANALYZING STANLEY FISH'S READER-RESPONSE CRITICISM AND ITS IMPACT ON LITERARY THEORY

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ABSTRACT:

Leading authority on reader response critique Stanley Eugene Fish contends that, in contrast to passive interpretations, readers actively create meaning from texts. His book **Is There a Text in This Class?** provides examples of how his literary theory has changed over time and how it interacts with various critical viewpoints. Fish discusses the conflict between reader-response theories, which hold that meaning is produced by readers, and formalist theories, which regard meaning as inherent in texts. He criticizes the static approach of formalism, pointing out that readers' interpretative actions are what give texts significance. This study examines Fish's evolution of reader response criticism, stressing the dynamic interaction between interpretative communities and texts and showing how his ideas go against conventional formalist viewpoints. According to Fish's view, meaning is not a fixed quality of texts but rather is created via interpretative activities. Despite reading being subjective, his concept of interpretative communities explains why readers often have similar perceptions. His writings encourage the idea that readers' circumstances and backgrounds influence the literary process. Subsequent investigations may examine the effect of Fish's ideas on modern literary studies as well as their applicability to other philosophical and cultural situations, such as the impact of new reading habits and digital media on interpretative communities.

KEYWORDS:

Fish, Interpretative Communities, Literary Theory, Stanley Fish, Textual.

INTRODUCTION

One of the main proponents of the literary criticism movement known as reader-response criticism is Stanley Eugene Fish. Reader reaction critics have even been dubbed the "School of Fish" in this regard. As the name would imply, reader-response criticism places a strong emphasis on the reader's part in evaluating a text's importance. This kind of critic views reading as an active process that creates meaning inside a book as opposed to a passive one that takes meaning from it. To try to map the development of his changing interpretative approach, Fish has compiled some of his most significant study's and study's into a book titled *Is There a Text in This Class?*

The book is not static; rather, it is evolving. Fish consistently displays the evolutionary nature of his work the way he has taken on new roles changed them and then moved on. Headnotes that connect previously published pieces to the main idea of interpretative communities as it develops in the latter chapters introduce them. Fish incorporates other critics' ideas rather than excluding them in the process of honing his theory, demonstrating how often they concur with him even on the occasions when their disagreements seem to be the most pronounced. Witty, insightful, and thought-provoking, this book will quickly establish itself as one of the foundational pieces of contemporary literary criticism [1], [2].

Reader's Literature

Fish emphasizes the temporal aspect of reading in the study "Literature in the Reader," which contrasts with other critics' proposals that the reading experience is spatial: ". it [the opposing school] transforms a temporal experience into a spatial one; it steps back and in a single glance takes in a whole (sentence, page, work) which the reader knows (if at all) only bit by bit, moment by moment." Fish discovers that the work's significance comes from this feeling of being a "informed reader," not from anything inherent in the text itself. Put another way, the process of becoming enchanted or disenchanted happens all at once while reading a book.

Fish describes an "informed reader" with the characteristics that follow: "The informed reader is someone who (1) is a competent speaker of the language out of which the text is built up; (2) is in full possession of 'the semantic knowledge that a mature listener brings to his task of comprehension,' and (3) has literary competence". Among the formalists who object to this focus on the reader's role in the meaning-making process of texts are William Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley. The following paragraph may be found in the *Verbal Icon* (1954): Confusion between the poetry and its effects (what it is and what it accomplishes) is known as the Affective Fallacy. It starts by attempting to infer the parameters of critique from the poem's psychological effects and concludes with relativism and impressionism. As a result, the poetry itself tends to vanish as a subject of particular critical analysis.

Fish responds, "I have an easy response to this. Because the language is so physically realistic, its objectivity is an illusion and a hazardous one at that. The presence of a line of print is so evident that it seems to be the only source of the significance and worth that we attach to it. According to Fish, the poetry cannot vanish as it was never really there in the first place rather, it was just a reflection of the technique used in its interpretation. According to Fish, any interpretation that is based on those formal elements is invalid since they are interpretations in and of themselves. Formal features are important, he admits, but in his study "What is Stylistics and Why Are They Saying Such Terrible Things About It?" he argues that these features ". acquire it. by their position in a structure of experience," rather than having any inherent meaning. Put another way, the reader applies his or her unique interpretation technique a result of his or her experiences to the text and extrapolates meaning from the arrangement of formal elements. He makes a stronger case for this in "What is Stylistics."

My argument is that formal patterns are products of interpretation in and of themselves, meaning that there can be no formal patterns that is, no pattern that can be observed before interpretation is hazarded and, thus, used to favor one interpretation over another at least not in the sense that is required for the practice of stylistics. However, the conclusion is not that formal patterns are absent, but rather that they are always present. The difference is that formal patterns are always the result of earlier interpretive acts, and as such, they are only discernible for as long as those acts are in effect.

However, this notion was undermined by Fish's dual denial that the text had any meaning and his manipulation of the text to manipulate the reader's experience. In "How Ordinary is Ordinary Language?" he starts addressing this issue by suggesting that the reader essentially creates the text by bringing to it certain presumptions that stem from his "informedness." He doesn't want the reader to infer any significance from this. He says, "Mine is not an argument for an infinitely plural or open text, but for a text that is always set; and yet because it is set not for all places or all times but for wherever and however long a particular way of reading [interpretation] is in force, it is a text that can change".

Nevertheless, this appears to highlight a lack of consistency and stability in interpretation, which is at odds with the fact that a large number of readers have the same overall "take" on

the texts. This question is answered by Fish in "Interpreting the Variorum." He inquires: "If interpretive acts are the source of forms rather than the other way around, why isn't it the case that readers are always performing the same acts or a sequence of random acts, and therefore creating the same forms or a random succession of forms?". He continues by stating, that both the stability of interpretation among readers and the variety of interpretation in the career of a single reader would seem to argue for the existence of something independent of and before interpretive acts. The reader's interpretative technique exists before he encounters the text, and this is what comes before these activities. Put another way, he is not required to read a work in a specific way, but he chooses to do so based on his interpretative technique.

In support of his claim that everything in the Scriptures, and indeed in the world when it is properly read, points to (bears the meaning of) God's love for us and our answering responsibility to love our fellow creatures for His sake, St. Augustine makes the following argument in his *On Christian Doctrine*. If anything does not seem to be pointing in this direction, Augustine claims that it is just a metaphorical method of producing the same "text" and that it is the responsibility of the Christian to choose how to interpret it as such. Fish explains in "Normal Circumstances and Other Special Cases" how Pat Kelly's conversion to Christianity is an example of this. Kelly attributed all of his accomplishments to his trust in God, but Fish notes that his conversion followed Augustine's guidelines in *On Christian Doctrine*. After being purified and cleansed, the eye that was enslaved to the phenomenal world which held the autonomy of that world as its fundamental principle can now see what is there, what is obvious, and what anyone with eyes can see. To the healthy and pure internal eye He is everywhere. He is everywhere because of an interpretative act carried out at a level so deep that it is indistinguishable from consciousness itself, rather than because of an interpretive act self-consciously carried out on facts that would otherwise be accessible [3], [4].

According to Fish, this concept is a very effective interpretative method for seeing the world. Similarly, he claims, readers choose to understand texts as either the same or different on a level that is "indistinguishable from consciousness itself," and this decision determines whether the texts' formal aspects are the same or different. This may help explain why different readers interpret a book differently, but it doesn't explain why different readers often comprehend the same material in the same manner or a somewhat similar way. Fish claims that "they don't have to" but when they do it's due to his notion of interpretive communities. that is made up of those who share interpretive strategies not for reading (in the conventional sense) but for writing [creating meaning in] texts, for constituting their properties and assigning their intentions". The fact that the subtitle of *Is There a Text in This Class* is *The Authority of Interpretive Communities* demonstrates how important Fish views the concept of interpretive communities. He clarifies this point of view in the book's introduction by saying, that the act of recognizing literature is not constrained by something in the text, nor does it issue from an independent and arbitrary will; rather, it proceeds from a collective decision as to what will count as literature, a decision that will be in force only so long as a community of readers or believers continues to abide by it". This suggests once again that readers contribute to a text's meaning and that it might vary over time and from place to location.

DISCUSSION

Fish introduces the notion of "context" in *Normal Circumstances*, whereby a sentence, although fixed at a certain time and place, may evolve. This is shown in the following passage: I use the term "literal" to refer to the several single interpretations a text will have in a series of distinct settings when we often reserve the term for the one meaning a text will always (or should always have). Since there is always a meaning that seems clear in the sense that it exists regardless of what we may do, there is always a literal meaning in any circumstance. However,

it just indicates that we have already completed the task; in a different circumstance, once we have completed another task, there will be a further evident, or literal, meaning. Never are we out of a predicament. We are always interpreting because we are never outside of a circumstance.

There is no way to get to a level of meaning that is above or beyond interpretation because we are not interpreting. Put another way, everything is always already part of a context, and phrases have meaning because of this context. Fish challenges the idea that direct and indirect speech actions are different, which strengthens his case. Communication activities classified as direct communication have a clear meaning ingrained in their "text." Speech actions that are deemed indirect are those in which the hearer understands the speaker's meaning despite it not being included in the "text" itself because they share the same contextual knowledge. The contextual interpretation of the statement is usually seen as being subject to "normal" conditions in both situations. Stated differently, the context in which the utterance and its reception occur falls within the mutual understanding of both parties means that the hearer is aware of the speaker's meaning regardless of whether the speaker employs direct or indirect language. Fish takes issue with this notion of usual situations. He states, I am putting out the identical case for normal context as I have put forth for "literal meaning. A typical situation will always exist, but it won't always be the same. He presents the following scenario, as used by John Searle, as an example:

Searle starts by picturing a dialogue between two pupils. I have to study for an exam, says student Y in response to student X's suggestion that they go to the movies tonight. Searle states that the first line "constitutes a proposal in virtue of its meaning," while the second sentence, which is interpreted as a rejection of the proposal, is not so understood since "in virtue of its meaning it is simply a statement about Y." Searle clarifies this distinction. This is where the last blow against this narrative must be delivered: the claim that any of these phrases is ever understood "in virtue of its meaning" If this were the case, we would have to conclude that a sentence's meaning renders it more amenable to some illocutionary uses than to others. This is exactly what Searle says about the phrase "I have to study for an exam": Even when given in reaction to a proposal, statements of this kind often do not amount to rejections of proposals. Therefore, in a typical situation, none of Y's comments I have to tie my shoes or I have to eat popcorn tonight would have been interpreted as a rejection of the proposition [5], [6].

This is where Fish raises the question, "Normal for whom?" about Searle's suggested normal environment. Then, if both X and Y were aware of the conditions, he continues to identify other scenarios in which munching popcorn and tying shoes may be interpreted as a rejection of a proposition. Fish responds, "normal" is content specific and to speak of a normal context is to be either redundant (because whatever in a given context goes without saying is normal) or incoherent (because it would refer to a context whose claim was not to be one) to the argument that these circumstances are special as opposed to normal. Crisis. would be possible only if a sentence could mean anything at all in the abstract," he says, not suggesting that an utterance can mean anything at all but rather that its meaning is subject to certain limitations. "A sentence. is never in the abstract; it is always in a situation, and the situation will already have determined the purpose for which it can be used," he continues.

Comparing Fish to the other critiques we have studied in class is challenging. Although he seems to be against structuralism, formalism, and stylisticism, he just disputes the conclusions that many of its tenets lead to. Fish's stance appears to be based on the following principles: reading is an activity; the meaning of any text is brought to it by the reader's interpretive strategy rather than being embedded in formal features; interpretive communities enable some degree of agreement on the meanings of texts; and all acts of interpretation take place in some context.

Even while these claims appear simple and apparent, many detractors seem to find them frightening. It seems that they share Wimsatt and Beardsley's opinion that Fish's approach creates uncertainty. Fish does not openly attempt to refute this assertion. He acknowledges this ambiguity himself after *Interpreting the Variorum* when talking about how to choose which interpretive group one belongs to. He responds, the answer is he can't, since any evidence brought forward to support the claim would itself be an interpretation. A nod of recognition from someone in the same community is the only evidence of membership that can be shown. The only thing a speaker of his perspective can declare with any degree of assurance is when he closes this study with these words: I say it [we know] to you now, knowing full well that you will agree with me (that is, understand) only if you already agree with me.

Stanley Fish Theory

I want to now examine Stanley Fish's reader-response theory in more detail. My goal is to analyze Fish's literary theory first, then connect it more widely to other phenomena in philosophy and culture that I will contend are historically conditioned, such as the privatization of meaning. Stated differently, Fish's argument is informed by existential ideas about truth as well as the growth of modernism and post-modernism. We can learn a lot from the phenomenological approach, which emphasizes the reader's mental experience while reading. Fish uses this technique in "Surprised by Sin: The Reader in *Paradise Lost*," one of his early works. In this study, he argues that Milton purposefully used a variety of literary devices to give the reader a false feeling of security, from which he would then unexpectedly diverge to startle the reader with his arrogant self-sufficiency. Milton allegedly intended to make the reader realize how wicked he was and to have him return to God's mercy. Fish's argument takes a rather clever go at both Milton's (mis)leading the reader and *Paradise Lost*.

At this stage of his career, Fish is most concerned with what "is happening in the act of reading," and the first half of his study collection, *Is There a Text in This Class?* reflects this. "An analysis of the developing responses of the reader about the words as they succeed one another in time" is how Fish describes his phenomenological method. Rather than focusing on the meaning of the text, his interest is in what it accomplishes. The formalism of the New Critical era, which maintained that meaning was ingrained in the literary artifact or, as Wimsatt and Beardsley called it, "the object" can be seen as the source of much of Worthen's work, as the author indicates. He argues that "The context for the discussion is the question of whether formal features exist before and independently of interpretive strategies." Fish finally responds negatively to this question, as one would expect. In addition to saying "No" to the question "Is there a text in this class?" he suggests that the reader transfers formal qualities that are discernible in all periods and places onto the text rather than having a text with these attributes [7], [8].

At this juncture in his career, Fish's views take on a different type of critique that denies the author's intentions and confines the meaning of the text to the minds of the readers. As a result, his philosophy is sometimes referred to as "affective stylistics" or "reception aesthetics." According to Fish, the interpretative community is the one who shapes reality. The community is what gives a text or life itself, for that matter meaning. He refers to those who believe that there is an everlasting superstructure or substructure of reality where meaning may be discovered as "foundationalists." Foundationalists would disagree with ideas like his own because they make up their interpretative communities and interpret using a grid like this. His theory is epistemological in that it focuses more on how knowledge is acquired than it does on literary criticism, even though both fields have enormous ramifications. I will mostly be analyzing Fish's later reader-response theory in the study that follows.

A student at Johns Hopkins University who had, coincidentally, just completed one of my courses contacted a colleague on the first day of the new semester. She asked him, "Is there a text in this class?" which I believe you would all agree is a really simple question. My colleague replied, "Yes, it's the Norton Anthology of Literature," with such flawless confidence that he didn't realize it (though he calls this moment "walking into the trap" in recounting the story). At that point, the trap which wasn't set by the student but rather by the limitless potential of language to be appropriated was sprung: "No, no," she said. "I mean, in this class do we believe in poems and things, or is it just us?" I will attempt to interpret this story in the following paragraphs as a demonstration of how unfounded the fear of these dangers is, even though it is now possible (and for many, even tempting) to read it as an example of the risks that arise from listening to people like me who preach about the instability of the text and the lack of definitive meanings.

Of the criticisms thrown at what Meyer Abrams has recently dubbed the New Readers (Jacques Derrida, Harold Bloom, Stanley Fish), the most enduring is that these proponents of undecidability and indeterminacy reject "our ordinary realm of experience in speaking, hearing, reading, and understanding" in favor of a world in which "no text can mean anything in particular" and "we can never say just what anyone means by anything he writes," all the while ignoring the "norms and possibilities" embedded in language, the "linguistic meanings" that words unquestionably have. Allegations arise that deliberate interpreters supersede literal or normative interpretations. Assume we investigate this accusation inside the framework of the current instance. In what sense does the question "Is there a text in this class?" have a normative, literal, or linguistic meaning?

In the context of current critical discourse, as reflected, for example, in the pages of *Critical Inquiry*, it would seem that there are only two possible answers to this question: either the utterance has a literal meaning, in which case we should be able to identify it, or there are as many interpretations as there are readers, none of which is literal. Nevertheless, the solution implied by my short story is that the statement has two literal meanings: in the context that my colleague assumed (I don't mean that he took the step of assuming them, but that he was already stepping within them), the statement is a question about whether or not a textbook is required for this specific course; however, in the context that he was made aware of by his student's corrective response, the statement is equally clearly a question about the instructor's position (within the range of positions available in contemporary literary theory) regarding the status of the text. Take note that what we have here is not an instance of undecidability or indeterminacy, but rather determinacy and decidability that can and in this case really do change and that do not always have the same form.

With his prestructured understanding of the situation, my colleague did not hesitate between two (or more) possible meanings of the utterance; rather, he quickly deduced what appeared to be an inescapable meaning and quickly deduced another inescapable meaning when that understanding was changed. Both readings were a result of the public and forming norms (of language and understanding) that Abrams cited; neither meaning was forced (a frequent phrase in the anti-new-reader polemics) on a more conventional one by a private, eccentric interpretative act. All institutional structures in which one hears utterances as already organized concerning certain assumed purposes and goals are home to these norms, rather than being embedded in language, where they could be read out by anyone with sufficiently clear, that is, unbiased, eyes. My colleague and his pupil are both embedded in that institution, thus their interpretative actions are limited by the institutionally accepted norms and presumptions rather than by the rigid rules and definitions of a linguistic system.

A more accurate way to state it would be to claim that no natural speaker of the language could instantly access any reading of the question, which we might conveniently label as "Is there a text in this class?" or "Is there a text in this class?" The question "Is there a text in this class?" can only be understood or read by someone already familiar with what falls under the general category of "first day of class" (i.e., what worries students, what administrative tasks need to be completed before instruction starts), and who consequently hears the statements made based on that knowledge, which is not applied after the fact but rather determines the shape the fact first takes. Just as "Is there a text in this class?" would be inaccessible to someone who is not already aware of the contentious topics in modern literary theory, so too would it be unavailable to someone whose awareness is not already shaped by that knowledge. While I will argue throughout this study that unintelligibility in the strict or pure sense is impossible, I am not claiming that for some readers or hearers, the question would be completely incomprehensible.

Rather, I am stating that there are readers and hearers for whom the question's intelligibility would not take on the same temporal succession of forms as it did for my colleague. One may see, for instance, someone who would interpret or hear the query as one asking where an item is located, such as "I think I left my text in this class; have you seen it?" Then, there would be a "Is there a text in this class?" and the prospect of an infinite succession in numbers that is, a universe where every speech has an unlimited variety of meanings which alarmed the supporters of the normative and definitive. But even if the example were expanded, it does not at way imply anything. Any scenario I could think of, or one I could be able to envisage, would significantly limit the significance of the utterance not after it was heard, but in the manner in which it might be heard in the first place. Only in cases where statements were not already ingrained in their context and had emerged as a result of various circumstances would an endless multiplicity of meaning be cause for concern. It would be unsettling if the norm were ambiguous and free-floating. That condition, if it could be found, would be the normative one.

But there is no such state; sentences only arise in situations, and in those circumstances, an utterance's normative meaning is always evident or at the very least accessible. However, in a different circumstance, the same utterance will have a different normative meaning that is equally evident and accessible. (The experience of my colleague serves as a concrete example). This does not imply that there is no way to distinguish between the meanings that an utterance can have in various contexts, only that because we are always in some context, the discrimination will have already been made in one context and will have been made again, albeit in a different context. To clarify, it is always feasible to rank and arrange the questions "Is there a text in this class?" and "Is there a text in this class?" It won't be feasible to assign them an unchangeable, final rating (because they will always have been rated), one that is based solely on their presence in certain circumstances (since they only occur in certain scenarios).

However, there is a distinction between the two that allows us to say that, in a limited sense, one is more normal than the other. This is because, as things stand, one of those contexts is undoubtedly more available than the other, making it more likely that the utterance is heard from that perspective [9], [10]. This is true even though each is perfectly normal in the context in which their literalness is immediately obvious (the successive contexts occupied by my colleague). It seems that this is an example of what I refer to as "institutional nesting": It is also clear that more people would "hear" "Is there a text in this class?" than "Is there a text in this class?" in a random population presented with the utterance; furthermore, while "Is there a text in this class?" could be immediately heard by someone for whom "Is there a text in this class?" would have to be laboriously explained, it is difficult to imagine someone capable of hearing "Is there a text in this class?" who was not already capable of hearing "Is there a text in this

class?" One is understandable to professionals in the field, the majority of students, and many employees in the book trade; the other is understandable to professionals in the field who, like me, would not find it strange to come across a critic using a term "made popular by Lacan." Admitting this fact does not diminish my argument by reintroducing the category of the normal, because the category as it is used in that argument is institutional rather than transcendental. Furthermore, although no institution is so widely accepted and enduring that the meanings it permits will always be normal, some institutions or ways of living are so commonplace that for a large number of people the meanings they permit seem "naturally" available, and it requires extra work to recognize that they are products of circumstance.

CONCLUSION

Reader-response criticism, as espoused by Stanley Fish marks a major break from conventional literary theory by focusing on the reader's involvement in meaning construction. Fish contends that the reader's active participation and interpretative processes provide meaning, not the text itself. His idea of "interpretive communities" demonstrates how readers' common practices and understandings of texts are shaped by agreements made collectively, therefore striking a balance between interpretation variation and consistency. This approach suggests that our understanding of truth and meaning is strongly influenced by our interpretative frameworks, which are consistent with existential and phenomenological views on these topics. Fish is committed to comprehending how texts work within certain interpretative settings, as shown by his transition from examining Milton to criticizing formalism and stylistics. Fish opposes the notion of objective literary analysis by rejecting set formal patterns and arguing that readers' interpretations and their communities determine meaning instead. In general, Fish's work challenges preconceived notions about the meaning and interpretation of texts, arguing in favor of an acceptance of the flexibility of meaning and the impact of interpretative communities. Beyond literary criticism, his contributions affect more general conversations about understanding, interpretation, and the creation of meaning.

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CHAPTER 6

DECONSTRUCTION AND ITS LEGACY: ANALYZING DERRIDA'S IMPACT ON PHILOSOPHY, LITERATURE AND THE CONCEPT OF PRESENCE

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ABSTRACT:

Renowned 20th-century philosopher Jacques Derrida is best known for creating "deconstruction," a critical methodology that was first used in the middle of the 1960s. By questioning binary oppositions like presence/absence and speech/writing, deconstruction questions conventional Western philosophical thinking and seeks to identify and question underlying presuppositions. The central concern of deconstruction is the criticism of the Western philosophical canon's dependence on dualism and the metaphysics of presence. By highlighting the flaws and inconsistencies in these well-established frameworks, Derrida's method calls into question their viability and influence on philosophical debate. This study investigates the literary and philosophical aspects of Derrida's deconstruction. It explores how Derrida's analysis of metaphysical ideas, particularly his study of dichotomies and the idea of undecidability, adds to more general philosophical and literary debates. By exposing the complexity of language and meaning and upending long-standing philosophical ideas, Derrida's deconstruction has a profound influence on some areas. His work highlights the inherently ambiguous and undecidable nature of texts, calling into question conventional literary and philosophical interpretation. Future studies might look more closely at how deconstruction is used in current philosophical discussions and how it affects theoretical frameworks. Furthermore, examining how deconstruction interacts with other critical theories may help us comprehend its place in the current intellectual conversation on a more complex level.

KEYWORDS:

Arche-writing, Binary, Deconstruction, Logocentrism, Metaphysic.

INTRODUCTION

Among the most well-known philosophers of the 20th century was Jacques Derrida. He was among the most productive as well. He used a tactic known as "deconstruction" in the middle of the 1960s to distance himself from the several philosophical traditions and movements (phenomenology, structuralism, and existentialism) that came before him on the French intellectual landscape. Deconstruction is essentially concerned with something like a criticism of the Western intellectual tradition, even if it is not strictly negative. Deconstruction is often explained via a text-by-text examination. It aims to reveal and then challenge the different binary oppositions presence/absence, speech/writing, and so on that form the basis of our prevailing modes of thought.

There are two main facets of deconstruction: literary and philosophical. The literary component deals with how the text is to be understood, and creativity is necessary to uncover hidden meanings that the text may have. The philosophical component addresses the "metaphysics of presence," or simply metaphysics, which is the primary focus of deconstruction. Derrida contends, beginning from a Heideggerian perspective, that metaphysics has an impact on

philosophy as a whole, beginning with Plato [1], [2]. Reversing dichotomies and trying to corrupt the dichotomies themselves are the two main ways that the deconstructive technique works on these too-stale modes of thinking. The tactic also seeks to demonstrate the existence of undecidables, or things that do not fit neatly into a category or opposition. In a later phase of Derrida's study, undecidability resurfaces when it is used to highlight contradictions in concepts like hospitality and gift-giving, whose conditions of impossibility are also their conditions of possibility. It is unclear, however, whether genuine hospitality and generosity are feasible or not.

During this time, the creator of deconstruction focuses on moral issues. Derrida specifically abandons the notion that duty is connected to an action that is publicly and logically justified by overarching principles as a result of the theme of obligation to the other (such as God or a loved one). In light of Jewish tradition stories, he emphasizes the total uniqueness of one's duty to another. In the fields of psychology, literary theory, cultural studies, linguistics, feminism, sociology, and anthropology, deconstruction has had a significant impact. It is easy to see why this is the case given that philosophy and non-philosophy (or philosophy and literature) are positioned in the midst of each other. However, the effort that follows highlights the philosophical relevance of Derrida's ideas.

Existence and Creations

Derrida was born in Algiers in 1930 into a Jewish household. Additionally, he was raised in a rather discriminatory milieu. In reality, since he was Jewish, he was either expelled from or withdrawn from at least two schools when he was a youngster. He was kicked out of one school for having a 7% Jewish student body, and he subsequently left another school due to anti-Semitic sentiment. Even though Derrida would not accept a biographical interpretation of his work, it is possible to claim that these kinds of events greatly influenced his subsequent emphasis on the significance of the marginal and the other. Derrida was ultimately admitted at the age of 19 after being turned down twice for a place at the esteemed Ecole Normale Supérieure, which is where Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir and most other French intellectuals and academics started their careers. As a result, he relocated to France from Algiers, and not long after, he started to take a leading part in the Marxist publication *Tel Quel*. Derrida was trained primarily as a philosopher via the prism of Husserl, and most of his early work in philosophy was phenomenological. His early ideas were also greatly influenced by Nietzsche, Heidegger, Saussure, Levinas, and Freud. Derrida recognizes that the development of his approach to texts, which has become known as "deconstruction," was influenced by all of these scholars.

Derrida made his mark as a globally significant philosopher in 1967. His three seminal works, *Of Grammatology*, *Writing and Difference*, and *Speech and Phenomena*, were published. Although each of these books has had a significant impact for a different reason, *Of Grammatology* continues to be his most well-known creation (it is examined at some length on this page). Derrida exposes and then disproves the speech-writing opposition, which he claims has had a significant impact on Western thinking, in *Of Grammatology*. Since the publication of these and other important texts (such as *Dissemination*, *Glas*, *The Postcard*, *Spectres of Marx*, *The Gift of Death*, and *Politics of Friendship*), deconstruction has gradually moved from playing a major role in continental Europe to also becoming a significant player in the Anglo-American philosophical context. His preoccupation with language in this text is typical of much of his early work. This is especially true in the fields of literary criticism and cultural studies, where scholars like Paul de Man have been influenced by deconstruction's approach to textual analysis. Additionally, he has had lecture roles at other colleges throughout the globe. 2004, Derrida passed away.

There has always been some debate concerning deconstruction. Many 'analytic' philosophers howled in disapproval when Derrida received an honorary degree at Cambridge in 1992. Since then, Derrida has also engaged in several conversations sometimes unjustly, but with philosophers such as John Searle, in which deconstruction has been harshly criticized. The hostility of these intellectuals does, however, make it evident that deconstruction poses significant problems to conventional philosophy, which will be discussed in more detail later in this piece.

Method of Deconstruction

Like many other modern European theorists, Derrida is obsessed with destroying the oppositional tendencies that have plagued a large portion of the Western philosophical canon. Since there would be nowhere for it to interfere without these hierarchies and rules of subordination, dualisms are, in reality, the primary meal of deconstruction. Deconstruction is parasitic in that it confines itself to twisting preexisting narratives and exposing the dualistic hierarchies they hide, as opposed to promoting yet another great story or theory about the nature of the world in which we live. Even if Derrida's assertions that he only talks at the fringes of philosophy are debatable, it is crucial to consider these assertions. If Derrida's concerns may be often philosophical, they are definitely neither ontological nor phenomenological (he informs us that his work is to be read especially against Husserl, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty).

Deconstruction operates by conducting in-depth examinations of certain texts, especially early deconstruction. It is dedicated to providing a thorough examination of a text's literal meaning while also looking for internal issues that may be pointing to other interpretations in the text's ignored passages (like the footnotes). According to Derrida, the first element of this deconstructive approach is similar to a "desire to be faithful to the themes and audacities of a thinking." Deconstruction, however, also famously draws on Martin Heidegger's idea of a "destructive retrieve" to expose texts to alternate, frequently suppressed meanings that exist at least partially outside of the metaphysical tradition though they are always at least partially tied to it. Derrida's constant injunction to "invent if you can or want to give my language to be understood; invent if you can or want to hear mine" exemplifies this more aggressive and violent side of deconstruction. According to Derrida, an accurate reading of him is one that extends beyond him, making innovation a crucial component of any deconstructive interpretation [3], [4].

He frequently makes cryptic recommendations such as "go where you cannot go, to the impossible, it is indeed the only way of coming or going." In the end, the value of a deconstructive reading lies in this imaginative interaction with another text that is not so faithful as it oscillates between these two demands. The fascinating thing about deconstruction, however, is that even while Derrida's readings of certain texts are very radical, it's sometimes hard to tell where a text stops and deconstruction's more violent aspects begin. Derrida is never one to put labels like "my text" or "your text" too clearly in his writings. This is partially because discussing a "work" of deconstruction is difficult in and of itself since deconstruction only draws attention to what the text itself already makes clear. The "neglected cornerstones" of an already-existing system contain all the components of a deconstructive intervention, and this equation remains largely unchanged regardless of whether the "system" is understood to be metaphysics in general, which must contain its non-metaphysical track, or the writings of a particular thinker, which must also always testify to that which they are attempting to exclude.

DISCUSSION

Naturally, Derrida reflects extensively on these ideas, and their implications are immediately felt at the meta-theoretical level. If we are going to speak about Derrida's arguments, at the

very least, we have to acknowledge that they are inextricably linked to the arguments of whomever or whatever it is that he is trying to dissect. For instance, Derrida contends that Husserl's writings, which exclude the self-presence he was seeking to establish, are the real foundation of his criticism of the Husserlian "now" moment. Derrida appears to be able to reject any transcendental or ontological stance if his argument is just that Husserl's phenomenology contains implications that Husserl overlooked. For this reason, he contends that rather than being philosophy in and of itself, his work exists on the periphery of philosophy.

According to deconstruction, all text contains inevitable ambiguities and "undecidability" that reveal whatever consistent meaning the author may have tried to impose on the reader. Writing always exposes what has been hidden, obscures what has been shown, and, more broadly, goes against the very arguments that are meant to support it. That point of equivocation will always be positioned in a new location depending on who or what Derrida is trying to deconstruct, which is why his "philosophy" is so textually oriented and why his core concepts are always shifting.

This further guarantees that any effort to define deconstruction must be done so cautiously. Nothing could be more at odds with the declared purpose of deconstruction than this effort to define it in terms of the metaphysical query, "What is deconstruction?" Since deconstruction is based on the desire to expose us to that which is entirely other (*tout autre*) and to open us up to alternate possibilities, it is contradictory to attempt to limit it to a single, overriding objective (OG 19). The widely acknowledged distinction between Derrida's early and late work is only the most obvious example of the challenges involved in suggesting that "deconstruction says this" or "deconstruction prohibits that." This exegesis occasionally runs the risk of ignoring the many meanings of Derridean deconstruction [5], [6].

Nevertheless, several characteristics of deconstruction stand out. Derrida's whole project, for instance, is based on the belief that the different philosophers and artists he examines are inherently dualistic. Although some philosophers contend that his discussions of the Western philosophical heritage are a touch too reductionist, it is his interpretation of this tradition that both informs and equips a deconstructive reaction. For this reason, it is important to take a quick look at the object of Derridean deconstruction: the metaphysics of presence, or, to put it another way, logocentrism.

Logocentrism/Metaphysics of Presence

Derrida uses a wide range of terminology to characterize what he believes to be the core idea or ideas of the Western philosophical tradition. These include phallogocentrism, logocentrism, and possibly most famously the metaphysics of presence, which is also sometimes referred to as just "metaphysics." Each of these phrases has a somewhat distinct connotation. The focus of logocentrism is on the special place that speech, or *logos* has been given in the Western past. Phallogocentrism indicates that this favoritism has patriarchal overtones. Heidegger's writings are largely referenced in Derrida's persistent allusions to the metaphysics of presence. Heidegger maintains that Western philosophy has continuously given priority to what is, or what appears, and has neglected to consider the circumstances around that appearance. Put otherwise, for Derrida, the favored thing is presence itself, not the thing that makes presence possible at all. All these disparaging phrases, however, are included under the general heading of "metaphysics." So what does Derrida mean when he speaks about metaphysics? "The enterprise of returning strategically, ideally, to an origin or to a priority thought to be simple, intact, normal, pure, standard, self-identical, in order then to think in terms of derivation, complexity, deterioration, accident, etc." is how Derrida defines metaphysics in the 'Afterword' to *Limited Inc.* This is how all metaphysicians have approached the subject: they have seen

good as existing before evil, the positive as existing before the negative, the pure as existing before the impure, the simple as existing before the complex, the essential as existing before the accidental, the imitated as existing before the imitation, etc. Furthermore, it is the metaphysical urgency that has shown to be the most consistent, significant, and powerful metaphysical gesture among others.

Therefore, in Derrida's view, metaphysics entails imposing subordination hierarchies and ordering on the many dualisms it meets. Furthermore, dependent and intricate ideas are seen as aberrations that are unimportant for philosophical analysis, while presence and purity are prioritized in metaphysical thinking. Therefore, metaphysical thinking almost always favors one side of a disagreement while ignoring or marginalizing the other side. Derrida has proposed that opposition of metaphysical conceptions (speech/writing, presence/absence, etc.) is never the face-to-face of two words, but a hierarchy and an order of subordination. This is another effort to explain deconstruction's handling of, and interest in, oppositions. Deconstruction cannot stop there or go straight toward neutralization; instead, it must practice an overturning of the classical contradiction and a broad displacement of the system via double gestures, double science, and double writing. Deconstruction will only be able to intervene in the arena of oppositions it criticizes under those specific conditions (M 195). It is helpful to think about an example of this deconstruction in action to better understand this dual methodology,' which is also the deconstruction of the notion of a methodology because it no longer believes in the possibility of an observer being exterior to the object/text being examined.

Derrida's Initial Writings

Derrida's vocabulary varies with each piece he publishes. This is a component of his dismantling approach. He concentrates on certain phrases or concepts that, because of their ambiguity, subvert the text's more overt aim. Since Derrida has written close to sixty writings in English, it is impossible to discuss them all, thus this study concentrated on some of the most important phrases and neologisms from his early ideas. It touches on some of his later, more thematically oriented ideas.

Written/Speech

The main conflict that Derrida addressed in his early work is the one between writing and speaking. In contrast, Derrida claims that intellectuals as diverse as Plato, Rousseau, Saussure, and Levi-Strauss have all denigrated written language and elevated voice to the status of a pure means of communication. They contend that written words are the symbols of that preexisting symbol, but spoken words are the symbols of mental experience. They are twice derivative and twice far from unity with one's mind as verbal representations. It is vital to keep in mind that the initial tactic of deconstruction is to invert existing oppositions, without getting into the specifics of how these intellectuals have gone about justifying this kind of hierarchical opposition. Derrida therefore tries to show that the structure of writing and grammatology are more significant and even "older" than the purportedly pure form of presence-to-self that is defined as characteristic of speech in *Of Grammatology*, possibly his most well-known book.

For instance, Ferdinand de Saussure attempts to limit the field of linguistics to phonetic and audible words only in a whole chapter of his *Course in General Linguistics*. During his investigation, Saussure even goes so far as to contend that "writing and language are two distinct systems of signs, the second of which exists only to represent the first." According to Saussure, language has an oral heritage that exists apart from writing, and it is because of this independence that a pure science of speech may exist. Derrida strongly disagrees with this hierarchy, claiming that speech is as capable of expressing any claims that can be made about

writing, such as that it is derivative and only refers to other signs. However, Derrida does more than simply criticize this stance for its illogical presumptions, such as the notion that we are self-identical with ourselves when we "hear" ourselves think; he also clarifies how Saussure's text undermines this hierarchy. The thesis known most famously as "the arbitrariness of the sign" which, to put it mildly holds that the signifier and that which is signified are not always related is put out by Saussure. Although Derrida notes that Saussure draws many conclusions from this perspective, it seems to rule out the possibility of any kind of natural attachment given the concept of arbitrariness and "unmotivated institutions" of signals. After instance, it would appear that one kind of sign spoken signs could not be more natural than another written signs if the sign is arbitrary and rejects any fundamental allusion to reality. Saussure, however, bases his case for our "natural bond" with sound on this very notion of a natural attachment [7], [8]. His contention that sounds are more closely associated with our thoughts than written words, therefore, contradicts his central thesis about the arbitrariness of the sign.

Writing in the Archaic

Derrida contends that signification, in its broadest sense, constantly refers to other signs and that it is impossible to arrive at a sign that refers exclusively to itself in *Grammatology* and other places. According to him, "writing is not a sign of a sign unless one says it of all signs, which would be more profoundly true" (OG 43). He wishes to emphasize the idea that "writing" is this process of endless referencing and never arriving at meaning itself. This is what he refers to as "arche-writing," not writing in the strict sense of the word, such as an actual inscription on a page. Writing that stresses that the gap between what is meant to be conveyed and what is conveyed is typical of an ordinary breach that affects everything one might wish to keep sacrosanct, including the idea of self-presence, is known as "archer-writing."

When the usual rupture that archer writing alludes to is dissected, two statements about temporal deferring and spatial differentiating emerge. Derrida's focus on how writing varies from itself may be explained by saying that writing, and hence all repetition, is divided (differed) by the absence that necessitates it. This is how he explains the first of these arguments. One way we may accomplish this is to write down information that we would quickly forget or to convey information to someone who is not there. Derrida argues that for writing to be what it is, it has to be able to continue even if all of its empirically established addressees are absent. Derrida also views delay as characteristic of the written, which serves to emphasize that a text's meaning is never fully present and is never fully caught by a critic's effort to define it. A text's meaning is always open to the whims of the future, but when that 'present' future is present (if we try to limit the future by referring to a particular date or event), the text's meaning is also unrealized, and subject to yet another future that can never exist.

Since writing continually hints at meaning, the author is never even in possession of the key to a piece. Derrida's mysterious statement that "there is nothing outside of the text" cannot thus be easily understood, nor can we ask him to clarify it. Derrida's explanations would need to be clarified to make sense. [That being said, it is important to note that Derrida does not primarily argue that everything is semiotic or linguistic he explicitly rejects this but rather that the processes of deferring and differing that are present in linguistic representation are indicative of a broader issue that affects everything, including the body and the senses. Derrida's concept of rewriting, which is a broader definition of writing, describes how the written word is made feasible by the "ordinary" deferral of meaning, which guarantees that meaning can never be fully present. He will come to characterize these two overlapping processes using that most famous of neologisms, *différance*, in connection with the differentiating element that we have previously seen him identify with and then expand beyond the conventional bounds of writing.

Disparities

The name "différance" itself plays on the contrast between the written and the aural, attempting to bring together the disparate and delaying elements of arche-writing. Since the distinction between *différance* and *différence* is inaudible, the written word is truly necessary to make this distinction. This undermines initiatives such as Saussure's, which in addition to trying to distinguish between writing and speech also imply that writing is essentially an extraneous component of speech. Derrida may easily respond to such a claim by pointing out that this kind of ambiguity difference as opposed to difference occurs often, if not always, in spoken language and necessitates reference to the written word. The spoken word is always apart from any purported clarity of awareness if the spoken word depends on the written to operate correctly. This common violation is what Derrida identifies as arche-writing and *différance*.

Derrida's emphasis that *différance* is "neither a word nor a concept" and the fact that its meaning varies depending on the specific context in which it is used indicate that a thorough definition of the term is impossible. For the time being, however, it is sufficient to imply that *différance* is representative of the activities associated with arche-writing and this generalized concept of writing that undermines the sign's fundamental logic, according to Derrida. Arche-writing, which maintains that signs always refer to other signs *ad infinitum* and that there is no ultimate referent or foundation, makes it impossible for the widely held belief that a sign represents something that, even if it is not genuinely present, could potentially be present. One of the two strategic goals of deconstruction is achieved by this inversion of the subordinated word of an opposition. For Derrida, writing or at least the characteristics of writing, such as *différance* and rewriting are universal rather than being condemned as secondary or derivative. This is equally characteristic of spoken language, just as written language lacks a self-present subject to define each term, meaning that written language must partially defy human attempts to regulate it. Nothing ensures that someone else will give the words I employ the same meaning I give them, even when I use an identical repetition pattern. The notion of an internal monologue and the notion that we can 'hear' our thoughts intimately and non-contingently are flawed as well since they overlook how arche-writing values individuality and non-coincidence with oneself.

Trace

It is important to note that, in this regard, the structure that deconstruction aims to destroy partially retains all of its reversals, including the reversals in arche-writing. It is crucial to understand that the simple reversal of an established metaphysical opposition could not also question the ruling framework and presuppositions that are being challenged. According to Derrida, "one always inhabits, and all the more when one does not suspect it." Therefore, deconstruction cannot stop at only giving text priority over voice; it must also complete the second key component of its two-pronged strategy, which is to tarnish and infect the opposition. Derrida has to emphasize that the categories that protect and maintain any dualism are inherently disturbed and moved. Derrida typically creates a new term or reworks an old one to permanently disrupt the structure into which he has intervened to effect this second of deconstruction's strategic intents. Examples of this include his discussion of the pharmacy in Plato (drug or tincture, salutary or maleficent), and the supplement in Rousseau, which will be addressed at the end of this section. To put it another way, the issue is that Derrida claims that via analyzing a binary opposition, deconstruction discloses a trace. This is not a replay of the oppositions that have already been dismantled; rather, the replay is a break in metaphysics, a pattern of contradictions where the metaphysical meets the non-metaphysical, which is the task of deconstruction as closely as possible. Although the trace does not emerge as such, a deconstructive intervention may mimic its course and bring it to the forefront of the text [9], [10].

Addendum

The supplement's reasoning is another crucial component of grammatology. A supplement is anything that purports to assist something "original" or "natural" in a secondary capacity. As Derrida notes, "If supplementarity is a necessarily indefinite process, writing is the supplement par excellence since it proposes itself as the supplement of the supplement, the sign of a sign, taking the place of a speech already significant." Writing is an example of this structure in and of itself. Derrida adds that masturbation is another example of the supplement, as is the use of birth control procedures.

The ambiguity that guarantees that what is supplemental may always be understood in two ways is what makes these two cases noteworthy. For instance, the way our culture uses birth control measures may be taken as implying that something is wrong with nature and that the contraceptive pill, condom, etc., fills the gap. However, one might equally counter that these safety measures only enhance and complement our natural way of life. Whether a supplement adds itself and "is a plenitude enriching another plenitude, the fullest measure of presence" or whether it "supplements adds only to replace represents and makes an image... its place is assigned in the structure by the mark of an emptiness" is always unclear, or perhaps better put, "undecidable." Derrida ultimately proposes that the supplement is "not a signified more than a signifier, a representer than a presence, a writing than a speech," i.e., it is both accretion and replacement. It precedes all of these methods.

This is not only a theoretical proposition devoid of practical implications in the context of deconstruction.

Derrida contends that "it has never been possible to desire the presence 'in person', before this play of substitution and the symbolic experience of auto-affection," despite Rousseau's constant lamentations in *The Confessions* about how often he masturbates. This is Derrida's way of saying that it is this extra masturbation that 'plays' between presence and absence (such as the picture of the absent Theories that Rousseau conjures up) that gives us the ability to imagine being satisfied and present in a sexual relationship with another person at all. Masturbation is "original" in a sense, and Derrida claims that this is true of all sexual interactions. Every erotic relationship has an additional component in which we are always engaged in some kind of representation rather than being exposed to a transient "meaning" of sexual encounters. For Derrida, such representations and images are the very conditions of desire and enjoyment, even if this does not take the form of imagining another in place of, or supplementing, the "presence" that is currently with us, and even if we are not always acting out a certain role, or faking certain pleasures.

CONCLUSION

Through his deconstruction, Jacques Derrida exposed the underlying dualisms and hierarchies in Western thinking, presenting a serious threat to established philosophical and literary traditions. Derrida showed how these binary oppositions such as speech/writing and presence/absence shape and constrain our perception of reality by closely examining them. His deconstructive method shows that texts and conceptions are intricate, flexible, and braided with underlying tensions and ambiguities rather than being just products of their seeming oppositions. Derrida's contributions to philosophy and literature have had a profound influence on a wide range of disciplines, including linguistics, psychology, and cultural studies. His focus on the "metaphysics of presence" and his criticism of logocentrism demonstrate his dedication to questioning the conventional belief that presence is preferable to absence. Derrida's examination of undecidability and the "impossible" nature of moral and philosophical problems draws attention to the shortcomings and inconsistencies of conventional paradigms. Despite

encountering opposition and discussion, especially from analytical philosophers, Derrida's deconstruction is nevertheless a vital instrument for challenging and reconsidering the fundamentals of literary and philosophical interpretation.

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CHAPTER 7

DECENTERING STRUCTURES: DERRIDA'S CRITIQUE OF STRUCTURALISM AND THE EVOLUTION OF POST- STRUCTURALIST THOUGHT

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ABSTRACT:

A turning point in post-structuralist theory was reached with Jacques Derrida's groundbreaking study, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of Human Sciences," which was first delivered at the John Hopkins International Colloquium in 1966. Derrida's work questions conventional metaphysical presumptions about structure and meaning while critically engaging with structuralism. There are drawbacks to traditional structuralism, which is based on the notion that structures are supported by a core or essence. Derrida examines this subject in detail, showing how the concept of a stable center has been essential to many theoretical and philosophical frameworks, ranging from structuralist theory to Platonic concepts. Derrida's criticism of structuralism and his investigation of the idea of decentering are the subjects of this paper. It looks at how Derrida's criticism of Levi-Straussian structuralism and his examination of the dynamic link between structure and center upends philosophical presumptions. Derrida's research exposes the fundamental flaws in the search for a stable core in structures. Derrida demonstrates how efforts to decentralize inevitably reconstruct a center via the process of absence and reveals the inherent inconsistencies within structuralist methods by dissecting the idea of a center. Subsequent investigations have to go deeper into the consequences of Derrida's analysis of modern structuralist and post-structuralist ideas. Furthermore, examining how Derrida's theories on decentering impact contemporary discussions in literary theory, philosophy, and the human sciences may provide fresh perspectives on the relevance of his work today.

KEYWORDS:

Acentricity, Decentering, Jacques Derrida, Metaphysical, Structuralism.

INTRODUCTION

The "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Human Sciences" by Jacques Derrida is introduced and discussed at length in this study. While brief passages cover the main ideas discussed in Derrida's study, the focus is mostly on the author's distinctive methods of rereading and dissecting original texts. Rather than being expanded upon, Derrida's concepts and techniques are enumerated.

Study by Derrida

Derrida divides his study into two sections:

- a. "The structurality of structure": an analysis of the consequences of the changing connections between structure and center. The following is an approximate summary of the examination's findings: In the past, a structure was thought to be anchored and stabilized by a single point of presence known as the center; however, in the present, this notion of centering has been questioned. Furthermore, challenging the central idea

is tantamount to opening a can of worms, upending and casting doubt on the most fundamental concepts in philosophy, such as idea, origin, God, and man.

- b. A critique of Levi-Straussian structuralism as a representation of the difficulties in understanding the connection between center and structure. This study's main idea, which can be summed up in one statement, is presented at the conclusion. Though it presents itself as a decentring, Levi-Straussian structuralism re-creates the center as the loss of a center. Stated differently, decentres is important. More importantly, there is a critical distinction between thinking of a structure as acentric merely. After all, it lacks a center versus thinking of it as acentric because it has lost a center. In Levi-Strauss's work, these two types of decentering are the ones that are always in conflict. Ultimately, it "centers" itself on the loss of the same center it seeks to achieve: absence turns into a manner of presence. So allow me to go over each of these sections in more depth [1], [2].

Ante-structuralism in Part One:

- a. "Every structure or system orients itself through a center, a moment at which the substitution of elements ceased, something that fixed or held the structure in place." "Structure has always been neutralized or reduced, and this by a process of giving it a center or referring it to a point of presence, a fixed origin." For instance, the word's antecedent mental picture may be God in the medieval feudal system or the king on a chessboard. The idea behind the center was to serve as the system's "reason deterrent," the thing that gave the system legitimacy, the point of reference for everything, and the closure it needed. Additionally, this center was linked to the whole of existence, positivity, essence, and being something.
- b. However, there was always a contradiction involved since the center had to be both within the structure (as a component of it) and outside of it (as an unusual object that did not entirely follow the principles that all other structural parts had to abide by). The development of the idea of structure may be seen as a sequence of center replacements, or a chain of center determinations (in terms of being/presence/fullness/positivity) Platonic concepts, Aristotelian telos, Descartes' ego, Kant's transcendental "I," and Hegel's absolute spirit are examples of several approaches to characterizing or identifying the center that gave the philosophical framework its coherence.

The study "What is an Author?" by Foucault will be directly relevant to us in this respect. There, Foucault moves the focus from the issue of what constitutes an author to one of the cultural anxieties suggested by the want to be able to correct the author. What "authorial intention" offers is exactly a focal point, a place of origin, and a presence that can be used to answer the query "What does it mean?" We have already seen a couple of these centerings so far: Fish first contends that the "reader" fixes meaning, in opposition to both New Criticism's insistence that the "closure of the text" fixes meaning and the premise that "authorial intention" permits us to do so. The meaning structure in each instance is based on a central concept that is seen as a point of existence, being, or essence: "author," "text," or "reader." From an alternative perspective, Foucault's study decentres the center, much as Derrida's does.

Next came structuralism (as well as Freud and Nietzsche, its ancestors, and co-cedents): Since structuralism maintains that elements of a structure are merely the results of sets of differential relationships rather than having a positive essence or being, it appears to be the opposite of these earlier essentialist, presentist ways of thinking (cf. Saussure's notion that there are no positivities, only differential relationships out of which what look like positive entities emerge). One result of this is that structuralism essentially rethinks the center as an outcome of the structure rather than something that comes before or is the foundation of it. The center

shouldn't be seen based just on its physical existence since it wasn't just there. This point, which happens when one considers the structurality of the structure and what constitutes a structure, is what Derrida refers to as decentering. Levi-Strauss? The idea of myth serves as an excellent illustration. The "core" of myth, or the collection of oppositions that make up its deep structure, is just the point of reference that is formed retroactively by the differences in the connections between the many versions and does not exist in the real world. These exist as distinct "versions" of the myth, not because they all originated from the same fundamental mythic structure, but rather because, as the separate, connected stories developed, a virtual object (like extending backward the rays reflected from a mirror to construct the virtual image, not a brilliant analogy but along the right lines) emerged.

Discontents with structuralism:

Thus, structuralism rejects the positive of the center, which was long seen to be fundamental to the concept of a structure, and instead promotes acentricity. Does it succeed, however, or is it just another in the line of that "series of substitutions of center for center," such as "authorial intention," "text," "reader," and so forth? The answer will be both yes and no; it succeeds in part but eventually fails to grasp the profound implications of decentering, leading to yet another center that is substituted for the one it purported to eliminate. Because, according to Derrida, even the most extreme efforts to decenter the center or conceive through its absence are unable to break free from a loop that manifests itself as "the relationship between the history of metaphysics and the destruction of the history of metaphysics." That is, to undermine centralized systems, one must use ideas that originate from them. By doing this, one revives these ideas and lends them credibility at the precise point of application.

And there's no escaping this. Since metaphysics' conceptual presumptions are so ingrained in it, there is finally nowhere outside of it where we can remain stationary and analyze it; we are always enmeshed in it and players in the game. We give the structures back their power at the precise time we are trying to take them away from them because the most fundamental ideas we use to attempt to overthrow them originate from these very structures. The field of Newtonian physics, for example, incorporates assumptions that quantum mechanics later renders unstable into its framework [3], [4]. The theological aspect of this was evident in Newton, who insisted on absolute space rather than relative space on fundamentally theological grounds. Now, there are always questions that do not need to confront the problem of what underlies them (large areas of physics, for example, can simply take nature as given, and objects as occupying a defined spatial and temporal place). It is important to note that there are several methods of becoming "caught in the game" that have various outcomes. Derrida tackles this issue of decentering preexisting conceptual and ideational frameworks while needing to rely on the ideas and concepts that comprise them, and specifically looks at the implications of how one decenters them, what difference how one enters the circle makes. Derrida does this by using Levi-Strauss as an exemplary case.

DISCUSSION

I believe it will be clearer if we give up on trying to read this part step-by-step and instead start after the study and go in the other direction. In particular, the paragraph from which I have excerpted: "This structuralist theme of broken immediateness is thus the sad, negative, nostalgic, guilty Rousseauistic facet of thinking the free play of which the Nietzschean affirmation would be the other side. As a turning toward the presence lost or impossible, of the absent origin." The non-center is therefore determined by this affirmation rather than as a loss of center." This is the closest you can go in terms of a possible Derrida thesis about Levi-Strauss. The main idea is that structures without centers may be seen in two different ways:

either as something that was previously centered but no longer does, or as acentric or non-centered. Furthermore, in the latter instance, that instant of prior presence and fullness (that is now missing) haunts the decentered structure and thus continues to exist in a sense, although in the shape of an absence.

At the same point that it is said that the structure lacks a center, this current absence brings it back to life. Derrida's comments against the structuralist "neutralization of time and history" are likewise based on this fundamental criticism. Levi-Strauss (correctly) destroys the connection between history and the metaphysics of the present by, among other things, "reducing" and "bracketing off" history (exposing the futility of a quest for the historical genesis, for example).

Let's put aside the question of what an "affirmation" of eccentricity and free play would entail (Derrida just acknowledges the issue that such an affirmation may be seen as creating yet another center in his work). Rather, we must see that Derrida's interpretation of Levi-Strauss consistently highlights the fundamental tension or contradiction between the assertion of acentricity or non-centricity on the one hand, and the "supplementary" shift that reinterprets acentricity as the loss of a center on the other. Furthermore, the unsolved issue serves as the link between the sequence of binary oppositions brought up by Levi-Strauss: Truth/Method; Engineer/Bricoleur; Nature/Culture, etc.

Nature and Culture: Consider the Nature/Culture dichotomy, for instance. It has been hard to ignore this difference, according to Levi-Strauss, who starts his debate by stating this (Elementary Structures). He continues by offering this contrast "a more valid interpretation" in terms of universality and norm. However, as soon as he does, he comes across the "fact" that is "not far removed from a scandal": the proscription against incest, which irrevocably combines the two poles of nature (universality) and culture (laws or norms unique to a community). As we've seen, his answer to this issue is to argue that the proscription of incest must be regarded as the "join" between nature and culture since it's only via and inside the prohibition that culture arises as both distinct from and connected to nature.

First, as Derrida notes, incest is only scandalous if one is already engaged in labor with the antagonism between nature and culture that is, inside the system. That is, the "fact" of incest prohibition may only seem to blur or destroy the distinction if one sees the nature/culture divide as something self-evident. If not, it is not scandalous at all; rather, it is just something that eludes the conceptual distinction and that distinction itself is unable to address (and in this sense, it alludes to an unthinkable situation inside a specific conceptual system, implying that this unthinkableability is not merely coincidental but rather a component of the system itself).

L-S adopts a different approach, drastically severing the technique from reality, rather than employing this "fact" to critically examine the background of the nature/culture conflict. He adheres to traditional ideas in the area of empirical discovery, sometimes pointing out their shortcomings and using them as tools while also challenging their veracity. He refers to this method as "bricolage" and positions himself as a bricoleur who is limited by the real world to function differently from an engineer (who can define his terminology to the most minute detail). Now consider the dilemma of technique vs truth or the bricoleur versus the engineer. In Levi-Strauss's view, the bricoleur embodies "the discourse of the method," meaning that he is the one who tackles whatever ideas are presented (nature and culture, for example). without considering their veracity, and employing them in the construction and destruction of systems. According to Levi-Strauss, bricolage is an example of a discourse about structure that completely rejects the idea of a grounding center. According to Derrida, the idea of the bricoleur derives its power from what it opposes: the engineer (and the idea of truth he

represents). However, the whole idea of a bricoleur is "menaced" if we acknowledge that there is no such thing as an engineer and that bricolage is the foundation of all finite speech.

The fact that Levi-Strauss's method entangles his critical discourse with the subject it examines has an additional effect. His examination of myth makes this the most evident. One notable aspect of his empirical approach to myth is how well it reflects the concept of bricolage: his analysis is not dependent on anyone's "central" legendary structure or origin. It describes itself as acentric and works by trial and error. As a result, the reference myth he used is not special; rather, it was something of an arbitrary decision (he might have selected a different one). The myth also lacks a one, definitive source. This is why Levi-Strauss continues to argue that discourse on myth, or his book, must adhere to the form of myth itself; unlike an engineer, it cannot turn his theory of myth as relational into the "truth"; rather, structuralist analysis must recognize and reflect the eccentricity and miracle-like quality of its object, which is a myth. [To quote Levi-Strauss: "My endeavor has had to submit to [the] demands [of myth]... unlike philosophical contemplation, which claims to go back to its source. Thus, this book which discusses myths in general is also a myth in its right. What Derrida reconstructs is this stress on the eccentricity of myth ("the stated abandonment of all reference to a center") and the assertion that structuralist readings of myth are similarly myth-like in that they lack a center.

However, this also has the effect of making it impossible to discern between the many (structuralist) interpretations of myth, since they all become in some manner equal. It avoids the topic of what perspective may be used to compare the "truth values" of various mythological discourses. There is therefore a curious conflict in L-S's work between his constant assertion that his work is empirical (depending on fresh information) and his rejection of empiricism (structuralism claims to get beyond the evident variation to patterns of underlying regularity). In this approach, structures both underpin and are "prior" to experience, meaning that experience is always necessary to achieve the structure. This also explains the ambiguity of his answer to the demand for "totalization": it is a meaningless condition since it is both superfluous (you don't need to list all examples to explicate the structure) and impossible (the empirical field is too huge).

Totalization, on the other hand, might also be conceptualized in terms of a "structural" aspect of the discourse itself, namely a deficiency that permits unlimited circulation inside a closed framework, rather than as an empirical impossibility. In the same way, the concept of "truth" in the engineer's discourse turns out to be nothing more than a mythical ideal that has existed in the past but is required for the idea of "eccentricity" to gain traction. The idealized discourse of an engineer or scientist who would "be the one to construct the totality of his language, syntax, and lexicon," representing the purity of meaning present to itself, is what Levi-Strauss' theory of bricolage and method evokes in viewing these as exemplifying "eccentricity." It presents this idealized picture as something that has been lost or is no longer there, and it is exactly because of this loss that the discourse around technique and bricolage stabilizes. In other words, there is a hidden, unrecognized tension in Levi-Strauss' descriptions between the desire for a mythic, idealized lost presence (the engineer, epistemic discourse), whose absence is what causes acentricity, and the maintenance of an acentric structure of differences (exemplified by bricolage). The bricoleur works in the shadow of loss, bringing the loss itself to the center in the process.

Text-Structure, Sign, and Play in Human Sciences Discourse

At the John Hopkins International Colloquium on "The Language of Criticism and the Sciences of Man" in October 1966, Jacques Derrida delivered his presentation "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of Human Sciences (1966)" for the first time, introducing a post-structuralist

theoretical paradigm. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donata said that this meeting was "the first time in the United States when structuralism had been thought of as an interdisciplinary phenomenon."

But even before the meeting ended, it was evident that Derrida's "radical appraisals of our assumptions" had taken precedence over the dominant transdisciplinary paradigm of structuralism. Derrida starts the study by talking about "an event," which is also a "redoubling," that has "perhaps" happened in the development of the idea of structure. The study chronicles the moment when structuralist thinking underwent a final epistemological breach and post-structuralism emerged as a movement that critically engaged both structuralism and conventional humanism and empiricism. It demands that structuralism has suppressed the "structurality of structure," turning the logic of structuralism against itself [5], [6].

In the opening of this study, Derrida challenges the fundamental metaphysical presuppositions of Western philosophy dating back to Plato, which has always primarily positioned itself with a fixed, unchangeable center and a static presence. Even in structuralist theory, the concept of structure has always assumed a type of center of meaning. This search for a center is what Derrida refers to as "logocentrism" in his groundbreaking book *"Of Grammatology" (1966)*. The Greek term "logos" means "word" with the highest possible concentration of presence. "Western Philosophy has also been, in a broader sense, 'logocentric,' committed to a belief in some ultimate 'word,' presence, essence, truth, or reality which will act as the foundation for all our thought, language, and experience," as Terry Eagleton explains in *"Literary Theory: An Introduction" (1996)*. It has longed for the one sign that will give all other signs their meaning "the transcendental signifier" as well as for the unwavering, anchored meaning that all of our signals seem to point toward (the transcendental signified).

According to Derrida, this center thereby restricts the "free play that it makes possible" because, as he puts it, "the Center is not the center." Free play in a centered structure rests on what Derrida terms "the metaphysics of presence," which is the essential basis for the immobility and undeniability of the center. Derrida uses this notion of a center as the foundation for his criticism of structuralism. A structure is assumed to have a center that restricts play, organizes the structure, and provides meaning to its constituent parts and appropriate interactions. In his criticism, Derrida examines structures both synchronically that is, as a freeze frame at a certain moment in time and diachronically that is, historically. The center is the point at which the replacement of contents, components, and phrases is no longer feasible, meaning that it cannot be swapped synchronously. Derrida makes this argument after the study: structuralism therefore stands in conflict with history. However, to create an epistemological shift, historically, one center is replaced with another: "The entire history of the concept of the structure must be thought of as a series of substitutions of a center for the center." As a result, although the point that defines play within a framework has varied historically, the center of the structure cannot be replaced by other parts at any particular moment. Thus, the development of human sciences has involved the replacement, substitution, and transformation of this central figure, which stands for God, the Idea, the World Spirit, the Renaissance Man, the Self, substance, matter, family, democracy, authority, and so forth, and serves as the search for all meaning.

Each of these ideas must exist independently of our whole cognitive and linguistic framework and be unaffected by the linguistic variations that shape it since they form the foundation of both. It must be in some way earlier than these discourses to avoid being connected to the same languages and systems it seeks to organize and anchor. According to Derrida, the issue with centers is that they want to exclude. By doing this, they exclude, suppress, or disregard others, making them the Other. Binary opposites are produced by this need for centers, with one term

of the opposition being central and the other peripheral. Terry Eagleton refers to this binary opposition that classical structuralism often uses as an exclusionary lens through which to view certain ideologies. According to him, "Ideologies like to draw rigid boundaries between what is acceptable and what is not". Derrida maintains that the "rupture" made it "necessary to begin to think that there was no center, that the center could not be thought in the form of a being-present, that the center had no natural locus a sort of non-locus in which an infinite number of sign-substitutions came into play." This beginning of the decentering process is ascribed by Derrida "to the totality of our era". As Peter Barry contends in *Beginning Theory: An Introduction to Literary and Cultural* (1995), "these centers were destroyed or eroded" in the twentieth century as a result of a complicated interplay between several historic-political events, scientific advancements, and technological changes. The idea that Europe is the origin and hub of human civilization was shattered by the Holocaust, just as the illusion of continuous material development was broken by the First World War [7], [8].

Scientific breakthroughs include the way the concepts of space and time as central, permanent absolutes were undermined by the theory of relativity. Then, throughout the first thirty years of the century, there were philosophical and creative movements like modernism in the arts that challenged fundamental absolutes like harmony in music, chronological order in story, and the portrayal of the visual world in painting. The Nietzschean critique of metaphysics, and particularly of the concepts of Being and Truth, the Freudian critique of self-presence, or as he puts it, "a critique of consciousness, of the subject, of self-identity, and the self-proximity or self-possession," and more radical still, the Heideggerean destruction of metaphysics, "of the determination of Being as Presence," are all places where Derrida suggests finding this "decentering" of structure, of the "transcendental signified," and of the sovereign subject. He lists these sources of inspiration. All of these efforts at "decentering," according to Derrida, were nonetheless "trapped in a sort of circle."

Derrida interprets structuralism which in his day was seen as a serious challenge to conventional Western thinking as being in favor of precisely those schools of thought. "We have no language syntax and no lexicon-which is alien to this history; we cannot utter a single destructive proposition which has not already slipped into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest," deconstructive thought holds. This is true for almost all critiques of Western thought that arise within Western thought. Phenomenology and semiotics are also insecure. Semiotics challenges the concentration on the essentially random character of signs by highlighting the essential relationship between language and voice. Phenomenology asserts that truth can only be found in human consciousness and lived experience, rejecting philosophical truths in favor of experiences and appearance.

Although Derrida believes that attacking metaphysics cannot be accomplished without using the concepts of metaphysics, he acknowledges that this process is unavoidable and emphasizes the importance of understanding it: "This is a matter of a critical relationship to the language of the human sciences and a question of a critical responsibility of the discourse." It is a matter of clearly stating and methodically addressing the issue of a discourse that appropriates the resources required by that legacy." It is crucial to remember that Derrida does not claim that thinking can occur outside of these parameters; any effort to challenge a specific notion is likely to become entangled in the concepts that it relies on. For example, we run the risk of creating a new center if we attempt to undermine the notion of awareness by claiming that the "unconscious" is the disruptive counterforce. We are only able to prevent one pole in a system from taking on the role of center and presence guarantee. Derrida uses Saussure's definition of sign as an example to support his claim. Saussure's emphasis on the idea that a sign consists of two parts the signifier and the signified, the latter of which is mental and psychological affirms

the "metaphysics of presence" in his view. This would suggest that, even though meaning is constructed via a system of distinctions, the speaker already knows the meaning of a sign when he employs it. This is also the reason Saussure maintains that speech comes first. Meaning becomes unanchored as soon as language is recorded because it creates a space between the subject and his words. Derrida, on the other hand, criticizes this "phono-centrism" and contends that there is always a gap between the speaker and the content of his words that is, even while he is speaking. There is no inherent or ultimate truth in sign. As a result, the signified is never immediately self-present. It is only a symbol in and of itself; it takes its meaning from other indications. Therefore, a signifier and a signified may be the same thing. According to this perspective, the sign must thus be separated from its signified element. We cannot avoid the process of interpretation; meaning is never there at face value. Derrida wishes to make the case for language as an open system, in contrast to Saussure who still views language as a closed system in which each word has a certain position and meaning. The boundaries between within and outside are also problematic when the metaphysics of presence is rejected. Meaning cannot be created elsewhere other than via words [8], [9].

Next, Derrida addresses the decentering idea about the ethnology of French structuralist Levi Strauss. Even though ethnology begins as a critique of Eurocentrism, it also shows how, in studying and researching the "Other," its practices and methodologies become predicated on ethnocentrism: "the ethnologist accepts into his discourse the premises of ethnocentrism at the very moment when he is employed in denouncing them." This need cannot be reduced; it is not based on past events. Derrida approaches Levi Strauss's writings by drawing on the traditional discussion of the conflict between nature and civilization. Starting with the working concept of nature as universal and spontaneous, without belonging to any other culture or predetermined standard, Strauss begins his work *Elementary Structures*. Contrarily, culture is flexible and may differ amongst social structures since it is based on a set of standards that govern society. But the 'scandal' that challenged this binary opposition to the ban on incest was something Strauss came upon. It is considered natural since it is almost always present in the majority of populations. It is, nonetheless, also illegal, which incorporates it into the cultural norms and traditions system. The system that legitimizes the distinction between nature and culture, according to Derrida, is what makes the dispute of Strauss's theory scandalous, not the theory itself. He said, "It could be argued that the entire philosophical conceptualization process, methodically connecting to the nature/culture dichotomy, is geared toward relegating the very concept that allows for this conceptualization the history of the incest prohibition to the realm of the unthinkable.

CONCLUSION

The study "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of Human Sciences" by Jacques Derrida, which expands and challenges the ideas of structuralism and post-structuralism, marks an important movement in philosophical thinking. Derrida challenges the conventional understanding of a stable, unchanging core inside structures, contending that this concept emphasizes the inherently unstable and flexible nature of meaning and structure. Derrida addresses the conventional wisdom that holds that structures are supported by a single, central point in the first section of his study. He contends that this notion is incorrect since the center causes conflicts and awkward substitutes because it serves as both a structural component and an external reference. Levi-Strauss's structuralism, which aims to reject the idea of a center but eventually produces a new kind of centrality, is criticized by Derrida. Derrida discusses Levi-Strauss's work in the second section, highlighting the conflict between structuralism's enduring centralizing impulses and its assertion of eccentricity. According to Derrida, the endeavor to reject a definite origin to transcend the center paradoxically reveals the influence of the center.

This criticism also applies to Levi-Strauss's technique, particularly to his examination of myth, whereby the purported lack of a center is transformed into a different kind of presence. All things considered, Derrida's study highlights the shortcomings and inconsistencies of attempting to completely decenter or negate the idea of the center and urges a reevaluation of structure and meaning. His work contributes to a larger conversation about knowledge, interpretation, and the philosophical underpinnings of the human sciences by exposing the difficulties of escaping the metaphysical frameworks that form our perception of structures and meanings.

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CHAPTER 8

RUPTURE OF STRUCTURALISM: DERRIDA'S CRITIQUE OF METAPHYSICS AND THE EMERGENCE OF POSTSTRUCTURALISM

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ABSTRACT:

The John Hopkins International Colloquium hosted Jacques Derrida's study "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" in October 1966. To highlight the inherent flaws and limits in the structuralist approach to the human sciences, this study critically interacts with the ideas of structuralism as put out by Claude Levi-Strauss. Although structuralism questions conventional metaphysical ideas, according to Derrida, it ironically reproduces a lot of the metaphysical elements it aims to criticize. The key problem is that structuralism is unable to get beyond its philosophical presumptions, which leaves a basic "aporia" in our comprehension of signals, structures, and the idea of free play. This study examines Derrida's criticism of structuralism and his support of post-structuralism. It looks at how Derrida undermines the notion of a stable core inside systems, highlighting the discourse of the human sciences' inherent instability and diversity of interpretations. Derrida comes to the fundamentally incorrect conclusion that the structuralist search for a core, stable framework is unachievable.

The "center" falls short of offering the stability it promises, but it is also vital and paradoxical. This criticism marks a transition from structuralism to post-structuralism, in which the ideas of difference and play are essential to comprehending interpretation and meaning. Subsequent investigations may go into how Derrida's analysis has influenced modern conceptions within the humanities and social sciences. Examining how post-structuralist theory influences the way that meaning, language, and interpretation are discussed today might provide important new perspectives on how theory is developing.

KEYWORDS:

Language, Lévi-Strauss, Metaphysics, Poststructuralism, Structuralism.

INTRODUCTION

In October 1966, at the John Hopkins International Colloquium on "The Language of Criticism and the Sciences of Man," Derrida read his study "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences." In it, he shows how structuralism, as embodied by anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss, can be interpreted as embodying precisely those aspects of science and metaphysics that it aims to challenge. "There are thus two interpretations of interpretation, of structure, of sign, of free play," the study ends. The person lives like an exile, driven by the need for interpretation, and strives to decode, dreams of decoding, a reality or an origin that is free from free play and the order of the sign. The other, which has moved away from the source, defend freedom of expression and makes an effort to transcend humanity and man." As a result, we are faced with two very different interpretations of structuralism and are unable to determine which is "right." The fundamental "difference" that exists between the two meanings is the cause of this "aporia" in language structure. Language is inherently "centrifugal," meaning it moves out from the center due to the force of "difference" or via the "scattering" of the philosophical system into many, contradictory interpretations. In this study, Derrida observes

in a characteristic way that "language bears within itself, the necessity of its critique." The work is credited with launching the theoretical trend known as "poststructuralism," which goes beyond structuralism [1], [2].

Text: Organization, Significance, and Play in the Humanities' Discourse

Derrida's 1970 book "Structure" is rightly regarded as one of his more approachable works despite his extensive body of work. In it, he outlines some of his fundamental ideas about deconstruction and post-structuralism, provides a brief history of the intellectual movement centered on these concepts, and provides several real-world examples to back up his claims. "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" is still regarded as one of the foundational texts of post-structuralist philosophy when compared to other introductory study's by theorists. It also seems to be a useful starting point for learning about Derrida's body of work.

Several times, Derrida writes what nearly seems like an ultra-brief history of structural and post-structural philosophy rather than making a claim based on the evidence he provides. Additionally, he presents some concepts in this study that are necessary to comprehend his views (such as his definition of "play"). However, although acknowledged, the majority of Derrida's theoretical concepts are not stated directly. Derrida, for example, spends a large deal of time discussing what he has dubbed elsewhere "logocentrism," yet he never formulates these ideas clearly in "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences."

Derrida applies a lot of what he writes about to his writing style here, as he does in much of his work (it's no secret that reading Derrida can be challenging). As usual, he "means" much more than what is immediately apparent from his writing. As a result, this study addresses many subjects at once, none of which are given names. The conventional metaphysical idea of "structure" is used to carry out the fundamental deconstructive process of identifying, challenging, and upsetting dichotomies, for example, but it is not given priority. Therefore, in reading this text as well as any other we must follow his advice precisely, just as he does in his readings of other texts: Look for meaning in the margins, the spaces, and "between the lines" of texts as well as in the declarative and prescriptive portions.

Within "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences", Derrida begins by implying that there was an "event" or "rupture" that fundamentally altered the course of the development of the idea of structure. He continues by saying that all the theories and concepts before it, including structuralism, end with this break and become post-structuralism. Derrida continues by summarizing the basic concepts of structure up to that moment. He demonstrates how the whole development of the idea of structure itself may be seen as operating within a single system or structure that of metaphysics, which includes logocentrism. The idea of buildings being arranged around a core unites all of those principles. However, this center, which may be God, freedom, man, happiness, awareness, etc., must be seen as being outside of the system and not being at the center since it cannot be impacted by the framework that surrounds it. The source, objective, and explanation of All is the center, yet it is not a part of the system it defines, even if it forms the axis around which everything revolves.

It was necessary to start considering the possibility that none of the structures under discussion have centers at the point "when language invaded the universal problem" a recurrent theme in Derrida's writing at Saussure's theories. This is also the point at which, in Derrida's words, the "rupture" mentioned in the opening paragraph took place. Since this ultimate sign, the "transcendental signifier," could not be defined without reference to yet another sign, it follows that there can never be "a center" neither within nor outside the system or "structure". This is implied by the very fact that signs define themselves by their relationships to other signs.

Derrida continues by enumerating many notable intellectuals, including Nietzsche, Freud, and Heidegger, who had a significant role in advancing this transition from structuralist to post-structuralist philosophy. The commonality across all the new ideas and notions was that, despite their claims to awareness of the difficulties, they continued to function inside a metaphysical framework. The notion that one cannot escape the metaphysical system as long as one does not wish to completely give up on the idea of the sign was generally unknown to the new generation of philosophers who articulated it. According to Derrida, there is significance in this broad shift from believing in structures with centers to believing in decentered structures about the field often referred to as "human sciences".

He contends that ethnology is an academic field that could only emerge inside the ethnocentric metaphysical framework, which had Europe as its core. Of course, these viewpoints had to change after "the rupture". Derrida provides a more thorough example when he talks about the theoretical writings of Claude Lévi-Strauss, who was firmly situated inside a metaphysical framework and who, surprise, reasoned and argued in agreement with much of what Derrida defined long later. Lévi-Strauss's study of mythology and his handling of the nature/culture divide are both examined by Derrida. In typical Derridean form, he also uses this as an occasion to analyze Lévi-Strauss' strategies and styles of argumentation. This example demonstrates how Derrida often approaches texts he works with on many levels and incorporates his ideas into his text-about-another-text. Regarding Lévi-Strauss, he argues that "his discourse reflects on itself and criticizes itself" exactly what Derrida does with his work as well as the material he utilizes to bolster his claims (Lévi-Strauss').

The establishing and challenging of dichotomies, the revealing of the fragmentedness and decenteredness of texts (here, myths, and ultimately language itself, according to Lévi-Strauss' argument), the impossibility of totalization when it comes to the concept of language, and, lastly, the concept of "play" are other deconstructive aspects of Lévi-Strauss' text that Derrida mentions. Derrida's study addresses all of these points in a very understandable manner; none are discussed here. Since they are not stated clearly in the texts he studies, some of these arguments in the vein of "always already there" are elaborated by Derrida and read into the writings of Lévi-Strauss. Here is another example of how Derrida simultaneously discusses theory and does it in practice: The idea of play; the flexibility of interpretation; and the use of the excess of meaning and the absence of a central figure to legitimize new and additional meanings meanings that the text itself may not have recognized [3], [4].

Critical Recognition

This study is on "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," as the title suggests, and it deals with the social sciences. It helps to grasp Derrida's intentions and direction to fully comprehend the study. Putting it mildly, I would argue that the study is about the demise of metaphysics and the rejection of any firm moral and intellectual grounds. Play (or contingency) takes the place of certainty and coherence in any system of thinking. Discourse, the never-ending game of signification in which signs only lead to other signs and never to objects, entities, locations, or other security markers, becomes the basis for all meaning. The paradoxical condition and area of the social sciences are defined, as Derrida would state after the study, by balancing the demand for metaphysics with the awareness that metaphysics is impossible. I believe this study is focused on that: It traces the emergence of the "incredulity toward all metanarratives," as Lyotard puts it, demonstrating the irreversible transformation of Western values; It suggests, through Lévi-Strauss, the possibility of a new discourse and a new ability to address the death of metaphysics.

The social sciences mirror the predicament of the West, which is caught between the need for anti-foundationalism and the need for foundations. However, the social sciences also provide at least the notion of a new language for modernity. The study plots the two scenarios—the eventuality and the break. Explaining a few essential phrases might help the reader comprehend the writing. Through "structure" I understand. Derrida refers to an intellectual structure or philosophical system of ideas, a kind of discourse in which each component is given meaning by its placement within the overall arrangement of the system and is defined by its relationships with other components. Examples include Christian cosmology, Husserlian phenomenology, and the US Constitution. Each defines experience for a certain, organized pattern, which gives experiences within the system meaning and support. The portion of a structure that organizes and concentrates the system as a whole is called the center. Aristotle's Unmoved Mover (UM) serves as an excellent illustration of this concept. Although the UM is immobile, it still directs and sustains the motion or animation of the whole organized universe. The unmoved mover gives the Aristotelian cosmos unwavering stability, regardless of mishaps or mutations. According to Derrida, the West has been fixated on finding a center and, to some extent, still is. Once again, the center's role is to provide a framework that unifies the system and restricts the quantity and quality of arbitrary play in "the total form." The center denotes a constant presence.

DISCUSSION

Play is just any modification of the framework, any spontaneous, unstructured action. Play is synonymous with deviation, change, contingency, arbitrariness, perversion, spontaneity, and mutation. The center may offer the necessary coherence, organization, and stability to make the world look orderly and comprehensible if it moderates and mitigates play within the structure. "The center is not the center." This sentence explains "the event" of the rupture that Derrida discusses in the opening paragraph. According to Derrida, the center has always been thought of as that secure, impenetrable space that is impervious to play throughout the history of Western philosophy. Although it was impervious to play, a structure's "permitted the play of its elements inside the total form" was still possible. It was seen that the center both controlled play and mitigated its consequences.

However, the center could not be thought of as being within the building to prevent its effects, since the structure provides the setting for play that is both permitted and confined. The core has to be seen as "beyond" or "transcending" the construction to be unaffected by the play that permeates it. However, the center also has to be seen as being within the system, involved in it, and an integral part of what the system is to govern and direct it. In what other way may it impact the system?

Because it decentered the structure, this contradiction gave birth to "the rupture" of the idea of the structure. "The center is not the center," according to Derrida. Thus, "the concept of centered structure is contradictorily coherent". That which gave Western thinking stability and certainty and served as the foundation for the West is now based on a contradiction and, as a result, is unable to achieve the coherence for which it had aimed. The idea of focused structuralism, by its criteria, is self-critiquing and easily played. Contradictory centers are not centers at all. Play produces the center itself, and this insight characterizes the moment when the idea of structure internally disintegrates. Play is now essential.

Causes and Characteristics of Ruptures

Nietzsche, Freud, and Heidegger were all involved in "The event" of the rupture, according to Derrida. Nietzsche attacked metaphysics, saying that it was present everywhere and that the conceptions of truth and being were "substituted" with those of play, interpretation, and sign.

In his criticism of consciousness, Freud demonstrated how the subject is not even aware of itself and cannot amount to a safe center. Furthermore, Heidegger demanded that the "determination of Being as a presence" and all metaphysics be destroyed.

An intriguing aspect of this is how these philosophers are constrained by the vocabulary of metaphysics in all of their criticisms of focused structures and metaphysics. This is because the West is only able to communicate in this particular language. The fact that metaphysics critics are stuck in a circle also characterizes the state of affairs for the human sciences. However, as we will see from Levi-Strauss's discourse, the human sciences also suggest that Nietzschean affirmation may be accepted in part.

Distinction

Saying that play has become essential is like saying that discourse has taken over all meaning. It came out that the center, which was meant to be fixed, varied depending on the philosophical system. It was not possible to replicate in the same method or as the same item. Formerly, signs indicated the center, from which they derived their stability and rationale. However, because the center is now seen as a kind of play, signs just lead to further signs, creating "an infinite chain of representations." Nothing is accomplished by a sign except for more signs. One indicator always replaces another, and the result is a dizziness of sorts. Regarding our path, the transcendental ego, for example, offers no haven and no access to apodictic assurance. Instead, it is a sign that consistently alludes to other indicators.

The difference then lies in the differences between the signs; it is the play of substituting signs wherein a symbol in any discourse always stays something other than itself and always leads to something else that is something else. Meaning is never acquired; it is constantly transmitted. Above all, Difference is the state of play that both precedes and permits the creation or use of any sign. Disturbance refers to the fact that no sign accomplishes its intended meaning; rather, it is the interruption of presence; nothing is ever made present; all signs indicate an absence [5], [6].

The Levi-Strauss Role

I believe Levi-Strauss's job in this study is to encapsulate the circumstances. Levi-Strauss critiques metaphysics by using its terminology. A language of oppositions, "the language of metaphysics" speaks of the oppositions between God and man, truth and error, form and substance, subject and object, and nature and culture. Levi-Strauss focuses specifically on the distinction between nature and civilization. Insofar as the system is consistent and stable, the distinction in a mental system that upholds this difference should stay true in any situation; the center should denote the same constant presence.

But when it comes to the issue of the incest ban, the opposition falters. The outlawing of incest, which Levi-Strauss turned into a research topic, is both natural (i.e., universal and spontaneous) and cultural (i.e., subject to a cultural norm and relative and specific). Thus, the incest taboo shatters or obstructs the dichotomy that is so essential to a certain worldview. For this system at least, the very core eats itself. The crucial thing to remember in this situation is that the idea of a centered structure does not satisfy its criteria for becoming one. This implies that "language bears within itself the necessity of its critique," according to Derrida. The first is to leave philosophy alone and stop using its language; the second is to "conserve all these old concepts within the domain of empirical discovery while here and there denouncing their limits." Stated differently, the other option is to "preserve as an instrument something whose value" is questioned. Levi-Strauss adopts a different approach. A bricoleur is someone who applies metaphysics to accomplish a task while critically evaluating the applicability and boundaries

of such ideas. The individual "uses the means at hand." Levi-Strauss learns about the myths of various cultures as a result, but he is well aware that his discussion of stories itself is a kind of mythology. Because it demands and assumes notions that break d, i.e., that comes from a play that is just as inevitable as the play in the civilizations whose mythology he examines. The key takeaway from this is that Levi-Strauss provides a framework for facing the reality of our circumstances. In other words, we need a strategy to deal with the problem since we are unable to embrace metaphysical conceptions and are trapped utilizing them. Levi-Strauss proposes bricolage, which is the use of philosophy to criticize itself rather than transcending it.

Two Ways to Interpret the Information

Levi-Strauss presents a middle-ground stance. It is caught between two possible readings, just as the whole West is, in Derrida's opinion. The West is not more of one interpretation than the other, to borrow a bit from both. Two interpretations imply two different approaches to "the situation," where "the situation" is also an interpretation, a play, or a lighthearted conversation rather than a centralized framework for which a genuine interpretation is required but not "true."

One method to deal with the circumstance when the idea of a centered framework has broken is to express remorse for the break, feel depressed and nostalgic, and "live" the need for interpretation as an exile. Derrida compares Rousseau's perspective to this one. Its primary characteristic is that it views the non-center as having lost its center. It would rather accept the need for interpretation than have the stability and assurance of a constant presence—a solid principle that explains everything and every variation. What Derrida refers to as Nietzschean affirmation is the second interpretation of an interpretation. In a nutshell, Nietzsche believed that all of our deeply held beliefs about certainty and truth are falsehoods that we are unable to question because we want them to be true. This means that truth is a mistake. In this instance, acceptance would constitute a kind of impossible request a Nietzschean affirmation. It would not overlook the reality but rather accept the need for interpretation. Play, and only play, would give it meaning in life "the security of play." It would no longer need the assurance of a clear goal or comprehensive idea.

We are unable to decide between the two. Together, we are the half-bricolage, half-engineer. We want a permanent, all-encompassing core that may reveal itself to us in play as presence and bricolage [7], [8]. Right now, we are unable to decide on doing so would need a shared, stable basis, which is not feasible given the constant flux of changes that divide any two places or indications." This is a question of sorts: "We are unable to decide, yet the bricoleur, or half of us, critiques the other half using words of ours. There's something fresh in the works. We continue to ignore what is developing. According to Derrida, we should acknowledge the situation and face the atrocity of it head-on. And get ready for it.

The distinction between signifier and signified can be eliminated in two ways:

- a. the traditional method, which involves reducing or deriving the signifier and subjecting the sign to thought (Husserl believed that the word expressed the thought);
- b. the JD method, which involves "putting into question the system in which the previous reduction functioned; first and foremost, the opposition between the sensible and the intelligible."

Among the human sciences, ethnology may have a special position. It emerged with the decline of European hegemony and the erasure of metaphysical history, but as a scientific discourse, it

cannot help but maintain the assumptions of the ethnocentrism it is trying to dismantle while still maintaining awareness of those ancient metaphysical conceptions.

This selection of Levi-Strauss is mostly due to his critique of the terminology used in the social sciences. From his first work, L-S employs and rejects the nature-culture dichotomy, pointing out that the incest taboo is both after characterizing the former as "universal and spontaneous" and the latter as socially ingrained norms and rules. As the impossibility of thinking inside the contradiction of these ideas, the ban "precedes them, probably as the condition of their possibility." Such research surpasses flimsy efforts to transcend philosophy by dissecting the fundamental ideas of philosophy's past.

L-S persists in this dual intention, using concepts whose veracity can no longer be affirmed as methodological tools. On the one hand, he envisions an integration of sciences to be carried out by the exact natural sciences, "the reintegration of culture in nature and finally of life within the whole of its physicochemical conditions"; on the other hand, he set forth methodological "bricolage" using whatever is available, eclectically, adapting, pluralistically. Since the bricoleur creates the illusion of the engineer who is supposed to establish a self-constituting language every discourse is, in fact, bricolage, and there is no fundamental difference between the two.

- a. Change to another thread.
- b. Bricolage is characterized as mythical by L-S.

Rejecting "any reference to a center, to a subject, to a privileged reference, to an origin, or an absolute Archie," L-S's work examines its language. Thus, according to *The Raw and the Cooked*: The "key" myth is positioned erratically among its neighbors and doesn't serve a core purpose. Mythology shouldn't betray myth as myth isn't centered or rooted. Mythology was "intended to ensure the reciprocal translatability of several myths." There is no author, topic, or center to this science. Myths are nameless, and the audience takes on the role of silent actors.

Thus, the requirement for a center seems mythical and like a historical illusion when ethnographic bricolage is overtly mythopoetic. Risks exist. What will set apart a mythopoesis of superior quality? The answer to this issue is unavoidable: without emphasizing the relationship between philosophy and myth, efforts to move beyond philosophy ultimately amount to poor philosophy or empiricism. L-S's persistent assertion that it is offering empirical science in the form of suggestions that may be updated by a more thorough sample of the whole body of data that is either unnecessary or impractical to need as a preface.

However, non-totalization may be ascertained from the perspective of the notion of play, a field that is exempt from totalization since it lacks a center that would stop and stabilize the structure's variability. This is the supplementarity movement, where the surplus sign is inserted to replace the center. L-S: You need an additional ratio of signification to maintain the necessary complementarity between signifier and signified. Mana, for example, is "force and action, quality and state, noun and verb; abstract and concrete, omnipresent and localized." Its purpose is to give more content to a website. "The absence of signification without entailing by itself any particular signification" is opposed by a phrase like "mana." The oversupply of signifiers arises from the need to supplement the limited [and centerless]. Play is thus significant in L-S. Tension is always present in play as well. History, which has traditionally been thought of as "a detour between two presences," conflicts with play [first]. A danger associated with historicism (a point in the history of metaphysics) is the emergence of new structures due to dramatic discontinuity and change, such as L-S on the genesis of language, which was "born in one fell swoop." Additionally, there is a conflict between presence and

play. Despite L-S's longing for exemplary societies, it is imperative to rethink the play of presence and absence from a radical perspective—based on play, not based on presence [9], [10]. An alternative exists: Nietzschean, positive, exuberant, ambiguous play, giving in to general indecision, and the groundbreaking journey of the trace. There are two ways to understand something:

- a. Interpreting a reality;
- b. Validating play that transcends humanity and man.

The social sciences are the area that these two ultimately incompatible conceptions of interpretation share. Discussing a choice between them seems pointless since their shared field has not yet been established. As with every new birth, this one is formless and silent, and we are just in the beginning stages of conception, creation, gestation, and labor to deliver this horror into the world.

CONCLUSION

Derrida's study "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" marks a pivotal moment in the evolution from structuralism to poststructuralism. By critiquing the foundational aspects of structuralism as presented by Claude Lévi-Strauss, Derrida exposes the inherent contradictions and limitations within the structuralist paradigm. He argues that structuralism, while challenging traditional metaphysical constructs, inadvertently perpetuates the very principles it seeks to deconstruct. The study demonstrates that the notion of a stable, central structure is fundamentally flawed, as language and meaning are characterized by "play" and "difference." Derrida introduces the concept of "the rupture," a critical break from the idea of a fixed center or foundation in philosophical and linguistic structures. This rupture highlights the inherent instability and decentered nature of meaning, where signs lead to other signs in an endless chain without arriving at a definitive meaning. This realization marks the shift to poststructuralism, which rejects the quest for a central, immutable truth in favor of embracing the fluidity and contingency of meaning. The study not only challenges the conventional understanding of structure but also reflects on the broader implications for the human sciences. It suggests that the social sciences must navigate between the desire for foundational stability and the acknowledgment of its impossibility. Derrida's critique of Lévi-Strauss and his broader philosophical discourse underscore the transition to a new intellectual framework that acknowledges and embraces the play of interpretation.

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CHAPTER 9

LIONEL TRILLING'S INTELLECTUAL JOURNEY: THE INTERSECTION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS, LITERATURE, AND POLITICS

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ABSTRACT:

American writer and literary critic Lionel Mordecai Trilling (1905–1975) was well-known for his collaborations with the New York Intellectuals. His works examine the relationships between politics, psychology, and literature. Trilling's examination of psychoanalysis, especially Freud's ideas, highlights the difficulties in comprehending how psychoanalysis and literature relate to one another. He investigated the conflicts between literary imagination and psychoanalytic rationality by contrasting Freud's theories about the mind and creativity with Romantic ideals. Examining Trilling's critical engagement with Freudian theory and its influence on literature and culture is the goal of the study. It examines how Trilling's observations such as his divisions between neurotic and creative artists clarify the connection between psychoanalysis and literary creation. Trilling's writing offers a nuanced view of Freud's literary effect, emphasizing the tension that exists between the integration of psychoanalytic concepts and artistic representation. His study clarifies the nuanced link between psychology and literature by showing how the artist navigates the complexity of the unconscious mind. Subsequent investigations may delve into how Trilling's approach may contribute to modern literary theory and psychoanalysis, specifically concerning the unconscious's influence on creative production and cultural interpretation.

KEYWORDS:

Authenticity, Literary Critic, Lionel Trilling, Psychoanalysis, Sincerity.

INTRODUCTION

Lionel Mordecai Trilling was an American novelist, teacher, and literary critic who lived from 4 July 1905 until 5 November 1975. He was a contributor to the *Partisan Review* and a member of the New York Intellectuals with his wife Diana Trilling. He is regarded as one of the most influential American critics of the 20th century for tracing the modern cultural, social, and political implications of literature, even though he did not establish a school of literary criticism. In contrast to other peers, he has maintained interest over time. Trilling talks about the connections between Freud and literature. Starting with the assertion that psychoanalysis can be seen as the literary embodiment of the Romantic movement of the nineteenth century, Trilling crafts a compelling thesis centered on the identification of three key characteristics of the Romantic movement: a commitment to self-research, an understanding of the hidden component in human nature, and the notion of the mind as a divisible entity.

All of these things are unquestionably a part of the Freudian foundation, but according to Trilling, Freud added a rationalistic anti-Romantic construct to the framework, seeing the ultimate goal of psychoanalysis as impulse control "where id was, there shall be ego be." Trilling considers Freud's perspectives on the artist as relatively limited, but he is not unfriendly. Trilling goes to considerable lengths to resolve these conflicts. Ultimately, a picture of the difference between the neurotic and the creative artist appears; the latter is occupied by

his dreams, while the former is in control of them. As far as Trilling is concerned, Freud's idea of the mind as imagistic "naturalizes" poetry [1], [2]. For the artist, Freudian man is viewed as a "creature of far more dignity and far more interest than the man which any other modern system has been able to conceive an inextricable tangle of culture and biology." The artist finds that the entire Freudian depiction of the unconscious both opens and complicates the world.

Life in Academics

Born in Queens, New York City, Lionel Trilling was the son of London-born Fannie (née Cohen) and Polish tailor David Trilling from Bialystok. His lineage was Jewish. After graduating from DeWitt Clinton High School in 1921, he enrolled at Columbia University at the age of sixteen, marking the start of an enduring relationship with the institution. He received his Columbia degree in 1925 and his Master of Arts in 1926. He was an instructor at Hunter College and the University of Wisconsin–Madison. He was a literature professor at Columbia University in 1932. He completed his doctoral dissertation on Matthew Arnold in 1938, which he went on to publish.

He became the first tenured Jewish professor in the English department when he was promoted to associate professor in 1939 and then to full professor in 1948. He was appointed the George Edward Woodberry Professor of Criticism and Literature in 1965. A well-liked teacher, Trilling co-taught Columbia's Colloquium on Important Books, a course on the connection between literary and cultural history, for thirty years with Jacques Barzun. Among his pupils were Louis Menand, Norman Podhoretz, Cynthia Ozick, Carolyn Gold Heilbrun, Jack Kerouac, Allen Ginsberg, John Hollander, and Lucien Carr. He held the Norton Professorship at Harvard University from 1969 to 1970. Declared "the highest honor the federal government confers for distinguished intellectual achievement in the humanities," he was chosen in 1972 by the National Endowment for the Humanities to provide the first Jefferson Lecture in the Humanities. After serving as a Senior Fellow at the Indiana School of Letters, Trilling was a Senior Fellow at the Kenyon School of English.

He began reading the freshly resurrected Marxist but anti-Stalinist periodical *Partisan Review* in 1937. Philip Rahv and William Phillips launched the publication in 1934. The New York Intellectuals, who emphasized the impact of history and culture on writers and literature, were linked to the *Partisan Review*. These individuals included Trilling, his wife Diana Trilling, Alfred Kazin, Delmore Schwartz, William Phillips, Clement Greenberg, Harold Rosenberg, Dwight Macdonald, Mary McCarthy, F. W. Dupee, Paul Goodman, Lionel Abel, Irving Howe, Saul Bellow, Richard Chase, William Barrett, Daniel Bell, Hannah Arendt, Isaac Rosenfeld, Susan Sontag, Steven Marcus, Norman Podhoretz, and Hilton Kramer. Because of this, the New York Intellectuals set themselves apart from the New Critics by focusing on the literature's sociopolitical implications. He argues in favor of the New York Intellectuals in the introduction to the 1965 study collection *Beyond Culture*: It is a dynamic and active group when it comes to ideas and, more importantly, attitudes. It has authority because of its diligence.

Because of the way our society is set up, a class like this is inextricably linked to less culturally literate groups that are more open to its influence. After being appointed an associate professor at Columbia in 1945, Trilling was promoted to full professor in 1948. In 1970, he attained the university's highest distinction by being named a University Professor. Numerous American universities, including Harvard, Northwestern, Case Western Reserve, Brandeis, and Yale, bestowed honorary doctorates upon him. In addition, the universities of Durham and Leicester in England granted him honorary Litt. D. degrees. In 1965, he was appointed to the Eastman Professorship at Oxford, and in 1972–1973, All Souls College, Oxford, named him a Visiting Fellow. Trilling joined the National Institute of Arts and Letters and was elected a Fellow of

the Academy of Arts and Letters in 1951. He was honored with the first Thomas Jefferson Award in the Humanities in 1972. That time, he gave a speech titled "Mind in the Modern World [3], [4].

Literary and Critical Works

Trilling's only book, *The Middle of the Journey* (1947), is about the meeting of a wealthy Communist couple and a Communist defector. Trilling subsequently admitted that Whittaker Chambers, a contemporaneous and fellow student at Columbia College, served as the inspiration for the character. Among his short tales is "The Other Margaret." Other than that, he produced reviews and studies in which he discussed how literature may question cultural norms and morals. The critic David Daiches said of Trilling, "Mr. Trilling likes to move out and consider the implications, the relevance for culture, for civilization, for the thinking man today, of each particular literary phenomenon which he contemplates, and this expansion of the context gives him both his moments of his greatest perceptions, and his moments of disconcerting generalization."

Trilling responded to concerns about "the tradition of humanistic thought and the intellectual middle class which believes it continues this tradition" by publishing two in-depth studies of writers Matthew Arnold (1939) and E. M. Forster (1943). *The Liberal Imagination*, his debut collection of studies, was released in 1950. Then came *The Opposing Self* (1955), which examined the tension between cultural influence and self-definition, *Freud and the Crisis of Our Culture* (1955), *A Gathering of Fugitives* (1956), and *Beyond Culture* (1965), which was an study collection about contemporary literary and cultural views on selfhood. He examines the concepts of the moral self in post-Enlightenment Western society in *Sincerity and Authenticity* (1972). In addition to writing the preface to the 1952 reprint of George Orwell's book *Homage to Catalonia*, titled "George Orwell and the Politics of Truth," he also defended Keats's concept of Negative Capability in *The Selected Letters of John Keats* (1951). An incomplete book that Trilling left unfinished in the late 1940s was released by Columbia University Press in 2008.

DISCUSSION

The partially completed book was found by researcher Geraldine Murphy among Trilling's records kept at Columbia University. *The Journey Abandoned: The Unfinished Book* by Trilling is a book set in the 1930s that centers on Vincent Hammell, a young protagonist who aspires to write a biography of the eminent poet Jorrie Buxton. The romantic poet Walter Savage Landor of the nineteenth century served as a rough model for Buxton's persona. *The Journey Abandoned* is "a crowded gallery of carefully delineated portraits, whose innerness is divulged partly through dialogue but far more extensively in passages of cannily analyzed insight," according to writer and critic Cynthia Ozick, who also praised the book for its complex characters and deft narrative. Politics Trilling's political views have been hotly contested and, like a lot of his ideas, may be characterized as "complex." Trilling's political philosophy is sometimes summed up as follows: "[Remind] people who prided themselves on being liberals that liberalism was... a political position which affirmed the value of individual existence in all its variousness, complexity, and difficulty." Trilling was a well-known opponent of Stalinism on the political left, a stance he carried out to the end of his life.

Neoconservative

Both conservatives and liberals contend that Trilling's views have progressively shifted toward conservatism over time. Neoconservatives, including *Commentary* editor Norman Podhoretz, have embraced Trilling as sympathetic to their ideology, but this embrace has not been

reciprocated, with Trilling criticizing the New Left (just as he had the Old Left) but not adopting neoconservatism. The degree to which Trilling may be considered a neoconservative is still up for discussion; this was discussed in (Rodden 2000). As suggested by several quotes, including the novel's title *The Middle of the Journey*, and a key section that reads, "An absolute freedom from responsibility - that much of a child none of us can be," Moderate Trilling has also been described as firmly moderate.

A whole obligation none of us has that much of a divine or metaphysical nature." For better or worse, politics determines our destiny. Even if it seems heroic, the destiny is not joyous in and of itself. However, there is no way around it, and the only way to survive it is to include all human behavior, including its subtleties, into our concept of politics. Trilling expressed his interest in what he called "the dark and bloody crossroads where literature and politics meet" early in *The Liberal Imagination*. However, he understood "bloody" to mean embattled rather than violent, and he believed that literature had more wisdom to offer because of its inherent humanism than the activist and morally troubling world of politics. The way that politics, literature, and ideas interact gives Trilling's work a depth and breadth that are uncommon in most literary criticism. Nevertheless, he has to be evaluated since it was as a literary critic that he made his name. To honor this goal, John Rodden organized his collection chronologically around Trilling's works, with a concluding part titled "Appreciations, Influences, Controversies, Reconsiderations" that is more broadly focused. Questions about a character named Gifford Maxim who was based on Whittaker Chambers, a Columbia College student at the same time as Trilling were addressed by Trilling in the book. Chambers then joined the Soviet intelligence organization. Trilling later came across Chambers as he attempted to restore a public persona after his split from the Communist Party, in an attempt to make it more difficult for the party to murder him.

Lenient

In his earlier writings, Trilling openly rejected conservatism and wrote for and within the liberal tradition. He emphasized the oft-quoted last line, "In the United States at this time, liberalism is not only the dominant but even the sole intellectual tradition," in the preface to his 1950 book *The Liberal Imagination*. For the simple reason that there are no conservative or reactionary concepts in common use today. Naturally, this does not imply that there isn't a tendency toward conservatism or reaction. These are undoubtedly powerful drives, maybe much more so than most of us realize. However, save from a few rare and ecclesiastical exceptions, the conservative and reactionary impulses only manifest themselves in actions or in irritated mental gestures that aim to mimic ideas.

The novel's depiction of the "liberal imagination" is significantly impacted by the assassination concern because the Crooms find it hard to accept that the Communist Party is capable of such evil and don't share Maxim's opinion that there is a serious threat. One of Trilling's most cunning strategies is to use this misplaced confidence as a springboard for Laskell to uncover the reality denials connected to extreme political beliefs. There are yet more fundamental reasons for this revelation, such as the hero's hosts, the Crooms, not wanting to acknowledge that their guest, who has just recovered from a very serious illness, is dead. The book was a serious and all-encompassing critique of the ideologies of the radical middle class of the time. Not everyone was warmly applauding it. The belief held by Communist supporters that the world could be changed to suit our own needs was the main modern ideal it insulted. Nancy Croom yells, "John, get out of my cosmos!" as he enters her flower bed of cosmic dust and tries to speak to her about death. Although she believes she is talking about flowers, we understand, just like Laskell, that she is acting to cancel out a friend's feelings in case they get in the way of her effort to use political optimism to reject death.

According to Trilling, his novel's English translation garnered more favorable reviews. Maybe the English of 1947 assumed that concepts had a direct correlation with the intellectual communities and socioeconomic strata that embraced them. A person only developed an English identity after they had blithely acknowledged their social background and the possibly quite different social environment they had come to inhabit. Americans find it more difficult to accept the concept of an intellectual milieu or a social class unless it is something completely alien since they are more akin to self-made gods. The social comedy of ideas does not elicit strong emotions among Americans [5], [6].

In the 1950s, it was widely believed more so in England than in our country that when asked by the authorities about someone's Communist membership or sympathies, one should not provide their name. Conversely, Trilling maintained that it was not disrespectful for an American citizen to respond to such inquiries. Diana Trilling claims that he had heated disagreements with a number of his college colleagues, including close friends, but that he never altered his opinions based on the book's preface.

College Allegiances

I had the good fortune to take the Senior Colloquium taught by Trilling and Jacques Barzun '26C '32GSAS in 1936–1937, early in their careers at the College. For me, as I'm sure it was for many others as well, it was an exceptional and life-changing event. There was an excellent faculty at the college in those years, and many students had similar reasons to celebrate as I did. When I started teaching at the College in 1939, Trilling and I became friends. It would be helpful to mention a quality I saw in him. He was a highly serious teacher. For him, it was a chance to assess, commend, and find out what abilities the students had and how they were being used. It was his duty to attempt to assist if they were being misused or squandered. Upon becoming his buddy and coworker, I sometimes learned of his efforts and his unwavering commitment to his teaching duties.

A three-year study covering English literature from antiquity to the end of the nineteenth century was available at the College during those years. For a long time, Trilling was a third-year instructor. The course included writings by Victorian and Romantic authors and one of Trilling's proudest accomplishments is the Keats piece he wrote and published in *The Opposing Self*. He also held Wordsworth in high regard, and every year there was a battle to persuade a group of juniors and seniors who were often resistant to acknowledge the poet's abilities. Henry James's stories and books were highly regarded among Victorians for being riveting. Numerous writings he wrote during the twentieth century show his continued interest in the cultural function of the book.

How consistently mindful my colleague was about the continuing operations of the department's College wing is one of his memories that sticks out to me. There was his heart. Although he oversaw dissertations and taught graduate courses, his greatest allegiance was to the College. Understandably, the reader of this little story about a great man whose talents are far above any others I have ever encountered might be curious about how he demonstrated the abilities I observed in him. I am hopeless at expressing more than a hint of the intrigue included in a certain piece.

The six lectures that makeup Sincerity and Authenticity were given at Harvard in the spring of 1970. He explores the 400-year history of the concept of honesty in England and elsewhere, as well as its interesting incarnations from Rousseau and Diderot (in his *Rameau's Nephew*) to Goethe and Hegel, and on to such remarkable works of literature as Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*. Among other things, he shows us the incredible depth of meaning that can be found in the signature that appears at the end of every letter we write: "Sincerely yours." In the lectures that

follow, we discover how and why authenticity became the norm at that point. The series' last lecture comes to an astonishing close. The chapter is titled "The Authentic Unconscious," and although Freud had coined the word "unconscious," it is now used to refer to a shift in meaning that peaked in a startling moment of the 1960s rather than psychoanalysis. David Cooper and R.D. Laing, two British psychiatrists, are quoted by Trilling. Cooper said this in the introduction to the English translation of Michel Foucault's *Histoire de la folie*: "What crazy is is a sort of vision that kills itself in the face of social tactics and strategy that already exist by its own choice of forgetfulness. For example, being insane means expressing the awareness that you or I am Christ." "So far from being an illness, a deprivation of any kind, madness is health fully realized at last," is how Trilling sums up Cooper's perspective. He then cites Laing as stating that "true sanity entails in one way or another the dissolution of the normal ego, that false self completely adjusted to our alienated social reality."

"Whoever has encountered our social reality will not be perplexed by its estranged state? And who among us has considered his experience in the context of some of the most significant conjectures of the past 200 years, some of which have been mentioned here, will not be inclined to find some merit in a perspective that suggests an antinomian reversal of all received realities and accepted values? But who among those who have conversed or attempted to communicate with a psychotic friend is willing to reveal the concealed suffering his confusion and isolation by elevating it to the status of the model of escape from the shackling illusions of a social reality that has alienated them? Whoever finds it comprehensible to describe madness (to use a word that cannot be preferred) in terms of transcendence and charisma will be unable to see through to the profound rejection of human connection that these sentences express, the horrifying belief that the acquisition of power or the persuasion of that power, which is not to be qualified or restricted by the co-ordinate existence of any fellow man, is what gives human existence its authenticity?

It may seem that no expression of disaffection from the social existence has ever been so desperate as this eagerness to say that the authenticity of personal being is achieved through ultimate isolation and through the power that this is presumed to bring. This is perhaps because the thought is accepted so easily, without what used to be called seriousness. The illusions of a disenfranchised social reality are abandoned in favor of upward psychotic mobility to the point of divinity, where each of us is a Christ but without any of the inconveniences of trying to intervene, offering oneself as a sacrifice, engaging in conversation with rabbis, delivering sermons, raising disciples, attending weddings and funerals, starting something and then declaring it finished." Though Trilling never quite reached this level of venom, it does capture the intensity with which he approached the question of how ideas and emotions relate to one another. As I draw to a close, I should not forget to mention that Trilling wanted to speak to and for everyone, not just one specific party or sect. To do this, Jesus spoke freely from a judgment that was not bound by theology on each occasion. It brings to mind one of my favorite memories of him. I taught Trilling how-to fish, and John Thompson 1902C and I both liked fly fishing. A yell of joy from a nearby pool welcomed us one day. He was commemorating the release of his first ten-inch trout [7], [8].

Amazing Major Works

Trilling cites Hegel's observation that in the eighteenth century, people began to oppose the self against the society in which it had grown for the title of his 1955 book *The Opposing Self*. Trilling's subsequent work would revolve around this idea of the self, especially in his study of authenticity in *Sincerity and Authenticity*. The introductions Trilling wrote for *The Reader's Subscription*, a book club led by W.H. Auden, Jacques Barzun, and Trilling, are published in *A Gathering of Fugitives* (1956). The lectures that Trilling gave at Harvard in 1970 while

serving as the Charles Eliot Norton Professor are published in *Sincerity and Authenticity* (1972). Before this, in 1967, Trilling produced an anthology titled *The Experience of Literature*. A book in the Uniform edition consists of introductions to each of the individual choices it includes. The current author contends that the original anthology, which includes Trilling's introductions and the works they discuss, serves as a superb introduction to the abilities and passions of Trilling.

Strong studies on Jane Austen's *Emma*, Isaac Babel, the contemporary definition of pleasure, and other subjects may be found in *Beyond Culture* (1965). Their days, "On the Teaching of Modern Literature," one of them, is debated more than the others since it is seen to be very significant for literature students. I can't even try to give this piece the respect it deserves here, except to remark that its pages provide no support or justification for those whose lives are solely focused on achievement and money. "A central enterprise of the volume is its search for a way out of the adversary culture which will not preclude a genuine experience of life," observes editor Diana Trilling of the book as a whole. Trilling discovers in Freud's sorrowful acceptance of the biologically given one such escape from the tyrannies of current cultural subversion." The volume's title comes from a lecture Trilling gave in 1955 to the New York Psychoanalytic Society. It was the first time that an individual from outside the group had addressed the members [9], [10]. Interestingly, Trilling coauthored a one-volume adaptation of Ernest Jones's three-volume biography of Freud with Steven Marcus '48C '61GSAS. In addition, Trilling penned some short tales, which Mrs. Trilling collected into a book for the Uniform edition, titling it "Of This Time, of That Place," after the most well-known of them. Included in the collection are many pieces about Jewishness including the often anthologized "The Other Margaret".

CONCLUSION

By combining literary analysis, psychoanalysis, and cultural critique in a novel way, Lionel Trilling made a major contribution to American literature and criticism. In his research, he examined the connection between psychiatric ideas and literary imagination as it relates to Freud. Trilling's analysis of Romanticism and the impact of Freud demonstrated his profound comprehension of how to strike a balance between personal creativity and societal rules. His time spent attending prestigious universities like Harvard and Columbia University cemented his reputation as one of the 20th century's leading intellectuals. Being involved with the *Partisan Review* and the New York Intellectuals distinguished Trilling from his contemporaries and demonstrated his interest in the social aspects of writing. His complex position eschewed oversimplified ideological classifications, despite changing political opinions. Trilling's interest in the moral and cultural effects of literary and intellectual traditions is reflected in his literary works, such as "The Middle of the Journey" and other studies. In addition to ideas like honesty and authenticity, his studies of writers like Matthew Arnold and E.M. Forster provide a framework for comprehending how social expectations and personal identity interact. Trilling's significance is rooted in his capacity to combine literature with more general cultural and psychological ideas. His critical stance highlights the ability of literature to investigate and shed light on the intricacies of the human experience. It does this by fusing literary criticism with psychoanalytic insights to provide a unique viewpoint on contemporary society and ideas.

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CHAPTER 10

EXPLORING THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN FREUD'S PSYCHOANALYSIS AND ROMANTICISM IN LITERATURE: TRILLING'S ANALYSIS OF THE ARTIST, THE NEUROTIC AND THE CREATIVE PROCESS

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ABSTRACT:

This study investigates the connection between literature and Freudian psychoanalysis, focusing on the idea that psychoanalysis is a literary representation of the Romantic movement. The study looks at Lionel Trilling's claim that, although having their roots in Romanticism, Freud's theories also have a rationalistic, anti-Romantic framework. The main point of contention is the conflict that exists between Freud's rationalistic methodology and the Romantic components of his ideas, particularly concerning his perspectives on the unconscious mind and the artist. This study will examine how Freud's psychoanalytic theory which drew inspiration from Romanticism emphasizes the ego's dominance over the id. It also explores how Freud's theories and literature are mutually influential, demonstrating how his contributions have influenced literary interpretation. The research concludes that, despite Freud's rationality, literary theory has benefited much from his investigation of the unconscious mind. Subsequent investigations may pursue a more comprehensive examination of the impact of Freud's rationalism on current literary theory and psychological analysis, as well as the influence of his theories on present literary and artistic interpretations.

KEYWORDS:

Freud, Neurotic, Psychoanalysis, Romanticism, Trilling.

INTRODUCTION

Trilling talks about the connections between Freud and literature. Starting with the assertion that psychoanalysis can be seen as the literary embodiment of the Romantic movement of the nineteenth century, Trilling crafts a compelling thesis centered on the identification of three key characteristics of the Romantic movement a commitment to self-research, an understanding of the hidden component in human nature, and the notion of the mind as a divisible entity. All of these things are unquestionably a part of the Freudian foundation, but according to Trilling, Freud added a rationalistic anti-Romantic construct to the framework, seeing the ultimate goal of psychoanalysis as impulse control " where id was, there shall be ego be." Trilling considers Freud's perspectives on the artist as relatively limited, but he is not unfriendly. Trilling goes to considerable lengths to resolve these conflicts. Ultimately, a picture of the difference between the neurotic and the creative artist appears; the latter is occupied by his dreams, while the former is in control of them.

As far as Trilling is concerned, Freud's idea of the mind as imagistic "naturalizes" poetry. For the artist, Freudian man is viewed as a "creature of far more dignity and far more interest than the man which any other modern system has been able to conceive an inextricable tangle of culture and biology." The artist finds that the entire Freudian depiction of the unconscious both opens and complicates the world [1], [2].

Text: Literature and Freud

According to Trilling, the "only systematic account of the human mind" that is "tough and complex, interesting and tragic in power" is the Freudian approach to psychology, which is similar to the "mass of psychological insights which literature has accumulated through the centuries." Reading a book on academic psychology after finishing a great literary work is like switching from one order of vision to another, yet the human nature of Freudian psychology is precisely what the poet has always used to practice his craft.

Psychoanalysis has thus had a significant influence on literary interpretation. Of course, the impact is "reciprocal, and the effect of Freud upon literature has been no greater than the effect of literature upon Freud". The "poets and philosophers before me uncovered the unconscious," as Freud himself acknowledged, but what he "discovered was the scientific method by which the unconscious can be studied." According to Trilling, a "whole *Zeitgeist*, a direction of thought" rather than "particular influences" is more important here. He links it specifically to a highly regarded book, Diderot's *Rameau's Nephew* (1762), which Freud himself quoted with approval. Trilling believes that it represents a "perception which is to be the common characteristic of both Freud and Romanticism, the perception of the hidden element of human nature and the opposition between the hidden and the visible". The works of Rousseau, Burke, Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Schiller, and even later thinkers like Arnold and Mill who were "aware of the depredations that reason might make on the affective life" all contributed to this "idea of the hidden thing going forward to become one of the dominant notions of the age." One significant component of this "tradition" is autobiography, which suggests how the mind evolved throughout time. The Romantic writers, "making poetry by what seems to them almost a freshly discovered faculty, find that this new power may be conspired against by other agencies of the mind".

Following Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister*, Trilling notes the rise of the *bildungsroman* and the ensuing "revolution in morals," the period's obsessions with "children, women, peasants, and savages, whose mental life, it is felt, is less overlaid than that of the educated adult male by the properties of social habit," and the idea that "we may not judge a man by any single moment in his life without taking into account the determining past and the expiating and fulfilling future. [3], [4]" According to Trilling, "The more literary affinities to Freud we find the further we look." He draws attention to the growing calls for and conversations about a "sexual revolution" made by authors including Shelley, Schlegel, Sand, Ibsen, Schopenhauer, and Stendahl. Time and again, we see the anarchic and self-indulgent id advocating for itself while the competent, utilitarian ego is demoted to a lower status. We see the active abuse of the notion that the mind is a two-part entity, with one side capable of reflection and mockery of the other.

DISCUSSION

Trilling mentions the emphasis on ambivalence by Dostoevsky, the "preoccupation with the death wish" by Novalis, the "fascination by the horrible" by Shelley, Poe, and Baudelaire, the widespread interest in dreams by intellectuals such as Nerval, and the concern with "metaphor" by Rimbaud and the later Symbolists, "metaphor becoming less and less communicative as it approaches the relative autonomy of the dream life."

In response, Trilling questions "what it is that Freud added that the tendency of literature itself would not have developed without him" since Freud is a product of this *zeitgeist*. One example of an "enterprise of psychoanalysis" is Proust's *Les Fleurs du Mal*, which is suggested by its approach of "investigation of sleep, of sexual deviation, of the way of association, the almost obsessive interest in metaphor." Even though authors such as Proust denied ever having studied Freud, the man had a significant influence on literary analysis. Students of literature might get

a "lively sense of its latent and ambiguous meanings, as it were, as it is, a being no less alive and contradictory than the man who created it" via psychoanalytically oriented critique. It has had a significant influence on literary biography in particular, where the aim is "not that of exposing the secret shame of the writer and limiting the meaning of his work, but, on the contrary, that of finding grounds for sympathy with the writer and for increasing the possible significances of the work," despite the "dangers of theoretical systematization" of which no one is more aware than the psychoanalytically inclined critic. Many authors of the modern era have acknowledged their obligations to Freud, including James Joyce, Thomas Mann, Kafka (who "explored the Freudian conceptions of guilt and punishment, of the dream, and of the fear of the father"), and the Surrealists.

According to Trilling, there is a "significant affinity with the anti-rationalist element of the Romanticist tradition" in many of Freud's ideas. still "much of his system is militantly rationalistic". He thinks that Thomas Mann is incorrect to emphasize how "the rationalistic, or 'Apollonian,' side of psychoanalysis is, while certainly important and wholly admirable, somehow secondary and even accidental." Although Mann "gives us a Freud who is committed to the 'night side' of life", Trilling contends that the "rationalistic element of Freud is foremost; before everything else he is positivistic". Not via his Faust, but through Goethe's scientific "disquisition on Nature," the "interpreter of dreams came to medical science." According to Freud, "positivistic rationalism. . . is the very form and pattern of intellectual virtue". "Freud's attitude to art" cannot be appreciated without such knowledge. He claims that mastery over life's darker aspects is the ultimate goal of psychoanalysis. The purpose is to "enlarge the field of vision, strengthen the ego, and make it more independent of the super-ego, thereby extending the organization of the id." "Where id was,' meaning all the illogical, irrational, pleasure-seeking dark energies, 'their ego will be,' meaning intellect and control [5], [6].

Contrarily, Freud would never have agreed to play the part that Mann appears to be giving him that of the defender of myth and the sinister, illogical processes of the mind. Even if Freud identified the evil side of science, he never supported it. On the other hand, his rationalism upholds straightforward materialism, a straightforward determinism, and a very straightforward kind of epistemology, all of which reject the legitimacy of myth and religion. Not a single brilliant scientist of our day has spoken out so forcefully and intelligently against all those who seek to sophisticate the scientific principles that sufficed for the nineteenth century with metaphysics. "Conceptualism or pragmatism is anathema to him through the greater part of his intellectual career".

According to Trilling, there are advantages and disadvantages to Freud's "rationalistic positivism". defining "strength is the fine, clear tenacity of his positive aims, the goal of therapy, the desire to bring to men a decent measure of earthly happiness". The "often naive scientific principles which characterize his early thought" and the fact that he "claimed for his theories a perfect correspondence with an external reality" that cannot be verified are the main causes of its weakness. Trilling emphasizes that Freud has "much to tell us about art" and about authors who provide "specific emotional insights and observations" that come from a comprehension of the "part played by the hidden motives." Hence, "literary men" are considered the "forerunners and collaborators in his science." According to Freud, art is an "illusion in contrast to reality" and a "substitute gratification."

Its impact is "'almost always harmless and beneficent'" and may be considered a "'narcotic'" but "shares the characteristics of the dream, whose element of distortion Freud calls a 'sort of inner dishonesty'". "In the same category with the neurotic" is how the artist puts it. According to Trilling, it seems sense that Freud would reach these findings "unprotected by an adequate philosophy." The goal of psychoanalytic treatment is to assist patients in managing the seeming

reality of their, sometimes unjustified, worries and issues. Freud saw two approaches to interacting with the outside world. One is sensible, useful, and constructive; this is the path of the conscious self, the ego, which has to become independent of the super-ego and expand its structure beyond the id. One may refer to the opposite approach as the "fictional" approach. The person who utilizes this method does something to, or about, his emotional state rather than something about, or to, the outside world. Daydreaming is the most prevalent and "normal" form of this when we provide ourselves with a certain level of pleasure by seeing our problems being addressed or our wishes being fulfilled. Moreover, sleeping dreams serve the same "fictional" purpose in much more intricate ways, while being quite unpleasant. Furthermore, our patient's genuine neurosis interacts with an external reality that the mind finds even more terrible than the excruciating illness itself, making the situation much more complex and unpleasant.

The "polar extremes of reality and illusion" or, to put it more accurately, "practical reality and neurotic illusion" are what Freud called them. Illusion essentially "means a response to what is not there," while reality essentially "means what is there". The Freudian approach is that selection and assessment by the mind, both for good and negative, contribute to the creation of reality. According to this perspective, reality is pliable and open to creation. Nevertheless, Freud also contributed another understanding of the mind, one that stems from his "therapeutic-practical assumptions" and holds that the mind "deals with a reality which is quite fixed and static, a reality that is wholly 'given' and not (to use a phrase of Dewey's) 'taken' [7], [8]."

The "reality to which he wishes to reconcile the neurotic patient is, after all, a 'taken' and not a 'given' reality," or more specifically, the "reality of social life and value, conceived and maintained by the human mind and will," leaves Trilling perplexed as to why Freud relies on the second approach. The elements of a formed reality are love, morality, honor, and esteem. According to this perspective, "we must call most of the activities and satisfactions of the ego illusions," just as Freud does not wish to engage in the creation of art, which is also an illusion. Trilling goes on to question what distinguishes art from neurosis and dreams, respectively. Both involve unconscious processes and have a fantasy component. The "poet is in command of his fantasy, while it is exactly the mark of the neurotic that he is possessed by his fantasy," however, is what separates them.

Second, the "illusions of art are made to serve the purpose of a closer and truer relation with reality". therapist's "assumption of the almost exclusively hedonistic nature and purpose of the art bar him from the perception of this". Freud acknowledges that there is a difference between neurotics and artists in that the latter "knows how to get a firm foothold in reality again, while artists know how to find a way back from the world of imagination." However, per Trilling's interpretation, this merely implies that the artist goes back to the actual world "once he suspends the practice of his art". Overall, Freud does not discount the role and value of art; it relieves mental tension, acts as a "substitute gratification" to help men reconcile with the sacrifices made for the sake of culture, encourages social sharing of highly valued emotional experiences, and helps men remember their cultural beliefs.

Trilling concludes by stating that although "Freud's very conception of art is inadequate," his point has been that "Freud's ideas could tell us something about art." According to Trilling, Freud is well aware of the limitations of "applying the analytic method to specific works of art." However, according to Freud, it does "explain the 'inner meanings' of the work of art and explain the temperament of the artist as man," among other two goals. For example, the interpretation of Hamlet by Freud and, subsequently, Jones, "undertakes not only the clearing up of the mystery of Hamlet's character but also the discovery of 'the clue to much of the deeper workings of Shakespeare's mind'" and "what Freud calls 'the mystery of its effect'." Jones tried

to "discover what it was that Shakespeare intended to say about Hamlet," keeping in mind that Freud believed that the "meaning of a dream is its intention" and that the "meaning of a play is its intention."

It was "wrapped by the author in a dreamlike obscurity because it touched so deeply both his personal life and the moral life of the world". Shakespeare "intended to say that Hamlet cannot act because he is incapacitated by the guilt he feels at his unconscious attachment to his mother," according to Freud and Jones. In a similar vein, Freud claims that the "meaning of King Lear is to be found in the tragic refusal of an old man to 'renounce love, choose death, and make friends with the necessity of dying'. But this is "not the meaning of King Lear any more than the Oedipus motive is the meaning of Hamlet," according to Trilling.

Trilling has this opinion because he considers "historical and personal experience" to be proof that there is "no single meaning to any work of art": Variations in the historical setting and the individual's mood alter the meaning of work and show us that appreciation of the arts is a matter of value rather than reality. A work's meaning cannot be found just in the author's purpose, even if that goal were exactly determinable. Its impact must also be the source of it. In other words, the meaning of the work is partially determined by the audience. Freud appears to allude to this, but he believes that a play such as Hamlet has an impact because Oedipus's motivation, to which we instinctively react so passionately, is "single and brought about solely by its magical power." The problem is that Hamlet's influence and attraction vary depending on the historical and cultural context.

According to Trilling, "criticism may use any instruments upon a work of art to find its meanings," much as Bacon "remarked that experiment may twist nature on the rack to wring out its secrets." Yet another kind of "research into the mind of the artist is simply not practicable": the subconscious "investigation of his unconscious intention as it exists apart from the work itself". Determining the "artist's statement of his conscious intention" is challenging enough, so how much less can we infer from his unconscious intention when seen as a separate entity from the whole work? The response was: "Very little that can be called conclusive or scientific". The primary obstacle is the author's absence; we are left to understand the symbols that make up his "dream text" without consulting the "dreamer's free association with the multitudinous details of his dream [9], [10]."

Trilling then focuses on the idea that an artwork may tell a great deal about the artist's psyche, which in turn can provide insight into the artwork itself. Jones asserts that there is a connection between the "inner meaning of the play" and the "deeper workings of Shakespeare's mind" based on the merest suggestion that Hamlet has a greater significance in Shakespeare's body of work than it does. Trilling quickly clarifies that he does not mean to discount a psychoanalytic interpretation. Not at all. Instead, he believes that those who have "surrendered the early pretensions. to deal scientifically with literature" are the greatest psychoanalytic critics. Work from more recently "pretends not to solve' but only to illuminate the subject". For the mere fact that it does not presume that "there is a reality to which the play stands in the relation that a dream stands to the wish that generates it and from which it is inseparable," such a nuanced approach yields interpretations that are not "exclusive of other meanings".

So what, asks Trilling, does Freud add to our knowledge of art? Freud's "whole conception of the mind" is what makes his method valuable. Poetry is "made indigenous to the very constitution of the mind" by Freudian psychology. Even if "the social intention and the formal control of the conscious mind supervene between the unconscious mind and the finished poem," the mind is primarily a "poetry-making organ". "Freud has not merely naturalized poetry; he has discovered its status as a pioneer settler, and he sees it as a method of thought".

Although he considers poetry to be "unreliable and ineffective for conquering reality", he is compelled to use it for himself, "as when he speaks of the topography of the mind and tells us with a kind of defiant apology that the metaphors of spatial relationship which he is using are most inexact since the mind is not a thing of space at all". In the eighteenth century, Vico "spoke of the metaphorical, imagistic language of the early stages of culture; it was left to Freud to discover how, in a scientific age, we still feel and think in figurative formations, and to create, what psychoanalysis is, a science of tropes, of metaphor and its variants, synecdoche, and metonymy [sic]". Furthermore, Freud demonstrates how the mind, at least one aspect of it, may function without logic but not without the controlling purpose and intent that give rise to logic. Because the unconscious mind operates without the syntactical conjunctions that are essential to logic, it can recognize no because, no, therefore, and no but. Similarly, concepts like community, agreement, and likeness are portrayed imagistically in dreams by condensing the pieces into a single whole. In its battle with the conscious mind, the unconscious mind always goes from the general to the specific, finding the little, palpable detail more hospitable than the grand abstraction.

Freud found that the processes through which art produces its effects such as the shifting of emphasis and the condensing of meanings are inherent in the very structure of the mind. According to Trilling, two other factors are very important to the study of art. According to Trilling, Freud makes a significant addition to the field of catharsis in tragedy à la Aristotle as well as a "speculative attempt to solve a perplexing problem in clinical analysis" in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920). Here, Freud discovers information that challenges his previous thesis, according to which every dream "has the intention of fulfilling the dreamer's wishes." They work toward the opposite of the reality principle, which Freud refers to as the pleasure principle. Traumatic experiences like shell shock, in which the patient "recurred in his dreams to the very situation, distressing as it was, which had precipitated his neurosis," prompted him to reevaluate this theory of dreams. The fact that the patient "recurred to the terrible initiatory situation with great literalness" indicates that there is minimal distortion and no "hedonistic intent" in these dreams.

This also applied to kid's games, which sometimes "seemed to concentrate upon the representation of those aspects of the child's life which were most unpleasant and threatening to his happiness, far from fulfilling wishes." Freud suggests the presence of a "repetition-compulsion which goes beyond the pleasure principle" to address these issues, with the "developing of fear" as its "intent." In other words, the dream is an attempt to recreate the unfavorable circumstance so that the missed opportunity to confront it may be made up for; in these dreams, there is no hidden desire to run away, only an attempt to confront the circumstance and exert fresh control. Furthermore, it seems that youngsters repeat even unpleasant experiences via play because they can master the powerful imprint by their actions to a considerably greater extent than they could have through passive experience.

This has consequences for how we conceptualize tragedy. Therein lies an "ambiguous" pleasure that is at once the "stark" expression of this horror and the "glossing over of terror with beautiful language rather than the evacuation of it." Yet another "function for tragedy": "tragedy is used as the homeopathic administration of pain to inure ourselves to the greater pain which life will force upon us". According to this viewpoint, tragedy gives us a "sense of active mastery" over an unpleasant reality. In this study, Freud also discusses the concept of "grandeur," "tragic courage in acquiescence to fate," and a "human drive which makes death the final and desired goal." According to Trilling, Freud presents a picture of humanity that is similar to that of Copernicus and Darwin and seems to be partially intended to subvert human pride. He asserts, however, that compared to all other contemporary models, the "Freudian man

is. a creature of far more dignity and far more interest." According to Freud, man is an intricate web of genetics and culture rather than being defined by any one straightforward formula (like sex). Not only is he not good, but he also has a type of hell within him from which the impulses that endanger his civilization constantly emerge. "His desire for man is only that he should be human, and to this end, his science is devoted".

CONCLUSION

Trilling's analysis elucidates the intricate relationship between Freud's psychoanalysis and Romantic literature, revealing that the two share deep roots in their exploration of the human psyche. By connecting Freudian theory with key elements of the Romantic movement self-exploration, the hidden aspects of human nature, and the divisibility of the mind Trilling demonstrates how Freud's work both aligns with and diverges from Romantic ideals. While Freud added a rational, anti-Romantic dimension to these ideas, his influence on literature is profound, reciprocating the impact that literature had on him. Trilling's exploration culminates in the distinction between the neurotic and the artist, underscoring Freud's view of art as a vital, though ultimately illusory, means of engaging with reality. The study thus highlights the reciprocal relationship between literature and psychoanalysis, affirming Freud's complex legacy in both fields.

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CHAPTER 11

EXPLORING THE INTELLECTUAL LEGACY OF LIONEL TRILLING: FROM MATTHEW ARNOLD TO FREUDIAN INFLUENCE

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ABSTRACT:

Although American literary critic Lionel Trilling, a prominent figure of the 20th century, is well-known for his significant work, his posthumously released book "Of This Time, Of That Place, and Other Stories," is not as well-known. This collection is renowned for its complex storylines and rich thematic content, which provide important context for understanding Trilling's literary critique. Despite Trilling's well-known status as a literary critic and his acclaimed biography of Matthew Arnold, his work "Of This Time, Of That Place, and Other Stories" is still overlooked in favor of his more well-known compositions, such as his critique of E. M. Forster's writings. To emphasize the significance of Trilling's short tales in comprehending his literary influence, the research aims to reevaluate their significance by analyzing their contribution to literary criticism and their reflection of Trilling's larger philosophical issues. Although Trilling's shorter pieces are often eclipsed by his longer pieces, they provide insightful perspectives into his critical methodology and thematic concerns, demonstrating his interest in ethical and philosophical quandaries. To further comprehend the relevance of Trilling's short tales in American literary studies, future study may examine their reception and influence in diverse academic settings and compare their effect with his other works.

KEYWORDS:

Fiction, Freudian, Literary Critic, Philosophy, Trilling.

INTRODUCTION

In addition to being one of the most prominent American literary critics of the 20th century, Trilling produced some short tales that were printed in magazines while he was alive. Five of his greatest works were gathered and published as *Of This Time, Of That Place, and Other Works* in 1979, four years after his death. Critics lauded the pieces for being intricate narratives that delve into recurring themes in Trilling's fiction and nonfiction writing. Despite receiving little critical attention, critics have praised *Of This Time, Of That Place, and Other Stories*, calling it an important and underappreciated work. It was largely because of Trilling's first book that his intellectual prowess was recognized on a global scale, establishing him as, as Rodden put it, "a rising star." Even Trilling was shocked by the overwhelming, almost universal acclaim for his 1939 biography of Matthew Arnold, the leading figure in English criticism in the late 1800s. Novelist, critic, and editor John Middleton Murry, one of England's foremost men of letters, began his review with a tongue-in-cheek statement about wounded national pride.

The finest book on Matthew Arnold that is now available was prepared by American professor Mr. Trilling. It is the most thorough and critical work on the subject. We find it a bit depressing that the United States should get this specific honor. "The most brilliant piece of biographical criticism issued in English during the last ten years," according to another British reviewer,

was written about the book. But what thrilled Trilling the most was Edmund Wilson's review. Wilson, who Trilling saw as a model for fusing literary, political, and social critique with an impressive clarity of language, was unquestionably America's top critic at the time. Trilling had once become hopeless about writing a piece on a topic so unrelated to the Great Depression and the approaching conflict [1], [2]. Wilson, who was only a passing friend at the time, pushed him to complete the book, saying the topic was important. Given his reputation for not taking well to criticism, Wilson hailed the release as "one of the first critical studies of any solidity or scope by an American of his generation."

The fact that Arnold provided Trilling with a uniquely empathetic subject a writer who blended the duties of literary critic, social-political thinker, and creative artist (poet as opposed to novelist) was a major factor in the success of the biography. Both men were aware of the conflict that existed between those who identified as both political liberals and cultural conservatives. Trilling's later work revealed a similar disposition toward melancholy and fatalism, foreshadowed by Arnold's brooding meditation in his famous poem "Dover Beach" ("we are here as on a darkling plain. Where ignorant armies clash by night") on the replacement of religious faith by science.

The tenure at Columbia University that the English department faculty had previously refused to grant Trilling because of the belief that a Jew could not properly understand English literature was eventually gained by the biography of Arnold. The faculty took a different stance once the university's president, a fervent Anglophile, expressed how much the book had impressed him. In the end, Trilling was one of just two department faculty members to be awarded the esteemed title of "university professor." In the 1950s, Trilling was already somewhat of a legendary character, the intellectual conscience of the undergraduate English Department and a connection to the volatile world of the New York intellectuals, as one ex-student recounts in Rodden's collection. Trilling's subsequent publication, a 1943 analysis of E. M. Forster's books, gave him the chance to test the literary technique he would later expand upon in *The Liberal Imagination*. In England at the time, Forster was somewhat well-known, but not so much in the US. Trilling's ebullient portrayal prompted a fresh evaluation of Forster's significance as well as a reprinting of his books. The famous first line of the book has a deceptively simple meaning that brings the reader up short.

For me, E. M. Forster is the only living author who can be read again and who, upon finishing each reading, bestows upon me that rare feeling of having gained knowledge that few other writers can match after our first days of immersing ourselves in a new book. A comparable experience was available to moviegoers in previous years without them having to read the books. Written between 1905 and 1924, *A Room with a View*, *Where Angels Fear to Tread*, *Howard's End* and *A Passage to India* are four out of the five that have been adapted into mostly accurate motion pictures. (*The Longest Journey* is still not available on screen.) Trilling was drawn to Forster's books because of their unique take on moral dilemmas. All writers deal with morality, but not all authors are interested in moral realism, which is the understanding of the difficulties, paradoxes, and perils associated with leading a decent life rather than morality per se.

Trilling was an admirer of Forster because, despite his liberal credentials, he rejected them. His writings, for instance, often discuss class, although class is not just determined by one's level of money. Forster "shows the conflicting truths of the idea that on the one hand class is character, soul, and destiny, and that on the other hand class is not finally determining," Trilling said, highlighting Forster's work in *Howards End* in particular. However, there are three levels at which class conflicts within the middle class operate: the two smart sisters are situated between the affluent businessman who despises art and weakness and the humble clerk who

enjoys poetry at the extremes [3], [4]. "Only connect the prose and the passion, and both will be exalted, and human love will be seen at its height," was Forster's interpretation of the moment after the book, when the joyful kid of the clerk and the younger sister is playing in a hayfield. Forster's ordinarily modest conversational language suddenly becomes transcendental, demonstrating that the author is, in Trilling's words, "content with human possibility and content with its limitations."

Text: Critical Appreciation of Freud and Literature

The only methodical explanation of the human mind that, in terms of depth and complexity, fascination, and tragic force, is worthy of being placed beside the disorganized mass of psychological discoveries that literature has amassed over the ages is Freudian psychology. Reading a book on academic psychology after finishing a great literary work is like switching from one order of perception to another, yet the poet has always used the human essence of Freudian psychology as the foundation for his art. It follows that the significant influence of psychoanalytic theory on literature is not unexpected. However, the link is mutual, and Freud's influence on literature hasn't outweighed that of literature on Freud. Upon being hailed as the "discoverer of the unconscious" at his seventieth birthday party, Freud corrected the speaker and rejected the title. "What I discovered was the scientific method by which the unconscious can be studied; the unconscious was discovered by poets and philosophers before me."

We cannot examine the specific literary "influences" on the father of psychoanalysis due to a lack of specific evidence. Moreover, when we consider the men Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, for example who so obviously anticipated many of Freud's ideas and then discovered that he did not read their works until after he had developed his theories, we must recognize that specific influences are not negotiable in this case and that what we have to deal with is nothing less than a whole *Zeitgeist*, a school of thought. One of the apex achievements of nineteenth-century Romanticist literature is psychoanalysis. If the idea of science standing on the shoulders of literature that declares itself to be anti-scientific in some ways seems contradictory, the contradiction can be reconciled if we keep in mind that this literature was itself scientific because it was fervently committed to self-research.

It is difficult for me to know where to start when attempting to demonstrate the relationship between Freud and this Romanticist tradition, but there may be some merit in going back to the beginning of the tradition, to Diderot's 1762 conversation known as *Rameau's Nephew*. In any case, a few influential figures in nineteenth-century philosophy all agreed that this brant little treatise had a special significance: Goethe translated it; Marx praised it; Hegel praised and elaborated on it extensively; Shaw was impressed; and Freud himself, as we know from a quotation in his *Introductory Lectures*, read it with the pleasure of agreement (Marx, as Marx reminded Engels in the letter announcing that he was sending the book as a gift).

DISCUSSION

The conversation is between Diderot and the renowned composer's nephew. Hegel refers to the protagonist, the younger Rameau, as the "disintegrated consciousness" and attributes considerable wit to him since it is he who dismantles the conventional societal standards and creates new combinations with the fragments. The protagonist is a hated, outcast, and shameless man. Hegel refers to Diderot, the deuteragonist, as the "honest consciousness," and he views him as rational, good, and uninteresting. Although Rameau is lustful and greedy, haughty yet self-abasing, perceptive yet "wrong," like a child, it is evident that the author does not despise him and does not intend for us to. Rather, Diderot seems to be elevating the man above himself in a way that suggests that Rameau represents the elements that lie beneath the reasonable decorum of social life. Perhaps going too far would be to connect Freud's id and

ego in Diderot and Rameau, but the connection does exist, and at least we have here the insight that is supposed to be the shared trait of both Freud and Romanticism: the insight into the hidden aspect of human nature and the opposition between the visible and the hidden. It is not a big step from Rameau's self-exposure to Rousseau's account of his childhood; society may reject or ignore the idea of the "immorality" that is hidden at the start of the "good" man's career, just as it may reject Blake's attempts to explain a psychology that would include forces beneath the propriety of social man in general. However, the idea of the hidden thing went on to become one of the dominant notions of the time. The hidden element can take many different forms and is not always "dark" and "bad." According to Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Burke, the unconscious and hidden sources of wisdom and power operated even in the face of conscious intellect, and according to Matthew Arnold, the mind was nourished by streams that were hidden farther than we can imagine.

The commitment to the many kinds of autobiography which is a significant feature in the tradition—provides numerous evidence of the transformation that has occurred. The mind has become significantly less simple. Poets who denigrate poetry for what appears to be a recently discovered ability discover that this newfound power may be subverted by other mental processes and may even lose its independence; Freud cites Shakespeare on the risk that the poet faces when relying solely on analytical reason, and the names of Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Arnold immediately come to mind. Not just poets, however, are in danger; intelligent and perceptive individuals throughout Europe also become aware of the potential harm reason may do to one's emotional life, as shown by the well-known case of John Stuart Wilson.

We also need to consider the obsession which dates back to the eighteenth and even the seventeenth century with women, children, peasants, and savages. The reason for this obsession is that it is believed that the pros- pretties of social habit have less of an impact on the mental lives of these groups than they do on educated adult males. This obsession is consistent with the historical and evolutionary orientation of the period and is accompanied by a passion for education and personal growth. Furthermore, we must acknowledge the moral revolution that occurred at the genesis if we may use that phrase of the bildungsroman, since in Wilhelm Meister's novels, the reader and author are virtually fully identified, implying a lax application of moral judgment. By utilizing all motive modulations and hinting that we should not judge a man by a single moment in his life without also considering the determining past and the atoning and fulfilling future, the autobiographical novel has an additional impact on moral sensibility [5], [6].

It is hard to know where to start since the more we research, the more literary similarities we uncover with Freud. Even if we stick to a bibliography, we may still be, at most, incomplete. The sexual revolution that was being called for, however, must be mentioned. Examples of this include Shelley, George Sand, Ibsen, and the Schlegel of Lucinde. Tieck boldly declared the sexual origin of art, while Schopenhauer stated it more subtly. Stendhal also researched sexual maladjustment, and his observations on erotic feelings are directly related to Freud's theories. Time and again, we see the anarchic and self-indulgent id advocating on behalf of the efficient, utilitarian ego, which is demoted to a subordinate position. The concept that the mind is a split tolling, with one portion capable of contemplating and mocking the other, is used energetically.

This is not too far from Dostoyevsky's masterful depictions of conflicted emotions. Novalis introduces the obsession with the death wish, which is connected to sleep on the one hand and the awareness of the perverted, self-destroying impulses on the other. This leads us to the horrific attraction found in Shelley, Poe, and Baudelaire. Furthermore, there is always a deep fascination with dreams—"Our dreams are a second life," according to Gerard de Nerval—and the nature of metaphor, which culminates in Rimbaud and the later Symbolists in the idea that

metaphor becomes less and less communicative as it gets closer to the relative autonomy of the dream life. Given that these were the elements of the *Zeitgeist* that Freud himself emerged from, we should pause to consider if it is true that Freud had a widespread literary influence.

What is it that Freud contributed that, in his absence, would have prevented the development of literature as a tendency? If one were to search for a writer who exhibited Freudian influence, Proust might be the first person who comes to mind. His novel's title, which is more suggestive in French than in English, alludes to a psycho-analytic endeavor, and his method—which includes investigating sleep, sexual deviation, associations, and an almost compulsive interest in metaphor—also suggests psychoanalysis. However, I think it's accurate to say that Proust didn't read Freud. Alternatively, an analysis of *The Waste Land* may seem a lot like a dream interpretation, but we know that Eliot's techniques were developed for him by other poets rather than Freud.

However, Freud has certainly had a significant impact on literature. Its magnitude is almost impossible to define since so much of it is so ubiquitous; it has permeated our lives and grown to be an inseparable part of our society, sometimes in the shape of perversions or ridiculous connotations. In biography, it had a dramatic but unlucky consequence. The majority of Freudian biographers were Guddensterns, who seemed to know the ropes but were unable to unravel the riddle at its core. The issue has drawn criticism for reasons that I will attempt to address later in this study. Of course, there are many names of creative authors who have used assumptions or tones that are somewhat Freudian. Still, a comparatively tiny percentage have used Freudian concepts in a meaningful way. It seems that Freud believed this to be the case as well; he is said to have had extremely low expectations for the writings that authors gave him, along with notes expressing thanks for what they had learned from him. With some inconsistency, the Surrealists have relied on Freud to provide "scientific" validation for their work. Kafka investigated Freudian ideas of guilt and punishment, the dream, and the dread of the father—all seemingly conscious of what he was doing. Thomas Mann, who admits that his inclination was always toward Freud's interests, has been particularly receptive to Freudian anthropology and finds particular appeal in the ideas surrounding mythology and magical rituals. James Joyce has perhaps most deliberately and thoroughly appropriated Freud's ideas through his treatment of fader themes, his interest in the various states of receding consciousness, his use of words as things and words that point to more than one thing, his pervasive sense of the interrelation and interpenetration of all things, and more.

However, although it will be evident to some extent how much Freud's ideas are influenced by the Romanticist heritage, we also need to recognize how much of his system is distinctly divorced from rationality. In his first study on Freud, Thomas Mann erred when he said that the rationalistic, or "Apollonian," aspect of psychoanalysis was incidental or incidental, even though it was significant and very praiseworthy. He presents us with a Freud who is devoted to life's "night side [7], [8]." Not at all: Freud's positivism comes first and comes from his rationalistic side. If, as he claims, the dream interpreter entered the field of medicine via Goethe, it was not through the *WuIptrrgisnucht* but rather through the renowned *Disquisition on Nature*, an study that had a significant influence on the careers of several nineteenth-century scientists.

Not only is this revision necessary for correctness, but it is also necessary for any comprehension of Freud's view of art. And to comprehend that knowledge, we must appreciate the depth of Freud's conviction that positivistic rationalism in its pre-revolutionary, golden age is the exact shape and pattern of intellectual goodness. He claims that mastery over the dark side of life is the ultimate goal of psychoanalysis. The goal is "to expand the organization of the id, to strengthen the ego, and to make it more independent of the super-ego." He ends,

recalling Faust, "reclamation work, & the draining of the Zuyder Zee." Where id was, "that is, where all the irrational, non-logical, pleasure-seeking dark forces were," there should e g o be, "that is, intelligence and control." Mann quotes this paragraph while discussing Freud a second time and does mention his positivistic goal; nonetheless, even in this instance, his artistic interest in the "night side" prevents him from giving this part of Freud the attention it deserves. Mann presents Freud as the champion of myth and the dark, illogical ways of the mind, a position that Freud would never have agreed to. Even if Freud identified the evil side of science, he never supported it. On the other hand, his rationalism upholds a restricted kind of epistemology, a basic materialism, and a simple determinism all of which reject the legitimacy of myth and religion. Not a single brilliant scientist of our day has railed so forcefully and intelligently against those who seek to sophisticize the scientific principles that sufficed for the nineteenth century with metaphysics.

He is opposed to both idealism and pragmatism, which, given the nature of his outstanding scientific approaches, is undoubtedly paradoxical. This rationalistic positivism accounts for all of Freud's flaws as well as much of his power. His good goals, the purpose of treatment, and his desire to provide men with a respectable level of worldly pleasure are what give him strength. However, rationalism must also bear some of the blame for his rather naive scientific principles, which primarily consist of asserting that his theories perfectly correspond with an external reality. This is a position that causes great discomfort for those who respect Freud, particularly for those who take his views on art seriously.

While I think Freud has a lot to teach us about art, his works that specifically address the subject of art do not include anything intriguing about him. Contrary to popular belief, Freud is not oblivious to art and has no intention of speaking disrespectfully about it in the future. He does talk about it with genuine love and considers it to be one of the genuine pleasures of the good life. He speaks with admiration and even awe of artists, particularly writers, though his appreciation of particular emotional insights and observations in literature may lie elsewhere. He speaks of literary men because they have recognized the role that hidden motives play in life and because they are the forerunners and collaborators of his science.

Ultimately, however, Freud treats art with a level of disdain that is unavoidable. He claims that art is 'an illusion in opposition to reality' and that it is a substitute delight'. But art is 'nearly always harmless and helpful', since 'it does not attempt to be anything but an illusion,' in contrast to most illusions. It never dares launch an assault on the domain of reality, except for a small number of individuals who are, one might say, fascinated with art. Being a 'narcotic' is one of its main uses. It is similar to the dream in that it has a distorted aspect that Freud refers to as a "sort of inner dishonesty [9], [10]." Regarding the artist, he essentially belongs to the same group as the neurotic. Freud said of a novel's protagonist, "By such separation of imagination and intellectual capacity, he is destined to be a poet or a neurotic, and he belongs to that race of beings whose realm is not of this world."

The logic of psycho-analytical cognition no longer needs Freud to have these beliefs. However, several aspects of psychoanalytic treatment make it reasonable for Freud to be persuaded to adopt the positions he does in the absence of a strong enough philosophy. The analytical treatment addresses delusion. The doctor receives the patient. Let's say to overcome a phobia of crossing the street. There is no doubt that the dread is genuine; in addition, it causes all the bodily signs of a more sensible fear, such as sweaty palms, a racing pulse, and shortness of breath. However, the patient is aware that there is no need to be afraid—rather, he claims that there isn't a "real came" since there aren't any tigers, machine guns, or man-traps in the area. Although the cause of the fear has nothing to do with what is or is not on the street, the doctor is aware that there is a "real" cause for the fear. The goal of therapy is to gradually identify this

real cause and release the patient from the effects of it. Now, when a patient visits a doctor and a doctor accepts a patient, they enter into an unconscious agreement on reality; they accept the restricted reality that allows us to survive, fall in love, catch trains, and have colds. The goal of the treatment will be to teach the patient effective coping mechanisms for this reality. Naturally, the patient has been coping with this fact incorrectly the whole time. Freud saw two approaches to interacting with the outside world. One is sensible, useful, and constructive; this is the path of the conscious self, the ego, which needs to become independent of the super-ego and expand its structure beyond the id. It is also the correct path. For our purposes here, the opposite approach might be referred to as the "fictional" approach. The person who utilizes this method does something to, or about, his emotional state rather than something about, or to, the outside world. The most prevalent and "normal" form of this is when we daydream, which is when we imagine solving our problems or fulfilling our wants to give ourselves a certain level of pleasure. Furthermore, Freud found that, while very unpleasant, sleeping dreams also serve the same "fictional" purpose in far more intricate ways. Additionally, the actual neurosis that our patient has is more complex and terrible in that it interacts with an outside reality that the mind finds even more awful than the excruciating neurosis itself. We may refer to Freud's views as psychoanalysts as the polar extremes of illusion and reality. Illusion is a derogatory term that refers to a reaction to what is not there, while reality is an honorable phrase that refers to what is there. Since the goal of a psychoanalysis course is practical efficiency rather than theoretical refinement, the didactic character of the instruction inevitably demands a certain degree of strong crudeness in maligning the difference. Practical reality and neurotic delusion, the latter measured by the former, are the opposites. Undoubtedly, this is the proper course of action; the patient is not receiving training in metaphysics or epistemology.

CONCLUSION

The study emphasizes the noteworthy influence of Lionel Trilling on literary and critical studies. Trilling rose to prominence with his biography of Matthew Arnold and his reading of the writings of E.M. Forster; the Arnold biography was a major accomplishment at Columbia University. His interaction with Arnold demonstrated his profound comprehension of the connection between sociopolitical theory and literary critique. Trilling's understanding of moral quandaries and class struggles is shown in his appreciation for Forster, which is especially clear in his 1943 study. Forster's moral realism is in line with Trilling's critical viewpoints, showcasing his aptitude for examining societal processes and character. Furthermore, Trilling's analysis of Freud emphasizes the intricate relationship between psychoanalytic theory and literature. He acknowledged the significant impact of Freud on literary criticism and emphasized how his theories have improved our comprehension of human psychology in writing. Trilling's work is still essential to comprehending the nexus between psychology, criticism, and literature as it provides insightful information about the development of literary analysis and how it interacts with psychological viewpoints.

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CHAPTER 12

JACQUES LACAN: REVOLUTIONIZING PSYCHOANALYSIS AND PHILOSOPHY THROUGH THE LENS OF LANGUAGE AND THE SYMBOLIC ORDER

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ABSTRACT:

Renowned French psychologist and psychiatrist Jacques Marie Émile Lacan is renowned for his revolutionary but controversial contributions to psychoanalysis and philosophy. His work, which was produced between 1953 and 1981, had a big impact on post-structuralist philosophers and French intellectuals. Lacan explores the nexus between language, psychology, and philosophy in his ideas, which question accepted psychoanalytic methods. His intricate theories on the ego, the unconscious, and the Mirror Stage have had a significant influence on many academic disciplines, but they have also generated a great deal of discussion and differing interpretations. This study looks at Lacan's major contributions to psychoanalysis, such as his integration of linguistic and philosophical frameworks and his views on the Mirror Stage, Symbolic, Imaginary, and Real orders. It seeks to place his work in the larger framework of psychoanalytic theory and its influence on several disciplines. Lacan's contributions to psychoanalytic theory represent a paradigm shift, emphasizing the role that language and symbolic structures play in the process of self-formation. More insight into subjectivity and identity may be gained from his theories of the Mirror Stage and symbolic ordering, and his criticism of ego psychology has spurred continuing debates regarding the methods of psychoanalysis. Future studies should look at how applicable Lacan's ideas are to modern psychoanalysis, particularly in light of developments in digital communication and linguistic theory. Studies may also look at how Lacanian ideas have influenced contemporary feminist theory and the development of subjectivity and identity debates.

KEYWORDS:

Ego Psychology, Mirror Stage, Psychoanalysis, Symbolic Order, Structuralism.

INTRODUCTION

French psychologist and psychiatrist Jacques Marie Émile Lacan has been dubbed "the most controversial psychoanalyst since Freud" for his significant contributions to psychoanalysis and philosophy. Lacan, who conducted annual seminars in Paris from 1953 to 1981, had a significant impact on French intellectuals throughout the 1960s and 1970s, particularly the post-structuralist philosophers. "It is up to you to be Lacanians if you wish," he said, referring to his multidisciplinary work as a "self-proclaimed Freudian." "I am a Freudian," the statement went on to discuss the ego, the unconscious, the castration complex, identification, and language as subjective perception. His theories have influenced critical theory, literary theory, sociology, feminist theory, cinema theory, 20th-century French philosophy, and clinical psychoanalysis.

A biographical sketch of childhood

Born in Paris, Lacan was the oldest of three children born to Emilie and Alfred Lacan. His dad was a prosperous dealer of oils and soaps. Lacan attended the Jesuit Collège Stanislas, and his

mother was a devout Catholic. In 1929, his younger brother entered a convent. Attending right-wing Action Française political gatherings in the early 1920s, Lacan got to know the organization's founder, Charles Maurras. Lacan had become unhappy with religion by the middle of the 1920s and had arguments with his family about it. Similar cases have drawn the attention of a burgeoning French psychoanalytic movement. Lacan established a link between psychoanalysis and psychiatric medicine in his 1932 doctoral thesis, "De la psychose paranoïaque dans ses rapports avec la personnalité." This amalgamation of the theoretical and clinical would shape Lacan's approach and contribute to his self-described "return to Freud." By closely examining Freud and carrying on with his therapeutic work, Lacan expanded the discipline of psychoanalysis throughout his lifetime into the fields of philosophy, linguistics, literature, and mathematics [1], [2].

Lacan's career has been classified into four parts in several debates. The first, which ran from 1926 to 1953, shows how traditional psychiatric practice gave way to the progressive integration of psychoanalytical ideas in the clinic for both diagnosis and therapy. Case studies are the first papers he made. Lacan created his "Mirror Stage" hypothesis in 1936 and wrote many studies regarding its significance for the field's evolution. The psychologist Henri Wallon, together with J.M. Baldwin, Charlotte Bühler, and Otto Rank, had a special effect on this study. The Mirror Stage is when a baby, between the ages of 6 and 18 months, can identify its image in the mirror before it can talk or manage its motor abilities. In that it is the reflection of its face and simply a reflected image at the same time, the child must see the picture of itself as both being itself and not itself. The baby has to accept that it is not the same as itself in the mirror to become a subject, or social being. This is the child's first attempt at speaking and the start of ego development. The focus in subject development shifts during the Mirror Stage from a biological basis to a symbolic or linguistic background. Lacan states, "Man speaks, but it is because the symbol has made him man," in the Discourse of Rome.

The more popular term for Lacan's 1953 speech in Rome, originally titled *Fonction et champ de la parole et du langage en psychanalyse*, is *The Discourse of Rome*. In the same year that he split from the International Psycho-Analytical Association (IPA), Lacan founded the *Société française de psychanalyse* (SFP), and this study became its manifesto. Lacan's split from the IPA stemmed from significant differences he had with the group's ego psychology, which posited that the ego is the source of mental stability. In his critique of therapeutic pretenses, Lacan maintained that the ego could never be "healed" and that the real goal of psychoanalysis was never treatment but rather analysis. Philosophers, linguists, and other intellectuals were drawn to St. Anne's Church for Lacan's well-known weekly seminar. Among his audience were Barthes, Foucault, Levi-Strauss, and Althusser, who were impacted by his writings. This lecture series gave rise to *Écrits* (1966), perhaps his most well-known book.

Lacan focused on structural linguistics and the significance of symbols in Freud's writings between 1953 and 1963. He believed that while Freud was aware of the linguistic foundation of human psychology, he would still be required to explain the connection using Saussure's terminology and the structuralist view of language as a system of distinctions. The unconscious is "structured like a language," according to Lacan in *Les Psychoses: Seminar III*, and is controlled by the signifier's order. This goes against the notion that independent suppressed or instinctive urges control the unconscious. Lacan demonstrated that no signifier ever rests on any specific signified thanks to Saussure's linguistic theory, particularly concerning the relationship of permanent separation between signifier and signified. He continued by saying that the formation of the person as a subject takes place in the symbolic order of the arrangement of signs, representations, significations, and pictures. According to him, the signifier's subject is always the subject [3], [4].

"Language is how I identify with myself, but only when I lose myself in it and become an object." What is realized in my history is not the present perfect of what has been in what I am, nor is it the past definite of what was, since it is no more; rather, it is the future antecedent of what I will have been for what I am becoming. (Taken from *Écrits*) Lacan translated Martin Heidegger's writings into French, and his study *The Function and Field of Speech in Psychoanalysis*, which focuses on the notion that subjectivity is symbolically constructed, is one way to see how Heidegger influenced Lacan. In addition, Hegel's writings and his conversations with Merleau-Ponty and Sartre had an impact on Lacan. Because he was the first to incorporate structural linguistics into psychoanalytic theory, he gained national and, later in the 1970s, worldwide recognition. In addition to his work as an analyst, he gave lectures that served as a practical application of his theory, which made him unconventional and unique in the field of psychoanalysis. His theory that language may communicate something other than what it says and that language talks through people just as much as language itself became clear throughout his lectures.

One of the three orders that make up the subject in Lacanian psychoanalysis the other two being the Imaginary and the Real is the symbolic order, to which language belongs. The Imaginary is the space where the subject misinterprets the symbolic and believes it to be transparent, failing to notice its lack of actuality. The location of essential illusion is the imaginary. The de-centering of the subject during the Mirror Phase is not recognized at the level of the Imaginary. One way to think of the Real is as something that is always "in its place," as symbols can only represent things that are missing from their proper locations. Language cannot exist in the same location as its referent; the symbolic fills in the gaps left by the absence of anything.

Lacan diverged far further from Freud and conventional psychoanalysis between 1964 and 1973. He developed a distinctive "Lacanian" dialect and gained notoriety for his intricate diagrams and neologisms. His work was revolutionary because he saw the Symbolic order as the fundamental location for subject development and the ego as the seat of neurosis rather than the center of psychic unification. Tension within the SFP resulted from his continued claims to be carrying out Freud's work, which had only been masked by his adherents. In 1963, Lacan departed from this group to establish the *École Française de Paris* (EFP). A series of lectures he gave at the *École Pratique des Hautes Etudes*, in which he attentively analyzed Freud's writings while simultaneously adding new terminology to the readings from outside the original work, served as the impetus for the decision to form the new group.

DISCUSSION

More people outside the psychoanalytic community took notice of these lectures, notably the press, which connected Lacan to the "structuralists" working in France at the same time. The IPA was distressed because Lacan's new school, the EFP, used training techniques quite different from the conventional training that the IPA provided for analysts. When Lacan became the "Scientific Director" of the psychoanalysis department at the University of Paris at Vincennes in 1974, after it had opened in 1969, tensions between him and the mainstream psychoanalytic community widened even more. Lacan thought that the new department at the university would provide psychoanalysis with a more rigorous scientific foundation by integrating languages, logic, and mathematics with psychoanalytic training.

Towards the end of his career, Lacan worked to develop a theory with a more exact mathematical foundation. He used mathematics in his "meta-theory" of psychoanalysis, rephrasing the Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary triangles he first thought of in terms of topology and themes as opposed to languages. As far as he was concerned, "*La mathématisation seule atteint y un réel.*" He began studying the intersection of the three registers in 1974 by using

intricate topological models. Even his most devoted followers started to get confused by him, and students started to doubt the usefulness of this kind of training for their future careers in medicine. After deciding to disband the EFP, Lacan founded the *École de la Cause Freudienne*, which he continued to run until he died in 1981. Lacan was one of the world's most prominent and contentious intellectuals at the time of his death. His writings have had a profound impact on philosophy, cinema studies, literature, and the theory and practice of psychoanalysis [5], [6].

Lacan's Principal Ideas

While "Lacan's quarrel with Object Relations psychoanalysis" was a more subdued affair, Lacan's "Return to Freud" emphasized a fresh focus on the source texts of Freud and featured a strong criticism of Ego psychology. Here he set out "to restore to the notion of the Object Relation. the capital of experience that legitimately belongs to it", based on what he called "the hesitant, but controlled work of Melanie Klein. Through her, we know the function of the imaginary primordial enclosure formed by the image of the mother's body", in addition to "the notion of the transitional object, introduced by D. W. Winnicott. a key-point for the explanation of the genesis of fetishism". The child's early relationships with the mother the pre-Oedipal or Kleinian mother were increasingly and almost exclusively the focus of psychoanalytic developments from the 1930s to the 1970s, which Lacan systematically questioned. Additionally, Lacan's rereading of Freud "characteristically, Lacan insists that his return to Freud supplies the only valid model" formed a fundamental conceptual starting point in that oppositional strategy.

According to Lacan, Freud's theories on "slips of the tongue," humor, and dream interpretation all highlighted the role that language plays in subjective constitution. In his book "The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud," he suggests that "the unconscious is structured like a language." He clarified that the unconscious is a construction as complex and structurally sophisticated as awareness itself, not a primal or archetypal aspect of the mind apart from the conscious, verbal ego. One result of the unconscious being organized like a language is the denial of any reference point for the self to be "restored" in the aftermath of trauma or identity crisis.

"When you read Freud, it is obvious that this proposition doesn't work for a minute," argued Andre Green. Freud believes that the pre-conscious is superior to the unconscious, which he defines as being made up only of thingpresentations. Only the pre-conscious may include anything linguistic. In his metapsychology, Freud undoubtedly distinguished between "the presentation of the word and the presentation of the thing. the unconscious presentation is the presentation of the thing alone." "Dylan Evans, Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis. takes issue with those who, like Andre Green, question the linguistic aspect of the unconscious, emphasizing Lacan's distinction between *das Ding* and *die Sache* in Freud's account of thing-presentation". Green accused Lacan of intellectual dishonesty in his critique of him, saying, "[He] fooled everyone. Going to Lacan was all that was required as a pretext for returning to Freud."

Mirror Scene

The mirror stage, which Lacan defined as "formative of the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience," was his first recognized contribution to psychoanalysis. By the early 1950s, he had come to see the mirror stage as a permanent feature of subjectivity rather than just a single phase of the infant's development. In "The Imaginary Order," the person is enthralled and captured by their image all the time. According to Lacan, "I ascribe a double importance to the phenomena known as the mirror stage. First of all, it is historically significant

since it represents a significant turning point in the child's mental development. Secondly, it represents a fundamental libidinal connection with body image. As this idea gained greater traction, its structural usefulness began to take precedence over its historical significance. According to Lacan, "the mirror stage is far from a mere phenomenon which occurs in the development of the child" (Lacan, "La relation d'objet," 4). It demonstrates how the dual connection is conflictual." The mirror stage explains how the ego develops via the objectification process, with the ego emerging from a tension between an individual's perceived outward look and their emotional experience.

Lacan referred to this identification as alienation. The youngster is still not physically coordinated at six months old. The youngster may identify oneself in the mirror before they have control over their physical actions. The infant perceives their body as a whole, and the synthesis of this picture creates a feeling of contrast with the body's apparent lack of coordination, which results in a body that is fractured. Because the picture's completeness threatens to divide the kid, the child first interprets this contrast as a competition with their image. As a result, the mirror stage creates an aggressive conflict between the subject and the image. The youngster connects with the picture to release the stress caused by aggression; this first identification with the counterpart creates the Ego. Lacan interprets this identification moment as a joyful time because it creates an illusory feeling of mastery. However, if the kid contrasts their flimsy sense of mastery with the mother's omnipotence, the joy may be accompanied by a melancholy response.

Since the specular picture helps the infant anticipate overcoming its "actual specific prematurity of birth," Lacan refers to it as "orthopedic." The kid moves from "insufficiency to anticipation" when they see their body as integrated and contained, as opposed to their real experience of motor incapacity and their feeling of the body as fragmented. Put differently, the mirror image starts the process of forming an integrated sense of self and then acts as a crutch to help with it. In the mirror stage, an imagined dimension is introduced to the subject, causing the "me" (*moi*) to become estranged from itself via a "misunderstanding" (*méconnaissance*) that forms the Ego. Because the adult figure carrying the baby is *sh* in the mirror stage, it also has a strong symbolic meaning. The youngster looks up at the adult, who stands in for the large Other, having joyfully claimed the picture as theirs. It seems as if the child is asking the adult to validate this perception [7], [8].

Different/Otherness

Lacan's usage of the word "other" is more in line with Hegel's, while Freud uses it to refer to *der Andere* (the other person) and "*das Andere*" (otherness), influenced by Alexandre Kojève. Lacan often used an algebraic symbology to represent his ideas: the little other is denoted by the letter *a* (italicized French *autre*), while the large other is marked by the letter *A* (for French *Autre*). Because "the analyst must be imbued with the difference between *A* and *a*, so he can situate himself in the place of Other, and not the other," he claims, understanding this distinction is essential to analytical practice.

Dylan Evans clarifies as follows:

The small other is the other that is a projection and reflection of the ego rather than the other as such. He [*autre*] is the specular image and the counterpart at the same time. Thus, the imagined order completely engraves the small other. The enormous other stands for extreme alterity, an other-ness that cannot be assimilation by identification and surpasses the imaginary's false otherness. Because Lacan associates this extreme alterity with language and the law, the enormous Other is ingrained in the symbolic order. The symbolic is, in fact, the large Other since it is particularized for every subject. Thus, the Other is both the symbolic

order that mediates the interaction with that other subject and another subject in his extreme alterity and unassimilable uniqueness." "The Other must, first of all, be considered a locus," argues Lacan, "the locus in which speech is constituted". Only when a subject holds this position and embodies the Other for another subject can we talk of the Other in a secondary sense as a topic?

Lacan emphasizes that language and speech are beyond the subject's conscious control when he contends that communication begins in the Other rather than in the Ego or the subject. They originate from somewhere else, beyond awareness; as the saying goes, "the unconscious is the discourse of the Other." Referring to Freud's idea of psychical locality in which the unconscious is referred to as "the other scene" Lacan views the Other as a location. "It is the mother who first occupies the position of the big Other for the child," according to Dylan Evans, "it is she who receives the child's primitive cries and retroactively sanctions them as a particular message". When the infant realizes that there is a "Lack (manque)" in the Other, making them feel incomplete, the castration complex develops. This implies that among the multitude of signifiers that the Other constitutes, there is always one that is absent. Lacan uses the symbol A as a visual representation of this incomplete Other; as a result, the incomplete Other that has been castrated is also known as the "barred Other."

Lacan's ideas on the Phallus and castration have been both praised and criticized by feminist scholars. While some feminist critics, like Luce Irigaray, contend that Lacan's phallogocentric analysis offers a helpful way to comprehend gender prejudices and imposed roles, others charge Lacan with upholding the sexist legacy in psychoanalysis. According to Irigaray, gender is defined by two positive poles rather than by a single axis that is either present or absent. Similar to Irigaray, Jacques Derrida addresses the phallus and hymen as both one and the other in a chiasmus while challenging Lacan's castration theory. Some feminists have seen Lacan's work as creating new avenues for feminist theory, including Judith Butler, Jane Gallop, and Elizabeth Grosz.

The Allegoric

Lacan contends that the Symbolic is a linguistic dimension in his Seminar IV, "La relation d'objet," since the ideas of "Law" and "Structure" are inconceivable without language. That being said, as language also incorporates the Imaginary and the Real, this order is not comparable to language. The signifier dimension, which is one in which components are created by their mutual differences rather than by their positive existence, is the dimension specific to the language in the Symbolic. The unconscious is this Other's speech, and the symbolic is also the domain of radical alterity or the other. In the Oedipus complex, desire is governed by the domain of the Law. Unlike the imaginary order of nature, the symbolic is the realm of culture. The concepts of death and lack (manque), both significant components of the Symbolic, work together to establish the pleasure principle as the one that controls the distance from the Thing ("das Ding a sich") and the death drive as something that extends "beyond the pleasure principle utilizing repetition" "the death drive is only a mask of the Symbolic order." The analyst may alter the analysand's subjective perspective by operating in the symbolic order [9], [10]. The Symbolic structures the Imaginary, hence these modifications will have imaginary implications.

The Actual

Lacan's PhD thesis on insanity from 1936 is when his idea of the Real first emerged. The concept was well-liked at the time, especially about Émile Meyerson, who described it as "an ontological absolute, a true being-in-itself." In 1953, Lacan went back to the Real topic and worked on it till his death. According to Lacan, reality and the Real are not the same thing. The

Real is outside of the Symbolic in addition to being opposite to the Imaginary. In contrast to the latter, which is made up of oppositions, or presence and absence, "there is no absence in the Real." In contrast, "the Real is always in its place," but the symbolic antithesis "presence/absence" suggests that anything could be absent from the symbolic. The Real is undifferentiated; it lacks a fissure if the Symbolic is a collection of distinct components (signifiers). "It is the world of words that creates the world of things originally confused in the 'now and now' of the all in the process of coming into being," states the Symbolic, introducing "a cut in the real" in the signifying process. That which is beyond language and completely resistant to symbolism is the Real. Lacan characterizes the Real as "the impossible" in Seminar XI because it is unattainable, unimaginable, and difficult to assimilate into the Symbolic. This aversion to symbolism is what gives the Real its horrific character. Finally, the Real is "the essential object which is not an object any longer, but this something faced with which all words cease and all categories fail, the object of anxiety par excellence" and is the source of anxiety since it lacks any potential mediator.

Idea of a Desire

Lacan's theory of desire, which is based on Freud's idea of *Wunsch*, is fundamental to his ideas. The purpose of psychoanalysis is to guide the analysand and reveal the true nature of his or her desire; however, this can only occur when the desire is expressed. Lacan said that "it is only once it is formulated, named in the presence of the other, that desire appears in the full sense of the term." It "is not a question of recognizing something which would be entirely given" when this desire is named. By giving it a name, the subject establishes or manifests a new existence. A patient receiving psychoanalysis is taught "to bring desire into existence." Though speech is never able to fully express the truth about want, the truth about desire is somehow present in discourse; whenever discourse tries to express desire, there is always a surplus or remnant.

In "The Signification of the Phallus," Lacan makes a distinction between demand and desire. A biological urge known as need is expressed as demand, but demand serves two purposes: it expresses need and also serves as a desire for affection. The desire for love doesn't go away even if the need expressed in the demand is met. The rest is anything you want. According to Lacan, "desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second." Lacan further states that "desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from need." As a result, desire is unsatisfiable; in the words of Slavoj Žižek, "desire's *raison d'être* is not to realize its goal, to find satisfaction, but to reproduce itself as desire." Making the distinction between urges and desire is also crucial. The drives are the many ways that a single force known as desire manifests itself. According to Lacan, the "object petit a" is the object of want, but it is the cause of desire rather than the thing that desire leans toward. Desire is a relationship to a lack (*manque*), not an item.

CONCLUSION

Jacques Lacan's profound influence on psychoanalysis and philosophy has established him as one of the most contentious figures in the field since Freud. His reinterpretation of Freud's theories and his innovative integration of structural linguistics into psychoanalysis marked a significant shift in understanding human subjectivity and the unconscious. Through concepts such as the Mirror Stage, the Symbolic Order, and his critique of Ego psychology, Lacan reshaped psychoanalytic theory, influencing a broad range of disciplines including critical theory, literary theory, sociology, and feminist theory. Despite facing criticism and resistance, particularly from traditional psychoanalysts and feminist scholars, Lacan's work remains a

cornerstone of contemporary psychoanalytic thought. His legacy continues to provoke debate and inspire new interpretations, underscoring the enduring relevance of his ideas in the exploration of human psychology and culture.

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